It is believed that surface ships are extremely vulnerable to submarines. This is not entirely true. Moreover, although in modern war at sea it is submarines that are mainly supposed to destroy surface ships, in the past, when the naval confrontation was reduced to the struggle between the surface fleet and the submarine, the surface fleet won. And the key success factor in all cases was the hydroacoustic means of detecting submarines.
Start
In the early morning of September 22, 1914, three British Cressy-class armored cruisers were patrolling at sea near the port of Hoek Van Holland on the coast of the Netherlands. The ships moved in frontal formation in a 10-knot course, in a straight line, maintaining a distance of 2 miles from one ship to another, going without anti-submarine zigzags.
At 6.25 am, a powerful explosion occurred at the left side of the cruiser "Abukir". The ship lost its speed, steam engines on board (for example, winches for launching lifeboats) were disabled. After a while, a signal was raised on the sinking ship, forbidding other ships to approach it, but the commander of the second cruiser, "Hog", ignored him and rushed to save his comrades. For a moment, the sailors of the Hog saw a German submarine in the distance, which surfaced after firing a torpedo due to the sharply reduced weight, but immediately disappeared into the water.
At 6.55 on the left side of the "Hog" there was also a powerful explosion. Immediately after it, another one occurred - part of the ammunition load of 234-mm artillery shells on board detonated. The ship began to sink and within 10 minutes sank to the bottom. By this time, the Abukir had already sunk.
The third cruiser "Cressy" was on the way to the rescue of drowning sailors from the other side. From its side, the periscope of a German submarine was observed and opened fire on it. The British even considered that they had sunk it. But at 7.20 am, a powerful explosion also occurred off the Cressy. The ship after him, however, remained afloat, and at 7.35 he was finished off by the last torpedo.
All three cruisers were sunk by the German submarine U-9 under the command of Lieutenant Commander Otto Weddigen. The old submarine, built in 1910, which had extremely modest characteristics for 1914 and only four torpedoes sent three outdated, but still quite combat-ready ships to the bottom in less than an hour and a half and left intact.
This is how the era of submarine warfare began in the world. Until that day, submarines were considered by many naval commanders as a kind of circus on the water. After - no longer, and now this "no longer" was forever. Soon Germany will switch to unlimited submarine warfare, and its submarines will continue to be used against the surface ships of the Entente, sometimes with a devastating effect, such as the U-26, which drowned the Russian cruiser Pallada in the Baltic, on which the entire crew died in 598 during the detonation of ammunition. human.
About a couple of years before the end of the war, engineers in the Entente countries began to approach the means of detecting submarines. At the end of May 1916, inventors Shilovsky and Langevin filed a joint application in Paris for a "device for remote detection of underwater obstacles." In parallel, similar work (under the conditional code ASDIC) in an atmosphere of deep secrecy was carried out in Great Britain under the leadership of Robert Boyle and Albert Wood. But the first ASDIC Type 112 sonars entered service with the British Navy after the war.
After successful tests in 1919, in 1920, this model of the sonar rises into series. Several advanced instruments of this type were the primary means of detecting submarines during World War II. It was they who "took out on themselves" the battles of convoy ships against German submarines.
In 1940, the British transferred their technology to the Americans, who themselves had a serious acoustic research program, and soon the sonar equipment appeared on American warships.
The Allies went through the Second World War with just such sonars.
The first post-war generation of sonar equipment
The main direction of the development of hydroacoustic stations in the first post-war years of surface ships was integration with means of destruction (fire control systems of rocket depth charges and torpedoes), with some increase in characteristics from the level achieved during the Second World War (for example, GAS SQS-4 on the destroyers Forest Sherman ).
A sharp increase in the characteristics of the GAS required a large amount of research and development work (R&D), which went on intensively since the 50s, however, in the serial samples of the GAS were already implemented on the ships of the second generation (which entered service since the early 60s) …
It should be noted that the GASs of this generation were high-frequency and provided the ability to effectively search for submarines (within the limits of their characteristics), incl. in shallow water, or even lying on the ground.
In the USSR at that time, both promising R&D and active development of the Anglo-American and German experience and scientific and technical groundwork from the Second World War were going on to create domestic GAS of the first post-war generation of ships, and the result of this work was quite worthy.
