Oddly enough, in historiography there is no generalizing information either about the funds allocated for the rearmament of the Russian army and navy on the eve of the Russo-Japanese and World War I, or about the impact of these expenses on the economic, cultural and social development of Russia. Meanwhile, militarism had a fatal effect on her social and political life. This was manifested primarily in the influence of the arms race on the national economy, in the deterioration of the life of the overwhelming majority of the country's population. The consequences of militarization were felt especially sharply from the end of the 19th century.
At the turn of the XIX-XX centuries. many countries joined the arms race (a term that has since received citizenship rights). Tsarist Russia was no exception. Moreover, as a result of a number of reasons, concern for the strengthening and development of the armed forces has become, in the figurative expression of PA Stolypin, “one of the cornerstones, one of the most important stones” in the policy of the “straining government” 1. This happened for a number of reasons.
First, the autocracy was the only one among other imperialist predators that contrived in the 20th century. prepare for two wars at once. Secondly, the first of them was unsuccessful and led the army to extreme disarray, and the fleet to almost complete destruction. Thirdly, for two and a half years a revolution has been blazing in the country, which has had a tremendous impact on the state of the armed forces. And finally, long before 1914 it was clear to everyone that the world was uncontrollably heading towards the abyss of a "big", "common" war, and the ruling circles of all countries reacted accordingly.
From the second half of the 90s of the XIX century. tsarism intensified its expansion in the Far East. In an effort to quickly create a fleet there stronger than the Japanese, the naval department asked the tsar in 1897 for permission to hastily order abroad 5 squadron battleships, 16 cruisers, 4 mine transports and minelayers, 30 destroyers with a total displacement of 150 thousand tons and a price of 163 million. rubles. The resolute objections of the Minister of Finance S. Yu. Witte 2 thwarted this plan, but did not diminish the desire of the naval department to increase the fleet. By the beginning of the period under review, the previously planned military and naval programs were being carried out.
By 1898, according to the shipbuilding program adopted in 1895, to replenish the Pacific squadron, 7 battleships, 2 cruisers of the first rank, a coastal defense battleship, 2 gunboats, 1 mine cruiser, 1 minesweeper and 4 counter-destroyers with a total displacement of 124 thousand tons and a cost of 66 million rubles 3. All shipyards in Russia were loaded to the limit. The total cost of the program was determined at 326 million rubles 4. However, these funds were not enough, and in 1898 another 90 million rubles were allocated for the "urgent construction of new ships". Five years later, in 1903, the tsar approved a new program, which provided for the construction of 4 squadron battleships, 2 cruisers, 2 minelayers and 2 submarines. In the amount planned for its implementation - 90.6 million rubles. - the maritime department did not meet, and the costs increased to 96.6 million rubles 5.
Thus, before the war with Japan, the autocracy allocated 512.6 million rubles for naval construction. (about a quarter of the annual budget of the empire), and this despite the fact that in 1904 the new Minister of Finance V. N.rub. for the repurchase of two battleships built in England for Chile and Argentina 6 (it was supposed to enter them into the 2nd Pacific Squadron).
The War Ministry was not asleep either. By 1897, the first stage of rearmament of the army with the three-line model of 1891 was completed, which required 2 million new rifles. In 1898, the second stage of rearmament began, according to which 1,290 thousand rifles were to be manufactured.7 For the production of rifles, cartridges and gunpowder, 16.7 million were allocated in 1900, and another 14.1 million were allocated in 1901. rubles 8. Less than a third of these funds were allocated from the maximum budget of the War Ministry 9, and the rest was allocated additionally from the state treasury, which was required for the second stage of rearmament of the army with a three-line rifle: 29, 3 million rubles. was released in excess of the military budget 10.
