Our previous post in English about the experience of using Russian UAVs in Syria caused serious passion in the blog. Taking into account numerous opinions and veiled hints, we present this material authored by Anton Lavrov in Russian. Let us remind you that the original article "Russian UAVs in Syria" was published in the second issue of the "Moscow Defense Brief" magazine for the current year.
During the war with Georgia in 2008, the Russian army had only a few outdated complexes of bulky but primitive drones at its disposal. As a result of the conflict, their use was recognized as unsuccessful due to the complete inconsistency of technical characteristics with modern requirements.
In the course of the ensuing military reform, they were abandoned. Hundreds of new reconnaissance drones have been developed and purchased. By the end of 2015, in September of which the Russian military operation in Syria began, there were already 1,720 drones in service. In 2016, the troops received another 105 complexes with 260 drones.
As of the spring of 2016, a group of 70 Russian drones were deployed in Syria, which is about 30 complexes. In December 2016, an additional transfer of three more complexes (six to nine drones) was reported to monitor the situation in compliance with the armistice reached by that time between government forces and the opposition.
In Syria, not only "ground" UAV complexes from the army drone companies of brigade and divisional subordination were involved. UAVs of the fleet UAV squadrons formed in 2013, equipped with the Orlan-10 and Outpost UAVs (produced in Russia under license from the Israeli IAI Searcher Mk II), were also sent there. It shouldn't seem strange. By that time, the naval UAV squadrons had concentrated six of Russia's 10 Forpost complexes (three drones each), and this is the only complex in service, approaching the MALE-UAV class. All other almost 2000 drones have a total take-off weight of no more than 30 kilograms and are radically inferior to the "Outpost" in terms of payload.
The joint headquarters of the Russian group in Syria was able to successfully use drones of all branches of the military together. So, naval drones were used to monitor the strikes of not only the fleet, but also the aerospace forces, as well as in the interests of ground groupings of the allies and Russia.
It is noteworthy that there is practically no information about the use by Russia in Syria of the lightest tactical short-range UAVs, which are used directly from the forward formations of troops or near the front line. This does not mean the complete absence of such drones, but confirms the limitations of the Russian Ground Forces involved in Syria.
Apart from the Forpost UAV, the most used type of UAV was the Orlan-10. This conclusion can be made based on photo and video evidence of the drones spotted in Syria, videos distributed by the Russian Ministry of Defense, made from UAVs and from known casualties. This is not surprising, since Orlan-10 makes up about a third of the entire fleet of Russian UAVs.
Their characteristics largely determined the intelligence capabilities of the entire Russian grouping. With a maximum takeoff weight of only 18 kg, the Orlan-10 has fairly high performance. It carries up to 5 kg of payload. Its options include stabilized day and night cameras, and even electronic warfare equipment. A small drone can transmit video online at a distance of up to 120 km from the control station and stay aloft for up to 14 hours, rising to an altitude of 5000 meters. If necessary, the transmission range can be further increased by using one "Orlan" as a repeater for another. In autonomous offline mode, the drone can survey targets at a distance of up to 600 km from the control station.
The internal combustion engine runs on regular gasoline. Takeoff is carried out from a simple folding catapult, landing is performed with a parachute, which allows it to be used from any site without the need for a runway. The drone itself is transported disassembled and the entire complex, and its calculation is placed in one car. All this makes Orlan-10 affordable and inexpensive to operate. A set of a car, a ground station, two drones, a payload and the necessary accessories costs the Russian Ministry of Defense 35 million rubles. (about 600 thousand dollars). This made it possible to purchase it in large quantities and quickly saturate the troops with them.
A large number of drones with a range of over 100 km made it possible to organize their work over the entire territory of Syria in areas of hostilities both against ISIS and against other anti-government forces. Several drones were often in the air at the same time.
So, during the first combat use of Kalibr cruise missiles from a large diesel-electric submarine of the project 06363 Rostov-on-Don on December 8, 2015, the drones simultaneously observed the launch of four missiles from a submerged position, their flight on a part of the route, as well as all three purposes for which they were applied. This required the involvement of at least four or five UAVs at the same time just to observe this strike.
The most massive tasks for Russian drones in Syria were reconnaissance of targets for air strikes, damage assessment, and adjustment of Syrian artillery fire. The latter task is now one of the priority areas for the use of drones in the Russian army. There are numerous video footage of observation from drones of the results of the firing of both barrel and rocket artillery in Syria.
Even in the army of the late USSR, the means of air adjustment of artillery fire in real time were practically not developed. In Russia, before the introduction of modern UAVs, they were completely absent. At the current stage, it became possible to adjust fire of all types of artillery, including long-range multiple launch rocket systems "Smerch" and operational-tactical missile systems. The software of the Orlan-10 and Outpost drones is adapted for this task, and they can be integrated into automated fire control systems for artillery. Drones of a lighter class have less capabilities and are used to adjust mortar fire.
For the Russian Ground Forces, still accustomed to relying on artillery fire, the widespread use of drones can significantly increase firepower. It is not known whether target designation systems from drones were used in Syria for corrected artillery shells, but such developments are also being tested.
Heavier complexes "Forpost", equipped with powerful optics, in the overwhelming majority of cases were used to monitor and control strikes against the highest priority targets. This made it possible to conduct covert observation from medium heights and distances, while remaining unnoticed. This is not always possible with lighter drones, which are forced to track targets from smaller distances.
