The nuclear weapons created in the United States during the Second World War were intended for use in the Axis countries (Germany and Japan) with the prospect of their use in the future against the USSR. Already in July 1944, Germany feared an atomic bombing of Dresden, and in September of the same year, the United States decided to use nuclear weapons against Japan. However, immediately after the end of the war, the United States began to assess the possibilities of using nuclear weapons against the cities of the USSR, and in 1946 the first plan for the atomic bombing of our country appeared.
ENEMIES OF AMERICA
With the formation in 1945-1949 of the camp of the people's democracy (China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Mongolia, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania), all these countries automatically became enemies of the United States and were later included in the strategic plans to defeat American nuclear weapons. Subsequently, US nuclear weapons were aimed according to regional plans at Algeria, Libya and Egypt in Africa, Syria, Iraq and Iran in Asia. Objects for American offensive or defensive strikes were located both on the territory of the Warsaw Pact Organization (ATS) and NATO, and within neutral states, for example, in Finland and Austria. After the end of the Cold War, the United States carried out nuclear planning in relation to the Russian Federation and the PRC, excluded Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus from the nuclear plans that became nuclear-free countries, resumed planning the use of nuclear weapons against the DPRK, Iran and Libya, began planning the use of nuclear weapons against countries that possessed or sought possess weapons of mass destruction.
The main goal of the United States during the Cold War was to destroy the social order in the USSR as a threat to the very existence of the United States, targeting the Soviet Union at an early stage in the confrontation of the entire nuclear arsenal of this country's strategic nuclear forces (SNF). In the 21st century, according to estimates in the media, from 80 to 63% of the US strategic nuclear forces were aimed at the Russian Federation, and only 16–28% at China. Consequently, the United States regards the Russian Federation as the main "existential" military-political adversary preventing the establishment of the United States' world domination.
The first plans for a nuclear war by the United States in 1946-1950 provided for nuclear strikes, first on 20, then on 70, then on 104 cities of the Soviet Union. In the 60s, the implementation of nuclear plans would mean the destruction of 50-75% of industry and 25-33% of the population of the USSR. The American plan SIOP-1A of 1961, which provided for the use of 3423 nuclear warheads (YaBZ) with a capacity of 7817 megatons (Mt) to destroy 1483 objects grouped in 1077 epicenters, was intended to bring the level of population losses in the Soviet and Chinese blocs to 54 and 16%, respectively, guaranteed to destroy from the Soviet and Chinese blocs, respectively, 74 and 59% of industrial areas, 295 and 78 urban industrial complexes with the complete destruction of the planned nuclear potential objects that threatened the United States. The creators of this plan clearly envisioned the transformation of the territory of the two blocs, especially the USSR, into radioactive ruins, not suspecting that the use of even 5 gigatons of nuclear explosives by the United States would lead to a “nuclear winter” disastrous for the whole world and for America itself.
MORE, POWERFUL, MORE ACCURATE
The basis of the insane nuclear arms race launched by the United States during the Cold War was the desire to be able to destroy or neutralize as many potential enemy targets as possible by first increasing the power and number of nuclear warheads, and then the accuracy of their delivery to targets.
In 1946-1960, the US nuclear arsenal grew from 9 to 18 638 nuclear warheads. In 1960 alone, 7178 YaBZ were produced. In 1956-1962, the needs of the US Armed Forces were estimated at more than 160 thousand YaBZ. In 1967, the US nuclear stockpile reached its ceiling of 31,255 YaBZ. In 1968-1990, the arsenal gradually decreased from 29.6 to 21.4 thousand YaBZ, in 1993-2003 it decreased from 11.5 to 10 thousand, in 2010 it reached 5 thousand, and in January 2017 it was brought up to 4018 YaBZ (another 2,800 YaBZ were waiting for disposal in the next decade). All in all, more than 70 thousand YABZ were produced in the USA. According to 2011 data, it was planned to bring the nuclear ammunition stock of the country's Armed Forces to 3000–3500 YABZ by 2022, and according to 2005–2006 data, by 2030 - to 2000–2200 YABZ.
The total capacity of nuclear warheads in active ammunition was increased to a maximum value of 20.5 thousand megatons in 1960, then sharply decreased, then gradually decreased to the current level of about 1,000 megatons. If the average capacity of one nuclear plant increased from 25 kilotons (kt) in 1948 to 200 kt in 1954, then already in 1955-1960 it ranged from 1 to 3 megatons. At present, the average capacity of one American nuclear warhead is less than 250 kt.