In 1953, the Taganrog plant, now known as "Priboy", and then simply "mailbox number 32", released the first domestic full-fledged GAS "Tamir-11". In terms of its performance characteristics, it corresponded to the best examples of Western technology at the end of World War II.
In 1957, GAS "Hercules" was adopted for service, installed on ships of various projects, which in its characteristics was already comparable to the American GAS SQS-4.
Undoubtedly, the effectiveness of the use of GAS in difficult conditions of the marine environment directly depended on the training of personnel, and as experience has shown, in capable hands, ships with such GAS could effectively counteract even the latest nuclear submarines.
As an illustration of the capabilities of the GAS of the first post-war generation, we will give an example of one pursuit by Soviet ships of an American submarine
From the article cap. 2 ranks Yu. V. Kudryavtsev, commander of the 114th brigade of the OVR ships and cap. 3 ranks A. M. Sumenkov, commander of the 117th PLO division of the 114th brigade of OVR ships:
On May 21-22, 1964, the ship's anti-submarine strike group (KPUG) 117 dk PLO 114 bk OVR KVF of the Pacific Fleet as part of MPK-435, MPK-440 (project 122-bis), MPK-61, MPK-12. MPK-11 (Project 201-M) under the command of the commander of the 117th division of the PLO for a long time pursued a foreign nuclear submarine. During this time, the ships covered 2,186 miles at an average speed of 9, 75 knots. and lost contact 175 miles off the coast.
To evade ships, the boat changed its speed 45 times from 2 to 15 knots, turned 23 times through an angle of more than 60 °, described four full circulations and three circulations of the "eight" type. released 11 movable and 6 stationary simulators, 11 gas curtains, 13 times created sighting interference to sonars of ships with illumination of record records. During the pursuit, the operation of the UZPS means was noted three times and once the operation of the GAS boat in an active mode. Changes in the depth of immersion could not be noted accurately enough, since the ships chasing it were equipped with GAS "Tamir-11" and MG-11 without a vertical channel, but judging by an indirect sign - the range of confident contact - the depth of the course also varied within wide limits …
The whole article with schemes of pursuit, combat maneuvering and construction of an anti-aircraft defense order here, highly recommended to anyone interested in the subject.
It is worth paying attention to this: the article describes how an American submarine repeatedly tried to escape from pursuit with the help of a gas curtain, but then and at that moment it failed. Nevertheless, it is worth focusing on this - gas curtains were an effective means of evading the first generation GAS. The high-frequency signal, with all its advantages, did not give a clear picture when working "through" the curtain. The same applies to the situation when the boat intensively mixes the water with sharp maneuvers. In this case, even if the GAS detects it, then it is impossible to use a weapon according to its data: the curtain, whatever it may be, prevents the determination of the elements of the target's movement - speed and course. And often the boat was simply lost. An example of such evasion is well described in the memoirs of Admiral A. N. Lutsky:
The neighboring OVR brigade received new small anti-submarine ships (MPK). The local brigade commander allegedly told ours that now the boats cannot escape from them. They argued. And somehow he summons the brigade commander, sets the task - to occupy the BP area, in full view of the IPC, to dive, to break away, in any case, not to allow them to be monitored for more than 2 hours continuously, with a total search time of 4 hours.
We came to the area. Four IPCs are already in the area, waiting. We approached the "voice" communication, negotiated the conditions. The IPC retreated by 5 cables, surrounded on all sides. Here, devils, we agreed that they would go away by 10 kb! Yes, okay … Let's see how they digest the homemade preparations. In the central post, a set of IPs (hydroreactive imitation cartridges - auth.) And something else have been prepared for staging …
- Battle alarm! Places to stand to dive! Both motors forward average! Below, how many under the keel?
- Bridge, 130 meters under the keel.
- The IPC set in motion, turned on the sonars, escorted, devils …
- All down! An urgent dive! … The upper conning tower hatch is battened down! Boatswain, dive to a depth of 90 meters, trim 10 degrees sediment!
At a depth of 10 meters:
- First Mate, VIPS (launcher for jamming devices - author) - Pli! Put on IPs with full rate of fire! At a depth of 25 meters:
- Blow it fast to the bubble! Right aboard! Right motor back middle! Boatswain, full circulation with the motors "razdraj" on the course …!
