His Majesty's ship "Invincible" is the most amazing creation of the British naval genius. She became the first battle cruiser in the world and the founder of a new class of warships. Its appearance had a tremendous impact on the naval doctrines of other states in the world, including the strategy and tactics of using cruisers. The Invincible certainly became as milestone among cruisers as the Dreadnought among battleships.
But it is very difficult to understand how all this succeeded in such an unsuccessful ship in every respect.
"Invincible" and its "sister ships" "Inflexible" and "Indomiteable" are subjected to numerous and, in general, fair criticism: their defense is considered ridiculous, the location of the main caliber guns is suboptimal, and the speed, although very high, is still insufficient for battle cruiser of the First World War. Hence, a natural question arises: how did the country, which until recently was the technical leader of the era, "the ruler of the seas" and possessed the most powerful fleet in the world, managed to create such a failed ship? What kind of eclipse has found such brilliant British designers and engineers?
In this series of articles, we will try to figure out the reasons for this failure.
For a long time, the British fleet created its armored cruisers, linking their construction with battleships: for example, the last series of British armored cruisers "Minotaur" had much in common with the battleships "Lord Nelson". Therefore, one should not be surprised that after the development and approval of a new and in every respect revolutionary project "Dreadnought", the British thought about an armored cruiser that could correspond to the newest battleship.
In order to ensure the best qualities of the newest British ships, a special committee was formed in England on December 22, 1904. Formally, he himself did not decide anything, since he was just an advisory body in the management of military shipbuilding. But practically it was there that the characteristics of British ships were determined, because John Arbuthnot Fisher himself presided over it, who had just taken the post of First Sea Lord, and the head of the Naval Shipbuilding Directorate was only one of the members of this committee. In addition to him, the committee included the most qualified specialists in England in artillery and mine work, leading shipbuilding engineers, industry representatives and, interestingly, the head of naval intelligence. In general, Fischer tried to bring together all the best specialists in this committee, with the help of whom it was necessary to make decisions on the projects of future ships.
As has long been known, the most correct way to create a ship includes determining the range of tasks that it will have to perform and determining the technical characteristics that will ensure the solution of the intended tasks. This process is called the development of technical specifications, well, in the future, the preliminary design of the ship begins.
Unfortunately, in the case of Invincible, this process was turned upside down. When the committee members were presented with draft designs of the future battle cruiser, they noted that
“… the functions of the cruiser have not yet been clearly established, but it is believed that, in theory, these include:
1) conducting reconnaissance;
2) support for smaller reconnaissance cruisers;
3) an independent service for the protection of trade and the destruction of enemy cruisers-raiders;
4) urgent arrival and cover of any actions of the fleet;
5) pursuit of the retreating enemy line fleet … putting it, if possible, in a stalemate, focusing fire on lagging ships."
Thus, the first problem of the future battle cruiser was the lack of intelligible tasks for the solution of which this ship was created. The members of the committee saw this and, obviously, tried to rectify the situation, considering the projects submitted to them for compliance with the functionality of the armored cruisers. This approach is logical, and it could be considered correct … if the British had any clear idea of why they needed ships of this class.
What is an English armored cruiser? First of all, it is a defender of trade, designed to defend the British sea communications that have entangled the world from the encroachments of enemy raiders. And what were the enemy raiders?
They could be divided into three categories: armored, armored and auxiliary cruisers. The most efficient of them were, of course, armored. But even with them, of course, the power of artillery, speed and protection were largely sacrificed to purely cruising qualities, such as seaworthiness and cruising range. A classic illustration is the comparison of the domestic oceanic raiders Rurik and Russia with the Japanese armored cruisers of the Asama and Izumo types. The latter, possessing much worse seaworthiness and range, had significant advantages in the power of the side salvo and protection.
We will briefly list the armored cruisers of other leading maritime powers capable of raiding in the ocean. The French cruisers of the "Gloire" class, which became part of the French Navy in 1900-1902, although they possessed a very impressive 152-mm armor belt and quite a decent speed of 21-21, 5 knots, were armed with only two 194-mm and eight 164 -mm guns with a displacement of 9,500-10,200 tons. The next series of armored cruisers, the Leon Gambetta, received twice as powerful armament (4,194-mm and 16,164-mm guns) and a speed increased by one knot with a similar level of armor, but the price for this was the increase in displacement to 12-13 thousand tons.
Americans 1901-1902 laid armored cruisers of the "Pennsylvania" type with a displacement of 15 thousand tons, armament of 4 203-mm and 14 152-mm and a speed of 22 knots with 127 mm armor belt. The Germans at the beginning of the century did not build specialized ocean-going armored raiders, but their cruisers Prince Adalbert and York, which were laid down in 1901-1902, at least theoretically could attack British communications. These cruisers had a displacement of about 10,000 tons and were armed with 4 210-mm and 10 150-mm guns at a speed of 20.5-21 knots.
