Due to its armament, maneuverability and offensive nature of operations during the Great Patriotic War, air defense fighter aircraft (air defense IA) remained the main striking force of the country's Air Defense Forces. Interacting with various branches of the armed forces, it covered large strategic centers, reserves, various objects of the front rear, railway communications from air strikes, and performed a number of other tasks.
Together with anti-aircraft artillery (ZA), searchlight units and barrage balloons (AZ), fighter aircraft repelled enemy air raids, both during daylight hours and at night. Night conditions precluded the use of aircraft by the belligerents in dense combat formations. That is why air battles at this time of day were conducted, as a rule, by single aircraft.
At night, fighter aircraft operated at long and short approaches to the covered objects. On the near approaches for the air defense aircraft, zones of night air combat were outlined, on the distant ones - zones of free search.
Zones of night combat were established around the object, usually at a distance of no more than 20 km from the outer border of effective anti-aircraft artillery fire and at a distance of 15-20 km from each other. So, by mid-August 1941, 16 such zones were prepared in the air defense system of Moscow. In the summer of 1942, on the outskirts of Voronezh, at a distance of 15-20 km from the city, there were 4 zones of night combat. If there were no particularly prominent landmarks on the terrain, the zones were indicated by light signs (beams of searchlights). They were planned in such a way that fighter pilots could find an enemy plane and shoot it down before entering the zone of fire behind.
In the presence of searchlight fields (SPF), the latter were simultaneously the zones of night combat of fighters. Light support for night combat for air defense fighters was created only during the defense of large centers. And a continuous ring of SPP was organized only around Moscow, and during the defense of other cities (Leningrad, Saratov, Gorky, Kiev, Riga, etc.), searchlight fields were created in certain probable directions of enemy aircraft flights. Such directions were characteristic linear landmarks: railways and highways, rivers, banks of reservoirs, etc. The depth of the searchlight fields, as a rule, did not exceed 30-40 km (5-6 minutes of an enemy aircraft flight at a speed of 360-400 km / h). If the target was illuminated at the leading edge of the searchlight field, then our fighters had the ability to make 2-3 attacks. One fighter aviation regiment was operating in the light field. Until 1942, each SPP had one fighter waiting area. As a result, fewer fighters were lifted into the air than required, as a result of which the combat capabilities of the air defense IA were reduced. So, in the summer of 1941, during German air raids on Moscow, there were cases when in the SPP the number of simultaneously illuminated enemy aircraft exceeded the number of air defense fighters, and some of the enemy bombers freely crossed the light field.
Then, in the years that followed, there was a change in the use of floodlight fields. A number of measures were taken to increase the effectiveness of mutual actions of searchlight and aviation units. In particular, in each light field, instead of one waiting area, three were organized (two - at the front edge of the SPP and one - in the center). This made it possible to increase the number of vehicles simultaneously lifted into the air, and the likelihood of intercepting enemy aircraft increased.
For the destruction of enemy bombers on distant approaches to the covered object (usually at a distance of up to 100 km from it in the direction of the likely flight routes of enemy aircraft), free search zones were created. In them, fighters had to operate without light support.
What were the methods of action of the air defense IA in the dark? These are airfield duty and air duty. The main one was the airfield watch, during which various degrees of combat readiness were established for the fighters.
Usually, the night watch was taken over an hour before dark. The duration of stay in readiness number 1 should not be more than two, and in readiness number 2 - six hours (during the daytime in readiness number 1 the pilots were not more than two hours, in readiness number 2 - all daylight hours). The success of fighter aircraft sorties to intercept enemy aircraft from the "airfield watch" state depended on accurate and timely notification of aviation units and well-organized targeting of the enemy. Usually, when using this method, one shot down enemy aircraft had several times fewer sorties than when patrolling in the air. But watch at the airfield was effective only when the defended object was at a significant distance from the front line, and visual posts of VNOS and radar could detect enemy aircraft in time. Otherwise, it was difficult to guarantee the interception of enemy bombers.
