Long-term military-political pressure on Tehran from Washington, expressed in the regular presence in the Arabian Sea of the US Navy's naval and aircraft carrier strike groups, as well as in the transformation of the entire western coast of the Arabian Peninsula into an anti-aircraft / anti-missile and at the same time strike outpost of the US Armed Forces near the Iranian maritime border, forced the military-industrial complex of this powerful state to concentrate on large programs for the development of high-precision strike and defensive weapons. The basis in the formation of the country's effective defense capability was taken ambitious projects and contracts for the re-equipment of the outdated air defense system, as well as the renewal of the radio equipment assigned to it.
As a result, we were able to observe the birth of the strongest air defense in the region, comparable in capabilities to those of Saudi Arabia and Israel. At the same time, in this direction, Tehran was able to achieve relative self-sufficiency, as indicated by the recent statement of Iranian Defense Minister Hussein Dehkan that there is no need to purchase Russian S-400 Triumph air defense systems. Here, Iran's air defense missile defense system is based on the most high-tech "semi-national" project - the Bavar-373 air defense missile system, which embodies the element base of the Chinese HQ-9 and our S-300PT / PS. Some elements of the latter were at the disposal of the creators of the complex for one and a half to two decades.
The anti-ship capabilities of the Iranian army (against the background of the lack of the required number of strike fighter-carriers of anti-ship missiles and the "frail" surface component of the fleet) are supported by the motley coastal batteries of the anti-ship missile complex, which are subordinate to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The most common BKRK are "Noor" and "Qader", which have a range of 120 and 250-300 km, respectively. These anti-ship missiles are developed on the basis of the Chinese C-802 and have a similar speed (800 - 900 km / h), a similar flight profile (25 m on the cruising section and 4-5 - on the final) and an identical radar signature of the order (EPR about 0, 15 m2). The two types of missiles are accommodated in built-in modular launchers mounted on a wheeled chassis of Mercedes-Benz Axor trucks. On the same trucks, a kung is also located with a combat control point for the coastal SCRC battery. The IRGC and the Iranian Armed Forces are armed with several hundred similar batteries with 1000 or more anti-ship missiles "Noor" and "Qader", ready for immediate use, but their range allows them to fire at enemy surface ships in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. As you know, the tactics of the US Navy AUG provides for an attack by the Tomahawk TFR from a distance of 500-800 km, which is carried out in parallel with the anti-radar operation of carrier-based aircraft.
Since Iran does not yet have the proper surface component of the fleet and air force, 3 low-noise Russian diesel-electric submarines pr.877 EKM will play a huge role here. Nevertheless, in Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain there are a huge number of strategically important facilities of the US Armed Forces (including the headquarters of the 5th Operational Fleet of the US Navy), for the protection of which, if necessary, Washington will definitely attract a reinforced AUG with 4- 5 EM "Arley Burke Burke" and 2 more RRC URO "Ticonderoga" in the composition (the US will never send a standard AUG to the shores of Iran). In this situation, missiles "Noor" and "Qadir" may be needed. Iranian calculations will be able to launch on the American grouping from several dozen to two hundred RCC Nur and Kader from the coastal areas of the provinces of Harmazgan, Fars and Bushehr, but even this number is unlikely to be enough to break through the "anti-missile shield" 5 - 7 "Aegis" -ships. After all, the slow subsonic Iranian anti-ship missiles will not be opposed to the outdated RIM-67D or RIM-156A missiles with PARGSN, but two types of promising anti-missiles - the light RIM-162 ESSM and the long-range RIM-174 ERAM. The latter are equipped with an active radar seeker and can be guided by target designation of E-2D "Advanced Hawkeye" AWACS deck aircraft, thanks to which Iranian anti-ship missiles will be successfully intercepted at the 50-100 km line beyond the horizon from the AUG.
