The conquest of the territory of the Soviet Arctic occupied one of the important places in the fascist plan of war with our country. The strategic goal of the German offensive in the North was the capture of the Kirov railway, the city of Murmansk with its ice-free port, the Polyarny naval base, the Middle and Rybachy peninsulas, and the entire Kola Peninsula. To carry out their plans, the fascist command intended to make extensive use of sea transportation. They acquired decisive importance for the enemy, since there were no railways in the north of Norway and Finland, and there were few highways. The role of sea communications has grown so much that without them the enemy could not conduct combat operations either with its own ground forces or naval forces. In addition, the military industry of Germany was very dependent on the stability of sea communications: 70-75% of nickel was supplied from the northern regions of Scandinavia.
For sea transportation, the Germans used most of their own and almost the entire Norwegian (merchant and fishing) fleet, and to ensure the stability of communications they attracted significant forces of escort ships and fighter aircraft.
The disruption of enemy sea communications from the very beginning of the war became one of the main tasks of our Northern Fleet (SF), in the solution of which its aviation also took an active part. The combat use of aviation was complicated by the physical and geographical conditions. Polar nights and days adversely affected the flight crew's performance. The presence of a large number of deep-water fjords, bays, as well as islands and a high rocky coast, created favorable conditions for the enemy for the formation of convoys and their passage by sea, at the same time making it difficult to use mines, low torpedo bombers against them (during the war years, the aviation of the fleets had the so-called low and high-altitude torpedo bombers: low torpedo bombers carried out an attack on ships at altitudes of 20-50 m, torpedoing from a height of 25-30 m; high-altitude torpedoes dropped by parachute from heights of at least 1000 m), as well as limiting the choice of directions for attacks by aircraft of any type. In addition, frequent snow and rain charges of considerable duration, strong winds and blizzards complicated and sometimes disrupted combat missions.
At the beginning of the war, the capabilities of the Northern Fleet aviation for operations on enemy sea lanes were very limited. It did not include torpedo and assault aircraft, and a small number of bombers and fighters were used to assist the ground forces. Therefore, to disrupt enemy communications, naval aviation was occasionally involved. At the same time, strikes were mainly delivered against transports and convoys going to the ports of the Varanger Fjord, from where the enemy's land and sea groupings were fed. And only in October 1941, after the front line had stabilized and with the beginning of the polar night, it became possible to use SB-type aircraft and partly reconnaissance aircraft for actions on enemy ports and bases, in which the main targets of strikes were transports and ships, and the spare were port structures.
Air strikes were carried out on the ports and bases of Varanger Fjord: Liinakhamari, Kirkenes, Vardo, Vadsø, located more than 200 km from our airfields. As a rule, bombers flew to attack targets without cover, carrying out individual targeted bombing from altitudes of 4000 to 7000 m. Under favorable conditions, attacks were sometimes launched against ships and at sea crossing. The results, of course, were very modest: having made over 500 sorties in 1941, bomber aircraft sank only 2 transports and damaged several ships.
In the spring of 1942, the operational situation in the North changed dramatically: the main struggle was shifted from the land to the sea, and was fought mainly on sea lanes. The Northern Fleet at this time is reinforced by the 94th Aviation Regiment from the Air Force of the Soviet Army, and in the summer, by the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters, a special naval air group was also transferred to it, consisting of three bomber regiments armed with Pe-2 and DB-3F bombers, and two fighter aviation regiments … In September, the fleet was replenished with two more aviation regiments (Pe-3 aircraft). In addition, at this time, the 24th mine and torpedo regiment was being formed, the 36th long-range air division, consisting of 60 DB-3F aircraft, entered the operational subordination of the fleet.
The measures taken to strengthen the aviation group of the Northern Fleet made it possible to move from rare raids in small groups on enemy ports and bases to intensive operations of larger air groups. However, all this demanded from the command a more perfect organization of hostilities and the coordination of efforts of diverse aviation forces. It was especially necessary to increase the role of mine and torpedo aviation, which has the most effective weapon in the fight against sea lanes - aviation torpedoes. In May 1942, the naval aviation received the first batch of torpedoes for low torpedo throwing. Since that time, a turning point has come in its use on enemy routes of communication. Torpedo bombers are becoming the main type of aviation in the fight against enemy traffic. The aviation area expanded to the Altenfjord.