In 1899, the reorganization of the fortress and siege artillery began, for which 94 million rubles were spent. 11, and since 1898 - rearmament of the army with a field three-inch rapid-fire cannon. For this, a special commission for the rearmament of field artillery was created, which received 27 million rubles in 1898. She announced an international competition to develop the best project for a three-inch rapid-fire cannon. After two years of testing, the model developed by the Society of Putilov Plants was recognized as the best, and on February 9, 1900, the tsar approved the first stage of rearmament of the troops with a cannon of the 1900 model. Of the 1,500 ordered guns, half were to be supplied by the Putilov Society, and the other half by state-owned factories. The price of the five-year order was set at 33.7 million rubles. Two years later, on March 8, 1902, the tsar approved an improved model of the Putilov cannon. According to the military department, 7150 three-inch guns (of which 2400 of the 1900 model) were received by the army in just three stages, and the most significant order - 2830 guns was received by the Putilov factory 12. The rearmament of field artillery required 155.8 million rubles. from funds of the Treasury and about 29 million rubles. from the marginal budget of the military department 13.
On the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, the rearmament of the fortress and howitzer artillery began. By the beginning of 1902, the land fortresses lacked 1472 guns, and the naval ones - 1331 14. For the re-equipment of the fortresses and the replenishment of siege parks, that is, sets of ammunition, 94 million rubles were required for 5 years (1899-1903) 15. Learning Nicholas II wrote from the “All-Subject Report” (report) of the military department for 1903 about this: “I declare once again in the most categorical way that the question of the lack of weapons in our fortresses seems to me formidable. I do not blame the General Artillery Directorate, because I know that it constantly pointed to this serious gap. Nevertheless, the time has come to resolve this matter vigorously, by all means.”16 But there were not enough funds for this. Going to meet the demands of the military, the tsar on June 28, 1904 authorized a release from the treasury of 28 million rubles. on the fortress artillery 17.
On the eve of the clash with Japan, about 257 million rubles were allocated from the funds of the state treasury (not counting the amounts in the maximum budget) for the rearmament of the army. 18, which together with the cost of new shipbuilding amounted to 775 million rubles. For Russia, these amounts were very significant, to which Witte drew the tsar's attention back in 1898 when drawing up the next maximum budgets of the War and Naval Ministries for 1898-1903. Noting that the War Ministry in the previous five years received 1209 million rubles according to the maximum budget, and more than 200 million rubles above it. from the treasury, and the maritime department to the five-year maximum budget of 200 million rubles. added almost the same amount (more than 180 million rubles), Witte complained that the population's tax capacity has been exhausted, that a budget deficit is in danger and “no country, even the richest, can withstand the continuously tense increase in the military budget” 19. However, this was followed by a new increase in military spending.
At the end of 1902, Witte turned to the State Council for help. In his general meeting on December 30, 1902, the latter, "appealing to the wisdom of the sovereign", asked "to keep the demands of the departments at the level of compliance with those resources that the state can provide, without shaking the economic well-being of the population." Recognizing that the tax press had squeezed out everything that was possible, the State Council warned the tsar that the government's debt had reached 6,629 million rubles, more than half of which (about 3.5 billion) fell on foreign loans. A further increase in spending, and above all on the arms race, will undermine "not only the financial well-being (of the state - K. Sh.), But also its internal power and international political significance."
However, the tsar was deaf to the advice of experienced dignitaries and held a firm course for the Far Eastern adventure. It is known how it ended: the fleet suffered the heaviest losses. In the waters of the Pacific Ocean, 67 combat and auxiliary vessels of the Russian fleet 21 perished or were captured by the Japanese with a total cost of 230 million rubles, and together with artillery and mine weapons stored for the fleet in Port Arthur and also captured by the Japanese, direct material losses of the fleet amounted to about 255.9 million rubles. 22 Tsarist Russia was left practically without naval forces: the entire Baltic fleet was transferred to the Far East, where it died, and the Black Sea was blocked, since its passage through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles was prohibited by international treaties.