Watching in the air at night, in contrast to the actions of the IA during the day, consisted in patrolling fighters in specially prepared and designated areas (night combat zones, free search zones), with the aim of intercepting and destroying enemy aircraft. The number of fighters patrolling in the air depended on the degree of importance of the defended object, the air situation and the distance of the object from the front line, as well as the availability of trained crews for night operations. For reliable air cover of the most important objects, patrolling was built in 2-3 tiers (air defense of Moscow, Leningrad). The minimum excess in height between patrols was 500 m (during the day - from 1 to 1.5 km).
If the enemy tried to penetrate the object only through one (two) zones, then air defense fighters from neighboring zones were sent there (depending on the number of enemy bombers). Moreover, the heights at which the watch was carried out in the air in the zone where the reinforcement was directed were indicated. When there were light fields in the air defense system, patrol zones were set 8-10 km from the front edge of these fields, which made it possible for pilots to use the entire depth of the searchlight field in battle. The departure of fighters for patrolling into the searchlight field was carried out at the command of the commander of an aviation regiment (division). Watching in the air during the day and at night required a large expenditure of aircrew forces and entailed a significant consumption of fuel and motor resources. Therefore, since the summer of 1943, as high-speed aircraft equipped with more advanced radio communication devices, as well as a sufficient number of radar detection and guidance stations arrived at the air defense aircraft units, they resorted to covering objects by patrolling only when fighter aircraft flew to intercept from the state For some reason, the “watch at the airfield” did not ensure a timely meeting with an air target (the proximity of the front line, the absence of a radar station, etc.).
The night-light pilots were carefully preparing for each flight. This preparation consisted in a firm knowledge of the boundaries of their own and neighboring zones of night combat, free search, waiting zones, as well as zones of fire for the back. A flight path to the holding area was plotted for each pilot. The entrance (exit) gates of this zone were indicated. The altitude and method of patrolling were assigned, the signals of interaction between the IA, ZA and searchlight units were studied. In their area, the crews had to clearly know the boundaries of the SPP, light reference points, the firing positions of the ZA batteries and alternate airfields in the event of an emergency landing.
The materiel was also being prepared for night action. In particular, the operating mode of the engine was pre-regulated in such a way that the glow of the exhaust gases in flight was the weakest. Instruments and their night lighting, aircraft armament, etc. were also checked. Such training was carried out, for example, in the 11th, 16th, 27th, 34th and other fighter aviation regiments of the 6th IAC Air Defense.
Tactical actions of air defense fighter aircraft were carried out with and without light support. In the first and second periods of the war, in the presence of light support, the air defense IA acted as follows. Finding aerial targets illuminated by searchlights, the fighters approached them and struck up a battle. The pilots carried out attacks, in most cases, from the rear hemisphere (above or below), depending on the position when approaching. The fire was carried out from minimum short distances without much risk of being shot down first, since the crews of the enemy bombers were blinded by the beams of searchlights and did not see the attacking fighters.
Here are two examples. On the night of July 22, 1941, the Nazis carried out their first massive raid on the capital. It involved 250 bombers. The first groups were spotted by VNOS posts in the Vyazma region. This made it possible to bring the air defense systems, including the aircraft, in readiness to repel the raid. German planes were attacked even on the distant approaches to Moscow. To repel the air strike, 170 fighters 6 IAC air defense were involved.
Active air battles took place in the searchlight fields at the Solnechnogorsk-Golitsyno line. Among the first to take off was the commander of the 11 IAP Air Defense Squadron Captain K. N. Titenkov and attacked the leader of the German He-111 bombers. First, he struck down an air gunner, and then set fire to an enemy plane from a short distance. That night, air defense fighters conducted 25 air battles, in which they shot down 12 German bombers. The main result was the disruption, together with the forces of the ZA, of the air strike on Moscow, only single aircraft were able to break through to it.