The Iranian Armed Forces also have a number of simpler medium-range anti-ship missiles, among which are noted such products as: subsonic S-801K (range 50 km, flight height 7-20 m, carriers - tactical fighters F-4E, Su-24M and etc.), "Raad" (3-ton anti-ship missile with a range of 350 km and a speed of 900 km / h, it has a large RCS of about 0.3-0.5 m2, designed on the basis of the Chinese S-201), the Nasr family "And" Kowsar "(range up to 35 km and speed ≥1M, warhead weight 29-130 kg, etc. But the greatest interest continues to be aroused by operational-tactical anti-ship ballistic missiles of the" Khalij-e-Fars "(" Persian Gulf ") and "Hormuz-2." did not become widespread due to various tactical and technological technical shortcomings that are characteristic of the RCC of the 60s. XX century.
The most significant of them are considered subsonic speed and low thrust-to-weight ratio with a large radar signature. An equally unpleasant moment can be considered the fact that a powerful suspended solid-propellant rocket booster with a thrust of 29 to 33 tons is used to launch a 3-ton anti-ship missile "Raad", which creates a huge infrared radiation. As a consequence: the missile launch site can easily be detected by high-resolution infrared complexes of high-altitude UAVs and tactical aircraft at a distance of 150 km or more. For comparison: the thrust of the accelerator of the Harpoon anti-ship missile system is only 6, 6 tons.
As it became known on March 9, 2017 from the information and news platform rbase.new-factoria.ru with reference to the Iranian news agency "Tasnim", the commander of the Air Force and Space Forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Brigadier General Amir-Ali Hajizade a statement about the successful training launch of the ballistic anti-ship missile system "Hormuz-2" in early March. The missile was able to hit a training target at a distance of 250 km, which is already a very good result for IRI, because achieving the minimum circular probable deviation (CEP) for a high-speed ballistic missile is a very delicate matter, providing for the high performance of its onboard computing facilities, as well as the speed data transmission from the seeker to the aerodynamic control module. With a high degree of probability, it can be assumed that the element base of this missile, like most types of Iranian precision weapons, is of Chinese origin. For obvious reasons, the statement of the IRGC command makes one feel real pride in the Iranian military-industrial complex, but how effective is the new concept of high-precision weapons against the above-described US Navy AUG or the air defense-missile defense system created by the American army in the countries of the "Arabian coalition"?
To answer this question, you need to familiarize yourself with the tactical and technical characteristics of this missile, as well as the principle of its use, which is fundamentally different from other (low-altitude and subsonic) anti-ship missiles of the Iranian Armed Forces. No matter how many Iranian media have declared about the uniqueness of the new missile, it is a "thoroughbred" conceptual analogue of the earlier ballistic anti-ship missile "Khalij-e-Fars". Both missiles have a range of 300 km and a speed of about 3200 km / h. Taking into account the circular probable deviation of the first modification of "Khalij-e-Fars", we were able to reduce from 30 to 8.5 m, the indicator of "Hormuz-2" can reach up to 5 m. This possibility appeared thanks to the equipment of the missile with modern television or infrared seeker of high resolution. Thanks to the modular type of the guidance compartment, a centimeter / millimeter active radar seeker can also be installed. With a warhead weight of 650 kg, an error (CEP) of 5-7 m is not a significant drawback, and the enemy's surface watercraft suffers serious damage.
Moreover, "Hormuz-2" has the ability to destroy mobile / stationary ground targets, and therefore can be used not only to defeat combat surface ships of the US Navy and the "Arabian coalition" fleets, but also to strike at the most powerful and dangerous bridgeheads of the US Air Force near the western coast of the Persian Gulf, which include airbases: Al-Dhafra (UAE), Al-Udeid (Qatar) and Al Salem (Kuwait). At the same time, AvB El-Udeid will very soon turn into an advanced link in the US regional aerospace defense system in the Western Asia region (a decimeter AN / FPS-132 Block-5 early warning radar with a range of 5,500 km will be deployed here, and its powerful Qatar Air Force fleet will cover it, represented by 72 tactical fighters F-15QA). It was vital for the Iranian armed forces to design a multipurpose operational-tactical missile system capable of striking both the AUG ships of the American fleet and the above ground targets in a matter of minutes. "Hormuz-2" has such capabilities. True, there are serious technical obstacles for this.