The threat to the empire and its capital, located on the coast, was further increased by the collapse of the coastal defense. A special examination of it by the Chief of the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GUGSH), together with the Chief Inspector of the Engineering Troops, gave a sad result: "The entire defense of the coast seems to be quite card-based, and, of course, does not represent any serious defense"; "Kronstadt and Petersburg are de facto not protected at all" 23: In January 1908, the Naval General Staff (MGSh) reported to the Minister of the Navy that the plans for mobilization, previously developed jointly with the land department, "provide for the most minimal tasks," but their " now, in the event of a declaration of war, it must be recognized as impracticable, and the position of the Baltic Fleet - critical”24.
In April, a joint meeting of the naval and land general staffs took place in order to find out the extent of the threat to St. Petersburg from the enemy landing. “All the work of our Baltic Fleet is reduced,” it was noted at the meeting, “only to a certain, and, moreover, very insignificant, delay in the enemy offensive in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland (by laying a minefield. - K. Sh.). But at the same time, representatives of the Maritime Ministry stated that in its present form the Baltic Fleet is completely unable to fulfill this more than modest task 25, since there are no coal reserves, the ships have a shortage (up to 65-70%) of officers and specialists, and most importantly, of the 6,000 mines required for laying mines, there are only 1,500.
The land army was also not in the best condition after the war with Japan. “Our combat readiness on the western fronts has suffered so much that it would be more accurate to say that this readiness is completely absent,” the Minister of War V. V. Sakharov admitted in the summer of 1905.26 He was echoed by the Chairman of the State Defense Council, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich: the Russian infantry needs an immediate and radical reorganization, “all cavalry requires a complete reorganization”, “we have few machine guns, and they are far from perfect”, “heavy army artillery must be created anew”, “our equipment is imperfect; the experience of the war has proved this; everything must be corrected without delay. The general part requires a complete reorganization and the creation of new foundations for its development”27.
During the Russo-Japanese War, many artillery and engineering units were sent from the western military districts to the Far East, which disrupted the organizational structure of the entire army. Almost all combat, engineering and quartermaster supplies were used up. "The army has no reserves, and it has nothing to shoot with … it is incapable of combat, and therefore in vain only burdens the state," acknowledged the Council of State Defense on April 7, 1907. In his opinion, due to the impossibility of immediately obtaining the necessary funds, the army was threatened with "staying for a certain period of time in such a state in which none of the armies of foreign powers is" 28.
Describing the state of the army, the assistant to the Minister of War, General A. A. Polivanov, who was in charge of duty for its material support, admitted in 1912: in every war, but also from the fact that it was in a state of backwardness in supplying it with the means created by military equipment. Then, in 1908, almost half of the set of uniforms and equipment required to enter the field of the army of military personnel was lacking, there were not enough rifles, cartridges, shells, carts, entrenching tools, hospital supplies; there were almost no means of struggle at all, the necessity of which was indicated both by the experience of the war and by the example of neighboring states; there were no howitzers, machine guns, mountain artillery, field heavy artillery, spark telegraphs, automobiles, that is, such means that are currently recognized as a necessary element of a strong army; I will say briefly: in 1908 our army was incapable of combat”29.
The Far Eastern adventure of tsarism, the direct costs of which, according to Kokovtsov's calculations, amounted to 2.3 billion rubles. gold 30, was the first reason that led the armed forces of tsarism into complete disorder. But, perhaps, the revolution of 1905-1907 dealt an even greater blow to them. In its first two years alone, at least 437 anti-government soldiers' actions were recorded, including 106 armed 31. Whole units went over to the side of the revolutionary people, and often, as was the case in Sevastopol, Kronstadt, Vladivostok, Baku, Sveaborg and other cities, the soldiers and sailors who raised the red flag fought real bloody battles against the troops who remained loyal to the government.
The constant use of them to suppress the revolutionary movement had a destructive effect on the armed forces. In 1905, troops were called in about 4,000 times to "assist civilian authorities". For a war with its own people, the War Ministry was forced to dispatch about 3.4 million people (taking into account repeated calls), that is, the number of soldiers involved in the fight against the revolution was more than 3 times higher than the number of the entire tsarist army by the beginning of 1905. (about 1 million people) 32. "The army does not study, but serves you," Minister of War AF Rediger threw at one of the government meetings to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and at the same time to the Minister of Internal Affairs Stolypin 33.
