The story of the 152-mm howitzer M-10 mod. The year 1938 is interesting already because the assessments of this system are so contradictory that they cause confusion among the authors even after writing the article.
On the one hand, the combat use of this weapon in all its guises in the Red Army has generated a lot of criticism and talk about design flaws. On the other hand, the use of captured guns before the 2000s in foreign armies (Finland), and the use without any incidents or accidents, speaks of the potential laid down in the 30s by Soviet designers.
In principle, the authors agree with the conclusions of some researchers that a completely worthy system could not take its rightful place in the history of Soviet weapons for reasons beyond its control.
In the last article, several specialists at once criticized our conclusion about the poor training of Soviet artillerymen in the pre-war period. However, we continue to argue that this was the case. The example of M-10 is quite indicative in this respect.
How can you explain, for example, the transfer of this howitzer to divisional artillery? 152mm howitzer! It was there that the very well-trained commanders of guns, batteries and divisions were located? Or it was there that there were the most competent engineers who could teach the calculations to the features of the new material part? And all the numbers of the crews by 1941 knew very well the peculiarities of working on these howitzers.
Maybe tankers when using the M-10 in KV-2 tanks knew the materiel better than the gunners? Then how to explain the completely ugly use of marine semi-armor-piercing shells?
In general, the authors do not pretend to be the most correct expert assessment of the system. There are gunsmiths for this. For this there are military engineers and designers of numerous design bureaus. After all, there is Alexander Shirokorad. We express our own opinion about the tool.
The story about the M-10 howitzer should start with a little background.
Already in the 1920s, the command of the Red Army came to understand the need for either modernization, or better replacement with modern weapons, which the Red Army inherited from the empire or were captured during the Civil War. Tasks were assigned to the Soviet design bureau, there were attempts to purchase technology in other countries.
It was then that the USSR began to cooperate with Germany. The German design school was one of the best at that time. And the Versailles Treaty quite seriously "tied hand and foot" German designers. So the desire to cooperate was mutual. German designers created systems in Soviet design bureaus. Germany received systems and technologies for their production for the future, and the USSR received a whole line of guns for various purposes.
Here the critics of the Soviet Union should be answered. There is an opinion often used in propaganda that it was we who prepared the Wehrmacht for war. It was on our base that German officers studied, German artillery systems, aircraft, and tanks were designed.
The answer to these accusations in history has already been given. Granted by World War II. The weapons of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army were different. And with a certain interest, you can see the places where these differences were "forged". Swedish, Danish, Dutch and Austrian firms have enjoyed using the German experience. And the Czechs did not shy away from such cooperation.
So, the Soviet Union signed a contract with the Byutast firm for the development and manufacture of prototypes of artillery systems. In fact, the contract was signed with the German concern Rheinmetall.
One of the fruits of this cooperation was the 152-mm howitzer mod. 1931 "NG". The barrel of the gun had a wedge-shaped breechblock. The wheels were sprung. Had rubber tires. The carriage was made with sliding beds. The firing range was 13,000 meters. Probably the only drawback of NG was the lack of the ability to conduct mortar fire.
Alas, it was not possible to organize the mass production of these howitzers. The design is too complex. The Motovilikhinsky plant did not have sufficient technologies for mass production at that time. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army had only 53 guns of this type. As they would say today - hand-assembled tools.
We specifically focused on this howitzer. Firstly, it was its characteristics that became the benchmark for Soviet developments. And secondly, the experience gained in Motovilikha in the production of these particular tools was then used in the design of other systems.
In April 1938, the Special Commission of the Artillery Directorate of the Red Army determined the tactical and technical requirements for the new 152-mm howitzers. Moreover, the very concept of using future howitzers has changed.
The guns now had to be in the artillery regiments, which, if necessary, would support the actions of the divisions. In fact, they were transferred to divisional subordination. But, there was an important caveat. Howitzers should be an additional means of reinforcing these regiments!
It seems to us that such a decision was made by the AU in the hope that the rapid development of tractor and automotive engineering will soon give the Red Army a fast and powerful tractor for these heavy systems. Thus, it will ensure their high mobility.
TTT for the new howitzer (April 1938):
- the mass of the projectile - 40 kg (clearly determined by the already existing grenades of the 530th family);
- muzzle velocity - 525 m / s (like the NG howitzer);
- firing range - 12, 7 km (also coincides with the tactical and technical characteristics of the NG howitzer);
- vertical guidance angle - 65 °;
- horizontal guidance angle - 60 °;
- the mass of the system in the firing position - 3500 kg;
- system weight in the stowed position - 4000 kg.