So, stirring up the water from the surface almost to the ground, we lay down on a course along the underwater hollow to the far corner of the BP area. 10 m under the keel, the travel with one motor is "the smallest". The squeak of the sonars remained aft at the dive point, as the distance was getting quieter, quieter and quieter …
The IPC spun at the point of our immersion, probably for almost an hour, then lined up in the front line and began a systematic combing of the area. We, nestling on the ground, maneuvered along the far edge of the area. Four hours later, they never made it to us.
We came to the base. I report to the brigade commander, but he already knows.
- What have you thrown out there again?
- A pack of IPs.
- …?
- Well, a maneuver, of course.
In the next generation of GAS, the problem of gas curtains was solved.
Second post-war generation
The key feature of the second post-war generation of GAS was the emergence and active use of new powerful low-frequency GAS, with a sharply (by an order of magnitude) increased detection range (in the USA these were SQS-23 and SQS-26). Low-frequency HAS were insensitive to gas curtains and had a much greater detection range.
To search for submarines under the jump in the United States, a towed medium-frequency (13KHz) GAS (BUGAS) SQS-35 was developed.
At the same time, the high technological level allowed the United States to create low-frequency GAS suitable for placement on ships of even medium displacement, while the Soviet analogue of the SQS-26, the GAS MG-342 "Orion" anti-submarine cruisers of project 1123 and 1143 had huge mass and dimensions (only a telescopic retractable antenna had dimensions of 21 × 6, 5 × 9 meters) and could not be installed on ships of the SKR - BOD class.
For this reason, on ships of smaller displacement (including BOD Project 1134A and B, which had an "almost cruising" displacement), a smaller medium-frequency GAS "Titan-2" (with a range significantly less than American analogues) and towed GAS MG were installed -325 "Vega" (at the level of SQS-35).
Later, to replace the GAS "Titan-2", the MGK-335 "Platina" hydroacoustic complex (GAC) was developed in full configuration, which had a subkeeping and towed antenna.
New sonar stations dramatically expanded the anti-submarine capabilities of surface ships, and in the early sixties of the last century, Soviet submariners had to fully test their effectiveness on themselves.
Let us cite as an example an excerpt from the story of Vice-Admiral AT Shtyrov, "It was ordered to maintain radio silence" about an attempt by a diesel-electric submarine of the USSR Navy to reach the range of using weapons on an American aircraft carrier. The events described date back to the mid-sixties and took place in the South China Sea:
- How will you act if you detect the operation of low-frequency sonars? - a representative of the fleet seized Neulyba like a burr.
- The instruction developed by the squadron regulates: to avoid the discrepancy at a distance of at least 60 cables. I can also detect the noise of the propellers of the ship with my SHPS (noise direction finding station) at a distance of about 60 cables. Therefore, having discovered the work of the low-frequency GAS, I must assume that I myself have already been detected by the enemy. How to get out of this situation, the situation will tell.
- And how will you keep track of the main objects, being inside the order of the escort ships?
Neulyba did not know how to perform such a task, having sound direction finders with a range less than the "lighting zones" of low-frequency sonars of aircraft carrier escort ships. He silently shrugged his shoulders: "It's called - and eat a fish, and do not sit on the hook."
However, he guessed: a comrade from the headquarters of the fleet, the likely creator of a combat order, does not know this himself.
But that was the time when it was fashionable to "set tasks" without thinking about the possibilities of their implementation. According to the formula: "What do you mean I can't, when the party ordered ?!"
By the end of the seventh night, Sinitsa, the commander of the OSNAZ listeners group, climbed onto the bridge and reported:
- Decoding, Comrade Commander. Aircraft carrier group "Ticonderoga" arrived in the area "Charlie" …
- Fine! Let's go for a rapprochement.
If Neulyba could have foreseen what this cheerful, lightweight "excellent" would cost him.
- Sector on the left ten - on the left sixty three sonars are working. Signals are amplified! The interval of messages is a minute, periodically they switch to an interval of 15 seconds. Noises are not audible.
- Battle alarm! Dive to a depth of thirty meters. Record in the logbook - they began rapprochement with the forces of the AUG (aircraft carrier strike group) for reconnaissance.
- The sonar signals are amplified quickly! Target number four, sonar on the right is sixty!
“Oo-oo-woah! Oo-oo-woah!” - powerful low-pitched messages were now being listened to on the corps.
