In the first half of the 1950s, many domestic design teams were mainly engaged in the development and construction of fighters. These design bureaus were united by the desire to reach flight speeds in the next five years, which would be twice the speed of sound, and shared the desire of each to be the first with the largest possible margin. It would seem that everything is going according to plan and according to business, when suddenly in 1954, against this background, a stunning proposal was put forward by a group of not very well-known specialists. They decided to create a new aircraft in the spirit of the old, but not officially removed, Stalinist slogan: "Fly faster, higher and farthest !!!".
To make an extraordinary plane that would not only meet the requirements of the time, but also really necessary, while one that no one else had before, is possible only in the Design Bureau, which has a solid experimental and production base. At that time, such a problem was almost impossible to solve, or at least very difficult.
By the early 1950s. all planned Soviet experimental aircraft construction was concentrated in several large experimental design bureaus. The chief designers of the collectives who remained in the MAP (after the closure of the experimental enterprises in 1946-1949), “holding hands”, turned into an insurmountable monolithic wall. Having divided the spheres of influence, design bureaus by all available means tried to prevent the promotion of new competitors. Only a few managed to come out on a par with them, and then in most cases for a short time (in 1951, the Myasishchev V. M. OKB was recreated, which was engaged in strategic bombers, and was stationed at plant number 23). Among the exceptions was OKB-256, which was located on the Moscow Sea in the city of Podberez'e on the territory of plant No. 256 (before that, the OKB IV Chetverikov worked here, and after 1947 - German aviation specialists headed by BV Baade). It was headed by Pavel Vladimirovich Tsybin (years of life 1905-1992), the author of many experimental, sport and landing gliders, which were built before 1948. To form his own design bureau, he had to try pretty hard to convince the government and the military elite of the need to build an aircraft according to his proposed preliminary project. This preliminary development was actually those. Tsybin's proposal.
March 4, 1954 Tsybin P. V. sent a closed letter to the Kremlin with a proposal to build a new aircraft, which will be endowed with unprecedented properties. Its maximum speed was supposed to be 3 thousand km / h, flight altitude - 30 thousand meters and a range of 14 thousand km. Many novelties have been proposed to achieve the stated characteristics. The tail and wing were prescribed hexagonal profiles with a very small relative thickness (from 2.5 to 3.5%), which had not yet been used for aircraft. For the fuselage, contours of a similar style with rectilinear generatrices of surfaces of revolution were chosen. An important condition for ensuring high flight data was the corresponding power-to-weight ratio. They were going to get it, firstly, thanks to the unprecedented lightness of the structure and filling with a recoil of 80% and, secondly, the use of new, more powerful engines.
The question that this power plant still needed to be created, for some reason, at the first stages, did not bother anyone.
Preliminary work was started at BNT TsAGI by a small group of specialists who were temporarily seconded under the supervision of PV Tsybin. These were OV Eliseev, IK Kostenko, AS Kondratyev, VB Shavrov. other. According to the preliminary design, the "PC" (jet aircraft) had an unusual aerodynamic layout. The device is rather elongated outlines of the hull (about 30 meters) with a trapezoidal wing of low aspect ratio (area 65 m2, span 10 m, sweep along the leading edge 58 degrees) had two engines at the ends of the wing, nose and tail horizontal empennage. The tail section was a peculiar highlight of the preliminary project, representing an elated "special cargo". At the command of the pilot (after an order from the Kremlin), it separates in flight, turning into a projectile. It was a winged bomb (the corps of the "244N" edition was taken as a basis), which, after leaving the lock of the bomb holder, glided at a target found 250 kilometers away, being dropped from it 50 kilometers away. The part of the aircraft that remained at the height made a turn and, without entering the enemy's air defense zone, returned … without a tail. After the separation of the "special cargo", the "jet plane" was transformed into an aircraft of the "duck" scheme. To balance it with a new position of the center of gravity (since a ton of weight was "removed" from the stern), forward horizontal all-turning surfaces were included in the control system. From the moment of the start to the separation of the "trunk" the front horizontal tail worked in a feathered, slightly "unwilling" mode. The steering surfaces of the winged bomb, initially included in the aircraft control system as a stabilizer, after separation switched to autonomous control, performing their function until the moment they met with the target. The targets could be Boston, London, New York, and so on.