There are two interesting circumstances concerning the reduction of the power of some types of YaBZ. Starting in 2020, the tactical and strategic aviation of the US Air Force will begin to receive the modernized B61-12 nuclear bombs with a medium-power YABZ (that is, with a range of 10-50 kt) with a variable TNT equivalent, which will replace all other nuclear bombs. In December 2016, the Scientific Council of the US Department of Defense recommended having a larger number of nuclear warheads of "low" power (that is, with a range of 1-10 kt) for limited use according to selected options.
By the end of the nuclear confrontation between the USA and the USSR, it was believed that 80-90% of the US strategic nuclear forces and 72-77% of the aircraft missiles of the bombers would reach targets of destruction, the chances of delivering nuclear bombs by bombers of various types were estimated at 27-60%. By the same time, the accuracy of delivering YaBZ to the intended aiming points had improved to several tens of meters for new aircraft missiles and up to several hundred meters for new ballistic missiles of the US Strategic Nuclear Forces.
In 1954-2002, the number of standard strategic bombers, ICBMs and SLBMs in the US SNF did not fall below 1,000, and in some periods exceeded the level of 2,000. In 2018, the US SNF intends to have 800 carriers of nuclear weapons counted under the 2010 treaty (66 bombers, 454 silos of ICBMs, 280 launchers of SLBMs), the delivery vehicles of which will be capable of carrying 1,550 reckoned nuclear warheads (in fact, more than 2 thousand YABZ). In the next 8-25 years, 12 new Columbia-class SSBNs with 192 SLBMs (more than 1,000 modernized nuclear warheads), 100 new B-21 Raider strategic bombers (with 500 new nuclear ALCMs with modernized nuclear warheads and several hundred nuclear bombs B61-12), 400 new ICBMs (with 400 modernized nuclear warheads).
WIDE RANGE OF GOALS
Now let's talk about objects in more detail. There are two types of targeting: counter-force targeting at targets to destroy (neutralize) the enemy's direct military capabilities (from nuclear forces to groupings of troops (forces) and counter-value targeting to destroy (neutralize) those targets that ensure the country's ability to wage war (economy, including military Objects were subdivided into pre-planned and detected during the operation. Pre-planned objects, in turn, were divided into struck as needed upon request and struck in strict accordance with the schedule with an accuracy of minutes in relation to the designated reference time. to targets after detection or upon request is carried out as part of directed planning or adaptive planning.
If in the 1950s the number of possible targets increased from hundreds to several thousand, then in 1974 the list of strategic enemy targets increased to 25 thousand and reached the level of 40 thousand in 1980. In each country of Eurasia chosen for destruction by the US offensive nuclear weapons, there were from less than 10 objects to more than 10 thousand objects. Before the collapse and after the collapse of the USSR, the number of strategic objects intended for destruction according to the SIOP plan began to decline sharply: from 12,500 in 1987, 2,500 remained by 1994. If during the Cold War, an average of 2 was assigned to each designated epicenter of the US strategic nuclear forces, 5 YaBZ, and NATO strike forces of 1-1, 6 or more YaBZ, then after its completion in connection with the abandonment of obsolete nuclear weapons, a transition was made to targeting each epicenter that united one or several objects, on average 1, 4 YABZ SYAS. The facilities were usually subdivided into four main categories: nuclear forces, other military facilities, government and military administration, and the economy.
The content of a nuclear war for the US Strategic Nuclear Forces would be the destruction (neutralization) of a certain number of objects of one or several categories, so that after its completion it would be in a comparatively better position in relation to the enemy. With the appearance of nuclear weapons in the USSR, the United States planned to conduct a nuclear war of two types: with a mutual exchange of nuclear strikes (the United States is delivering nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union, and the USSR - against the continental United States) and with the use of US nuclear weapons in a theater of war far from them in Eurasia (the continental part of the United States would then enjoy immunity from enemy nuclear strikes). In the first case, a nuclear war would be called "strategic" in the United States, and "general nuclear war" or "general nuclear response" in NATO. In the second case, in the United States, it would be called a "nuclear war in the theater", and in NATO terminology "a war that does not reach the scale of a general nuclear war," that is, it would be a "limited nuclear war." With the advent of the Russian Federation, the US strategic nuclear war gradually gave way to "strategic nuclear operations", and nuclear war in the theater of war became "nuclear operations in the theater"; In NATO, the place of a general nuclear war and a limited nuclear war was taken by "strategic response" with plans for the main emergency types of nuclear strikes and "substrategic response" with plans for selective emergency types of nuclear strikes against the Russian Federation.
