Armor is strong and our tanks are fast

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Armor is strong and our tanks are fast
Armor is strong and our tanks are fast

Video: Armor is strong and our tanks are fast

Video: Armor is strong and our tanks are fast
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Armor is strong and our tanks are fast
Armor is strong and our tanks are fast

Build KV-1 tanks of the 116th Tank Brigade. The Shchors tank has a cast turret, the Bagration tank has a welded turret. The picture shows a member of the tank crew behind a turret anti-aircraft machine gun DT. The crew of the Shchors tank: tank commander junior lieutenant A. Sundukevich, driver-mechanic senior sergeant M. Zaikin, gunner-radio operator senior sergeant Georgy Sorokin. According to data on the combat strength of the Red Army on May 1, 1942, the 116th Tank Brigade was in the Volga Military District in the Penza Region at the stage of formation. She was sent to the front in June 1942 in the Kursk region.

June 25, 1941 - the fourth day of the war. In the book of records of the chief of the German General Staff, Colonel-General Halder, victorious reports follow one after the other, and suddenly, after a telephone conversation with the headquarters of Army Group Center, an entry follows: 37 cm (?), Side armor - 8 cm … The 50-mm anti-tank gun penetrates the armor only under the gun turret. The 88-mm anti-aircraft gun, apparently, also penetrates the side armor (it is not yet known exactly). a tank armed with a 75-mm cannon and three machine guns."

So the German command first learned about the new Soviet tanks KB and T-34.

Strictly speaking, German intelligence learned about the existence of the T-34 and KV tanks even before the war. But this information was contradictory and was not brought to the attention of the field troops.

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Fording Soviet T-34 tanks and artillery across a small river

It immediately became clear that all German tank and anti-tank guns (PTP) did not penetrate the armor of KB and T-34 tanks, but Soviet 76-mm tank guns 30 klb long. (L-11 and F-32) and 40 klb. (F-34 and ZIS-5) pierce the armor of all German tanks at a distance of up to 1000 m. After the very first battles, German soldiers dubbed the 37-mm * PTP "door knockers" and "army crackers". One of the reports said that the crew of the 37-mm anti-tank rifle achieved 23 hits on the same T-34 tank, and only when the shell hit the base of the tower was the tank out of action. The T-III tank hit the T-34 from 50 meters four times, and then from 20 meters again, but all the shells split into pieces without damaging the armor.

This raises a quite reasonable question from the reader (the author claims that our anti-tank vehicles and tanks were qualitatively superior to the German ones), so how to explain the fact that in 1941 the Red Army lost 20, 5 thousand tanks and 12 thousand anti-tank guns? There are more than enough reasons for this. But the most important thing is that the unmobilized Red Army, which had not fought, faced an army that had fought for two years. An army with the best equipment in the world and the best soldier in the world; army, which took only a month to defeat the combined armies of England, France, Belgium and Holland in 1940.

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Armoring scheme of the T-34-76 tank

The new KB and T-34 tanks had just begun to enter the troops and were not mastered by the personnel. Few of the driver's mechanics had more than five hours of experience driving a tank, and many crews never conducted a firing practice. And not only tanks fought. Everyone knows the absolute superiority of the Germans in the air. And our field troops could fight off the Luftwaffe only with 7, 62-mm Maxim machine guns. The German artillery was almost 100% motorized, while ours was 20%. Finally, the level of senior command personnel was poor. The repressions of 1937 significantly weakened the power of the Red Army, although their role should not be overestimated. After all, the repressed marshals and commanders were mostly not professional soldiers, but heroes of the Civil War, promoted by Trotsky and Sklyansky. Civil war or turmoil in the state usually leads to the leadership of an army of incompetent people. Among the brilliant galaxy of Napoleon's marshals, there were no heroes who took the Bastille, Lyon and Marseilles, and the commanders of the Civil War in the Great Patriotic War who survived the repressions, to put it mildly, did not show themselves. A locksmith can hang a marshal's shoulder straps, a personal guard - generals, a journalist - a rear admiral, and they will faithfully serve the owner, protecting his power from the "internal enemy", but in the fight against an external enemy, one can only expect defeats from them.

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We will return to the narrow topic of the article on the ratio of losses of Soviet heavy and medium tanks and anti-tank guns of the Reich. By June 1, 1941, the Wehrmacht was armed with 181 - 28-mm, 1047 - 50-mm and 14459 - 37-mm anti-tank guns. In addition, the Germans had several thousand captured anti-tank vehicles: Czech 37-mm and 47-mm anti-tank vehicles, Austrian 47-mm anti-tank vehicles mod. 35/36, French 25-mm and 47-mm anti-tank guns.

