The spring of 1920 could not inspire any optimism in the southern Russian white movement. The rollback and decay of the White Guards seemed irreversible. Naturally, in such conditions, the search for the guilty began among the belligerents. Involuntarily, all eyes were turned towards the first figures - the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia Anton Denikin and his headquarters commander Ivan Romanovsky. Most opponents of the commander-in-chief were inclined to believe that only the commander of the Caucasian army, Lieutenant-General Pyotr Wrangel, could be such a figure.
Unlike Denikin, Wrangel did not appear in the Volunteer Army immediately. Initially, he deliberately avoided participating in the Civil War and only on August 25, 1918, arrived at the location of the Volunteer Army. His appointment by Denikin to the post of interim commander of the 1st Cavalry Division was met with disapproval in the army. In the army, first of all, the "pioneers" were valued - the participants of the famous "Ice" campaign of the Volunteer Army in the winter-spring of 1918, which became a kind of symbol of the White movement.
The volunteers appreciated, first of all, the "White Guard" experience of this or that military man, and not his previous military merits. However, Denikin, who was in short supply of experienced cavalry commanders, took the risk and made the right decision. Wrangel became one of the most popular and successful leaders of the White movement, the peak of his success was the capture of Tsaritsyn in August 1919, which Trotsky proudly called "Red Verdun".
However, as Wrangel's popularity in the army grew, his relations with Denikin became increasingly conflicted. Each of the generals was not very fond of dwelling on the history of the conflict, which Anton Ivanovich in his hearts called "a Russian disgrace." Another thing is more important here: in many ways, this conflict was the prehistory of the events described below. You can argue for as long as you like about whether Wrangel was preparing an intrigue against Denikin in order to remove him, or whether he was impeccably clean in this respect, another thing is important: in Denikin's mind, Wrangel was an intriguer, aiming at his place. Even his closest comrade, General Pavel Shatilov, agreed that for Denikin "Wrangel appeared to be a person who was ready to use all the ways to get Denikin's replacement."
General Alexander Lukomsky, who was "injured" by Anton Ivanovich at the end of the "Denikin" stage of his career, also echoed Shatilov. According to him, "a certain impression was created that Wrangel was not only waking up against Denikin, but was leading a certain intrigue against the latter, putting himself forward to replace him." The white commander-in-chief also knew that in the army he was rapidly losing popularity and faith in him, and that very many were sure that only Wrangel could rectify the situation, and besides him there were also "shadow" leaders - Yakov Slashchov and Alexander Kutepov.
General depression, a feeling of the inevitability of the collapse of what he loved, the loss of faith in the army - all this led to the fact that Denikin decided to leave his post. In addition, Denikin's conversation with the commander of the 1st Army Corps Kutepov, which took place on the eve of the news of the convening of a council of senior officers to choose a new Commander-in-Chief, was also of great importance.
In a conversation with Denikin, Kutepov pointed out that the volunteers no longer want to see Denikin as their leader. This news crushed Anton Ivanovich. His decision to leave the post was inevitable. How subtle the game Kutepov played here is anyone's guess. Whether he himself was aiming at Denikin's place, or whether he sincerely believed that Anton Ivanovich should leave his post in the name of a common cause is unknown. At the same time, we repeat that it was precisely the conversation with Kutepov that predetermined Denikin's decision.
General Nikolai Schilling, who was well aware of the events of the time, recalled that: “On March 19, General Kutepov reported to the Commander-in-Chief about his conversation with General Slashchov, who told him that on March 23 it was planned to convene a meeting of representatives of the clergy, army, navy and population to discuss the provisions . According to him, it was this meeting that should have turned to Denikin with a request to surrender the command.
“All these intrigues and harassment by the authorities that General Wrangel led and aspired to, with the support of General Slashchov, most of the navy officials, as well as extreme right-wing elements headed by Bishop Benjamin of Sevastopol, known for his intrigues and restless character,” wrote Schilling. - All this, taken together, clearly showed General Denikin that under such conditions it is impossible to work and fulfill the duty to the Motherland. The result of this decision was reflected in the issuance of the order for the Military Council."