Armored cruisers of the leading naval powers for the most part were inferior to armored cruisers both in defense and in armament, without exceeding the latter in speed. The auxiliary cruisers were armed non-military ships and, accordingly, were even weaker, but had one advantage: if an ocean liner was armed, then it had high speed and excellent seaworthiness, superior to those of warships in fresh weather.
How did the British respond to these threats?
In 1901-1902. The British laid down six Devonshire-class armored cruisers, which they managed to equip with only 4 190 mm and 6 152 mm guns. Their speed was 22 knots, the maximum thickness of the armor belt was 152 mm with a relatively moderate displacement, 10,850-11,000 tons. The ships entered service almost simultaneously with the French Leon Gambetta, to which they were inferior in almost all respects, but even before that the British understood that for the reliable protection of their sea routes they will need much more powerful and large ships.
As a result, the British returned to large fast cruisers armed with 234mm artillery. In 1899, they already laid four such ships (of the Drake type), which, with a displacement of 13,920 tons, carried 152-mm armor, two 234-mm and 16 152-m cannons, developing a speed of 23 knots. But later the British abandoned this type in favor of lighter and cheaper armored cruisers of the "Kent" class: this should be regarded as a mistake, because the latter were sufficient only against enemy armored cruisers. In fact, the unsuccessful "Devonshires" were just enlarged and strengthened "Kents", but they still remained insufficient.
But in 1903 Great Britain began to build two series of large armored cruisers Duke of Edinburgh (12,595 tons) and Warrior (13,240 tons). The ships were very fast, developing 22.5-23 knots and had a very powerful armament of six 234-mm guns housed in single-gun turrets, mounted in such a way as to have 4 barrels in a side salvo and 3 when firing at the bow and stern. At the same time, ships of the Duke of Edinburgh type also had 10 152-mm guns in low-lying casemates, and the Warriors - four 190-mm guns in single-gun turrets. Reservation of the Duke of Edinburgh and Warrior, in the opinion of the British, provided acceptable protection against 194-mm - 203-mm shells.
In life, it turned out that British ships suffer from a number of unobvious defects, but their description will take us far beyond the scope of the topic of this article. But on paper, the British got excellent trade defenders cruisers. They could catch up with almost any armored or armored raider, except that the liners converted into auxiliary cruisers had a chance to leave them in fresh weather. At the same time, their 234-mm guns were significantly more powerful than the 194-mm - 210-mm guns of the French, German, Russian and American cruisers. The level of protection was comparable, but, naturally, possessing the strongest artillery, the British had an advantage over any armored cruiser in the world.
But at what cost were all these advantages achieved? The displacement of British armored cruisers came close to battleships: for example, the King Edward VII-class battleships laid down in 1902-1904 had a normal displacement of 15,630 tons. The firepower of the armored cruisers was highly rated. For example, Philip Watts, the head of the naval shipbuilding department, had an extremely high opinion of the capabilities of the 234-mm cannon. Apparently, he was greatly impressed by the shooting of the old battleship (it is usually indicated that it was "Orion", but it seems that this is some kind of mistake). The 305-mm shells did not cause significant damage to the battleship, but then the ship was fired upon by the Drake-class cruiser, which entered from the stern. Its 234-mm projectile pierced the armored deck in the area of the aft tower, went through the engine rooms to the very bow barbette of the battleship and exploded there, causing great destruction. In battle, such a hit would have led to severe damage to the ship and its failure.
In addition, the results of the maneuvers of the British fleet undertaken in 1901-1903 should be taken into account. In three training "battles" squadrons converged, and in each case the British formed one squadron of newer and faster battleships, and the older ones had to resist them. As it turned out, the superiority in speed of 1, 5 - 2 knots practically guaranteed victory - in all three cases the faster squadron put the enemy "a stick over T" and won over the "slugs" with a devastating score.
Under these conditions, it is absolutely impossible to imagine that British admirals, brought up in an offensive, Nelsonian spirit, would abandon the idea of forming a "high-speed wing" of the fleet out of large armored cruisers to participate in a general battle. They did not refuse: so, during the 1903 maneuvers, Vice Admiral Wilson, with an unwavering hand, sent his armored cruisers to attack against the three stragglers of the "enemy" battleships.
But what would all of this turn out to be in a real battle?
