Great underwater wall

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Great underwater wall
Great underwater wall

Video: Great underwater wall

Video: Great underwater wall
Video: Rheinmetall – MBT Challenger 2 - Advanced Technologies 2024, May
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Great underwater wall
Great underwater wall

The past, present and future of Chinese nuclear submarines

In 2009, the Chinese Navy celebrated two significant dates - the 55th anniversary of the formation of the national submarine forces and the 35th anniversary of the commissioning of the first Chinese nuclear submarine (nuclear submarine). Project 885 PLARK (Severodvinsk).

Unfortunately, these events did not find proper coverage in the Russian press, and in fact we are talking about a neighboring great power, which is now a full member of the world nuclear submarine club. In addition to the United States (the "founding father"), Russia and China, it also includes Great Britain, France and India, which already has experience in operating the Soviet multipurpose missile nuclear submarine of project 670 that was leased to it in 1988-1991 and is building its own nuclear submarine - missile carrier "Arihant".

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PORT-ARTURSKY BEGINNING

This year is also a jubilee in this regard - in December it will be 20 years since the completion of the construction of the first series of nuclear submarines in the history of China, the appearance of which made serious adjustments to the geopolitical balance of sea power in the Pacific Ocean in general and in the waters washing East and Southeast Asia, in particular.

And it all began on June 24, 1954, when in Lushun (Port Arthur) national flags were raised on the first two submarines of the naval forces of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) - "New China-11" and "New China-12 "(According to other sources -" Defense "). Such names were given to the Soviet diesel submarines C-52 and C-53 of the IX-bis series, which were transferred to the PRC, built in 1943. This event touched the mayor of Shanghai, Marshal Chen Yi, so much that when he visited New China-11, he entered a poetic entry into its logbook, which in Russian translation sounds something like this:

Airplanes are flying, ships are sailing, We need to master the submarines. We dive into the ocean for a thousand whether, The enemy will not be spared!

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With the depth of immersion, Comrade Chen Yi, of course, overdid it, since the Chinese measure of length "li" corresponds to 576 meters, but the emotional impulse of the marshal is quite understandable: mastering (with the help of Soviet instructors) even old submarines became a serious reserve for the future.

The matter was not limited to the first two "New Chinas", and soon the PLA Navy received from the Pacific Fleet of the USSR several more submarines of types C and M. Submarine of project 613, and after another five years - design and technical documentation for medium diesel submarines of project 633.

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From the late 50s - early 60s, China built more than a hundred submarines of these projects, which allowed it to take the third place in the world in the next decade in the total number of submarines after the USSR and the USA. And most importantly, the Chinese have gained experience in submarine shipbuilding.

However, Beijing did not intend to limit itself to diesel-electric submarines (and their Chinese later learned to design on their own). Knowing about the successes of the Americans in creating a nuclear submarine fleet and being confident that the Soviet Union was not sitting idly by either (perhaps the leaders of the Celestial Empire had some information about the construction of the first Soviet nuclear submarines in Severodvinsk and Komsomolsk-on-Amur), the leaders of the PRC in 1958 year they asked the Kremlin to provide China with technical documentation for nuclear submarines, but they were refused, although, probably, not too categorical. Moscow nevertheless considered the possibility of transferring to Beijing nuclear submarines of Project 659 - carriers of P-5 cruise missiles in nuclear (!) Equipment, designed to destroy area ground targets.

Considering that the use of P-5 missiles in conventional equipment did not make sense due to the low accuracy of their firing (even in the improved modification of the P-5D, the circular probable deviation - KVO - was 4-6 km), it is appropriate to assume that the USSR really had intentions equip the PLA with nuclear missiles. But it seems that the Celestial Empire would receive nuclear warheads only in the event of a real danger of war with the United States and its allies. Moreover, the Chinese sailors should already have (and be able to use) nuclear warhead carrier rockets. This, apparently, explains why, for example, in the second half of the 1950s, Beijing was supplied with documentation for the R-5M strategic medium-range ballistic missile, and somewhat earlier - with combat models of the R-2 operational-tactical ballistic missiles (mastered in production as “Dongfeng-1 ") and R-11 (according to the Chinese nomenclature -" type 1060 "). On the basis of the R-5, the PLA ultimately created and entered service with the PLA in 1966, the first proper Chinese model of nuclear missile weapons - the Dongfeng-2 missile, which received a nuclear warhead of its own design.