Neulyba's cunning plan - to slip along the security forces to the intended location of the aircraft carrier - turned out to be ludicrous: after half an hour, the boat was tightly blocked by ships on all sides of the horizon.
Maneuvering by abrupt course changes, by throwing speeds from low to full, the boat went down to a depth of 150 meters. There remained a scanty "reserve" of depth - twenty meters.
Alas! Isothermal conditions over the entire depth range did not hinder the operation of sonars. The blows of powerful parcels hit the body like sledgehammers. The "gas clouds" created by the carbon dioxide cartridges fired by the boat did not seem to bother the Yankees much.
The boat rushed about, striving with sharp throws to get away from the nearest ships, whose now clearly distinguishable noises galloped in unpleasant proximity. The ocean raged …
Neulyba and Whisper did not know (this was realized much later) that the tactics of "evasion - separation - breakthrough" available to them, cultivated on post-war instructions and snail speeds, were hopelessly outdated and powerless in front of the latest technology of "damned imperialists" …
Another example is given in his book by Admiral I. M. Captain:
… two American ships arrived: the Forrest Sherman-class destroyer (which had an AN / SQS-4 GAS with a detection range of 30 cables) and the Friend Knox-class frigate (as in the text of I. M. - ed.)
… set the task: to ensure the immersion of two submarines; forces for this were determined - three surface ships and a floating base.
The first submarine, which was followed by a Forrest Sherman-class destroyer against our floating base and a patrol ship, managed to break away after 6 hours. The second platoon, followed by the frigate "Friend Knox", tried to break away for 8 hours and, discharging the battery, surfaced.
Hydrology was of the first type, favorable for sub-keel hydroacoustic stations. Nevertheless, we hoped with two ships against one US ship to push it back, make tracking difficult and planned to create interference with hydroacoustic stations by resetting regeneration.
from the actions of the patrol ship, we realized that it keeps contact with the submarine at a distance of more than 100 cables … GAS AN / SQS-26 had … a detection range of up to 300 cables.
… Tense opposition for 8 hours did not give any results; the submarine, having used up the energy of the storage battery, surfaced again.
We could no longer oppose the new hydroacoustic station, and we had to go to the command post of the Navy with a proposal to send a detachment of ships on a planned official visit to Morocco, in which a submarine will also take part.
These examples contain formal contradictions: in the instructions of the Pacific Fleet submarine brigade, the detection range of new low-frequency GASs of the US Navy is indicated on the order of 60 cab, and for the Captain (up to 300 cab). In reality, everything depends on conditions, and primarily hydrology.
Water is an extremely difficult environment for search engines to work, and even the most effective search means in it - the acoustic conditions of the environment have a very strong impact. Therefore, it makes sense to at least briefly touch on this issue.
In the Russian Navy, it was customary to distinguish 7 main types of hydrology (with many of their subtypes).
Type1. Positive gradient of the speed of sound. It usually exists during the cold season.
Type 2. The positive gradient of the speed of sound changes to negative at depths of the order of tens of meters, which occurs when there is a sharp cooling of the surface or near-surface layer. At the same time, below the “jump layer” (“break” of the gradient), a “shadow zone” is formed for the sub-keel GAS.
Type 3. The positive gradient changes to negative, and then back to positive, which is typical for deep-sea areas of the world ocean in winter or autumn.
Type 4. The gradient changes from positive to negative twice. This distribution can be observed in shallow ocean areas, shallow sea, shelf zone.
Type 5. The decrease in the speed of sound with depth, which is typical for shallow areas in the summer. In this case, a vast "shadow zone" is formed at shallow depths and relatively small distances.
Type 6. The negative sign of the gradient changes to positive. This type of VRSV occurs in almost all deep-water regions of the world ocean.
Type 7. A negative gradient changes to a positive one, and then back to a negative one. This is possible in shallow sea areas.
Particularly difficult conditions for the propagation of sound and the operation of the GAS occur in shallow-water areas.
The realities of the detection range of low-frequency HAS strongly depended on hydrology, and on average were close to the previously named 60 cables (with the possibility of their significant increase in favorable hydrological conditions). It should be noted that these ranges were well balanced with the range of the US Navy's main anti-submarine missile system, the Asrok anti-submarine missile system (PLRK).
At the same time, analog low-frequency sonars of the second post-war generation of ships had insufficient noise immunity (which in some cases was successfully used by our submariners) and had significant limitations when working at shallow depths.