At the end of 1941 and the first half of 1942, the Wehrmacht leadership took emergency measures to provide troops with materiel capable of hitting T-34 and KV tanks. The Germans took two paths: firstly, they created new ammunition for the tank and anti-tank guns in service, and secondly, new, more powerful anti-tank guns appeared in the troops.

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Tank booking schemes KB

In the ammunition of all tank and anti-tank guns, sub-caliber shells were introduced, which sharply increased the armor penetration, albeit at short distances. Guns with a caliber of 75 mm and above received cumulative shells, the penetration of which did not depend on the firing range. For the 37-mm anti-tank rifle, an over-caliber cumulative mine loaded from a muzzle was adopted. The tabular firing range of such a mine was 300 m, there is no need to talk about the rate of fire and accuracy of the mine. Presumably, the mine was adopted mainly to raise the morale of the calculations.

In 1941-1942, the Germans did not follow the path of creating heavy anti-tank vehicles, here hopes for a "blitzkrieg", for light anti-tank vehicles with a tapered bore, and the conservatism of German generals, psychologically not ready to switch from the miniature 37-mm RAC 35/36, affected two years of shooting tanks all over Europe, to 88-mm or 128-mm guns.

Anti-tank guns with a tapered bore of the 28/20-mm S. Pz. B.41, 42/28-mm RAK 41 and 75/55-mm RAK 41 were undoubtedly masterpieces of engineering. Such barrels consisted of several alternating conical and cylindrical sections. The projectiles had a special design of the leading part, allowing its diameter to decrease as the projectile moves along the channel. Thus, the most complete use of the pressure of the powder gases at the bottom of the projectile was ensured (by reducing the cross-sectional area of the projectile). In the 28-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1941, the bore was reduced from 28 mm to 20 mm at the muzzle; at 42-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1941 - from 42 to 28 mm; and the 75-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1941 - from 75 to 55 mm.

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Destroyed Soviet tanks KV-1S and T-34-76

Cannons with a tapered barrel provided good penetration at short and medium ranges. But their production was very difficult and expensive. Barrel survivability was low - no more than 500 shots, that is, 10-20 times less than that of conventional anti-tank guns. The Germans did not manage to establish large-scale production of such cannons with a tapered barrel, and in 1943 their production was discontinued altogether.

It should be noted that experiments were carried out in the USSR with cannons with a tapered barrel. So, in 1941-1948, in the Grabin Central Design Bureau and in the OKB-172, several samples of such weapons were developed and tested, but the management decided that their disadvantages outweigh their advantages. In the USSR, guns with a tapered channel did not enter mass production either during or after the war.

The use of captured equipment turned out to be more successful. In 1941, the Germans put the barrel of a captured French 75-mm divisional gun mod. 1897, equipped with a muzzle brake. The most effective German anti-tank gun (until 1943) turned out to be … the Soviet 76-mm divisional gun F-22, which was named by the Germans RAK 36. Several hundred captured F-22s were converted into an anti-tank gun, both in a towed version and on a tank chassis. T-II and 38 (t). The Germans squandered the F-22 chamber, increased the charge by 2, 4 times, installed a muzzle brake, reduced the elevation angle and eliminated the variable recoil mechanism. It should be noted here that the Germans simply corrected the "whims" of Tukhachevsky and a number of other figures, who at one time forced Grabin to use a 1900 cartridge case in such a powerful gun, which limited the weight of the charge and entered an elevation angle of +75 - … for firing at aircraft.

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ACS Marder II with a captured Soviet cannon (full name 7, 62 cm PaK (r) auf PzKpfw ll Ausf D Marder II (SdKfz 132). On December 20, 1941, Alkett received an order for the installation of a captured Soviet divisional gun F-22 mod. 1936 years on the chassis of a light German tank PzKpfw ll Ausf D. The F-22 gun was captured in large numbers by the Wehrmacht in the first weeks of the war against the USSR and was modernized by the Germans: in particular, a muzzle brake was introduced. mm armor-piercing projectile Pzgr 39 left the barrel of this gun at a speed of 740 m / s and at a distance of 1000 m pierced 82-mm armor.

