So, dear readers, before you is the last article in the cycle. It's time to draw conclusions.
Conclusion 1 - The Argentines could not realize the superiority in the number of combat aircraft, in fact, the British faced in the air with forces approximately equal to them.
I draw the attention of dear readers: statistics were taken not for the entire period of the Falklands conflict, but only from the beginning of large-scale hostilities until the end of the battles on the "bomb alley" - this is how the British called the section of the Falklands Strait near the San Carlos Bay, where on May 21-25 they deployed the fiercest aerial combat in the entire campaign. The reason for this selection is that until May 1, there were no significant military operations with the use of aviation, but it was on May 25 that the air war for the Falkland Islands was lost by the Argentines. Starting on May 26, the Argentine command abandons the main idea of the defense of the islands - preventing the British landing by inflicting an unacceptable level of losses on the British naval group and switches its aviation to work on coastal targets. At the same time, its actions after May 25 were of an irregular, sporadic nature - if in 5 days of fighting on the "bomb alley" the Argentine strike aircraft made 163 sorties, then for the entire period from May 26 to June 13 (19 days) - no more than a hundred.
It should also be borne in mind that only the actions of Argentine fighter and assault aviation are reflected in the column of Argentine aviation's sorties (in brackets - minus the sorties of the light attack aircraft "Pukara Malvinas Squadron"). Departures of Mirages, Daggers and Skyhawks, which, in fact, posed a danger to British ships and aircraft, have been fully accounted for. Also, the known cases of search and / or attack of the British by light aircraft forces are fully taken into account. But some of the light aircraft sorties were not included in the above statistics - for example, it is known that on May 2 the Argentines raised the aircraft of the Falkland Islands to inspect the places of potential British landing. But what, how much and where - is unclear, therefore, it is not possible to take such sorties into account. Also, this column does not include flights of reconnaissance aircraft, tankers, PLO aircraft off the coast of Argentina, etc.
Therefore, the number of sorties indicated in the "Argentine" column of the above table can be interpreted as follows - this is the number of sorties by fighter and assault aircraft undertaken to support the air defense of the Falkland Islands and strikes against British ships. In a similar "British" column, the number of sorties of only vertical take-off and landing aircraft is indicated - flights of "Nimrods", "Volcanoes", tankers and other aircraft of Great Britain are not included in it.
What immediately catches your eye? The Argentines, having concentrated at least 75-85 Skyhawks, Daggers, Mirages and Canberras against the British (this is already minus the technically faulty and "reserved" cars in the event of the Chilean invasion) and received from the repairmen a few more " Skyhawks "during the conflict, theoretically could make daily 115-160 sorties by military aviation alone (1, 5-2 sorties per aircraft). But in practice, the maximum reached was 58 sorties (May 21). In just 25 days of hostilities, which determined the military loss of Argentina, its aviation was more or less intensively used for 8 days, during which 244 sorties were made, i.e. even during these 8 days, on average, only 31 sorties were made per day. During the climax of the fight in the air - five days of fighting over the "bomb alley", the average number of sorties was 32.6 per day.
The British, with a much smaller number of aircraft, flew much more often. Unfortunately, in the literature available to the author there is no complete data on the sorties of British VTOL aircraft, but Rear Admiral Woodworth in his memoirs indicates that on May 22:
“The busiest place in the entire South Atlantic was the flight decks of the Hermes and the Invincible. We made about sixty sorties from them for air duty. That's ten more than we did on D-Day."
At the same time, D. Tatarkov points out that on May 23, the aircraft of the 317th task force made 58 sorties, of which 29 were to cover the San Carlos Bay. It turns out that the British made more sorties in three days of the battle on the "bomb alley" than the Argentines in all five. At the same time, such data very well correspond to the size of the British air group - on May 21, there were 31 aircraft on the decks of British aircraft carriers, which, taking into account the technical readiness of over 80% (as written by A. Zabolotny and A. Kotlobovsky), gives about 2 sorties in day for one plane. On the other hand, it is completely unclear whether the GR.3 Harriers were involved in aerial patrols. If not, then it turns out that 25 British Sea Harriers (of which 21-23 were combat-ready at any given time) performed up to 60 sorties per day, ie. almost 3 departures per plane.