This assumption is also supported by the fact that the USSR supplied China with two diesel submarines of Project 629 - carriers of ballistic missiles (one submarine towed from Komsomolsk-on-Amur was completed afloat in China in 1960, and the second was assembled from previously received Soviet nodes and sections in 1964). Together with them, they sent six R-11FM surface launch ballistic missiles - three per boat (plus one more training missile).

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The R-11FM ballistic missile, which we put into service in 1959, became the world's first weapon of this class for submarines. Its use in the USSR Navy was envisaged only in nuclear warheads (charge power - 10 kt with a firing range of 150 km and a KVO 8 km). In fact, it was about the transfer to the Celestial Empire of the latest, although not too perfect, domestic naval weapons designed to defeat ground targets, that is, de facto strategic! At that time, only nuclear warheads were not in the hands of the Chinese.

A WEDDING WAIT!

However, the onset of cooling in Soviet-Chinese relations, which soon passed into a phase of confrontation, prevented the implementation of these plans. Since Mao Zedong did not intend to change the course of counteracting the "Soviet revisionists" taken after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the PRC leadership also had no doubts about the speedy curtailment of military-technical cooperation with Moscow.

Therefore, back in July 1958, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided: the country should independently create a nuclear submarine and sea-based ballistic missiles. Obviously, against the background of the American Polaris submarine launch ballistic missile, the tests of which were successfully completed at that time, the Soviet R-11FM that soon appeared among the Chinese looked more than modest, inferior to it in firing range by 14, 4 times and absolutely - in stealth application.

Chairman Mao commented on the decision of the highest party leadership of the PRC in his characteristic pompous and pathetic manner: "We must build nuclear submarines, even if it will take us 10 thousand years!" Some sources claim that the "great helmsman" set this task back in 1956, that is, before China began building diesel submarines.

The history of the creation of the PRC nuclear submarine fleet is full of drama. For the Celestial Empire, this program had the nature of a national priority of particular importance, comparable to the creation of its own nuclear weapons (1964) and the launch of the first Chinese satellite, Dongfanhon-1, into near-earth orbit (1970).

The implementation of this program immediately ran into difficulties, both internal and external. The latter are explained by the break with the USSR, whose help would probably have allowed the PLA to acquire Soviet-designed nuclear submarines already in the first half of the 60s. On the other hand, thanks to the support of Moscow in the previous decade, a national cadre of shipbuilders, submariners, nuclear scientists and gunsmiths appeared in China, as well as its own industrial base for the construction of submarines was deployed, which was of key importance for the implementation of the plan.

Formed in 1958, a group of specialists involved in the implementation of "Project 09" (this name was given to the atomic submarine program of the PRC), consisted of young physicists, shipbuilders, nuclear power engineers and rocket scientists. The group was headed by Pen Shilu, who had just graduated from the Moscow Power Engineering Institute, later - an academician, one of the leading Chinese scientists in the field of nuclear science and technology.

Talented young people with great enthusiasm took up the task entrusted to them. A funny episode testifies to the working mood that prevailed in the group. At a friendly party, one of the developers of the project suddenly unceremoniously left his partner right during the dance with an exclamation: "I will not marry until our boat is operational!" And he kept his word, signing with her after 16 years - only after this long-awaited event happened.

But the main obstacle turned out to be internal problems.

First, the implementation of the program was affected by the lack of qualified personnel and funds, since the highest priority was still given to the creation of nuclear weapons, the accelerated deployment of ground-based ballistic nuclear missile systems and the space program. Some of the specialists were “removed” from “Project 09” and were aimed at solving precisely these problems.