Near Leningrad, the most successful air battles were carried out by 7 IAC air defense fighters in May-June 1942, when the Nazis undertook an operation to mine the fairways in the area of about. Kotlin. Success was achieved thanks to the timely detection of enemy bombers and the guidance of our fighters with the help of radio means at the air targets illuminated by searchlights, and, in addition, the tactically competent actions of our pilots, who approached the enemy, remaining unnoticed, and opened fire from small distances, mainly from the rear upper hemisphere. Only 9 enemy aircraft were shot down, but the enemy's plan was thwarted.
In terms of their performance characteristics in the initial period of the war, our aircraft were mostly inferior to the German ones, and the pilots, having spent their ammunition, were forced to use a ram to prevent the bombing of important objects (Lieutenant P. V. Eremeev, Junior Lieutenant V. V. Talalikhin, Lieutenant A. N.. Katrich and many others). This tactic was carefully crafted and required heroism and skill. Soviet pilots destroyed enemy aircraft, often saving their aircraft for new battles. Gradually, in connection with the quantitative as well as the qualitative growth of fighter aircraft, the improvement of weapons and the acquisition of tactical skill, air rams began to be used less and less, and by the end of the war they practically disappeared.
From the second half of 1943, after the rapid advance of the Soviet Army, the enemy could no longer carry out raids on large centers in the interior of the country. Therefore, the air defense IA almost did not fight in the searchlight fields. The searchlight units were mainly responsible for the combat operations of the ZA.
Air defense fighters since 1944, in the absence of SPP, used lighting bombs (OAB). The greatest successes were achieved by the pilots of 148 IAD under the command of Colonel A. A. Tereshkina. Consider briefly the night battle of this division with the use of OAB. The planes were usually echeloned in three tiers. In the first, fighters patrolled at the altitude of enemy bombers, in the second, they were 1500-2000 m higher; in the third - 500 m higher than the second tier. The radar and airborne observation posts detected the air enemy. When the enemy planes approached the holding area, the fighter patrolling in the second tier was given the command from the command post: “Drop the UAV”. After that, the first tier fighters searched and attacked the illuminated aircraft. The pilot who dropped the OAB immediately descended, made a search and also entered the battle. And the fighter that was patrolling in the third tier holding area was monitoring the situation. If the enemy aircraft tried to leave the illuminated area, it dropped the AAB, increasing the lighting area, and attacked the enemy itself. The tactical actions of the air defense IA were carried out differently without light support.
On a moonlit night, fighters, while patrolling, kept slightly below the likely altitude of the enemy's flight, so that the silhouette of the enemy aircraft was visible against the background of the moon or thin clouds through which the moon shines through. It was noticed that when searching above the clouds, it is more advantageous to keep, on the contrary, above the enemy in order to see him from above against the background of clouds. In some cases, it was possible to detect an enemy bomber by the shadow it cast on the clouds. So, on the night of June 15, 1942, Captain I. Moltenkov flew on a MiG-3 fighter to intercept bombers, which were reported by the VNOS service. In the Sestroretsk area, at an altitude of 2500 m, the captain noticed two Ju-88 bombers. Their silhouettes were clearly visible against the bright sky. Moltenkov quickly turned the plane around, went into the enemy's tail and approached the right leading Ju-88 to a distance of 20 m, keeping slightly below him. The crew was unaware of the approach of the fighter and followed the same course. Captain Moltenkov equalized speed and almost point-blank shot the enemy. The Junkers caught fire, went into a tailspin and fell into the Gulf of Finland. The second plane turned sharply towards the dark part of the horizon and disappeared.