Of course, this was the peak load that the British could hardly withstand constantly - according to A. Zabolotny and A. Kotlobovsky, the British VTOL aircraft made 1,650 sorties in the combat zone. Even if we do not take into account flights made before May 1, ignore the fact that the planes flew even after the end of hostilities, and assume that all 1,650 sorties were made between May 1 and June 13 (44 days), it is still an average the number of sorties will not exceed 37.5 sorties per day. Despite the fact that in some cases (such as the battles on the "bomb alley") the British flew more often, respectively, on "quiet" days - less often.
Probably it would not be a mistake to assume that on ordinary days the number of sorties of the British air group did not exceed 30-35, but during intense hostilities the number of sorties could reach 60 per day, of which about half was in the defense of the landing area, and the other half was in cover for an aircraft carrier group. It is worth noting that 2-3 sorties per day per aircraft is an excellent answer to anyone who believes that carrier-based aircraft cannot operate at the same intensity as ground-based aircraft. During Desert Storm, MNF aircraft made an average of 2 sorties per day. It should also be noted that if the Argentines were able to provide their air force aircraft with a level of combat capability comparable to that of the British (technical readiness coefficient of 0, 85 and 2-3 sorties per day), then every day the Argentine aviation would carry out from 130 to 200 sorties. Obviously, the British air defense could not withstand such stress, and the British amphibious group would have been defeated within 1-2 days.
But another thing is also interesting - subject to the provision of 2-3 sorties per day per aircraft, the number of actually completed Argentine sorties could be provided by an air group, which at the beginning of hostilities consisted of about 38-40 combat aircraft - and this is taking into account the losses actually incurred by them (i.e. by May 21 there would be about 30-32 planes left, etc.). Therefore, surprising as it may seem, it can be said that the British at the Falklands faced an air adversary of approximately equal numbers.
However, paying tribute to the work of British pilots and technical specialists, we must not forget that 25-30 sorties per day to cover the landing zone represent 12-15 pairs of Sea Harriers during the day. Given that British aircraft carriers were located at least 80 miles from the islands, it is unlikely that one pair could patrol for even an hour. This, in turn, means that 2 British aircraft carriers were able to provide constant air watch over their amphibious group with only one pair of Sea Harriers (sometimes increasing the patrol to two pairs).
Conclusion 2: Despite the comparable ratio of forces in the air, the air defense mission of the ship formations was completely failed by the British carrier-based aviation.
In total, during the period 1-25 May, the Argentines tried 32 times to attack British ships, 104 aircraft took part in these attempts. The British managed to intercept groups of attacking aircraft 9 times (before they launched an attack), but only managed to thwart 6 attacks (19% of the total), in other cases the Argentines, although they suffered losses, nevertheless broke through to the British ships. All in all, out of 104 attacking aircraft, 85 were able to attack British ships, i.e. The Sea Harriers were able to thwart attacks of only 18, 26% of the total number of Argentine aircraft participating in them.
On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that the two attacks, which took place on May 12, in which eight Skyhawks took part, were deliberately missed by the British: Rear Admiral Woodworth was trying to find out how strong air defense can be provided by the combination of the Sea Dart air defense system and Sea Wolf, substituting the destroyer Glasgow and the frigate Brilliant for the Argentines. Therefore, it is not entirely correct to blame the Sea Harriers for these attacks. But even excluding these attacks, we find that the Sea Harriers were able to prevent 20% of the attacks, and 19.8% of the total number of aircraft taking part in them did not reach the British ships. For the "battle on the bomb alley" this figure is even more modest - out of 26 attacks, 22 (84, 6%) were successful, out of 85 aircraft participating in the attacks, 72 (84, 7%) broke through to the ships.