Secondly, the Cultural Revolution that broke out in the late 60s, which caused enormous damage to the Chinese society and economy, led to wild excesses in relation to naval specialists and scientific and technical intelligentsia. Thus, repression fell on about 3,800 experienced naval commanders, including 11 former admirals (in 1965, military ranks in China were canceled, they were restored in 1988).

The diving school in Qingdao was completely closed from 1969 to 1973. And one of the leaders of "Project 09" Huang Xiuhua was severely persecuted by the Red Guards, who arranged forced interrogations for him, forcing him to confess to belonging to foreign agents. And only the personal intervention of the Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Zhou Enlai saved Huang Xiuhua from being sent to a pig farm - such a "correctional" sentence was passed by the torturers. (By the way, how can one fail to recall that the designer of the first Soviet nuclear submarine of project 627 "Leninsky Komsomol" Vladimir Peregudov also went through repression at one time, falling into the "iron grip" of the NKVD on absurd suspicion of espionage …)

CHINESE WITH FRENCH ACCENT

The very fact of the accusations of espionage being brought against the developers of "Project 09" can obviously be explained by the fact that the severance of scientific and technical ties with the USSR forced the Chinese to seek engineering support in the creation of a nuclear submarine from Western firms, primarily French.

The project, revised with the participation of the French, was assigned number 091, and the lead nuclear submarine Changzheng-1 was laid down at the shipyard in Huludao in 1967. "Changzheng" translates as "Long March" (in honor of the historical campaign of the Chinese Red Army in 1934-1935) - all Chinese nuclear submarines are given just such a name with the corresponding serial number. In the USA and NATO, Project 091 submarines were named "Han".

The construction of "Changzheng-1" was delayed due to technical and economic reasons for seven long years - it was accepted into the PLA Navy only on August 1, 1974, and even then with significant defects, including those associated with the first circuit of a nuclear power plant. Eliminating them and fine-tuning other systems took another six years, so the boat went on combat patrols only in 1980. The next four ships were handed over to seamen in 1980-1990, and the accumulated experience made it possible to reduce the construction duration (the last one in the Changzheng-5 series was built for about four years).

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In terms of their architecture, the first Chinese boats of Project 091 very much resemble the enlarged French nuclear submarines of the "Rubis" type, built in 1976-1993 (only six units). However, perhaps we should say the other way around - it is very likely that for the French the construction of "Changzheng-1" became a testing ground for working out optimal solutions embodied in their own ships. After all, their first attempt to build a nuclear submarine Q-244, dating back to the late 50s, ended in failure. It had to be completed as an experimental rocket submarine "Zhimnot" with a diesel-electric power plant.

On the Chinese nuclear submarines of project 091 and on French boats of the "Rubis" type, there is no main turbo-gear unit, since the propeller is driven by the main propeller motor powered by direct current, into which the alternating current of the turbine generators is converted. The submarines are equipped with one pressurized water reactor with a thermal capacity of 48 MW.

It would seem that the chosen electric propulsion scheme and the moderate power of the reactor installation should have ensured the relative quietness of the boat, but in fact it turned out to be 2.68 times more noisy than the most powerful American nuclear submarine of the Los Angeles type with a turbo-gear unit. This, in particular, determined the low anti-submarine potential of the first Chinese nuclear submarines.

Project 091 boats were created as "purely" torpedo boats, but the last three of them, in addition to torpedo tubes, received YJ-8 anti-ship missiles, launched from surface launchers located behind the wheelhouse, which inevitably unmasks the ship.

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Nevertheless, Project 091 nuclear submarines have become the subject of national pride of the PRC, despite serious "childhood illnesses" (however, some have been "cured" over time, for example, those associated with the reliability of the reactor installation). They have found wide application to demonstrate the power of the Chinese Navy, primarily in the seas washing its coast. There have been cases of unconcealed (even in spite of detection) pursuit by the first Chinese nuclear submarines of American aircraft carrier groups.