The Kremlin liked the promised indicators so much that they became a powerful bait for the military and the governments of the post-Stalinist USSR, which forced them to take the proposal very seriously, despite skepticism about its viability.
The preliminary project was handed over to proxies in the Ministry of Aviation Industry. Its consideration and study for a general assessment was carried out at the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute. After discussion at an expanded commission, which included representatives of industry and the Air Force, those. the proposal was recognized as capable and competent. Experts of the Aviaprom Institute expressed doubts about the 80% weight return, and this led to the formation of a separate subcommittee headed by I. I. (head of the weight brigade at the Sukhoi Design Bureau). The check showed that for the proposed design and layout of the apparatus 80% are unrealistic, and one can only count on 60% (in the practice of Soviet aircraft construction, it was already possible to create an aircraft with a weight return exceeding 50%. In the Polikarpov Design Bureau in 1943, a wooden bomber NB ("T"), the weight return of which was 55%). Considering that such a result was promising, Tsybin's proposal was given a "green light". Thus, with all the pros and cons, the enthusiasts have achieved complete success.
Various commissions, inspections and inspections on private issues have artificially delayed the inspection of the "PC" facility for almost a year. And when there was nothing more to complain about, the innovators presented their "brainchild" at the expanded board of the Minaviaprom with the participation of officials from the defense department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. On May 5, 1955, a report by P. V. Tsybin took place. at the top, and on May 23 a government decree was signed on the creation of OKB-256 and the construction of "PC". The document was signed by the first 13 members of the government of the USSR and the Politburo: Malenkov G. M., Khrushchev N. S., Bulganin N. A., Kaganovich L. M., Mikoyan A. I., Suslov M. A., Zhukov G. K., Pospelov P. N., Voroshilov K. E. other. At the same time, they signed the estimate, the total amount was 224 million 115 thousand rubles. By February 1, 1957, the first flying machine was supposed to be ready, and the backup - by April 1 of the same year. All work was given 1, 5-2 years. Needless to say, Pavel Vladimirovich and his associates accomplished a real feat by creating a new business and opening an enterprise. The new design bureau was allocated a room and a production base of plant No. 256. Design Bureau management: P. V. Tsybin - Chief Designer, Golyaev A. G. - deputy. on general issues, B. A. Merkulov - deputy. on science and Yakovlev I. A. - deputy. for special equipment and systems. The famous aircraft designer V. B. Shavrov was appointed head of the design department (fuselage, empennage, wing, control, landing gear, and so on) and led individual teams specializing in the listed units. In addition, the new design bureau had a large number of other brigades and departments, to fill the staff of which a wide reception was opened. Other chief designers were instructed to allocate a certain number of people to Tsybin. Also, freshly baked young specialists from technical schools and universities were assigned to OKB-256. From the point of view of staffing, Tsybin was not lucky since the recently recreated (1951-1952) OKB-23 of chief designer V. M. Myasishchev. absorbed unclaimed human resources, filling its own staff with specialists who were left out of work after the reduction in the second half of the 1940s. aviation enterprises. In this regard, very little qualified contingent remained for OKB-256. Naturally, the chief designers did not give the best workers from their staff (everyone tried to get rid of low-skilled and unwanted ones). Thus, the general professional level of OKB-256 employees was lower compared to other enterprises. However, this is not all. Almost all workers who came from outside believed that their wages could not be lower than at the previous place of work. In addition, in large experimental design bureaus, as a rule, a bonus of up to 20% of the salary was paid every month, but in the new design bureau there was not yet anything to pay it for. Therefore, workers began to apply for an increase in grades and categories in order to bring their earnings up to the level of previous salaries. Significant inconveniences in the recruitment of personnel were represented by the remoteness of the plant from Moscow, which became the reason for the costs with an already determined estimate. The chief designer was in a hurry to fill the staff for the early deployment of work on the product, and in some cases he went to overstate the categories and grades for designers and other engineers. For example, instead of the 2nd and 3rd category, they gave the 1st and 2nd, which in many cases did not correspond to the actual qualifications. In addition, the stratum of leading engineers and other "nondescript" leaders and officials, clerks and social activists with large salaries (heads of departments, groups, brigades, along with their deputies and assistants, as well as all kinds of trade union, Komsomol and party semi-liberated and liberated secretaries) were quite significant.