The assignment was entrusted to the design bureau of the Motovilikhinsky plant. FF Petrov was officially in charge of the development. However, in some sources, another person is called the leading designer - V. A. Ilyin. The authors have not found an answer to this question. In open sources at least. With 100% certainty one can speak only about Ilyin's participation in these developments.
Structurally, the 152-mm howitzer mod. 1938 (M-10) consisted of:
- barrel, including pipe, coupling and breech;
- a piston valve opening to the right. The shutter was closed and opened by turning the handle in one step. In the bolt, a percussion mechanism with a linearly moving striker, a helical mainspring and a rotary hammer was mounted; for cocking and lowering the striker, the trigger was pulled back by the trigger cord. Ejection of the spent cartridge case from the chamber was carried out when the shutter was opened by a crank-style ejector. There was a mechanism to facilitate loading and a safety mechanism that prevented premature unlocking of the bolt during prolonged shots;
- a gun carriage, which included a cradle, recoil devices, an upper machine, aiming mechanisms, a balancing mechanism, a lower machine (with sliding riveted box-shaped beds, combat travel and suspension), sighting devices and shield cover.
The trough-type cradle was laid with trunnions in the slots of the upper machine.
The recoil devices in the cradle under the barrel included a hydraulic recoil brake and a hydropneumatic knurler. The rollback length is variable. In the stowed position, the trunk was pulled back.
The balancing mechanism of the spring-loaded pushing type was located in two columns covered with casings on both sides of the gun barrel.
The upper machine was inserted with a pin into the socket of the lower machine. The shock absorber of the pin with springs ensured the suspended position of the upper machine relative to the lower one and facilitated its rotation. On the left side of the upper machine there was a flywheel of a sector rotary mechanism, on the right - a flywheel of a lifting mechanism with two gear sectors.
The combat course is sprung, with shoe brakes, with four wheels from a ZIS-5 truck, two slopes per side. GK tires of standard size 34x7 YARSh were filled with sponge rubber.
Sights included a gun-independent sight with two shooters and a Hertz-type panorama. The design of the sight, with the exception of the cutting of the scales, was unified with the 122 mm M-30 howitzer. The aiming line is independent, i.e. when the aiming angle and the target elevation angle were set on the device, the optical axis of the panorama remained fixed, only the aiming arrow rotated. The scale divisions of the elevation angle and the panorama protractor were two thousandths, the same was the permissible error when aligning the sight. To simplify aiming in the vertical plane, there was a remote drum with distance scales for the full, first, second, third, fourth and seventh charges. A change in the sight setting by one division on the distance scale for the corresponding charge approximately corresponded to a change in the firing range by 50 m. The optical part of the panorama provided a fourfold increase in the angular dimensions of the observed objects and had a crosshair in the focal plane.
TTX 152-mm howitzer mod. 1938 M-10
Initial speed, m / s: 508
Weight of grenades (OF-530), kg: 40, 0
Firing range at n.a., m: 12 400
Rate of fire, high / min: 3-4
Weight in firing position, kg: 4100
Mass in the stowed position, kg: 4150 (4550 with the front end)
Barrel length without bolt, mm (clb): 3700 (24, 3)
Vertical guidance angle, degrees: -1 … + 65
Horizontal guidance angle, degrees: - / + 25 (50)
Towing speed, km / h
- highway: 35
- off-road, dirt roads: 30
The time of transfer from the traveling position to
combat and back, min: 1, 5-2
Calculation, people: 8
At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, there were 773 guns in the western districts, but during the battles almost all of them were lost. The large mass of the weapon affected. A herd of horses, and transporting howitzers required 8 horses per gun, was an excellent target for the German aviation. And we had catastrophically few mechanical conveyors.
Despite the fact that the howitzer was produced for only 22 months, the then fashionable "transplant" on the tank chassis did not pass it.
Two Leningrad plants, Kirovsky and plant No. 185, already at the end of 1939 created the chassis of heavy tanks for special use. However, no weapons were developed for these vehicles.
The Soviet-Finnish war pushed designers to create heavy vehicles for the destruction of bunkers and other engineering structures. Cooperation of SKB-2 of the Kirov plant began under the leadership of J. Ya. Kotin and AOKO Motovilikhinsky plant, which resulted in the creation of a tower installation for the KV - MT-1 with an M-10 howitzer. The tank turned out to be one-turret, but high.
In February 1940, two prototypes of the KV "with a large turret" took the first battle in Finland. These tanks were put into production.
But the collaboration continued. The tower was reduced. This installation was named MT-2. Today we know this tank under the familiar name KV-2. In some sources, the M-10 system is called M-10-T or M-10T.