By the beginning of the war, the aviation of the Northern Fleet had 116 aircraft, including 49 sea (boat) reconnaissance aircraft MBR-2, 11 SB bombers, 49 fighters, 7 transport (boat) GTS aircraft. The method of "free hunting" became widespread at this time, since the enemy escorted transports with relatively little security. After detecting transports, torpedoes were dropped at a distance of 400 m or more from the target. The first successful attack by pilots who carried out low torpedo throwing in the North was made on June 29, 1942. The convoy, which left the Varanger Fjord, consisted of 2 transports and 8 escort ships. For his attack, 2 torpedo bombers were sent, under the command of Captain I. Ya. Garbuz. Near the Porsanger Fjord Bay, at about 6 pm, the torpedo bombers discovered an enemy convoy, marching 25 miles from the coast. Having entered from the direction of the sun, the planes began to approach the enemy, building an attack on the largest transport that was going in the head. From a distance of 400 m, the crews dropped torpedoes and, firing at the escort ships from onboard machine guns, withdrew from the attack. The result of the attack was the sinking of a transport with a displacement of 15 thousand tons. By the end of the year, low torpedo bombers conducted 5 more successful attacks, sinking 4 ships and a patrol ship.
"Free hunting" was carried out most often in pairs, and sometimes in three planes. Group searches and attacks soon became the main torpedo bombers: in 1942, out of 20 attacks, only 6 conducted single aircraft. An important condition for the success of group searches and strikes was the provision of reliable intelligence data. As the combat experience of the crews grew, it began to practice delivering torpedo strikes in the dark. This was already a big step forward for the young torpedo aircraft of the Northern Fleet. Captain G. D. Popovich. He won his first victory at night on August 15, 1942, the second on December 15 of the same year, sinking in each of the attacks on transport. He deserves the honor of introducing night torpedo strikes into the daily practice of torpedo aircraft.
Simultaneously with the delivery of torpedo strikes, aviation began to use mines, the setting of which was carried out by single machines in ports or straits inaccessible to other forces of the fleet. In total, in 1942, the crews of the Northern Fleet aircraft made more than 1200 sorties for operations on communications, of which about half were for reconnaissance, and the others were for striking ports and convoys, as well as setting minefields. The result of these actions was the destruction of 12 enemy ships.
In 1943, the fleet continued to receive new aircraft, which not only made up for their loss, but also made it possible to form new air units. So, as part of the Air Force, the Northern Fleet began combat work against enemy ships of the 46th Assault Aviation Regiment. He was armed with Il-2 attack aircraft.
A significant event for the entire fleet at that time was the first victory of the 46th Shap, won on June 7, 1943, when it hit a convoy, which was discovered by air reconnaissance in Kobbholfjord. Attack aircraft flew up to the convoy from Finland. The appearance of unknown aircraft caused confusion among the enemy. The ships gave strong identification signals and opened fire only when the Il-2 began to dive at them. Soviet pilots dropped 33 bombs on the convoy and fired 9 rockets. The lead transport with a displacement of 5000 tons, which was hit by bombs dropped by Lieutenant S. A. Gulyaev, caught fire and sank. The second ship was damaged by an aircraft piloted by Captain A. E. Mazurenko.
In addition to attack aircraft, the convoys were attacked by groups of aircraft of the 29th dive regiment, covered by small groups of fighters. The area of their operations, in most cases, was the Varanger Fjord. So, on June 16, 1943, six Pe-2s (leading Major S. V. Lapshenkov) were tasked with bombing a convoy discovered by reconnaissance at Cape Omgang. On the route, the group, having deviated to the left, went to Vardø and thus found themselves. To mislead the enemy, Lapshenkov turned the group on the opposite course, and then, being far out to sea, again led her to the goal. The convoy was found off Cape Macquore. Masquerading as clouds, the leader brought the planes to the target and gave the signal: "For a dive attack." The flights were rebuilt in the bearing system with an interval of 350 m between them, and between the planes at a flight of 150 m and began the attack. The crews from the altitudes of 2100-2000 m introduced the machines at an angle of 60-65 ° into a dive and from the altitudes of 1200-1300 m they dropped 12 FAB-250 bombs. 8 fighters covered the "petliakovs" when entering and exiting a dive. Both groups returned without loss. In this battle, Lapshenkov's group sank the transport.
The increased losses in transport ships and escort ships forced the fascist command to resort to some measures to strengthen the protection of the convoys. Since the summer of 1943, the composition of the convoys usually included 3-4 transports with cargo and troops and up to 30 escort ships, of which 1-2 destroyers, 4-5 minesweepers, 8-10 patrol ships and 6-7 patrol boats. At the same time, the enemy began to widely use new methods of securing convoys on the crossing, creating very difficult conditions for our pilots to reach the target and attack transports. Movement directly near the coastline and covering one of the flanks of the convoy with high rocky shores, which made it difficult to attack low torpedo bombers and mastheads, allowed the enemy to push escort ships towards the open sea 10-15 km from the defended transports. And before dropping a torpedo or bomb on a target, the aircraft had to overcome this zone, saturated with anti-aircraft fire from ships and the coast.