Meanwhile, the complexity and novelty of the tasks set required the availability of first-rank specialists, from management to simple designers. Today we can safely say that the original idea was beyond the power of the performers of OKB-256. This already affected the first stages of work. The joint collective did not have a common work backlog, that long joint preliminary work (when people get used to each other and get used to each other), which gives the necessary stock of knowledge.
It was with great difficulty that the final general appearance of the "Jet Plane" and even its scheme were succeeded. For a long time (approximately the first two years), 5 general arrangement drawings were made at a scale of 1: 5, equally signed by Tsybin, but only partially served as the basis for detailed studies, since subsequent views did not replace the previous ones, which were not canceled at the same time. And none of the big questions was fully thought out. There was no complete consistency in the design teams. Especially many changes were made due to the equipment, which was constantly changing in the order of its improvement, when one system that did not justify itself was replaced by another, as a rule, more complex and capacious. In addition, there was a lot of unnecessary work that arose in the minds of "initiative" deputies and assistants. So, for example, a lot of time was spent on air conditioning issues (even a proposal to breed chlorella was considered). Built, however, was not completed, or rather abandoned at the beginning of the work, its own thermobaric chamber. They made, but did not dynamically assemble, a similar model of an aircraft at a scale of 1:10. Made from the finest energy in every detail, it was designed to study future vibrations and deformations. In a word, a lot of unnecessary things were done, attention was scattered, and the main issues remained unresolved. For a long time, the work could not get out of the state of various kinds of dead ends. Therefore, it is almost impossible to talk about clear developments and achievements in the first 2-3 years. The work entered a stable channel almost at the end of the existence of the design bureau. However, first things first.
Of course, in the work there were numerous consultations with TsAGI, as well as other sectoral institutes of the aviation industry under the supervision of the defense department of the Central Committee. When making decisions, the work of all the OKB services shuddered from the painful linkages with the aggregate factories, minders and non-MAP departments and institutions. The case turned out to be new in such a fullness and breadth that neither the customers, nor the developers of "PC", nor the legislators even suspected. But over time, much has stabilized. A large number of calculations and blowdowns were carried out, laboratory complexes were built and the like. The original "ace" idea of a detachable tail was soon abandoned due to the clarified difficulties that were associated with separation and autorecentration, with the superposition of problems of supersonic and subsonic aerodynamics inherent in a single aircraft and its isolated parts. As a result, the designers settled on the normal layout of the aircraft with a tail unit, as well as a semi-submerged suspension under the fuselage of the "special cargo". At the same time, the layout, design and location of the retractable landing gear were revised, which received the front position of the main leg and modified side struts with the tail support.
During the development of the conceptual design of the "PC" it became clear that the weight of the aircraft exceeds the proposed one and one does not even have to think about the weight return of 60%. By the end of 1955, it turned out that the maximum flight range would not exceed 7.5 thousand km. There was an idea about the "PC" suspension for the Tu-95N. The joint flight range was supposed to be 3000-4000 km, followed by the uncoupling and acceleration of the Jet Plane using two twin boosters (with a liquid propellant rocket engine) in the climb mode. Further independent flight (after dropping the accelerators) took place on two marching supersonic ramjet air-jet engines at a speed of 3000 kilometers per hour. The bomb, as in the original version, was to be dropped 50 kilometers before the target, with its detection by the onboard radar at a distance of 200-250 kilometers.
The draft design of the aircraft "PC" in this form was released on 31.01.1956 and approved by the chief designer P. V. Tsybin. Long before that, almost from the very beginning of development, in OKB-670 Bondaryuk M. M. sent an official order for the development of a supersonic ramjet engine. Two such SPVRDs, which received the designation RD-013, developed a thrust of 4400-4500 kgf each at the design height. The engines were supposed to provide a speed of 3000 km / h at an altitude of 20 thousand meters. RD-013 had an adjustable external compression air intake with a central cone. The total length of the engine is 5.5 m, the diameter of the combustion chamber is 650 mm.
At about the same time, other design bureaus (Lavochkina S. A. and Myasishcheva V. M.) were developing alternative projects: ed. "350" and ed. "40". These were remotely controlled unmanned winged vehicles known as the Tempest and Buran. The devices were also designed for a speed of 3000 km / h and an intercontinental (transpolar) flight range. They were equipped with ramjet engines RD-012U and RD-018A (respectively) designed by M. M. Bondaryuk. "Tempest" and "Buran" were distinguished by vertical launch from the ground using rocket boosters with liquid propellant rocket engines.