They also performed other tasks, from aerial photography and 3D mapping of the area to escorting humanitarian convoys and search and rescue operations. So, after the wreckage of a downed Su-24M2 plane fell near the border with Turkey in a mountainous area, the surviving crew member was discovered by the Orlan-10 drone. Rapid detection allowed the injured navigator to be evacuated from territory controlled by armed opposition units. The operator's crew of the drone was awarded Russian state awards.
Initially, unmanned systems were located at the Khmeimim airbase in Latakia. As Russian involvement in the ground operation expanded, they were dispersed across Syria. Mixed units, including the Forpost UAV, required an airstrip, so they were usually deployed at air bases. During the offensive against eastern Aleppo since August 2016, one of these units was located at Aleppo International Airport. It is also known about the basing of Russian drones at the T-4 airbase near Palmyra, where they were used in hostilities against ISIS. Placing drones closer to the front line made it possible to use them with greater efficiency and increase the time spent above the target.
The use of reconnaissance UAVs by Russia in Syria is assessed as successful. At the same time, the operation showed a critical flaw - the lack of attack drones in Russia. In addition to the UAVs of the US coalition, Israeli, Iranian and Turkish middle-class attack drones are already being used in Syria, as well as improvised ultralight unmanned bombers from commercial components developed by ISIS terrorists.
Experiments are being carried out in Russia to equip the Orlan-10 with gliding controlled containers, which can be used, among other things, for strike missions. But the limited payload (no more than 5 kg) makes them not very effective in this role. There is no reliable information that even these experimental developments were used in Syria.
Launched by order of the Ministry of Defense in 2011, the development of a family of specialized medium and heavy drones is still far from complete. Work on complexes with a takeoff weight of 1-2 tons and 5 tons is underway, and their prototypes are flying, although they have not yet begun testing weapons. The pace of creation of the heaviest platform - a 20-ton drone is even lower, and it has not yet begun flights.
It is hoped that the experience accumulated in Syria in the real combat use of reconnaissance drones will help in the development of shock drones after they enter the Russian armed forces. They will be integrated into the existing extensive infrastructure for the use of unmanned aerial vehicles. This will allow Russia to close its gap in this critical area.
Like other users of military UAVs, the Russian command was pleased to note that their losses did not become big news and did not cause any problems with public opinion. Despite the fact that it is known about the loss of at least 10 Russian drones in Syria, there was practically no reaction to this. In addition, aircraft are easily replenished as they are only part of the complex.
The first of the Russian UAVs was lost in Syria on July 20, 2015, two months before the official start of military operations there. The Eleron-3SV UAV shot down in the mountains of Latakia is in service with the Ground Forces. It is a light tactical unit used from combat formations and has a range of up to 15 kilometers. It is not clear whether it was handed over to the Syrian troops, or whether it was used by Russian specialists. Until now, it has not been reported that any Russian drone models have been transferred to the Syrian government forces or their allies.
Around the same days, another Russian drone of an unknown model was lost there. Based on the payload, it was designed for 3D terrain mapping, which might be needed to prepare for an aviation campaign.
Another similar UAV was shot down by the Turkish Air Force when it crossed the border with Turkey in the Latakia region on October 16, 2015, after the start of the Russian operation. Despite the fact that it has the color and markings typical for Russian military UAVs, it was not possible to correlate it with any of the models in service. It may have been a specialized or experimental model.
The fact that during the operation not only serial, but also experimental samples were tested is known from reports on the use of Russian drones on hydrogen fuel in Syria. The device with alternative fuel used is just a prototype and in its current form is not suitable for adoption. Nevertheless, without the interest of the Ministry of Defense in it, its testing in Syria was hardly possible. In October 2016, an undamaged Ptero UAV was also found in the province of Latakia. It is not in service with the Department of Defense and is a commercial model used for aerial photography.
All other lost drones are well-known reconnaissance types in service with Russia. It is noteworthy that in most cases they did not have traces of combat damage - bullet and shrapnel holes. Destruction was sustained from impact with the ground, and in some cases they were found intact. This most likely indicates a significant proportion of losses due to technical reasons. These are usually problems with the engine or on-board electronics. Most of the lost Orlan-10s had strong signs of wear and tear and field repairs, characteristic of intensive use. It is known that in some cases they exceeded their assigned resource of 100 flights many times.
Table 1. Known losses of Russian drones in Syria
Date Type Region Remarks
2015-20-07 "Eleron-3SV" Latakia Fire
2015-20-07 Unknown Latakia Destroyed
2015-16-10 Unknown Turkey, near Latakia F-16 Turkish Air Force shot down
2015-18-10 Orlan-10 Northern Aleppo Not damaged
2015-15-12 Orlan-10 Daraa Not damaged
2016-02-06 "Orlan-10" Latakia Destroyed
2016-02-08 Orlan-10 Ramouseh, Aleppo Destroyed
2016-13-08 Orlan-10 Homs Destroyed
2016-03-09 "Orlan-10" East Homs Destroyed
2017-23-01 "Orlan-10" Hama Not damaged
2017-24-01 "Granat-4" Palmyra Destroyed
Drones are still a fairly new and unusual technology for the Russian military. They began to enter into service en masse only in 2013-2014. According to the results of the Syrian operation, which has been going on for over a year and a half, UAVs are assessed as a critical military technology. According to Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, they are "irreplaceable in modern conflicts."
The experience of their use in Syria could stimulate the emergence of a second generation of Russian reconnaissance drones and spur the creation of strike models of all classes, from light tactical to heavy 20-ton class. Already announced the creation of a new modification of the "Outpost", with improved "stuffing" and localization, which should remove dependence on Israeli components and allow the production of additional kits. In addition, a selection of new models of drones of an intermediate class between 450-kg "Forpost" and 18-30 kg tactical drones is underway.