As an example of the composition of the convoy and the density of its anti-aircraft fire, one can name the convoy, which was discovered by a reconnaissance aircraft on October 12, 1943, at Cape Nordkin. He followed to the east, clinging to the coast, consisted of 3 transports and had a strong guard.6 minesweepers went ahead along the course, 3 patrol ships on the right near the coast. Seaward of the transports, three security lines were created: the first - 2 destroyers, the second - 6 patrol ships and the third - 6 patrol boats. Two fighter planes patrolled the convoy. The firepower of this convoy was determined by the number of guns and anti-aircraft machine guns available on all ships.
Considering that the attacking aircraft are in the anti-aircraft fire zone for 3 minutes before the attack starts and, in addition, they are fired upon after leaving the attack for 2 minutes, then the total duration of their stay under fire is 5 minutes. During the same time, provided that only 50% of the anti-aircraft artillery and machine guns of the convoy are fired, 1,538 shells and 160 thousand bullets can be fired.
Enemy fighters also posed a great danger to attacking aircraft, which usually operated as follows:
- when the convoy approached the reach of our aviation, 2-4 Me-110 fighters patrolled over it, at the same time all the air defense means of the convoy and the coast were put on high alert;
- with the detection by visual observation posts or radio-technical means of reconnaissance aircraft in the air, the number of patrolling fighters increased; however, the bulk of them remained readily available at the airfields;
- a barrage was installed above the convoy, as a rule, at two, and sometimes at three heights (4000, 2000, 300 m);
- groups of 6-8 aircraft were sent to intercept our aircraft, and often enemy fighters entered our territory;
- by the time of the attack on the convoy, the Nazis sought to concentrate over it fighter aircraft from the nearest airfields. If this succeeded, then fierce battles were tied up over the convoy, and the strike aircraft had to carry out attacks with strong fighter resistance.
All this created considerable difficulties for the strike groups of the diverse aviation forces. But she did not stop the attacks of the convoys. On the contrary, the activity of the North Sea aviation increased. In her actions, one could see the matured tactical and fire skills. Increasingly, massive raids and combined strikes of all types of aviation began to be used. And in the last period of the war, fleet aviation, torpedo boats, and submarines successfully interacted. The following figures testify to the intensification of our aviation's actions on enemy communications: if in the 4th quarter of 1942 only 31 sorties were made to attack convoys, then in the 1st quarter of 1943 170 aircraft flew to German communications, of which 164 were torpedo bombers …
A typical example of organizing and conducting a combined strike is the attack on a convoy on October 13, 1943, near Cape Kibergnes (south of Vardø). The strike involved 4 tactical groups: six Il-2 attack aircraft, 3 high-altitude and 3 low torpedo bombers, and six Pe-2 dive bombers. All groups had a fighter cover of 30 aircraft. Reconnaissance aircraft established continuous surveillance of the German convoy and directed the air strike groups. The preliminary attacks of the Pe-2 and Il-2 weakened the defenses of the convoy and disrupted its order of battle, which made it easier for the low torpedo bombers to launch the attack. From 1000-1500 m they dropped 4 torpedoes (the most trained crews took 2 torpedoes each). German fighters provided strong resistance, and this somewhat reduced the results of the strike; however, a transport ship and a patrol ship were sunk, and 2 transports were damaged. In addition, 15 fascist aircraft were shot down in an air battle.
The aviation of the Northern Fleet, independently, as well as in cooperation with the Air Force of the Karelian Front and units of the ADD, delivered strong strikes at enemy airfields. Intense air combat in the summer of 1943 ended with the victory of Soviet aviation. The forces of the 5th German Air Fleet continued to weaken. At the beginning of 1944, at the northern airfields of Finland and Norway, the formations of this fleet numbered 206 aircraft, and in some months their number dropped to 120.
The enemy naval grouping in the bases of Northern Norway was significant. At the beginning of 1944, it included: a battleship, 14 destroyers, 18 submarines, 2 minelayers, more than fifty patrol ships and minesweepers, a flotilla of torpedo boats, more than 20 self-propelled barges, about fifty boats, various auxiliary vessels. Surface ships, with air defense systems on them, and German aviation were mainly involved in protecting shipping on communications, so 1944 was not an easy year for the SF aviation. In outlining missions and distributing strike and support forces among targets, depending on their location, the naval aviation command approached their implementation in a differentiated manner. If, for example, torpedo bombers went on long-distance raids on enemy communications, then, given the limited range of attack aircraft, 46 Shap mainly conducted combat work on close communications.