Conclusion 3: Fighter aviation on its own (without external target designation) is not capable of either achieving air supremacy or providing any reliable air defense of sea or land formations.
In total, from May 1 to May 25, there were 10 cases when the Sea Harriers intercepted Argentine aircraft before the latter launched an attack. At the same time, nine cases of interceptions of attack aircraft were carried out according to data from external target designation, which was given by British warships. The only case when the pilots of the Sea Harriers were able to independently detect the target was the interception of the Mentor flight on May 1, but even with this case, not everything is clear, since it is possible that the Harriers pointed the Sea King helicopter, which the Argentines were going to attack. On the same day, the Sea Harriers were attacked three times by Argentine fighters, and in at least two cases out of three Argentines were directed by the ground flight support of the Falkland Islands.
Conclusion 4 (which is, perhaps, an extended version of Conclusion 3): The main reason for the ineffectiveness of the British carrier-based aircraft in their air operations was the isolated use of strike and fighter aircraft without supporting its actions by reconnaissance aircraft, AWACS, RTR, and electronic warfare aircraft
The effectiveness of modern air warfare directly depends on the competent use of all "branches of the armed forces" of aviation. Then the synergistic effect begins to operate, which clearly showed the complete helplessness of the British against the joint actions of the Super Etandars, the reconnaissance Neptune and the Argentinean tankers on May 4, when the Sheffield was heavily damaged by a missile strike. The British had much larger forces, their carrier-based aviation was supported by a very powerful naval air defense, and the Sea Harriers were individually stronger than any Argentine aircraft. But none of this helped them. The same applies to the effectiveness of "Harriers" when working on ground targets.
Conclusion 5: The main reason for the "off-system" use of "Harriers" was the concept of aircraft carriers - VTOL carriers, on which AWACS, RTR and EW aircraft simply could not be based due to the lack of ejection takeoff.
Thus, the Harriers fiasco at the Falklands is not connected with the fact that these aircraft are VTOL aircraft, but with the absence of aircraft in the air groups that provide and support the actions of fighter and strike aircraft.
Conclusion 5: The merits inherent (or attributed to) VTOL aircraft did not have an impact on the course of hostilities.
A. Zabolotny and B. Kotlobovsky in their article "Harriers in the Falklands" write:
“Having found an Argentine fighter or a missile launched by it, the pilot of the Harrier changed the thrust vector of the engine, due to which he sharply slowed down. The missile seeker lost its target, and the enemy fighter skipped past, and the Harrier was already in an advantageous position for firing."
Over the Falklands, only 3 battles between fighters took place (all on May 1). In the first case (2 Mirages versus 2 Sea Harriers), neither side succeeded. Judging by the available descriptions, the Argentines attacked the British, they noticed the Mirages and turned towards them, after which the Argentines used missiles from a distance of about 20-25 km and withdrew from the battle. In the second case, a pair of Mirages tried to get close to the British on a head-on course, after which, having slipped over the Sea Harriers, they made a sharp turn and went into the tail of the British. Descriptions of what happened later differ, the most similar to a maneuverable battle looks like this - the Argentines and the British, moving on converging courses, flew past each other, while the pilots of the Mirages lost sight of the British. Then "C" Harriers "turned around, went into the tail of the" Mirages "that did not see them and shot them down. In the third case, Ardiles' Dagger was able to quietly launch an attack on a pair of Sea Harriers, his missile did not hit the target, and he himself slipped past a relatively slow-moving British air patrol at high speed (usually Sea Harriers patrolled at a speed of no more than 500 km / h) and tried to leave, taking advantage of the speed advantage - but the Sidewinder was faster. In all other cases, the Sea Harriers shot down attack aircraft that were trying to break through to the British ships, or, dropping bombs, tried to escape from the Sea Harriers. Consequently, if the Sea Harriers possessed superiority in maneuverability, then they could not realize it due to the lack of maneuverable battles.