Successful battles on moonlit nights were conducted by air defense fighters while repelling raids on Volkhov, Smolensk, Kiev and other cities. On a moonless night, the search for the enemy was very difficult, but, as experience has shown, it is possible. The fighters kept slightly below the altitude of the enemy aircraft, the silhouettes of which were visible only at close range. Often the enemy was given out fires when the engines were exhausting. So, on June 27, 1942, at 22 hours 34 minutes, Captain N. Kalyuzhny flew to a predetermined zone in the Voronezh region. At an altitude of 2000 m, he found the enemy bomber through the exhaust from the pipes, attacked it from a distance of 50 m and set fire to the right engine. The plane caught fire, fell to the ground and exploded.
It was also noticed that at dusk and dawn, the plane is well projected on the bright part of the horizon and is visible at a long distance. This was skillfully used by air defense fighters to search for and attack enemy bombers during the air defense of Smolensk, Borisov, Kiev, Riga and other cities.
During the white nights, the pilots operating in the North also achieved success. So, on the night of June 12, 1942, Sergeant Major M. Grishin, patrolling in the night battle zone over the Gulf of Finland on an I-16, noticed two He-111s going to the Kronstadt area. The silhouettes of the planes stood out quite clearly against the background of the sky and clouds. Stealthily approaching the enemy, Grishin attacked the leader from behind, fired two rockets from a distance of 400-500 m, and then opened fire from all fire weapons. The attacked plane went into a dive, trying to hide in the clouds, while the other made a 180 ° turn and began to leave. Sergeant Major Grishin caught up with the dive leader and made a second attack in the tail from a distance of 150 m, however, this time without success. As soon as He-111 emerged from the upper cloud layer, Grishin attacked it from the top from the side for the third time from a distance of 50 m. The bomber was shot down. In that battle, it was possible to destroy the enemy only when fire was opened from close range and at a favorable angle of attack.
Often, fighter pilots detected enemy bombers by the contrail, which aircraft leave behind in flight at high altitudes (in winter - at almost all altitudes). So, on August 11, 1941, Lieutenant A. Katrich shot down a Dornier-217 bomber on a MIG-3 fighter, having found it on the contrail.
The above examples indicate that air defense fighter pilots have successfully mastered the tactics of night combat, both with and without light support, have shown perseverance, determination and achieved success. However, there were also disadvantages. These include: poor use of radio, insufficient training of pilots in determining distances at night, which led to the opening of fire from long distances, inept use of rockets, the firing of which was most often impartial and ineffectual, etc.
During the war, the air defense IA was widely involved in covering railway junctions and highways in the front line. Each air regiment was assigned a specific object or section of the railway, depending on the combat composition of the regiments, the importance of the section and the presence of airfields. The fighters had to repel enemy raids mainly at night, without having light support. So, in July 1944, out of 54 enemy aircraft shot down by the Air Defense Agency's Northern Front, 40 aircraft were shot down in night battles. When repelling one of the raids on the Velikiye Luki railway junction at the end of July 1944, 10 pilots of 106 air defense IADs, acting competently outside the zone of searchlights that provided fire for the FORE, shot down 11 enemy bombers.
In the actions of the air defense IA at night, the interaction of aviation with other branches of the armed forces deserved special attention. At the heart of the interaction of IA and FORAA at night, as in daytime conditions, was the separation of battle zones. The fighters operated at the distant approaches to the covered object, the anti-aircraft artillery conducted barrage (escort) fire at the close approaches to and above it. In contrast to operations during the day, at night the searchlight regiments created light fields for the fighters, and the searchlight battalions - light zones for firing FOR. Fighters had the right to enter the light zone in order to complete the attack. Then the anti-aircraft batteries ceased fire and conducted the so-called "silent fire". Entering the light zone 3A, the fighter was obliged to give a signal with a colored rocket and duplicate it by radio, on a predetermined interaction wave.