Taking this factor into account, the previous generation of high-frequency GAS remained and was widely represented in the fleets of both the USA and NATO, and the Soviet Navy. Moreover, in a sense, the "revival" of high-frequency anti-submarine GAS has already occurred at a new technological level - for air carriers - ship helicopters.
The first was the US Navy, and the Soviet submariners quickly assessed the seriousness of the new threat.
In the USSR, for the Ka-25 anti-submarine helicopter, a lowered GAS (OGAS) VGS-2 "Oka" was developed, which, despite its simplicity, compactness and cheapness, turned out to be a very effective search tool.
The small mass of the Oka made it possible not only to provide a very good search tool for our helicopter pilots, but also to massively equip naval ships (especially those operating in areas with complex hydrology) with OGAS. VGS-2 was also widely used on border ships.
Undoubtedly, the lack of OGAS in the ship version was the ability to search only on the foot. However, for the weapons of submarines of that time, the ship on the stop was a very difficult target. In addition, anti-submarine ships were usually used as part of ship search and strike groups (KPUG), had systems for group attacks and data exchange on detected submarines.
An interesting episode on the use of OGAS "Oka" with actual performance characteristics much higher than those established (moreover, in difficult conditions of the Baltic) is contained in the memoirs of Cap. 1 rank Dugints V. V. "Ship's Phanagoria":
… at the final stage of the Baltika-72 exercise, the commander-in-chief decided to check the vigilance of all anti-submarine forces of the BF naval bases. Gorshkov gave the command to one of the Kronstadt submarines to make a covert passage across the Gulf of Finland, and then along our territorial waters all the way to Baltiysk and set the task of the entire Baltic Fleet to find the "enemy" submarine and conditionally destroy it. To search for a boat in the area of responsibility of Livmb, on May 29, the base commander drove out to sea from Liepaja all combat-ready anti-submarine forces: three TFR and 5 MPK with two search and strike groups ironed the areas assigned to him for several days. Even two submarines 14 provided this search operation in designated areas, and in the daytime anti-submarine aircraft with Be-12 aircraft also provided assistance with their buoys and magnetometers. In general, half of the sea was blocked by the forces of the naval bases of Tallinn, Liepaja and Baltiysk, and every commander dreamed of catching the aggressor in his spread nets. After all, this meant in fact to catch the real prestige of the anti-submarine in the eyes of the commander-in-chief of the Navy himself.
The tension grew every day not only on the ships, but also on the command posts of the command posts of the base commanders and the entire Baltic Fleet. Everyone was tensely awaiting the results of this protracted duel of submariners and anti-submarine men. By noon on May 31, MPK-27 found contact, happily reported, however, by all indications it turned out to be an underwater boulder or rock.
… when searching, they used an innovative 'double scale' technique or, more simply, 'work through a parcel', increasing the range of the station. This trick was developed by our divisional acoustician, midshipman A. It consisted in the fact that while the first impulse of the generator's sending went into the water space, the next next sending was manually turned off and as a result it turned out that this first impulse passed and was listened to at double the distance of the distance scale.
… on the indicator, quite unexpectedly, there appeared a vague burst of sweep at the maximum distance, which, after a few transmissions, formed into a real mark from the target.
- Echo bearing 35, distance 52 cables. I assume contact with the submarine. The echo tone is higher than the reverb tone!
… the usual silence and monotonous boredom of the search on the ship instantly exploded with a rush along the ladders and the deck of the ship. …
… the acoustics kept contact for 30 minutes, during which time Slynko transmitted the data to the division commander, and brought two IPCs to the target, which received contact and attacked the submarine.
The work from the stop made it possible to take into account the conditions of hydrology as much as possible, literally "choose all the possibilities" for the search for submarines. For this reason, the most powerful OGAS "Shelon" of the IPC of project 1124 had the greatest search capabilities of all the second generation GASs, for example, from the history of MPK-117 (Pacific Fleet): 1974 - during the development of tasks for the detection of submarines, he set a division record. GAS MG-339 "Shelon" detected and kept the submarine within a radius of 25.5 miles; 1974-26-04 - monitored the foreign square. The contact time was 1 hour. 50 minutes (according to the intelligence of the US Navy submarine); 1975-02-02 - monitored the foreign square. The contact time was 2 hours. 10 min.