The first launch of the intercontinental ballistic missile R-7 designed by S. P. Korolev, which took place on 1957-15-05, and the launch on 1957-21-08 of the same missile at the design range, contributed to the fact that work on cruise carriers of strategic nuclear weapons was soon sharply reduced.
Black days have come for military aviation and aircraft construction. The creators of rocket technology were able to form the opinion of the army elite and the government that aircraft is losing its importance as the main strategic weapon. New ideas about military equipment, where missiles dominated, were widely advertised. The era of radical restructuring of the military-industrial complex of the USSR began. The hotly supported and thoughtlessly dogmatic point of view (of the participants and partisan proponents of rocket science) was inflated by the successes in astronautics, which led to the categorical statement: "Rockets will replace aircraft!", Which became the driving slogan, transferring the indiscriminate decision to tactical military aviation. Some aircraft design bureaus and the most powerful plants of the Aviation Industry were forever transferred to the Ministry of Medium Machine Building. Their rig, tech. equipment and all aircraft accessories were put under the pile driver. The culture of design, design and production left over from the aviation industry in various sectors (from the manufacture of parts to the general assembly of products) played a significant role in the powerful development of rocket propulsion, rocketry and astronautics. Once again, the missilemen literally robbed the aircraft industry and to this day they are resting on their laurels, confident in their righteousness. Suffice it to say that factories # 1 and # 23 - the flagships of the Soviet aircraft industry - were "usurped" for the serial production of SP Korolev's missiles. and Chelomey V. N. “It was a terrible time,” said V. Ya. Litvinov, director of plant No. 1, twice Hero of Socialist Labor. Fresh banners and new appeals hung on the walls of the buildings looked like appeals to suicide, and nothing could be changed …"
In those years, a large number of military aviation units, units and formations were deprived of mat. parts and disbanded. Thousands of warplanes have found their "final resting place" right in the parking lot under gas cutters. Spawned by the massive destruction of aircraft, aircraft cemeteries multiplied and grew on an unprecedented scale. Throughout its history, the world has never seen such unbridled vandalism regarding the results of the labor of its people in its own country. Military aviators and aircraft builders dropped out and were retrained into missile and rocket designers. Shoulder straps with "wings" and blue buttonholes were innumerably replaced by black ones with criss-cross overlays from the trunks. Just one example of perestroika plunges into real horror. So, for example, in the Lavochkin Design Bureau, former fuselages developed hulls for space satellites, and yesterday's wing designers … by only external similarity (and even then, only in the eyes of housewives or journalists) switched to designing solar panels …
Simultaneously with the work on the PC object, the OKB was engaged in the design and creation of other vehicles. One of the most promising was a strategic reconnaissance aircraft designed to conduct operational work in the deep rear of a potential enemy and over possible theaters of military operations. The deployed and previously carried out work on a cruise nuclear bomb carrier became a help for OKB-256, which made it possible to keep it afloat during the period of decisive missile dominance. At that time, the creators of rocket and space technology had not yet dreamed of reconnaissance space stations and orbiting spy satellites. Therefore, in the late 1950s, an "atmospheric" reconnaissance aircraft could be quite relevant.
The initial project of the reconnaissance aircraft, called "2RS", also provided for the use of two supersonic ramjet air-jet engines RD-013 Bondaryuk M. M. and air launch from under the carrier. The question of the suspension under the Tu-95N aircraft in the light of the then ideas about the carriers of strategic weapons was consigned to oblivion. The topic was continued under the designation "PCP" that is "jet reconnaissance aircraft". The new reorientation of the object, from a high-altitude start to an airfield independent takeoff, turned out to be forced. The development of suspension systems for the carrier, which began in 1956 at the stage of assembling and issuing general-view drawings of the "PC" bomb carrier, was not completed for several reasons. The length of the scout "2RS" in connection with the installation of the tail antenna increased in comparison with the prototype by 700 mm. This caused additional difficulties with its suspension under the fuselage of the Tu-95N bomber. The testing of the suspension systems, separation of the object in flight and the launch of the SPVRD was carried out at OKB-156 of A. N. Tupolev. extremely slowly and reluctantly (first of all, this was associated with the fact that A. N. Tupolev was the main opponent of Tsybin's work). Things did not go any faster even after the government issued a decree on the continuation of the serial production of the Tu-95 in Kuibyshev at plant No. 18 due to the need for carrier aircraft for the 2RS. These works at the Tupolev Design Bureau were soon unilaterally terminated.