True, the article mentioned above also contains such a description:
“On May 21, the day of the landing of the main landing force, the pilots of the 801st AE Nigel Ward and Stephen Thomas engaged six Duggers. Dodging five missiles fired at them, the British shot down three cars, and the rest left towards the continent in afterburner."
The only battle that fits this description is the destruction by a British patrol of one of two triples of Daggers attempting to attack British ships off San Carlos. However, this episode in the description of A. Zabolotny and B. Kotlobovsky looks extremely doubtful. Firstly, it is known that the second trio of "Daggers" nevertheless went to the British ships (she was attacked by the frigate "Diamond"). Secondly, Argentina's Daggers were equipped with either free-fall bombs or air-to-air missiles, but not both at the same time. And, thirdly, the British themselves describe this battle much more modestly. Thus, Rear Admiral Woodworth writes in his memoirs:
The Harriers' pilots saw three Daggers below them, heading north towards the British ships. The Argentine garrison at Port Howard opened barrage of small arms fire on the Harriers as they dived at a speed of six hundred knots towards the sea. Lieutenant Thomas's Harrier received three, fortunately minor, hits. The Harriers continued their attack, fired their Sidewinder and shot down all three Daggers."
That is, most likely, there was a detection and destruction of a troika of attack aircraft without a "dog dump" and missile firefight.
Conclusion 6: The main factor that predetermined the success of the Sea Harriers in aerial combat was their use of the AIM-9L sidewinder missiles.
This missile provided the British with a colossal advantage, but not only because it allowed them to hit enemy aircraft in the front hemisphere. The fact is that the effectiveness of these missiles was about 80%, which practically guaranteed hitting the target when approaching it at a launch distance. Interestingly, the effectiveness of the Sidewinder was about twice that of the Sea Wolf air defense system.
Rear Admiral Woodworth believed that the Argentines had made a serious mistake by not trying to cover the attacks of their strike aircraft with fighter aircraft. But there was a reason in such tactics: by sending several groups of attack aircraft into battle, the Argentines could well expect that a maximum of one link would be intercepted, and even then not every time - which, by the way, constantly happened in practice. At the same time, even if the link is intercepted by the British, the pilots still have good chances to escape, using the low speed of the VTOL aircraft. But the pilots of the Mirages with their Shafrirs, thrown into battle against the Sea Harriers with their all-aspect missiles, tended to have zero chances of survival. Accordingly, it was much more effective to send a link of "Daggers" to attack ships, allowing the pilots to flee in case of interception, rather than equip this link with air-to-air missiles and almost guaranteed to lose it in a battle with the Sea Harriers.
On the other hand, if the Argentines had at their disposal all-aspect missiles of a similar quality, then the outcome of air battles could have significantly shifted not in favor of the British.
Conclusion 7: The disadvantages of the Sea Hariers inherent to them as VTOL aircraft significantly reduced their effectiveness.
The main disadvantages of the Sea Harriers were:
1) Low speed, which very often did not allow them to catch up with Argentine planes fleeing from them, as a result of which the list of downed "Sidewinder", "Daggers", "Skyhawks" and so on. much shorter than it could be. For example, if the British had "Phantoms", it is unlikely that at least one of the six "Canberras", so imprudently sent to search for British ships on May 1, would have survived. VTOL aircraft, however, managed to shoot down only one aircraft of this type.
2) Insufficient combat radius, as a result of which one (rarely two) pairs of Sea Harriers could be on duty over the landing site. The same "Phantoms" could "patronize" the amphibious compound much more tightly.
3) Small ammunition load - 2 "Sidewinder", this is at least half what a horizontal take-off and landing fighter could carry. As a result, after intercepting the enemy link, the British were forced to return in any case, even if there was enough fuel for further patrolling - you can't fight a lot without missiles.
However, it should be noted that the absence of these shortcomings (ie, if suddenly the Sea Harriers had magically acquired the speed, ammunition and combat radius they needed) would somewhat improve the combat statistics of the British carrier-based aircraft, but would not dramatically increase the effectiveness.