Using the rich experience of our other fleets, the Severomors mastered topmast bombing. The method got this name because of the low heights of dropping bombs - from 20-30 m, that is, at the level of the top (upper part) of the mast. This tactic gave a large percentage of hits on the target. The pilots of the 46th Assault and 78th Fighter Aviation Regiments, and then the 27th Fighter Aviation Regiment, were the first among the Severomorians to master this method of bombing. The new method was most actively used by the 46th chap. In 1944, attack aircraft sank 23 enemy ships and transport vessels. Aviation intensified its work on enemy communications even more. By 1944, it had grown significantly and included 94 attack aircraft, 68 torpedo bombers and 34 bombers. The skill of the flight personnel and the high training of the aviation command personnel made it possible to come close to solving the most difficult problem of the fight against shipping - the organization of tactical interaction of heterogeneous forces, that is, the delivery of simultaneous strikes against convoys by them. First of all, this was achieved in the blockade actions against the port of Petsamo. In particular, on May 28, as a result of joint attacks on enemy convoys of Soviet torpedo boats, aircraft and a coastal one, three transports and a tanker were sunk, and the minesweeper, two patrol boats and three other ships were damaged. After this battle, the enemy no longer made a single attempt to lead ships to the port of Liipa-hamari or to withdraw them from there.
From June 17 to July 4, the port of Kirkenes, which was the main unloading point for Nazi military cargo and the port of sending ore to Germany, was dealt three powerful strikes (from 100 to 130 aircraft each). The constant actions of Soviet aviation in Kirkenes and the blockade of the port of Petsamo, carried out by artillery and torpedo boats, forced the Nazis to carry out part of their cargo operations in the Tana and Porsanger fjords remote from the front.
Our aviation inflicted strong blows on enemy convoys at sea. So, in May-June, six strikes were carried out, in which 779 aircraft were involved. The 5th mine and torpedo division, the 14th mixed air division, the 6th IAD and the 46th shap, in close cooperation, sometimes achieved the complete defeat of the convoys.
An example of the interaction of heterogeneous fleet forces is the actions of aviation and torpedo boats in the fall of 1944. So, on September 24, the submarine "S-56" found the convoy, attacked it and sent the transport to the bottom. After that, the commander reported that the convoy was heading towards Varangerfjord. Fleet commander Admiral A. G. Golovko, having received this report, ordered the Air Force commander and the commander of the torpedo boat brigade to make a series of consecutive and joint strikes in order to destroy the convoy.
The convoy that approached Cape Skalnes was significantly strengthened by the addition of ships from Vardø, Vadsø and Kirkenes. Low clouds and haze made it difficult for our planes and boats to observe the convoy, so it was not possible to accurately determine its composition. The strike of the first group of attack aircraft coincided with the attack of the boats: at 10:45 am 12 Il-2, covered by 14 fighters, launched an assault bombing strike, and at the same moment the attacks of 9 torpedo boats began. The blow lasted 6 minutes. Groups of cover and combat fighters supported the actions of attack aircraft, and a separate group covered the boats. 2 minutes after the attack of the last boat, the attack of the second group of attack aircraft, consisting of 8 Il-2 and 10 Yak-9 covered from the air, followed. The actions of bombers and attack aircraft made it easier for boats to withdraw from the battle and separation from the enemy. However, the enemy sent a detachment of patrol boats from the Bekfjord to intercept the Soviet boats on their way back to the base. Our command sent a special group of attack aircraft to the area, which thwarted the enemy's attempt. In addition, the aviation carried out several strikes on coastal batteries in the areas of Komagnes, Skalnes, Sture-Eckerey in order to suppress their fire. Thus, tactical interaction of torpedo boats was achieved not only with fighter cover, as it was before, but also with aviation strike groups. The Nazis lost 2 minesweepers, 2 self-propelled barges and a patrol boat.
After the joint strike, the aviation launched a series of attacks. At Cape Skalnes, the remnants of the convoy were attacked by 24 fighter-bombers. An hour after them, attack aircraft again took off to attack the port of Kirkenes, where the enemy ships took refuge. A group of 21 Il-2s, covered by 24 fighters, took part in these actions. One transport was sunk, one ship and a patrol ship were damaged. At the same time, 16 other aircraft blocked the Luostari airfield.
In October, in the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation, all types of aviation operated against enemy convoys, as a result, these actions resulted, in fact, in the air pursuit of enemy convoys carrying out intensive transportation of personnel and equipment. In just one month, 63 convoys were observed off the coast of Northern Norway, including 66 transports and 80 self-propelled landing barges. Thanks to the actions of the SF aviation in the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation, the enemy lost up to 20 transports. During air battles during this time, 56 enemy aircraft were shot down over the sea. In total, during the war, the aviation of the fleet destroyed 74 transports, 26 ships and auxiliary vessels.