THE OUTLINES OF THE OCEAN TOMORROW

Today "Changzheng-1" has been withdrawn from service of the PLA Navy. It is being replaced by new multipurpose nuclear submarines of project 093 (in the West they are classified as "Shan"), the construction of which began in the late 90s. By 2005, at least one submarine of Project 093 was already sent for sea trials, and by 2010 it was expected that the Chinese fleet would have four nuclear-powered submarines of this type (there should be six of them by 2015).

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It is assumed that in terms of their tactical and technical elements, the new Chinese submarines are close to foreign nuclear submarines of the 70s-80s - the Soviet project 671RTM or even the American Los Angeles type of the first and second series, and promising maneuvering cruise missiles for accurate destruction of ground targets.

The only Chinese nuclear-powered missile submarine with ballistic missiles (SSBN) "Changzheng-6" built according to project 092 (in the West, the conventional category "Xia" was adopted for it) entered service in 1987 after a lengthy refinement that followed the launch in 1981 (the submarine was laid down in 1978). Project 092 was based on project 091 - in principle, this is the same submarine, but with a missile compartment embedded in the hull.

Almost the same nuclear power plant and torpedo and electronic weapons systems are used on the Xia-class submarine. The Chinese specialists faced great difficulties in fine-tuning the complex of 12 solid-propellant ballistic missiles underwater launch "Juilan-1": the first launch of a ballistic missile from a submarine in 1985 was unsuccessful, and a successful missile launch of "Changzheng-6" made only in 1988.

In terms of its characteristics, the one-piece "Juilan-1" is close to the American "Polaris" A-1 missile, but inferior to it in firing range (only 1,700 km).

It is clear that the one and only "Changzheng-6", the technical reliability of which, moreover, left much to be desired, could not be considered the basis of the Chinese naval strategic nuclear forces: to ensure constant combat patrols, the Navy must have at least three such boats. This problem is being addressed by the deployment of new Datsingui-class SSBNs (Project 094), which were developed using Russian technology and represent a significant step forward compared to the Project 092 submarine.

Project 094 SSBN (in the West it is conventionally referred to as the "Jing" class) differs from its predecessor in a more reliable nuclear power plant, less noise, improved hydroacoustic and electronic systems and can be considered similar in its characteristics to the Russian SSBN of Project 667BDRM, albeit with less ammunition …

Missile armament "Datsingui" is represented by 12 solid-propellant ICBMs underwater launch "Juilan-2" (firing range - not less than 8000 km). Unlike the first Chinese ballistic missile with a submarine launch, the Juilan-1, which was outdated by the time it entered service, the Juilan-2 is an intercontinental-range missile carrying an individually guided multiple warhead.

In terms of its characteristics, the Juilan-2 missile is comparable to the American Trident C-4 SLBM of the 1979 model. While patrolling northeast of the Kuril Islands, missile strikes from the Datsyngui can be launched against targets located on 75% of the continental United States. According to sources close to American intelligence, the first submarine of this project began to undergo sea trials in 2004, and currently, the PLA Navy presumably has two Datsingui-class submarines. In total, the series includes four or even five SSBNs, which should be fully deployed in 2015-2020.

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Thus, the PRC is currently implementing a limited program for the construction of a nuclear submarine fleet, whose quantitative parameters are comparable to the British and French. This is in line with the general task of the current stage of development of the national navies, which by 2020 should control a vast oceanic zone from the Kuril Islands to the Mariana and Caroline Islands, New Guinea and the Malay Archipelago. In the longer term, by 2050 it is planned to have a full-fledged fleet capable of operating in any areas of the World Ocean.

Speaking about this prospect, experts are already mentioning the future Chinese nuclear submarines - Project 095, designed, among other things, to ensure the combat stability of the alleged Chinese aircraft carrier groups, and Project 096 SSBNs, similar to American Ohio-class submarines. One can only guess about the power of such a fleet, but there is no reason to doubt that dynamically developing China has all the prerequisites for its creation.

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