Conclusion 8: Despite all of the above, it should be recognized that the Sea Harriers were the best air defense weapon of all that the British had at their disposal.
Amazing, isn't it? After so many swear words against VTOL aircraft, the author is forced to recognize them as the best … but it really is. However, it should be understood that the Sea Harriers became the leaders of the British air defense system not because they were good in this role, but because the rest of the air defense systems turned out to be even worse.
From the table above, we see that between May 1 and May 25, the Sea Harriers shot down 18 enemy aircraft, most of them Mirages, Skyhawks and Daggers. The author did not credit the Sea Harriers with one Mirage that was shot down on May 1 - the plane was damaged, but still had a chance of an emergency landing. This plane is listed in the column "Argentine anti-aircraft gunners", because it was they who finished it off. As for the 3 planes destroyed on the ground, we are talking about light attack aircraft destroyed during the raids on the Gus Green and Port Stanley airfields. At the same time, the minimum figure is taken, it is possible that the Harriers destroyed or disabled a greater number of aircraft before the end of the war during raids on airfields.
Accordingly, the share of VTOL aircraft can be recorded 21 destroyed aircraft, or almost 48% of the total number of those killed on May 1-25. The SAS fighters are next in terms of effectiveness with their 11 aircraft destroyed during the raid on about. Pebble. This is 25% of the total, but still the success is leveled by the fact that 5 aircraft were just light attack aircraft, and the rest of the six were completely stupid "Mentors". Air defense systems and artillery of ships - in third place, seven vehicles (19%). An interesting fact is that for the Argentine aviation, their own anti-aircraft gunners posed as serious a danger as the British - both of them shot down 2 Argentine aircraft each. But here it is necessary to take into account the discrepancies about the Skyhawk shot down on May 25 - the British believe that this plane was hit by the Sea Cat missile from the Yarmouth frigate, while the Argentines are sure that it was the land-based Rapier. The author credited this victory to Yarmouth, because the British probably had a better opportunity to identify the air defense system that dealt the fatal blow. And, finally, other losses - this is the "Skyhawk", which, making an anti-missile maneuver, fell into the sea during the attack of the frigate "Diamond" on 12 May. In this attack, Sea Wolf SAM missiles shot down 2 aircraft and it is highly doubtful that a third missile was launched, so with a 99.9% probability no one fired at the ill-fated Skyhawk - the pilot reacted too nervously to the launch of missiles that were not intended for him.
In 1982, the British dispatched an openly weak and incapable of modern naval and air operations to the Falkland Islands. Luckily for the British, Argentina's military turned out to be a paper tiger. Without challenging the courage, heroism and martial art of individual warriors of this nation, we have to admit that the Argentine Air Force was completely unprepared for modern warfare, and even was in a terrible technical condition. At least 70-80 combat aircraft at the peak of combat readiness are not able to make 60 sorties a day, and, having lost a dozen aircraft, “moved down” up to 20-25 sorties - one sortie per 3 aircraft a day! But even of those cars that could be lifted into the air, sometimes up to a third of the cars returned back for technical reasons.
But even a few Argentine units, attacking without any tactical intention, without preliminary reconnaissance of targets, without clearing the airspace, without suppressing the air defense of ships, and even using non-exploding free-falling bombs, almost put the British fleet on the brink of defeat. Weak attacks by the Argentines ran into the equally weak air defense of the British, as a result of which each side suffered significant losses, but still could inflict no less significant losses on the enemy. If the British had a full-fledged carrier group with a catapult aircraft carrier, the Argentine Air Force simply crashed against its air shield, so the war would have ended before it began. If the Argentines, instead of their 240 "military aircraft", have a modern air group of fifty aircraft, including RTR, AWACS and electronic warfare aircraft, attack aircraft, and fighters equipped with modern guided weapons and equipment, and pilots capable of operating all this properly - British The 317th connection would not have lasted two days. But each side had exactly what it had, so the only question was who could endure the losses longer. The British were stronger - and won the conflict. Affected by training, character and, of course, regularly suitable reinforcements. In the war of attrition, the Sea Harriers became the weapon system that was able to inflict the greatest losses on the Argentines and thus played a key role in the Falklands conflict.