The size and power of the British armored cruisers simply blurred the fact that their protection was completely unsuitable for squadron combat. Let's look at the same "Warrior"
152 mm armored belts protected only the engine and boiler rooms, and opposite the bow and stern 234-mm towers were only 102 mm and 76 mm armored belts, respectively! And it would be fine behind them there was a powerful carapace deck, similar to that of the Asama and Iwate with 51 and 63 mm thick bevels. Instead, the ends of the Warrior were protected by a 19.1mm deck in the bow and 38mm in the stern, and it is unclear if this deck had a bevel. But even if there were, it was unlikely that this was enough even to protect against 203-mm armor-piercing shells, and against 305-mm such armor did not protect at all.
The British were never stupid and fully understood the weaknesses of their armored cruisers. Hence the vagueness of the wording of their tasks, like "covering up any actions of the fleet." But in fact, the explosions of three British battle cruisers in Jutland thundered so loudly that the death of the armored cruiser Defense of Rear Admiral Arbuthnot simply went unnoticed by the general public. But, judging by the available descriptions, the following happened: the first salvo of German 305-mm guns from a distance of 40 kbt hit the weakly armored aft part and a strong flame rose over the ship. The next volley hit the bow, causing the cruiser to explode. It is likely that the first hits led to a fire in the aft cellar, and the second volley led to an explosion in the bow tower cellars. Of course, we can say that the armored cruisers of Arbuthnot were hit by the newest heavy German ships, and this is what predetermined their fate. But the point is that if the old Kaiser battleships with their 280-mm guns had been in their place, the result would have been the same.
The British Rear Admiral is scolded for exposing his cruisers to a German attack, but in fairness, we note that Arbuthnot did nothing reprehensible - he acted in the vanguard of the fleet, including carrying out a search for the enemy, which, according to British views, is precisely was part of the tasks of his cruisers. Of course, if the Battle of Jutland took place somewhere in the Pacific Ocean or in the Mediterranean Sea, where excellent visibility is the norm rather than the exception to the rule, then armored cruisers could somehow fulfill this task, observing the enemy from afar. But to assign reconnaissance functions to huge, weakly defended ships in the North Sea with its fogs, where enemy battleships can suddenly be found 5 miles from your ship?
But what are there battleships … Recall "Good Hope", an armored cruiser of the "Drake" type, which had a similar armor to the "Warrior" bow extremities: 102-mm armor belt in the nose and 25 mm lower armored deck with 152 mm armor of the turret and barbet. At the very beginning of the battle at Coronel, unlucky for the British, the cruiser was hit by a 210-mm shell from the armored cruiser Scharnhorst from a distance of about 50-60 cables. The projectile was not even armor-piercing, but high-explosive, but it was enough to make the bow tower of the ship out of order and a high tongue of flame rose in the bow of the cruiser. Most likely, gunpowder ignited without an explosion in the bow tower cellars. At the same time, the German 210-mm artillery system had rather average characteristics and was by no means a super-powerful wunderwaffe. All this raises doubts about the resistance of the protection of the extremities of British armored cruisers even against 203-mm shells.
From source to source wanders the phrase from the naval yearbook "Brassay":
“But that's all. that the admiral, who has an Invincible-class cruiser with 305-mm main artillery in his fleet, will no doubt decide to put them in a battle line, where their relatively weak armor protection will harm, and high speed will have no value."
However, it should be understood that this phrase fully applies to the armored cruisers of the British. There is no doubt that if the British had to fight at sea in the pre-dreadnought era with a strong enemy, their armored cruisers would have suffered heavy losses, as happened later with battlecruisers. The discrepancy between the strike and defensive capabilities of the first British battle cruisers did not arise from scratch - it was the result of a systematic error of the British in defining the tasks for their armored cruisers.
All these "Drakes", "Warriors" and "Diefens" had a certain specialization, they were good defenders of trade - so the British should have limited their activities to this role. But the British could not resist the temptation to use large and powerful ships for squadron combat, although they were not intended for this at all. The British could not seriously strengthen the protection of their armored cruisers. In this case, in order to stay in the existing displacement, it was necessary to "cut" the cruising range, armament or speed, but all this was unacceptable, because it would prevent the cruiser from performing the function of a defender of trade. The second method was an additional increase in displacement, but then the armored cruisers would become larger than battleships, and for this the British were not yet ready.
So, it should be understood that when designing the world's first battle cruiser, the British immediately made two key mistakes:
First, they simply did not understand that they were creating a ship of a new class and, accordingly, did not formulate tasks for it. In fact, the British were engaged in designing the next armored cruiser and evaluating various variants of the Invincible projects from the standpoint of the tasks assigned to the armored cruisers of the Royal Navy.
Secondly, the tasks for the armored cruisers were set incorrectly, because they assumed the use of cruisers intended for fighting on communications, not only for their intended purpose, but also as squadron ones. In other words, the British completely unreasonably set universal tasks for specialized ships.