General Denikin's headquarters were in those days in Feodosia, which during the Civil War, in the words of Osip Mandelstam, resembled "a robber Mediterranean republic of the sixteenth century." Early in the morning of March 20, 1920, the new chief of staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the All-Russian Soviet Socialist Republic, General Pyotr Makhrov, was summoned by Denikin to his place. The look of Denikin, pale and tired, did not inspire any optimism. Handing out to Makhrov a piece of paper covered with a pencil, Denikin said: "You will read it, and I ask you to send it to the destination immediately." Makhrov began to read a piece of paper on which was written an order to convene the Military Council for March 20 in the evening under the chairmanship of General from the cavalry Abram Dragomirov to select a new Commander-in-Chief.
Makhrov recalled: “For me it was so unexpected and seemed so dangerous at the moment that I involuntarily burst out:
- But this is impossible, Your Excellency!
General Denikin, usually amiable, this time objected grimly and categorically:
- No talk. My decision is irrevocable, I thought it over and weighed everything. I am mentally broken and physically sick. The army has lost faith in the leader, I have lost faith in the army. I ask you to carry out my order."
Denikin proposed to the Military Council "to elect a worthy person to whom I will successively transfer power and command." The order to schedule the meeting caused everyone's surprise. No one could intelligibly answer the question: how can a "worthy" one be elected?
All those invited gathered in the palace of the Fleet Commander on the evening of March 21, 1920. The first thing that caught the eye of everyone who arrived at the palace was that the palace was surrounded by Drozdovites, a couple of machine guns stood at the entrance, the nearby streets were cordoned off by soldiers. “We were gathering as if they were dangerous conspirators,” ataman Afrikan Bogaevsky, a participant in the meeting, recalled.
Considering that power in Sevastopol in those days actually belonged to the Drozdovites, Makhrov reasonably suggested that they were up to something, expressing the idea that in this situation “volunteer bayonets could play the same role as in 1613 the Cossack saber at the choice of Mikhail Fyodorovich for the kingdom”.
“Who could have taken the place of General Denikin? - reasoned Makhrov. - Of course, not General Dragomirov, who lost all authority after Kiev. Kutepov had even less chances, whose mental horizons could not expand as quickly as he was given the ranks. An always half-drunk cretin in a suit like a clown or a Caucasian highlander - Slashchov could not take the post of commander-in-chief. Nobody would have spoken for Pokrovsky … The impeccable name of Ulagai remained, but he was only a soldier."
There was no unanimous opinion among the audience about what was happening. First of all, the electoral principle did not fit into the minds of the generals, reminding them of a similar practice among the Bolsheviks. This position was vividly expressed by Slashchov, who argued that the deputy commander-in-chief should be appointed by Denikin himself, in addition, he sarcastically called what was happening "the general's sovdep". "What do we serve - a cause or persons?" - asked the future prototype of General Khludov from Bulgakov's "Beg": "Are we really going to choose the chief?"
"No! - The chairman Dragomirov answered. "The commander-in-chief wants to know the opinion of senior commanders, but he will choose and appoint."
Slashov also did not like the fact that his corps, which heroically defended the last piece of white Russia - Crimea, was represented on the council by a smaller number of military leaders than other corps. Abram Mikhailovich said that it was necessary, without wasting time, to name the name of the new Commander-in-Chief.
The chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet, Captain I Rank Ryabinin, who asked to speak, said that from the point of view of naval sailors, only General Wrangel could be a worthy successor to Anton Ivanovich. The commander of the Drozdovskaya division, Vitkovsky, said that the Drozdovites categorically refuse to participate in the elections. He was supported by the commanders of the Kornilov, Markov and Alekseevsk divisions. A chorus rang out: "Hurray for General Denikin!"
Vitkovsky and other senior officers began to prove to Dragomirov the need to immediately report by telegraph to General Denikin about the mood of the Military Council and a request to stay in power. Dragomirov did not agree, but in the end he was forced to send the following message to Denikin: "The Military Council recognized it impossible to resolve the issue of the successor to the Commander-in-Chief, considering the precedent of the elected leadership impossible, decided to ask you to single-handedly indicate that …"
Soon Denikin's reply came: “Morally broken, I cannot stay in power for a single day … I demand that the Military Council fulfill my duty. Otherwise, Crimea and the army will be plunged into anarchy."
Gathering the members of the Military Council the next day, Dragomirov read out to them the text of Denikin's telegram. After much wrangling, it was decided to hold two meetings - one from the senior bosses, the other from all the others. The first was to outline a successor, the second - to support or reject the elected person.