NUCLEAR WAR FOR TWO YEARS
The duration of the US nuclear war against the USSR in different periods of time was estimated from several days to two years, from the 1980s - in two to six months (until the repeal of the provision on a protracted nuclear war in 1997). In one of the exercises in 1979, the scenario of a strategic nuclear war provided for a semi-daily nuclear "spasm" in the form of the fulfillment of the SIOP plan by the US forces on duty (the result was the loss of 400 million people in the US and the USSR) with the conduct of subsequent nuclear operations by the forces of the US guaranteed nuclear reserve for five months for the destruction of the remaining unaffected and newly identified objects in the USSR.
The US strategic nuclear war against the countries of Eurasia, and above all against the USSR, was to be carried out according to the plans of the EWP of the Air Force Strategic Aviation Command (SAC) in the 40-50s, according to the SIOP SNF plans in the 60-90s (this name of the plan is formally remained until 2003), according to the number plans of the 80XX type strategic nuclear forces from the 90s. Strategic objects were subdivided into categories corresponding to the tasks; objects of the categories were distributed according to the types and variants of strikes.
There were several types of nuclear strikes: main (MAO), selective (SAO), limited (LAO), regional, by the forces of a guaranteed nuclear reserve. The main strikes were designed to destroy objects of specified categories with the maximum possible speed using several thousand nuclear warheads. Selective strikes were part of the main ones. For inflicting limited strikes, from a few units to hundreds of YaBZ would be used. Regional strikes would use forces in the forward areas (for example, during the US-Iranian crisis in the early 1980s, nuclear strikes were planned against Iran using 19 ALCMs by B-52 bombers). The guaranteed nuclear reserve included 25% of all US SSBNs, its forces could sometimes be used before and mainly after the implementation of the SIOP plan. In our century, the strategic nuclear forces were scheduled to deliver “emergency response” (ERO), selective (SAO), “main” (BAO) strikes, and “on orders” / “on adaptive plans” (DPO / APO) strikes.
SIOP plans, as a rule, were drawn up for the possibility of using any of four options for strikes: sudden, unexpected for the enemy; preemptive against a alerted enemy; response-oncoming upon detection of a launch (LOW) and after confirmation of the admission of enemy nuclear missiles to targets in the United States (LUA); response (LOA) after the first nuclear explosions in the United States.
The implementation of the SIOP plan in full depended on the duration of the entry into the duty forces of all bombers, ICBMs and SSBNs assigned to carry it out and ranged from one to one and a half weeks to one to two days. The time of launching ballistic missiles or takeoff of bombers and tanker aircraft was strictly regulated in relation to the reference time in order to ensure the conflict-free arrival of weapons at their targets at exactly the appointed time. In a normal situation, the SIOP on duty (and they had 35–55%, on average 40% of the YaBZ SNF) were kept ready to start launching a ballistic missile (aircraft takeoff) 5–15 minutes after receiving the order. With the maximum build-up of the duty forces, they would have at least 85% of the standard ICBMs, bombers, and SLBMs.
In the last decade of the Cold War, the US Strategic Nuclear Forces had more than 5,000 nuclear warheads on duty, in 1997 their number decreased to 2300, and now it is clearly less than 700 nuclear warheads of ICBMs and SLBMs. Strategic aviation, which in 1957 allocated 33% to the duty forces, 50% in 1961, and 14% in 1991, after the end of the Cold War, no longer carries a permanent combat duty at airbases with nuclear weapons on board. At the beginning of 1968 (then the US SNF had 4,200 active nuclear warheads), it was officially stated that as a result of the first nuclear strike by all the USSR SNF in the United States, 50% of the SNF would survive and that three quarters of the surviving forces (these 75% meant the duty forces) would reach their objects and destroy over 40% of the population and over 75% of the industrial capacity of the enemy.
EUROPEAN THEATER
In a nuclear war in the European theater of war, NATO's Nuclear Strike Forces (UYF) in Europe could use American nuclear weapons to deliver limited nuclear strikes (LNO) to destroy dozens of military and industrial facilities in each, for example, air bases in Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria; regional strikes (RNO) in one or several theaters of operations, for example, to defeat the first echelon of an advancing enemy; strikes to the full depth of the theater (NOP) against stationary targets and enemy troop / forces concentration.