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A cartridge with an armor-piercing sub-caliber projectile and an over-caliber cumulative mine for a 37-mm anti-tank gun

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Soldiers of the German 19th Panzer Division aim at the 28mm light anti-tank gun s. Pz. B.41. 2, 8 cm schwere Panzerbüchse 41 in the Wehrmacht was classified as a heavy anti-tank rifle, but since it had all the signs of an artillery gun (firing shells, a fairly large caliber, gun carriage, recoil devices, the inability to carry by one person (weight 229 kg), in Soviet and American documents during the war, it was referred to as light anti-tank guns.

As a result, the incidence of Soviet heavy and medium tanks grew steadily. So, until September 1942, through holes of these tanks were 46%, and blind holes - 54% (i.e., most of the shells hit did not penetrate the armor), but during the battle for Stalingrad these figures were already 55% and 45%, in Kursk battle, respectively, 88% and 12%, and finally, in 1944-1945 - from 92% to 99% of the shells that hit heavy and medium tanks pierced their armor.

Light sub-caliber shells often, having pierced the armor, lost most of the kinetic energy and could not disable the tank. So, at Stalingrad, for one disabled T-34 tank, on average, there were 4, 9 hits of shells, and in 1944-1945 this required 1, 5-1, 8 hits.

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Destroyed tank T-34 # 563-74 from the 15th tank regiment of the 8th tank division, which crushed the German anti-tank gun PaK-38 during the battle. On June 25, 1941, the vehicle as part of the regiment participated in a battle with the 97th light infantry division of the Wehrmacht near the village of Magerov (22 km east of the city of Nemyriv). Also in battle, the crew of this tank destroyed an artillery tractor based on a captured French tankette "Renault UE".

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Calculation of the German 50-mm anti-tank gun PaK 38 on the Eastern Front at the end of 1942

The complete destruction of T-34 tanks occurred only with a simultaneous explosion of ammunition, which was achieved by direct hitting the ammunition of shells that had, after breaking through the armor, large kinetic energy or cumulative shells. The impact of small-caliber shells rarely led to an explosion of ammunition on the T-34. So, during the Stalingrad operation, the percentage of destroyed tanks from the total number of irrecoverable losses was about 1%, and in 1943 in various operations this figure was already 30-40%. It is curious that there were no cases of complete destruction of the T-70 and other light tanks from the explosion of ammunition during the war. The tests carried out showed that the ammunition load of 45-mm projectiles does not detonate. The cases of complete destruction of KB tanks were slightly less than the T-34, which is explained by the lower residual energy of the shells after penetrating the thicker armor, which was insufficient for the explosion of ammunition.

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Shells for the cannon RAK 41. From left to right: 75/55 mm fragmentation tracer grenade, armor-piercing tracer sabot projectile NK, armor-piercing tracer sabot projectile StK

Only after two years of fighting the T-34 and KB tanks, the German leadership decided to switch to tank and anti-tank guns with a caliber of over 75 mm. These guns were created on the basis of 88-mm and 128-mm anti-aircraft guns. By the way, they did the same in the USSR, taking as a basis the 85-mm anti-aircraft gun mod. 1939 In 1942, the Wehrmacht adopted the 88-mm tank gun model 36, which was installed on the Tiger tanks. And in 1943, the 88-mm anti-tank gun model 43 and 43/41, as well as the 88-mm tank gun, were adopted. obr. 43, which had the same ballistics and ammunition. The tank gun model 43 was installed on the Royal Tiger tanks, and the anti-tank gun model 43 was installed on the Elephant, Jagdpanther, Nashorn and Horniss self-propelled guns, as well as on a wheeled carriage.

The Germans considered the most advantageous ranges of firing at tanks from their tank and anti-tank artillery, based on its armor-piercing ability: for 37-mm and 50-mm guns - 250-300 m; for 75-mm guns - 800-900 m and for 88-mm guns - 1500 m. It was considered inexpedient to fire from long distances.

At the beginning of the war, the firing range of our tanks, as a rule, did not exceed 300 m. With the advent of 75 mm and 88 mm cannons with an initial velocity of an armor-piercing projectile of 1000 m / s, the firing range of tanks increased significantly.

Surveys of 735 Soviet destroyed medium and heavy tanks and self-propelled guns based on them, carried out in 1943-1944 by our specialists, showed that the firing range of our tanks and self-propelled guns from 75-mm tank and anti-tank guns ranged in most cases from 200 to 1000 m and usually did not exceed 1600 m. For 88-mm guns, the distance ranged from 300 to 1400 m and usually did not exceed 1800-2000 m (see Table 1).