By that time, General Wrangel had arrived in Sevastopol from Constantinople, delivering the text of the English ultimatum addressed to Denikin, but given to Wrangel on March 20 in Constantinople. In an ultimatum, the British government proposed to the White Guards to end the unequal struggle and promised its mediation in negotiations with the Soviet government. Otherwise, England disclaimed responsibility and threatened to stop any assistance. “After reading the ultimatum,” Wrangel told the journalist Rakovsky, “I considered it obligatory for myself to respond to the call to arrive at the army, which was almost in a stalemate.”
Wrangel familiarized Dragomirov with the text of the ultimatum, saying that “under the present conditions, General Denikin has no moral right to leave the case at which he was up to now. He must bring this matter to the end and take responsibility for everything that happens. " In response to the considerations expressed by Wrangel, Dragomirov said that “The decision of the Commander-in-Chief to leave is final. I am convinced that he will not change it. " From the hall, where the meeting was to take place, "there was a noise, a chatter, the stamping of numerous feet."Wrangel, who saw through the ajar door "a significant crowd of several dozen people", independently of Slashchev said that it was "some kind of Sovdep."
According to him: “The new Commander-in-Chief, whoever he may be, must know with complete certainty what his comrades-in-arms will demand of him under these conditions, and the latter what the new leader can promise them. All of this is impossible to discuss in such a large gathering, largely composed of boys. After all, some of the current regimental commanders in normal times would only be lieutenants. I believe that all persons who are younger than the corps commanders, or who are equal in power to them, should be removed from the council.
In the new, reduced composition of the council, twenty names remained, the other participants in the meeting were asked to leave the premises, and Dragomirov reported the text of the ultimatum to the senior chiefs.
“To all of us, the English proposals seemed so ridiculous and impracticable that the discussion of them somehow disappeared by itself,” Schilling recalled.
- And again, at our meeting of senior chiefs, lively conversations began about the choice of the Commander-in-Chief, I repeat that most of the participants pointed to the inadmissibility of the elective beginning, saying that if General Denikin was destined to remain without General Denikin, then whoever he himself appoints will obey … Since most of us, senior bosses, refused the elections and did not indicate a person worthy to be the successor of General Denikin, the Donskoy Ataman Bogaevsky made a lengthy speech, brightly and colorfully sanctified the created situation, emphasized the need to end the question at all costs about the Deputy General Denikin and … named General Wrangel as the future Commander-in-Chief … Some spoke for, some against.
All this talk, reasoning and excitement tired everyone to the extreme. To this we must add that the junior chiefs, members of the military council, not knowing the reasons for the delay, remaining isolated in the large hall, were naturally nervous and repeatedly sent to find out whether our meeting of senior chiefs would end soon and the meeting of the military council, interrupted so unexpectedly, would begin to continue. After a lengthy debate, it was still decided to focus on the candidacy of General Wrangel, who was again invited to our office, where General Dragomirov announced our decision to him.
Having agreed to accept the post of commander-in-chief, General Wrangel, to our great amazement, presented us with a resolute demand to sign him that the condition for accepting the post of commander-in-chief would not demand an offensive against the Reds, but only the withdrawal of the army with honor from the difficult situation that had arisen … was given to him."
After that, a telegram was immediately sent to Denikin announcing the decision of the Military Council. Having inquired about whether Wrangel knew about the change in the foreign policy situation that had taken place the day before, and having received an affirmative answer, Denikin gave his last order to the Armed Forces of the South of Russia. The order appointed Lieutenant General Baron Wrangel Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia. The order ended with the words: “To all who walked with me in a difficult struggle, - a deep bow. Lord, grant victory to the army and save Russia."
Having announced Denikin's last order to the members of the Military Council, Dragomirov proclaimed "Hurray!" General Wrangel. "Without enthusiasm and unanimity," Schilling recalled, but the Council shouted "Hurray!" the new commander-in-chief, who walked around all the members of the Council, shaking hands with everyone.
On the evening of March 22, 1920, Denikin left Russia forever. The Crimean epic of Baron Wrangel began - the final stage of the white struggle in the South of Russia. It did not last long. In November 1920, the remnants of the once mighty Armed Forces in the South of Russia suffered a final defeat.