The refusal to create a carrier (and, as a consequence, from an air launch) led to the replacement of the power plant and a revision of the scheme and chassis design in order to carry out full-fledged aerodrome operation of the aircraft (the previous chassis was intended exclusively for landing).
On August 31, 1956, the CM issued a decree on the release of the PCR aircraft equipped with a pair of D-21 engines designed by PA Solovyov. This aircraft was supposed to leave the assembly shop by the first quarter of 1958. The TTT Air Force formulated it on January 15, 1957. If these requirements were met, the device would become the first all-day aircraft with supersonic flight speed, designed to conduct reconnaissance at a distance of 1, 7 thousand km from the airfield. The highest speed "PCR" of 2, 7 thousand km / h was required only at a cruising altitude of 25, 5 km. The draft design of the "PCR", which was completed on June 26, 1957 and made very soundly, confirmed the reality of fulfilling both the customer's requirements and the Kremlin's hopes.
The height of 20 thousand meters was to be gained by a reconnaissance jet in 15 minutes from the moment it took off from the runway. The speed of sound was to be reached at an altitude of 8, 5 thousand m 4 minutes after takeoff. At an altitude of 10, 7 thousand m at a speed of 1540 km / h, suspended tanks were dropped and, having gained a cruising altitude (25, 5 thousand m), the "PCR" performed a long steady-state flight at a supersonic speed corresponding to M = 2, 65. Maximum the flight altitude at speeds up to 2800 km / h was supposed to be 26, 7 thousand meters, and the flight range at altitudes over 20 thousand meters at a lower speed reached 3760 kilometers. According to the calculations, the takeoff run was 1300 meters with the flaps extended up to a lift-off speed of 330 km / h, with a take-off angle of up to 9 degrees and a thrust of 9500 kgf. The descent of the "PCR" for landing was to begin 500 kilometers before the airfield. The length of the run at a landing speed of 245 km / h was 1200 meters. During the flight, the scout had to observe the radio and radar silence modes. To reduce radar reflection, the specialists agreed with the designers to provide appropriate shapes for the lower surface of the vehicle, as well as the possibility of using porous radar-absorbing skin coatings. To evade enemy missiles, which were detected by onboard antennas, it was envisaged to perform anti-missile maneuvers with overloads of up to 2, 5 (for example, an energetic rise to a dynamic ceiling of 42 thousand meters or an ascent with a left and right roll with a further sharp change in height), as well as creation of passive and active radio interference in the operating frequency ranges of detection of enemy air defense equipment. Jamming was possible in the presence of a radiating locator powered by a central turbine unit and equipped with two electric generators.
The scheme of the "PCR" aircraft was a single-seat midwing with a trapezoidal wing of low aspect ratio and a similar all-turning tail unit. The profiles of the control and bearing surfaces were formed into symmetrical hexagons with straight lines. Hexagons on the trailing and leading edges are pointed. The fuselage, assembled from cylinders and cones, had a circular cross-section with a diameter of 1500 mm in the central part. On top of the hull, a laid on trapezoidal gargrot was laid, which stretches from the cockpit to the leading edge of the vertical tail. This add-on was not made immediately, but during design studies. Its main purpose was the wiring of communications along the fuselage from the cockpit from the controls to the deflected surfaces of the tail, for communication between hydraulic and electrical units and fuel tanks. The front part of the fuselage is a cone with a bow ogival spinner. The tail section, also conical in shape, ended with a hemispherical radome for the warning antenna at the rear extreme point. The cockpit canopy was formed by transparent flat surfaces. This form was used to avoid distortion of visibility. The fuselage was divided into eight compartments: the bow spinner; instrument compartment; sealed cockpit compartment; front carrying fuel tank; the middle part occupied by functional equipment; rear carrier tank, consisting of two sections: the steering compartment and the aft fuel tank. The cockpit compartment had thermal insulation and two shells. Also, the fuselage housed one small-capacity supply tank, a turbo unit, and a supercooled propane tank, which was used to cool instruments and some equipment in combination with thermal insulation materials. Welded kerosene tanks were made of D-20 duralumin sheet. The diameter of the suspended tanks was 650 mm, the length was 11,400 mm, and they could hold 4.4 tons of fuel. For flights with a variable speed regime (subsonic-supersonic-subsonic speed), in order to avoid sharp longitudinal imbalances, automatic pumping of fuel into the rear fuselage tanks from suspended tanks was provided, and a certain production procedure was introduced. At the same time, the optimal position of the center of gravity relative to the average aerodynamic chord of the wing was ensured.