These two circumstances led to a sharp weakening of the armed forces of tsarism. The cause for concern was not only the complete breakdown of the armed forces as a result of the Russian-Japanese war, but also the sad fact for the autocracy that in 1905-1907. for the first time in its centuries-old history, soldiers and sailors began to get out of the control of the officers, and took the side of the revolutionary people.
In such conditions, with an unprecedented decline in the prestige of tsarism both outside and inside the country, with its ever-increasing financial and economic dependence on the more developed Western powers, the Romanov empire could only be preserved through the comprehensive strengthening and development of the armed forces. The same was demanded by the aggravation of international contradictions on the eve of the First World War, the widespread growth of militarism and "marineism" (as the fascination with naval forces was called at that time), the most obvious manifestation of which was then the Anglo-German naval rivalry. It was clear to the Russian landowners and the bourgeoisie that tsarism could not survive the second Mukden, the second Tsushima; everything possible must be done to avoid this, it is necessary at any cost to bring the army and navy up to the level of modern requirements of military affairs.
After the Russo-Japanese war, the first to engage in the development of new weapons programs was the naval department, which remained practically without combat ships, but with the same staffing and salaries. Another circumstance pushed him to this: at that time, the Russian navy was built partly abroad, and partly at state-owned factories, which could not be left without orders. Insisting on the immediate laying of the battleships, the naval minister A. A. Birilev said at one of the meetings in the summer of 1906 that the four largest state-owned factories were out of work, had reduced the number of workers to the limit, but those who remained had nothing to do under these conditions. “At present,” he said, “the question looms in the foreground, should the factories be supported or not? There is no middle ground in this matter. We must say unconditionally: yes or no. If yes, then we need to start building large battleships, and if not, then indicate who takes responsibility for such a decision before the tsar, Russia and history”34.
The Naval Ministry was developing various options for new shipbuilding programs even before the defeat at Tsushima, in March - April 1905, since after the 1st and then 2nd Pacific squadrons left for the Far East, the Baltic Sea was left almost completely without warships. In March 1907, this ministry submitted four variants of shipbuilding programs to the tsar for consideration. At the same time, the minimum was reduced to the creation of one squadron in the Baltic (8 battleships, 4 battle cruisers, 9 light cruisers and 36 destroyers), and the maximum - four squadrons of the same composition: two for the Pacific Ocean and one for the Baltic and Black Seas. The cost of these programs ranged from 870 million to 5 billion rubles 35.
At the same time, the War Ministry presented its claims to the treasury. According to his most conservative estimates, it was required to spend more than 2.1 billion rubles at a time. Only for the reorganization of the artillery the generals demanded 896 million rubles, for engineering - 582 million; In addition to these one-time extraordinary expenses (stretched, of course, over a number of years), the annual usual expenses of the War Ministry were to increase by 144.5 million, associated with the creation of new expensive artillery, engineering, etc. branches of the armed forces, their manning, supply and so on. “The size of the amount calculated in this way,” Rediger was forced to admit, “excludes any possibility of counting on its appropriation, despite the fact that the measures that could have been created at the expense of this enormous amount are not in the way of further development of our armed forces, but only on the path of their improvement and supply with the necessary in a level with the modern requirements of military affairs. " Recognizing the impossibility of allocating such a colossal amount by the state, the Minister of War demanded that the departments reduce their claims and focus on "measures considered urgent", and at the same time take into account the measures "to be discussed in the coming years" 36. But also according to the program- the minimum required a lump sum of 425 million rubles. and an increase in the budget by 76 million rubles. in year.