At the end of the seventies, a new technological leap was outlined in hydroacoustics.
Third post-war generation
The key feature of the third post-war generation of the GAS was the emergence and active use of digital processing in the GAS and the massive introduction in the navies of foreign countries of the GAS with a hydroacoustic extended towed antenna - GPBA.
Digital processing has sharply increased the noise immunity of the GAS and made it possible to efficiently operate low-frequency sonars in difficult conditions and in areas with shallow depths. However, flexible extended towed antennas (GPBA) became the main feature of the western anti-submarine ships.
Low frequencies in water spread over very long distances, theoretically making it possible to detect submarines at very long distances. In practice, the main obstacle to this was the high level of background noise from the ocean at the same frequencies; therefore, to implement large detection ranges, it was necessary to have separate (in frequency) "peak" emissions of acoustic energy of the submarine noise spectrum (discrete components, - DS), and appropriate means of processing information anti-submarine, allowing you to "pull" these DS "from under the interference", and working with them to obtain the desired long detection ranges.
In addition, working with low frequencies required antenna sizes that were beyond the scope of placement on the ship's hull. This is how GAS with GPBA appeared.
The presence of a large number of characteristic "discrete" (discrete noise signals, that is, noise clearly audible at certain frequencies) in Soviet submarines of the 1st and 2nd generations (not only nuclear, but also diesel (!) To a certain extent, they retained their effectiveness in the already well-muted submarines of the 3rd generation when solving the problem of anti-submarine defense of a convoy and detachments of warships (especially when our submarines were moving at high speeds).
To ensure maximum ranges and optimal conditions for detecting the GPBA, they tried to deepen it into the underwater sound channel (SSC).
Taking into account the peculiarities of sound propagation in the presence of a shut-off device, the GPBA detection zone consisted of several “rings” of illumination and shadow zones.
The requirement to "catch up and overtake" the USA by GAS for surface ships was embodied in our MGK-355 "Polynom" GAK (with a subkeeping, towed antenna and, for the first time in the world (!) - a really working torpedo detection path, ensuring their subsequent destruction). The backwardness of the USSR in electronics did not allow the creation of a fully digital complex in the 70s of the last century; Polynom was analogue with secondary digital processing. However, despite its size and weight, it ensured the creation of very effective anti-submarine ships of project 1155.
Vivid memories of the use of the "Polynom" complex were left by hydroacoustics from the "Admiral Vinogradov" submarine:
… we were also found and "drowned". At this point, how the cards will fall. Sometimes "Polynom" is useless, especially if you were too lazy to lower the BuGASka under the jump layer in time. But sometimes "Polynomka" catches everyone there under the water, even more than 30 kilometers.
"Polynomial". A powerful yet ancient analogue station.
I don't know what state the Polynomials are in now, but some 23-24 years ago it was quite possible to passively classify surface targets located at a distance of 15-20 km, that is, out of visual control.
If there is good to work in an active, always try to work in it. It is more interesting in the active. With different ranges and power. Surface targets, depending on hydrology, are also well caught in the active mode.
So we once stood in the center of the Strait of Hormuz, and it has a width of 60-something kilometers. So "Polynomushka" whistled all over him. The downside of the strait is that it is shallow, about 30 meters in total, and a lot of signal reflections accumulated. Those. quietly along the coast it was possible to sneak unnoticed, probably. In the Baltic, the diesel engine was kept 34 km from a towed station. Perhaps the BOD of Project 1155 has a chance to use the Trumpet at full range at its control center.
According to a direct participant in the events, who was then the cap of "Vinogradov" VA Chernyavsky.
At that time amers, the British, the French and ours conducted joint teachings in Persian (the beginning is like in a joke)… moved on to catching underwater objects.
The amers had a pair of imitators (the cap stubbornly called them "interference") with a programmable route of movement.
"The first one went." At first, while the "obstacle" was spinning nearby, everyone kept in touch. Well, for "Polynom" the distance up to 15 km is generally considered a close search. Then the "hindrance" went away and from the group of the seers, the paddling pools with the Saxons began to fall off. Amers followed, and the entire western crowd could only listen to our reports on the distance, bearing, course and speed of the "interference". Chernyavsky said that the likely allies at first did not really believe in what was happening and asked again, such as "stable contact rially, or not rially."