The basis of actions to the entire depth of the theater of war (to the Urals) was the SSP plan of the Supreme Command of the Allied Forces of NATO in Europe, which was a 4-5 times smaller copy of the American SIOP plan, with which it was fully coordinated in terms of targets and the time of their destruction, and was intended for destruction primarily those objects that threatened the Euro-Asian allies of the United States in NATO. Preemptive actions by NATO's nuclear forces in 1969, according to this plan, were planned either for objects of the ATS countries, excluding the USSR, or only for objects of the USSR, or for all objects of the ATS. Judging by the list of high-priority sites for this plan in 1978, out of 2,500 sites, one-third were in the USSR and two-thirds were on the territory of its allies in Eastern Europe. In 1983, NATO could use up to 1,700 air bombs from tactical aviation of the Air Force, over 150 air bombs from tactical aviation of the Navy, about 300 YABZ BRMD, 400 YABZ SLBMs and about 100 YABZ SLBMs of Great Britain.
Direct nuclear support (NSP) of ground forces in Europe was to be carried out partly during a limited nuclear war and in full in an all-out nuclear war with standard ground nuclear weapons with the involvement of tactical aviation. In the 70s and 80s, the US Army operated plans for direct nuclear support in the form of constantly updated "nuclear packages" of corps and "nuclear subpackages" of divisions, providing for the use of nuclear missile launchers, NURs, atomic artillery, missiles and landmines in the near zone. In the 70s, it was believed that one US field army would spend 400 YABZ every day. In the 70s and 80s, the US Army Corps could use up to 450 nuclear warheads with a total capacity of up to one and a half megatons during an operation in its combat zone. In 1983, of the 3330 YABZs available then for the US Army for projectiles and tactical missiles in Europe, there were 2565 (77%) such YABZs. In 1991, the US Armed Forces abandoned tactical nuclear weapons of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, and in 2012, the Tomahawk SLCM.
By the end of the Cold War, only 5% of the "dual-use" fighter-bombers were part of the NATO nuclear forces on duty in Europe; soon the combat duty of these aircraft with nuclear bombs on board in 15-minute readiness for take-off was terminated. In the European zone, there were significantly more non-strategic ("tactical") US nuclear warheads for the Army and Air Force than in the Pacific Ocean zone: for example, in 1967, this nuclear stockpile in Europe was close to 7 thousand nuclear warheads, and in the Pacific Ocean zone there were more than 3 thousand, although there was a US war against North Vietnam. If in Western Europe the FRG was the main "nuclear cellar", then in the Far East it was the island of Okinawa. By 2010, of the approximately 500 US nuclear bombs intended for use by tactical aircraft in the Air Force, up to 40% were in Europe. Nuclear support for NATO countries and other US allies is envisaged with the use of American "non-strategic nuclear weapons" and with the participation of the US strategic nuclear forces.
Significant are the provisions set out in the communiqué on the NATO Summit in Warsaw on 8-9 July 2016. "Any use of nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamentally change the nature of the conflict." "… NATO has the capacity and determination to price the adversary at a price that would be unacceptable and far exceed the benefits that the adversary would expect to receive." It is known that NATO has never abandoned the use of nuclear weapons first, at its own discretion. The communiqué does not say a word about NATO's preemptive substrategic and strategic response, as if it were all implied by itself, but it declares that “any” use of nuclear weapons by the adversary changes the nature of the conflict “radically” and that now the cost of such use of nuclear weapons by the adversary is in comparison with the previous prices will rise for him "significantly". Compare this to the 1991 NATO nuclear use clause (any use of nuclear weapons, especially in the early stages, should be considered deliberately limited, selective, restrained) and feel the difference.
COUNTER-VALUE TARGING
In 1979, the President of the United States claimed that every American submarine with Poseidon SLBMs carries enough nuclear warheads to destroy large and medium-sized cities in the Soviet Union. Then the United States had 21 SSBNs with SLBMs of this type, each SSBN carried up to 160 YaBZ with a capacity of 40 kt, and in the USSR there were 139 cities with a population of 200 thousand people or more. Now the United States has 14 SSBNs, each such SSBN with Trident SLBMs has about 100 YaBZ, but already with a capacity of 100 or 475 kt, and in the Russian Federation there are about 75 cities with a population of 250 thousand people or more. In 1992, the NATO secretary general announced the end of targeting missiles at large cities. Consequently, NATO's "taboo" on delivering nuclear strikes did not apply to medium and small cities in the USSR. In accordance with the 2013 nuclear strategy, the United States will not rely on a counter-value strategy, will not deliberately target civilians and civilian objects, and will seek to minimize collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects.