In the aggregate, the claims of the naval and military departments amounted, thus, from 1, 3 to 7, 1 billion rubles. one-time expenditures, that is, approximately half to three of the country's annual budgets in 1908. And this is not counting the inevitable increase in the annual costs of the regular budgets of both ministries. A lot of funds were required, and the financial situation in Russia at that time was simply desperate. Considering the estimate for 1907, the Council of Ministers on August 15, 1906 stated that the financial "state of the Russian state threatens with the most serious complications, and in the event of the continuation of the truly troubled time experienced by our fatherland, there may not be enough funds even for absolutely urgent needs." By 1909, as a result of expenditures caused by the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War and the struggle against the revolution, the state debt had grown by another 3 billion rubles, and annual interest payments increased by 150 million rubles. in addition to what Russia has already paid before on a government loan 38.
Under these conditions, with fierce disputes between the naval and military departments over the distribution of appropriations for armaments, the tsar decided to give preference to the navy and in June 1907 approved the so-called Small Shipbuilding Program, allowing the Maritime Ministry to release 31 million rubles for new shipbuilding within four years.. rub. annually. (Later, due to the change in this program, its cost was increased to 126.6 million rubles.) A year later, in May 1908, the War Ministry received permission from the Council of Ministers to apply to the legislature with a request to allocate about 293 million rubles. "To replenish stocks and material and to build premises for them" in 1908-1915 39. The State Duma, in order not to lose control over the spending of this amount, decided to approve loans not immediately in full, but annually (except for those that required conclusion of contracts for two or more years).
However, from 1909 the economic situation of the empire began to improve. A series of unusually fruitful years followed, happily coinciding with the rise in prices in the world grain market, which significantly increased treasury revenues from the main export item. The improvement in the financial situation was immediately taken into account by the War and Naval Ministries, which demanded an increase in loans for armaments. From August 1909 to the beginning of 1910, at the behest of the tsar, four special meetings were held, led by Stolypin. Their composition, in addition to the military and naval ministers and chiefs of general staffs, included the ministers of finance and foreign affairs. These conferences were created to consider a 10-year program for the development of the naval armed forces of Russia, but actually pursued the goal of distributing funds for armaments between the army and the navy.
The results of the five-month work of the meeting were reported to the government on February 24, 1910. The Council of Ministers decided to allocate 715 million rubles over the next 10 years. for the development of the army and 698 million rubles. - fleet 40. To get these almost 1.5 billion rubles. it was decided to introduce new indirect taxes, and in particular to increase the price of vodka. In view of the financial "prosperity" achieved, the government considered it possible in 1910 to provide the War Ministry with twice the amount in 1908 (then it was planned to spend 293 million rubles in 8 years, now - 715 million rubles in 10 years), and the fleet received even 5.5 times more (698 million rubles instead of 124 million). However, the Maritime Ministry soon violated the expenses agreed and approved by the government (the 10-year program did not manage to pass through the legislative institutions).
This happened in connection with a sharp aggravation of the military-strategic situation in the region of the Black Sea straits - the most painful region for tsarism in the world. Funded by France, Turkey decided, under the leadership of British officers, to reorganize its naval forces. Already in the spring of 1909, the tsarist government began to receive alarming news for it about the revival of the Turkish fleet, about the purchase for this purpose of ships from Germany and the order of modern battleships of the dreadnought type at the shipyards of England. All attempts to "reason" Turkey through diplomacy have led nowhere. The order to the English firm "Vickers" was made by the Turkish government, and, according to the contract, in April 1913. Turkey was to receive the first powerful battleship capable of single-handedly deal with the entire Black Sea Fleet of Russia, whose linear forces consisted of low-speed and weakly armed ships of the old design.
The threat of Turkish dreadnoughts appearing on the Black Sea forced the autocracy to take appropriate measures. On July 26, 1910, the naval minister addressed the tsar with a special report. In it, he proposed to lay on the Black Sea 3 battleships of the latest type that were not provided for by the newly approved 10-year program and to accelerate the construction of the previously planned 9 destroyers and 6 submarines 41. Nicholas II on the same day approved the proposal of the minister, and in May 1911 The State Duma adopted a law on the allocation of 151 million rubles for the construction of the Black Sea Fleet, the main expenditure being 100 million rubles. for the construction of battleships - was not provided for in the 10-year program. (At the end of 1911, due to the increase in the cost of battleships, the costs of this program increased to 162 million rubles.)