However, there were also serious shortcomings in ensuring interaction. So, in June 1943, in the course of repelling the raids on Gorky, it turned out that the pilots of the 142 air defense IAD did not interact clearly enough with the AF. Either the fighters came under fire from anti-aircraft batteries, or they stopped firing prematurely in order to avoid hitting their aircraft. Searching for targets with searchlights was often haphazard, the rays shone in different directions and therefore did not help the fighters to find targets, and the signal of the fighter with a rocket - "I am going to attack" - due to the beams of searchlights, tracer bullets and shells, was most often poorly visible from the ground, when in doing so, he helped the enemy find our fighter. The demarcation of battle zones at night by heights also did not justify itself. In the future, these shortcomings were mainly eliminated.
Also, the air defense IA in night conditions interacted with barrage balloons on the principle of separation of zones of action. AZ was used in the defense of the largest centers of the country, as well as as part of detachments and divisions in the defense of individual objects - factories, ports, power plants and large railway bridges. The setting of the AZ forced the enemy aircraft to raise the flight altitude, so the results of aimed bombing were reduced. In order to avoid collisions with the cables of balloons, air defense fighters were strictly forbidden to enter the zones of the AZ. The fighter aviation interacted with the VNOS units. Having discovered enemy aircraft, the VNOS posts immediately transmitted information by radio (wire means of communication) to the main VNOS post and in parallel to the air unit. The radar and some VNOS posts equipped with radio stations not only detected enemy aircraft, but also served as technical means of guiding air defense aviation to air targets. The mastering of the tablet guidance method deserves special attention. Guidance was carried out by aviation representatives of IA units and formations.
Air defense fighter aircraft gained experience of interaction not only with other branches of the country's Air Defense Forces, but also with IA and FOR fronts. So, on the night of June 3, 1943, pilots of the 101st Air Defense IAD, together with anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aircraft of the 16th Air Army, repelled a raid on the Kursk railway junction. Enemy bombers came in to strike from different directions with single aircraft and groups of 3-5 vehicles. In total, up to 300 aircraft took part in this night raid. The interaction of forces consisted in the division of battle zones. Troops FORA opened fire on enemy aircraft in its zone, front-line fighters located at forward airfields carried out attacks on German aircraft near the front line, air defense fighters struck fascist bombers on the long and short approaches to Kursk up to the zone of fire for the country's Air Defense Forces. This alignment of forces brought success: the raid was repelled with heavy losses of the Germans.
In the future, the interaction has received even greater development. Particular attention was paid to the organization of the notification. In most cases, all company, battalion and main posts of the Air Defense Forces of the Western Front of the Air Defense, had a direct connection with the IA units. Thanks to this, from January to April 1944, there was not a single sudden raid of enemy aircraft on railway junctions at night. At that time, in the southern part of the Left-Bank Ukraine and Donbass, a unified system of radar support for military operations of the IA was operating. The radar visibility zones overlapped and formed a single continuous field of detection of enemy aircraft and guidance of their fighters in a wide area.
The interaction between IA and ZA due to the development of radio and radar facilities has improved significantly. An example is the reflection of the raid of 100 German bombers on the Darnitsa station on the night of April 8, 1944. Enemy aircraft were discovered by VNOS and radar posts. Air defense aviation operated mainly on the distant approaches to the city. Anti-aircraft artillery created a curtain of fire on the near approaches and over the city. Individual fighters dropped lighting bombs over false targets on the route of German aircraft, thereby misleading German pilots. Radio and radar were used to control and guide our aircraft. The enemy raid was repelled.
In general, air defense fighter aircraft actively counteracted the enemy air force while repelling enemy night raids. In night air battles, air defense fighters during the war shot down 301 enemy aircraft, or 7.6%. of the total number of enemy aircraft destroyed by them. Such a small percentage is explained by the lack of special equipment for night combat (airborne radars), as well as the weak saturation with technical means of control, guidance and support that are extremely necessary for the successful conduct of air defense IA battles at night (powerful radio stations, anti-aircraft searchlights, radar, etc.). Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that the relative effectiveness of fighter aircraft combat operations at night was three times higher than during the day: there were 24 sorties for every aircraft shot down at night, and 72 sorties for every aircraft shot down in the daytime.