I would like to tell you about one more idea that, alas, was not implemented. About the T-100Z tank. Above, we mentioned the Leningrad plant No. 185. The design bureau of this plant, under the leadership of L. S. Troyanov, developed a project for a breakthrough tank based on the T-100 chassis. The tank was two-turret. The tower with the M-10 was at the top, and the tower with the gun was in front and below.
The project was not implemented in metal. The tower was completed in April 1940, when the war with Finland had already ended. However, according to some reports, the tower still fought. True as a bunker in the defense of Leningrad.
In general, the armament of tanks with such powerful weapons as the M-10 was redundant. On this, the authors agree with General Pavlov. A powerful howitzer, when fired on the move, simply "killed" the chassis. It was necessary to shoot only from a short stop.
Yes, and there were really no targets for such machines at the initial stage of the war. It is one thing to break through the Mannerheim Line in Finland, another thing is to use heavy machines where it is much more convenient to use the artillery being transported.
Heavy tanks KV ceased to be produced on July 1, 1941. And here again there are discrepancies in the timing. Cars were delivered to the troops later. Why? In our opinion, this was due to the rather long production of such tanks. Agree, to stop working on an almost finished tank during the war is a crime.
It is worth debunking one more myth, in which many people believe even today. The myth about the lack of shells for heavy tanks. The tanks were thrown because they supposedly could have been used more to intimidate the Germans than for a real war.
What was the difference between shells for transportable systems and shells for tanks? In one of the previous articles, we provided statistics on the release of shells of various calibers in the pre-war period. Well, there was no shortage of shells as such. It was what was written above. Incompetence of the command and poor knowledge of the material part!
In "Reminiscences and Reflections" by G. K. Zhukov, his conversation with the commander of the 5th Army MI Potapov on June 24, 1941 is given. At this time, Georgy Konstantinovich was the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army:
"Zhukov. How do your KVs and others operate? Do they pierce the armor of German tanks and approximately how many tanks did the enemy lose on your front?"
Potapov. There are 30 large KV tanks. All without shells for 152-mm guns …
Zhukov. The 152-mm KV cannons fire projectiles from 09-30 years, so order the concrete-piercing shells from 09-30 years to be issued immediately and put them into operation. You will beat the enemy tanks with might and main."
On June 22, 1941 in the Red Army, there were 2 642 thousand howitzer rounds of all types of 152-mm caliber, of which, after the outbreak of the war until January 1, 1942, 611 thousand pieces were lost. and spent in battles 578 thousand pieces. As a result, the number of 152-mm howitzer rounds of all types decreased to 1,166 thousand pieces. as of January 1, 1942
We use the calculator, and we conclude: there were enough shells. There weren't just a lot of shells. There were a lot of them.
You can blame Zhukov for all sins, except incompetence. But he did not speak with the platoon commander immediately after school. He spoke to the commander of the army! Army! Which has subordinate to a "company" of artillery commanders who have no lieutenant knowledge. And not the newly minted "tankers with guns" …
On the eve of June 22, you realize with particular bitterness that no one else could have done as much harm as the incompetent commanders of the Red Army did. Neither the Abwehr, nor the Green Brothers. No one. Themselves not only coped perfectly well. They also killed people.
JV Stalin remembered about a heavy tank with a 152-mm gun in 1943. But for the M-10 it was no longer important. It was discontinued long ago. The new SU-152, and then the ISU-152, were equipped with a more powerful ML-20 cannon-howitzer.
Serial production of 152-mm howitzer mod. In 1938, the Motovilikhinsky (# 172) plant and the Votkinsk (# 235) plants were engaged. 1522 guns were manufactured (excluding prototypes). 213 M-10T tank howitzers were also manufactured. The guns were produced from December 1939 to July (actually September) 1941.
The main reason for the discontinuation of the production of howitzers of this caliber, in our opinion, is the need to increase the production of 45-mm and 76-mm cannons, as well as A-19 cannons and new 152-mm ML-20 howitzers-cannons. It was these systems that suffered the greatest losses or were badly needed in the initial period of the war. And there were no reserves for increasing the production of guns at the factories. They released what was needed at the expense of other products.
A howitzer that could have become … But it did not. Those remnants of these systems that "survived" in the battles of 1941 reached Berlin. Moreover, after the end of the war with Germany, the number of these howitzers in our army increased. The guns that the Germans captured in 1941 returned from "captivity". However, this did not in any way affect the fate of the gun.
Time M-10 is over. The powerful and beautiful weapon became a museum piece in the late 1950s.