Soon, the Naval Ministry sharply increased its requirements. Having received permission from the tsar to revise the 10-year program, the Naval General Staff in April 1911 presented him with a draft "Law on the Imperial Russian Fleet," which outlined the creation of two combat squadrons and one reserve squadron in the Baltic within 22 years (each consisting of 8 battleships, 4 battleships and 8 light cruisers, 36 destroyers and 12 submarines). It was planned to have a fleet on the Black Sea, 1.5 times stronger than the fleets of the states located on the Black Sea coast. Full implementation of this law required 2.1 billion rubles from the state 42.
The first five of these 22 years constituted a special period, considered in the special "Program of the reinforced shipbuilding of the Baltic Fleet for 1911-1915". During this period, it was necessary to build 4 battle cruisers and 4 light cruisers, 36 destroyers and 12 submarines in the Baltic, that is, the same number as they were going to create in 10 years in a little over a year before. The cost of this program was determined at more than half a billion rubles. The tsar was delighted with the presented documents. “Well done job,” he said to the Chief of the Naval General Staff, “it is clear that they are standing on solid ground; praise them (the officers of this headquarters - K. Sh.) for me”43.
In July 1912, the "Program for Reinforced Shipbuilding of the Baltic Fleet" was approved by the State Duma, which excluded loans for port building, which reduced the cost of the program to 421 million rubles. The "Law on the Fleet" approved by the tsar by the decision of the Council of Ministers was to be submitted to the Duma no earlier than the end of 1914, when the implementation of its first part - "The Program of Reinforced Shipbuilding of the Baltic Fleet" - would significantly advance and give the Marine Ministry reason to raise the issue of continuing successfully started business 44.
Finally, on the eve of World War II, in connection with the purchase by the Turkish government from Brazil of two battleships built by the British firms Armstrong and Vickers, the government in the summer of 1914 obtained from the State Duma an additional appropriation of 110 million rubles. for the hasty construction of one ship of the line, 2 light cruisers, 8 destroyers and 6 submarines.
In total, on the eve of the First World War, the Naval Ministry carried out four shipbuilding programs through the legislature, the completion of which took place in 1917-1919. Their total cost reached 820 million rubles. In addition, the naval department received the tsar's approval of the "Law on the Fleet", it remained only at the right moment to pass through the legislature the appropriation of loans for it, and, if necessary, the introduction of new taxes. For 17 years (from 1914 to 1930), it was planned to spend 1 billion rubles on military shipbuilding 45.
The military department, not feeling such support from the tsar and the government, made not so fantastic plans as the Naval Ministry. Although the generals, unlike the admirals, proceeded from the conviction that it was the army and not the navy that would have to bear the brunt of the approaching war on their shoulders, they adhered to the program approved back in 1908 for a long time. Only the law of May 12, 1912 allowed the military department loans in the amount provided for by the 10-year program of 1910.
Meanwhile, the army was extremely poorly armed. In the fall of 1912, at the request of the Minister of War, V. A. The picture turned out to be gloomy. Only food, quartermaster, sanitary supplies and the simplest types of engineering equipment were almost in full availability, and what was lacking had to be replenished during 1913-1914. It was believed that the army was also supplied in abundance with rifles, revolvers and cartridges (but of the old type, with a blunt bullet that had poor ballistic properties).
With artillery, the situation was much worse: only light weapons were available in the required quantity. Almost half of the mortars were missing, there were no new types of heavy guns at all, and the old guns of the 1877 model (!) Were supposed to be replaced only by the end of 1914. The rearmament of the fortress artillery was planned to be completed by 1916 only half, in the siege artillery there was no material at all, so this artillery was listed only on paper. After the announcement of mobilization and the formation of new units in the army, a shortage of 84% of machine guns, 55% of three-inch grenades for field guns and 62% for mountain grenades, 38% of bombs for 48-line howitzers, 17% of shrapnel, 74% of gun sights for new systems and etc., etc. 46
The tense international situation no longer left the Council of Ministers in doubt about the need to increase loans for the development of the armed forces. On March 6, 1913, Nicholas II approved a program for the development and reorganization of troops, according to which it was planned to allocate 225 million rubles for armaments. at a time and increase the annual budget of the military department by 91 million rubles 47. Most of the one-time expenses (181 million rubles) were allocated for the development of artillery.