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Tank IS-2 from the Soviet convoy moves along the road on the near approaches to Tallinn

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A rare instance of the IS-2 tank. Minsk, parade on May 1, 1948. In the foreground is the IS-2 tank with a "German" type of muzzle brake and a piston bolt for the D-25 cannon, one of the very first IS-2 (IS-122) tanks produced during the Great Patriotic War. Minsk, parade on May 1, 1948.

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Reservation of T-34-85 tanks (above) and IS-2

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Tank column (T-34-85 tanks) "20 years of Soviet Uzbekistan" on the march. 2nd Belorussian Front. From the memoirs of an officer of the 406th separate machine-gun and artillery battalion (OPAB) L. S. Sverdlova: "On the approaches to the city of Sopot, one terrible picture was remembered. There is a whole column of our tanks burned by the German" faustics "on the road in the line, twenty vehicles. On the twenty-fifth of March, an unsuccessful assault on the city was undertaken, but the artillery barrage did not reach its goal, many firing points were not suppressed."

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Night attack by Soviet T-34-85 tanks at the Razdelnaya station in the Odessa region. Signal flares are used for illumination. In the background is the building of the Razdelnaya station. 3rd Ukrainian Front

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Destroyed Soviet tanks T-34-85

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Soviet tank IS-2 No. 537 of Lieutenant B. I. Degtyarev from the 87th Separate Guards Heavy Tank Regiment, knocked out at Striegauer Platz in the German city of Breslau (now Wroclaw, Poland). The tank is known from the photograph by Anatoly Egorov "Musical moment". From April 1 to April 7, a regiment of 5 IS-2 tanks supported the infantry of the 112th and 359th rifle divisions in the southwestern part of the city. For 7 days of fighting, Soviet troops advanced only a few blocks. The tank regiment did not conduct more active actions. The IS-2 in the photo is from the first issues, with an inspection hatch-plug of the driver.

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Calculation of the German anti-tank gun 7, 5 cm PaK 97/38. In the background, the anti-tank self-propelled gun Marder II. Eastern front

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Column on the march during the retreat of German troops from Breslau. Ahead, an Sd. Kfz 10 tractor tows a 75 mm PaK 40 anti-tank gun.

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The gunners are firing from a German 75-mm anti-tank gun PaK 40. The German-Romanian crew: the commander and gunner (left) - in German uniform, and the three on the right (loader and ammunition carriers) - in Romanian (windings on the legs, characteristic belts). Area of the Soviet-Romanian border

Consider the distribution of losses of T-34 tanks from different calibers of guns during the war - see Table 2. Thus, starting with the Battle of Oryol in 1943, tanks suffered the greatest losses from tank and anti-tank guns of 75 and 88 mm caliber.

In total, the USSR entered the war with 22, 6 thousand of all types of tanks. During the war, 86,100 were received and 83,500 were lost (see Tables 3 and 4). Irrecoverable losses of tanks left after the battle on their territory totaled 44% of all combat losses, and specifically for the T-34 - 44%.

Combat losses of our tanks in 1943-1945 by types of means of destruction: from artillery fire - 88-91%; from mines and land mines - 8-4%; from bombs and aviation artillery fire - 4-5%. More than 90% of the irrecoverable losses were caused by artillery fire.

These data are averaged and in some cases there were significant deviations. So, in 1944, on the Karelian Front, mine losses amounted to 35% of combat losses.

Losses from bombs and artillery fire only in some cases reached 10-15%. As an example, one can cite the experimental shooting at the NIIBT range, when, in a calm environment, from a distance of 300-400 m, out of 35 shots of a LaGG-3 cannon, 3 shells hit stationary tanks, and from IL-2 cannons, 3 shells of 55 shots.

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German artillery positions southwest of Rzhev. In the center, a direct-fire 88-mm anti-aircraft gun (8, 8 cm FlaK 36/37). On the barrel of the cannon there are marks about the equipment knocked out by the gun.

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German anti-tank towed guns of the period of the 2nd World War

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Artillerymen of the 29th motorized division of the Wehrmacht from an ambush shot at the side from a 50-mm PaK 38 cannon Soviet tanks. The closest, on the left, is the T-34 tank. Belarus, 1941

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Calculation of the German anti-tank 37-mm gun PaK 35/36 in position

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Soviet T-34 tank crushes the German light anti-tank gun PaK 35/36 caliber 37 mm, which was called "mallet"

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The crew of the 75-mm anti-tank gun PaK 40 is fighting the Soviet troops in Budapest. The soldiers, judging by their uniforms, are from the SS troops

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German 88-mm anti-tank gun PaK 43, mounted on a position on the banks of the Dnieper

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