However, later on there was a substitution of concepts. Just as the death of General Belgrano masked the failure of the British operation to establish naval and air supremacy in the Falkland Islands on May 1-2, and the emphasis on the exclusive role of the Sea Harriers in the Falklands (which is to a certain extent true) the inability of VTOL aircraft carriers to provide air defense of formations and conduct effective air strike operations was masked out. Moreover, as has been repeatedly noted, the reason lies not in the tactical and technical characteristics of VTOL aircraft, but in the absence of VTOL aircraft carriers in the air group, AED, RTR, electronic warfare, and so on.
Interestingly, a similar situation has developed with nuclear submarines, whose successes in the Falklands conflict were more than modest. Of course, Conqueror, directed at the target by US satellite intelligence, did not have much difficulty in destroying the antediluvian General Belgrano. But later the nuclear submarines could not find the Argentine fleet during its movement to the Falklands, and when the ARA ships pulled back to their home coast and the British nuclear submarines followed them, then … ultra-modern ships were squeezed out of the coastal waters of Argentina in a matter of days.
The history of the Falklands conflict once again teaches us that no weapon, even a very perfect one, can replace and cannot resist the systemic use of heterogeneous forces.
With this, dear readers, I end the series of articles "Harriers in Battle: Falklands Conflict 1982". But on the topic of the Falklands conflict, another, "off-cycle" article with an alternative historical bias will be posted, in which the author will try to answer the questions: "Was it possible to replace British aviation with the latest air defense systems?"; "Could the British scrape together funds for ejection carriers, and what could the replacement of VTOL aircraft carriers with an ejection carrier give?" in which case it is not necessary to simulate the results of clashes based on the passport performance characteristics of military equipment.
Thank you for the attention!
P. S. During the discussion of the articles, many respected commentators have repeatedly expressed the idea of some similarity of the Falklands conflict with a cozy medical institution, where the wards are soft, the orderlies are extremely polite and the injections do not hurt at all. Within the framework of this theory, I would like to note:
The gallant British BBC has at least three major countermeasures to the British military. The first was when they trumpeted all over the news that Task Force 317 of Rear Admiral Woodworth had linked up with an amphibious group. It was impossible to more accurately inform the Argentines about the impending landing. For the second time, following the results of the first battles "on the bomb alley", journalists announced to the whole world that Argentine bombs did not explode. Apparently so that the Argentine services correct this misunderstanding as soon as possible. And, finally, the third case - when the news reported about the impending assault on Darivin and Gus Green by British paratroopers, as a result of which the Argentines were able not only to prepare the forces they had there for the assault, but also to transfer substantial reinforcements to the defenders. Argentine admirals and generals after the war admitted that 90% of all intelligence information was kindly provided to them by the British press.
And further. Rear Admiral Woodworth may not have been Nelson, but he nevertheless succeeded in an extremely difficult operation, such as the return of the Falkland Islands for England. How did the Fatherland meet him?
From the admiral's memoirs:
However, I would like to tell you about one of the first official letters that I received upon my return to my office. It was from the Chief Financial Officer of the Navy and sent to me five days before I returned from the south. It said that the office had conducted a quarterly review of my hospitality expenses and found that in the last quarter, during which I was a little busy, I spent only £ 5.85. And in this regard …
… we have accordingly revised your representative pay down by £ 1.78 per day. Moreover, we have recalculated this amendment since your appointment in July 1981. It is established that you were overpaid 649.70 pounds.
We would like to receive this amount in full and as soon as possible.
Bibliography
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8. A. Kotlobovsky A. Zabolotny Application of attack aircraft IA-58 "Pucara"
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15. BATTLE ATLAS of the FALKLANDS WAR 1982 by Land, Sea and Air by Gordon Smith