Having received the Tsar's approval, the Minister of War decided to apply the same method as the Naval Ministry, that is, to single out and immediately carry out the most urgent measures through the legislative bodies. On July 13, 1913, the military department submitted to the State Duma the so-called Small Program, according to which it was planned to spend 122.5 million rubles in 5 years (1913-1917). for the development of artillery and the acquisition of ammunition for it (97.7 million rubles), and the rest - for the development of engineering and aviation units 48. On July 10, 1913, the tsar approved the decision of the Duma and the State Council, and the "Small Program" became law. No matter how hurried the War Office was, it was clearly late. A little more than a year remained before the start of the First World War, and the program was designed for five years.
At the same time, the Main Directorate of the General Staff was developing the "Big Program", of which "Small" was a part. At the end of October 1913, the tsar approved the "Big Program", imposing a resolution: "This event should be carried out in a particularly urgent manner," and ordered to complete it in full by the fall of 1917.49 In addition to increasing the army personnel (by 11, 8 thousand officers and 468, 2 thousand soldiers, a third of whom was supposed to enter the artillery and engineer troops), the program required more than 433 million rubles for the development of weapons and other expenses, but since part of these funds had already been allocated under the "Small Program", the legislature had to approve only about 290 million rubles. new appropriations. Upon completion of all the planned measures from 1917, the expenditures on the army according to the regular budget were to increase by 140 million rubles. in year. There were no objections either from the Duma or from the State Council 50, and on June 22, 1914, the tsar imposed a resolution on the "Big Program": "To be according to this." Several weeks remained before the start of the war.
However, the point is not only that Russia's financial and economic weakness has delayed preparations for a world war. By its very nature, this training deliberately led to a further lag behind the level of development of military affairs achieved in the world. If in 1906 the generals believed that in order to bring the army in line with modern requirements, it was necessary to receive 2.1 billion rubles. into service, by the beginning of 1914 the government was able to pass through legislative institutions only 1, 1 billion rubles 51. Meanwhile, the arms race demanded more and more funds. When the Duma discussed the "Big Program" and the Minister of War was asked whether it would fully satisfy the needs of the army, Sukhomlinov said that there was no consensus among the military on this score. The Minister of War was simply afraid to name in the Duma the entire amount of expenses calculated by the departments of the military department.
Only one of them - the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) - considered it desirable, in addition to the "Big Program", to spend in the next five years on arming the army with an automatic rifle (including the cost of plant equipment and the creation of a stock of 1,500 rounds of ammunition per rifle) - 800 million. rubles, for the rearmament of light field artillery with guns of the new system - 280 million rubles, for the rearmament of fortresses - 143.5 million rubles, for the construction of new barracks, shooting ranges, etc. The Big Program "and the redeployment of troops required 650 million rubles. and so on. 52 In total, only GAU dreamed of getting 1.9 billion rubles, and there was also a quartermaster, engineering, and other departments!
If before the Russo-Japanese war, in addition to the usual budget, 775 million rubles were allocated from the treasury for the rearmament of the army and navy, then after it, by the beginning of the First World War, the legislature allocated only 1.8 billion rubles for new armament of the army and navy.. rub. (of which 376.5 million rubles were spent by 1914, that is, one fifth). In general, the costs of the arms race in 1898-1913. amounted to 2585 million rubles. And that's not counting the funds allocated to both departments for their regular budgets! And yet the Naval Ministry and the land artillery department claimed another 3.9 billion rubles.