The manual on the laws of war, amended by the Pentagon in December 2016, requires compliance with five principles: military necessity, humanity (prohibition of causing unnecessary suffering, injury or destruction to achieve a military goal), proportionality (refusal to use unreasonable or excessive force, refusal threat to civilians and civilian objects), demarcation (differentiation between military and civilian objects, military personnel and civilians) and honor. This precept prohibits attacks by any means on unarmed small, medium and large cities. But pay attention to the main circumstance: in these documents there is not a word about the US refusal from nuclear targeting of military facilities and military resources in enemy cities. And the proclamation of emphasis on the counter-force component of the strategic nuclear forces means that the United States intends to use nuclear weapons first, when and where it will be beneficial to them.
PLANNING ISSUES
In nuclear planning, the US Armed Forces are guided by quite understandable aspirations: to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries that do not possess them; prevent the use of nuclear weapons by old and new adversary states on the territory of the United States; reduce the level of damage and destruction on its territory in the event of a nuclear war.
The proliferation of nuclear weapons can be prevented by the use of conventional or nuclear weapons according to the supplier and consumer.
It is possible to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by the enemy on its territory by a preventive or preemptive strike if it has a reliable system of defense against ballistic missiles.
To reduce the damage and the level of destruction in your country from the actions of the enemy, you can either by mutual agreement with him on the "rules of the game" (using limited or selective types of strikes to reduce the scale of nuclear operations with the likelihood of an early mutual termination of nuclear strikes, refraining from using high-power nuclear weapons, renouncing the use of nuclear weapons against objects in cities), or mutual reduction of nuclear weapons to a minimum acceptable to both sides. In the USA in 2011-2012, studies were carried out on the possibility of reducing the nuclear warheads of the US SNF, first to 1000-1100, then to 700-800 and then to 300-400 nuclear weapons, and in 2013, a proposal was made to reduce the nuclear warheads of the US and RF SNF each side. The rationale is quite clear: with a mutual reduction in the number of strategic nuclear warheads and with a unilateral sharp increase in the US missile defense capabilities, this country gains an advantage in the number of nuclear warheads reaching its targets. It is obvious that it is now unprofitable for the Russian Federation to agree to both the reduction of the nuclear weapons of its strategic nuclear forces and the reduction of the number of its non-strategic nuclear warheads, which compensate for the superiority of the United States in precision weapons and missile defense and create a certain barrier against the nuclear-armed countries of Europe and Asia.
The plans for the use of nuclear weapons are reflected in the "field" exercises (with forces) and command and staff exercises (KSHU) with designated forces, which are regularly conducted in the US Strategic Nuclear Forces. For example, annually there was a large-scale "field" exercise of the SAC Global Shield in 1979-1990, the exercise of the Joint Strategic Command (USC) Bulwark Bronze in 1994-1995, Global Guardian in 1996-2003, Global Thunder since 2005. KSHU USC with designated forces (such as Polo Hat, Global Archer, Global Storm) were sometimes held several times a year, now the annual KSHU with designated Global Lightning forces is gaining momentum. Regularity is also inherent in the activities of NATO forces to practice the conditional use of nuclear weapons.
In accordance with the 2013 nuclear strategy, the United States will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear nonproliferation treaty countries. From the 2010 Pentagon Nuclear Review, it can be understood that the United States intends to use nuclear weapons against states that possess nuclear weapons or do not comply with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, as well as against states of these two categories that may use conventional or chemical and biological weapons against The United States or its allies and partners. Judging by the statement made in April 2017 by the USC commander, the opponents of his country are the Russian Federation, China, North Korea and Iran.
What dilemmas does the United States face in planning the use of nuclear weapons? In Asia, the number of nuclear warheads is increasing in countries possessing nuclear weapons “legally” (China) and “illegally” (Pakistan, India, North Korea). At the same time, there is an increase in the number of states whose nuclear weapons are capable of reaching the continental United States (remember the Indian SSBNs and the recently shown North Korean SLBM). The American nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging over Eurasia, is increasingly becoming a nuclear boomerang, threatening the United States itself. This requires counterforce targeting from the United States. With the reduction of nuclear ammunition by large countries to a level of several hundred nuclear warheads for each and with a possible limitation of the TNT equivalent for the most powerful nuclear warheads to hundreds or several tens of kilotons, the temptation for the mutual use of nuclear weapons by these countries on military facilities to achieve victory in the war, so and the ability of such countries to demographic and economic survival in a mutual counter-value exchange of nuclear strikes. The latter would require strengthening counter-value targeting to the detriment of counter-force targeting.
Since there is no hope for a voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons on the part of those "legal" and "illegal" nuclear states in Eurasia that are not allies of the United States, planning for the use of US nuclear weapons in Eurasia will continue.
And a gun hanging on the stage of the theater can fire during the play.