Meanwhile, the distance to the obstacle exceeded 20 km. In order not to get bored, amers launched a second simulator. The oil painting was repeated. Animation at first, while the obstacle was spinning nearby (all this time ours continued to hold the first imitator) and then the silence, broken by reports from "Vinik": "the first" obstacle "is there, the second is there".
It turned out to be a real embarrassment, given that ours, unlike not ours, had something to blast at the target at such a distance (PLUR shoots at 50 km). According to the cap, the data on the maneuvering of the simulators taken from the "bodies" pulled out of the water and the "tracing paper" from the "Vinik" completely coincided.
Separately, it is necessary to dwell on the problem of the development of GPBA in the USSR. The corresponding R&D was started in the late 60s, almost simultaneously with the USA.
However, significantly worse technological capabilities and a sharp decrease in the noise (and DS) of underwater targets, which was clearly indicated since the late 70s of the last century, did not allow the creation of an effective GPBA for NK until the early 90s.
The first prototype of the SJSC "Centaur" with GPBA was deployed on board the GS-31 experimental vessel of the Northern Fleet.
From the memoirs of his commander:
I took an active part in testing the new GA complex … the possibilities are just a song - from the middle of Barentsukhi you can hear everything that is done in the North-East Atlantic. days …
to draw up a "portrait" of the newest American submarine type "Sea Wolfe" - "Connecticut", which made its first trip to the shores of Russia, I had to go to direct violation of the Combat Order and meet her at the very edge of a terrorist, where specialists from "science" rewrote it far and wide …
And in the mid-80s, R&D was completed already on fully digital SAC for ships - a number (from small to the largest ships) "Zvezda".
Fourth generation. Post-Cold War
A decrease in the noise level of submarines built in the 80s led to a sharp decrease in the ranges and the possibility of their detection by passive GPBA, as a result of which a logical idea arose: to "illuminate" the water area and targets with a low-frequency emitter (LFR) and not only to preserve the effectiveness of passive means of search for submarines (GPBA of ships, RSAB Aviation), but also significantly increase their capabilities (especially when working in difficult conditions).
The corresponding R&D projects were started in Western countries back in the late 80s of the last century, while their important feature was the initial rate on ensuring the operation of various GAS (including ships and RGAB aviation) in a multi-position mode, in the form of a "single search systems ".
Domestic specialists have formed views on what such systems should be like. From the work of Yu. A. Koryakina, S. A. Smirnov and G. V. Yakovleva "Ship sonar technology":
A generalized view of this type of GAS can be formulated as follows.
1. Active HAS with GPBA can provide a significant increase in the efficiency of PLO in shallow water areas with difficult hydrological and acoustic conditions.
2. GAS should be easily deployed on small warships and civilian ships involved in ASW missions without significant changes in the ship's designs. At the same time, the area occupied by the UHPV (storage device, staging and retrieval of the GPBA - author) on the deck of the ship should not exceed several square meters, and the total weight of the UHPV together with the antenna should not exceed several tons.
3. The operation of the GAS should be provided both in an autonomous mode and as part of a multistatic system.
4. The detection range of submarines and determination of their coordinates should be provided in the deep sea at distances of the 1st DZAO (far zone of acoustic illumination, up to 65 km) and in the shallow sea in conditions of continuous acoustic illumination - up to 20 km.
For the implementation of these requirements, the creation of a compact low-frequency emitting module is of paramount importance. When arranging a towed body, the goal is always to reduce drag. Modern research and development of low frequency towed emitters goes in different directions. Of these, three options can be distinguished that are of practical interest.
The first option provides for the creation of a radiating module in the form of a system of radiators that form a volumetric antenna array, which is located in a streamlined towed body. An example is the arrangement of emitters in the LFATS system from L-3 Communications, USA. The LFATS antenna array consists of 16 radiators distributed over 4 floors, the spacing between the radiators is λ / 4 in the horizontal plane and λ / 2 in the vertical plane. The presence of such a volumetric antenna array allows you to give a radiating antenna, which contributes to an increase in the range of the system.
The second version uses omnidirectional powerful emitters (one, two or more), as it is implemented in the domestic GAS "Vignette-EM" and some foreign GAS.