For 1898-1913, according to the reports of the State Audit Office, the total budget of the military and naval departments amounted to 8, 4 billion rubles in gold. Tsarist Russia spent more than 22% of all its expenses on the navy and army during this time. If to this amount we add 4-5 billion rubles determined by the Minister of Finance. indirect and direct losses of the national economy from the Russian-Japanese war, it turns out that the molokh of militarism absorbed from 12, 3 to 13, 3 billion gold rubles. What this amount meant for the country can be understood by comparing it with other figures: the total capital of all joint-stock companies in Russia (excluding railway companies) in 1914 was three times less (4.6 billion rubles 53), the value of the entire industry was 6, 1 billion rubles 54. So, there was an outflow of colossal funds into the unproductive sphere.
The general figures of the budgets of the military and naval departments cannot give an idea of the share of the wealth that was intended for the military industry and thus influenced its development, because most of the funds allocated to the military and naval departments went to the maintenance of the personnel of the army and navy, the construction of barracks and others. office space, food, fodder, etc. A more specific idea of the financial base that served as the basis for the development of the military industry, can give information about the allocations for the rearmament of the army and navy.
From 1898 to 1914, the legislative bodies released 2.6 billion rubles for the rearmament of the army and navy alone. And although by the beginning of the First World War, both departments were able to use only part of these funds, big capital, rushing into the military industry, counted on a much larger amount. It was no secret to anyone that the tsarist generals and admirals, not satisfied with the already approved programs, hatched plans for the further deployment of the army and navy, and some of these plans by 1914 were already predetermined. Thus, according to the "Law on the Imperial Russian Navy," it was supposed to spend 2.1 billion rubles on new shipbuilding by 1932. The Main Artillery Directorate, after the approval of all its pre-war programs, planned to carry out rearmament within the next years after 1914, which required 1.9 billion rubles. So, 2, 6 billion rubles. for new weapons already approved costs and in the near future, another 4 billion rubles. - this is the real amount on which the industrial world of Russia, engaged in the military business, could orient itself. The amount, to be sure, is very substantial, especially if you remember that the entire capital of the railways at the beginning of the XX century. was estimated at 4, 7-5, 1 billion rubles 55. And after all, it was the railway construction that was the locomotive that pulled the development of almost all large-scale industry in Russia in the 19th century.
In addition to their huge overall size, military orders had other features. First, they, as a rule, could only be carried out by large-scale industry; secondly, the military and naval departments gave them only to those enterprises that already had experience in the production of weapons or secured guarantees from large banks and leading industrial firms in the world. As a result, the arms race led not only to the growth of the economic power of the largest bourgeoisie, its subordination through bribes and bribery of some organs of the state apparatus, but also strengthened its claims to participate in solving important state affairs (rearmament of the army and navy), which, while maintaining political power in the hands of the autocracy, which defended primarily the interests of the nobility, served as the economic basis for the growth of the liberal-bourgeois opposition against tsarism, exacerbated social collisions in the country.
But this was not the main result of the influence of militarism on the Russian economy. To squeeze out 8, 4 billion rubles from the budget. gold for the War and Naval Ministries, the tsarist government twisted the tax press, introducing new indirect taxes and increasing the old ones. It reduced to the limit the spending on education, science and social needs. As can be seen from the State Comptroller's Reports on the execution of the state budget, in 1900, 4.5 million were spent on universities, 9.7 million on secondary educational institutions, 487 thousand on the Academy of Sciences, and on military and naval institutions. - more than 420 million rubles. A year later, expenses on the Academy of Sciences were increased by 7, 5 thousand rubles, and even reduced by almost 4 thousand rubles for universities. But the Military and Naval Ministries received 7.5 million rubles. more.
In 1913, the total expenditures on these departments increased by 296 million rubles in comparison with 1900, and a little more than 38 million rubles were carved out for the maintenance of higher and secondary educational institutions in the same year, that is, an increase in expenditures on these paragraphs of the budget in absolute terms was 12 times less. (Almost the same amount - 36.5 million rubles - was spent by the Ministry of Justice - “on the prison side.”) One-sided economic development, impoverishment of the masses, lack of material conditions for the development of science and overcoming illiteracy - this was the result of the arms race.