In particular, the upper sections of the ballistic trajectory of the Ormuz-2 missile, exactly like Khalij-e-Fars, pass at an altitude of 40-70 km in a speed range of 3 - 3, 2M, which turns it into a simple target for combat information and control systems "Aegis", as well as attached to them shipborne air defense systems SM-3 and SM-6, deployed on American destroyers and cruisers. Considering the E-3C / D aircraft in service with the US Navy's deck air wings, which allow the Iranian Hormuz-2 to be detected while still on the acceleration section of the trajectory, their interception can occur over the western section of the Persian Gulf as RIM-161B and RIM-174 ERAM anti-missiles and AIM-120D ultra-long-range air combat guided missiles, which are armed with F / A-18E / F "Super Hornet" carrier-based fighters.
Moreover, due to the low takeoff speed of 2300 - 2800 km / h, Ormuz can be quickly detected by the onboard radars of the Emirati and Qatari Mirage-2000-9 and Rafale, and then easily destroyed by air-to-air missiles. MICA-EM. Let's not forget about the Patriot PAC-2/3 air defense missile systems covering the American air bases on the Arabian Peninsula: for them, the Hormuz-2 missiles practically do not pose a threat at all. The new MIM-104C and ERINT anti-missiles have advanced semi-active and active radar seeker with ballistic target software. These interceptor missiles will shoot down dozens of Hormuz-2s with a probability of 0.8 - 0.95.
Unfortunately, even in the appearance of the Hormuz-2 missiles, the simple design of the aerodynamic controls and the absence of a block of gas-dynamic control engines can be clearly seen. All this points to the low maneuverability of the ballistic missile, which will not allow "escape" even from such a missile as "Super-530D" or AIM-7M "Sparrow." "Hormuz-2" is a large missile with an RCS of about 0.5 - 0.7 m2, which is why not only modern fighters of the "Arabian coalition" Air Force with active phased array can be detected, but also the Emirati "Mirage" equipped with slotted radars RDY-2 -2000-9 ".
The lack of high maneuverability of the Hormuz-2 missile, combined with the use of an active radar homing head, defines another unpleasant surprise for the IRGC command. Its essence lies in the simplicity of intercepting the Hormuz-2 ballistic anti-aircraft missile system using the RIM-116 Block-2 self-defense anti-aircraft missiles used in the ASMD (SeaRAM) shipborne anti-aircraft missile system. Even if the fairing of the "Hormuz-2" homing head does not have the required temperature to capture the infrared-ultraviolet seeker of the RIM-116 Block-2 RAM missile, the second (additional) passive radar guidance channel RIM-116, presented by two miniature radio interferometers placed in front of the radome of the thermal seeker on special "tendril" rods. Interferometers provide correction of guidance by electromagnetic radiation of an active radar homing head of an enemy missile. Consequently, in view of the impossibility of intensive anti-aircraft maneuvering of the Hormuz-2 missiles, the use of active radar guidance makes them even more vulnerable to the close defensive line of American destroyers, cruisers, littoral warships of the coastal zone and aircraft carriers (all of them are equipped with the ASMD complex).
Based on the above parameters of the new Iranian multipurpose OTBR, as well as the technological features of the air defense systems of the American fleet and the anti-missile defense of strategic air bases on the western shores of the Gulf, it can be emphasized that even the massive use of multipurpose operational-tactical ballistic missiles of the Khalij-e-Fars family / “Hormuz-2 will not allow the Iranian Armed Forces to inflict significant damage to the forward shock-defensive bridgehead of Washington on the Arabian Peninsula, including the support groups of the US Navy. For a noticeable change in the alignment of forces in Western Asia, Tehran needs to develop and large-scale production of promising supersonic types of high-precision weapons with a low-altitude flight profile, as well as low radar and infrared signature.