In the third version, the radiating antenna is made in the form of a linear array of longitudinal-bending radiators, for example, of the "Diabo1o" type. Such a radiating antenna is a flexible string consisting of small cylindrical elements of a very small diameter, which are interconnected by a cable. Due to its flexibility and small diameter, the antenna, consisting of EAL (electroacoustic transducers - auth.) Of the Diabolo type, is wound on the same winch drum as the cable tug and GPBA. This makes it possible to significantly simplify the design of the UHPV, to reduce its weight and dimensions, and to abandon the use of a complex and bulky manipulator.
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In the Russian Federation, a family of modern BUGAS "Minotaur" / "Vignette" was developed, with performance characteristics close to foreign counterparts.
New BUGAS are installed on ships of projects 22380 and 22350.
However, the real situation is close to catastrophic.
First, the modernization of new GAS ships of combat strength and the normal (mass) delivery of new ones were thwarted. Those. there are very few ships with new GAS. This means that taking into account the real (difficult) hydrological conditions and, as a rule, the zonal structure of the acoustic field (the presence of zones of "illumination" and "shadow"), there can be no question of any effective anti-submarine defense. Reliable PLO is not provided even for detachments of warships (and even more so for single ships).
Taking into account the conditions, effective and reliable illumination of the underwater situation can only be provided by an optimally distributed grouping of dissimilar anti-submarine forces in the area, operating as a “single multi-position search complex”. The extremely small number of new ships with "Minotaurs" simply do not allow it to be formed.
Secondly, our "Minotaurs" do not provide for the creation of a full-fledged multi-position search engine, because they exist in the "parallel world" from our own anti-submarine aircraft.
Anti-submarine helicopters have become a very important component of new search engines. Equipping them with new low-frequency OGAS made it possible to provide effective illumination for both aircraft RGAB and GPBA ships.
And if Western helicopters are capable of providing new OGAS and multi-position joint work with BUGAS and aviation (RGAB), then even the newest ships of Project 22350 have an upgraded Ka-27M helicopter, on which essentially the same high-frequency OGAS Ros remained (only digital and on a new element base), as on the Soviet Ka-27 helicopter of the 80s, which has absolutely unsatisfactory performance characteristics and is incapable of either working together with the "Minotaur" or "illuminating" the RGAB field. Simply because they work in different frequency ranges.
Do we have low-frequency OGAS in our country? Yes, there is, for example, "Sterlet" (which has a mass close to OGAS HELRAS).
However, its frequency range of the active mode differs from the "Minotaur" (ie, again does not provide for joint work), and most importantly, the naval aviation "does not see it point-blank".
Unfortunately, our naval aviation is still a "detached carriage" from the "train" of the Navy. Accordingly, OGAS and RGAB of the Navy also "live" in a "parallel reality" from the ship's GAS of the Navy.
What is the bottom line?
Despite all the technological difficulties, we have a very decent technical level of domestic hydroacoustics. However, with the perception and implementation of new (modern) concepts for the construction and use of means of search for submarines, we are just in the dark - lagging behind the West by at least a generation.
In fact, the country has no anti-submarine defense, and the responsible officials are not at all worried about it. Even the newest Kalibrov carriers (projects 21631 and 22800) do not have any anti-submarine weapons and anti-torpedo protection.
An elementary "modern VGS-2" could already significantly increase their combat stability, making it possible to detect a torpedo attack, and underwater means of movement of saboteurs (at distances much more than the standard "Anapa"), and, if lucky, and submarines.
We have a large number of PSKR BOKHR, which are not planned to be used in any way in case of war. A simple question - in the event of a war with Turkey, what would these PSKR BOKHR do? Hide in bases?
And the last example. From the category "to make the admirals ashamed."
The Egyptian Navy has modernized its patrol ships of the Chinese project "Hainan" (whose "pedigree" comes from our project 122 of the end of the Great Patriotic War) with the installation of modern BUGAS (the media mentioned the VDS-100 of the L3 company).
In fact, according to its characteristics, this is the "Minotaur", but installed on a ship with a displacement of 450 tons.
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Why does the Russian Navy have nothing of the kind? Why don't we have modern low-frequency OGAS in the series? Small-sized GAS for mass equipping of both the Navy ships (not having "full-scale" GAK), and PSKR guard during mobilization? After all, technologically, all this is quite within the capabilities of the domestic industry.
And the most important question: will measures be finally taken to correct this shameful and unacceptable situation?