The pilot, who was wearing a spacesuit, was in a sealed cabin, in which an internal pressure of 780 mm Hg was maintained near the ground, and at a working height of 460 mm Hg. In the cockpit, the air temperature was maintained around 30 degrees at an outside temperature of 60 degrees and dropped not lower than -5 degrees at an overboard temperature of up to -60 degrees. The pilot used an individual air conditioning system that powered his spacesuit. In flight, the spacesuit was connected to the main air conditioning system using valves. In the event of a cabin depressurization, the emergency pressurization system of the spacesuit was automatically triggered, providing an internal pressure that corresponds to a flight altitude of 11.5 thous.m, that is, acceptable living conditions for 15 minutes, during which the pilot could descend into denser layers of the atmosphere to return to his airfield.
During the flight, the accuracy of air navigation along a given route when using radar landmarks every 500 km should be at least +/- 10 km m along the course, and when entering the target area, up to 3-5 km. These indicators were achieved using a number of automatic systems: an astro-inertial system with a vertical gyro, flight and navigation equipment, a course stabilization system, an autopilot and radar sighting devices. The on-board electrical system consisted of a pair of GST-6000 starter-generators installed on each engine and two EG-6000 generators, which were powered by a turbine unit. The turbine unit itself, installed in the fuselage and operating by taking power from the compressors of turbojet engines, was a stationary thermal reactor with an outlet nozzle that was removed from the hull skin. Three 15-horsepower hydraulic pumps, an air compressor with a capacity of 40 tons per hour (working pressure 2 atmospheres) and a cooling system fan with a capacity of 1000 tons per hour (pressure 0.7-1 atmosphere) were driven from the turbine unit.
The composition of the defensive weapons and reconnaissance equipment "RSR" included a radar sight with a photo attachment and a radio reconnaissance station, which were installed inside the front fairing. Their use was necessary for conducting reconnaissance of industrial centers at a distance of 250 km and detecting enemy ground-based radar systems (at distances that correspond to 125-130 percent of their detection range). After that, photographic equipment was put into operation during the flight over the target at an altitude of 23 thousand meters. During the flight along the route, an optical sight was switched on, serving to control the operation of photographic equipment, as well as a warning station about radar exposure by enemy air defense means. If necessary, it was possible to use equipment for setting passive and active radio interference.
With all variants of the aircraft, regardless of the purpose, the idea remained that, first of all, it was necessary to test the possibility of flying an aircraft of this design and scheme with its unusual wing, and to study the features of takeoff, landing, behavior in the air, and other specific features. The scaled-down models, as well as the similarity criteria associated with them, did not provide comprehensive data on the results of aerodynamic research. To obtain complete information, it was necessary to build and conduct flight tests of several full-scale models, included from the very beginning in the estimate. However, the government was not interested in full-scale models and were not reflected in the decrees. However, as the work progressed, the need for their creation became more and more obvious. In 1956, the development of a full-scale model No. 1 (NM-1) began, in which the design of the future "PCR" was implemented: landing gear, airframe, equipment placement, control, operation of some onboard systems and the effect of systems on the external forms of the aircraft and its main tasks.
НМ-1 is a simplified "PCR" aircraft with similar outlines, piloted in research flights without load and equipped only with test instruments. In a word, a laboratory that was created for flights without achieving the specified flight performance with limited modes. Before receiving standard turbojet engines (D-21), 2 AM-5 engines with a thrust of 2000 kgf each were installed on the car (the model was designed for subsonic speed), which imposed certain simplifications on the design of the machine and the nature of flight experiments. The nose of the NM-1 was made much shorter in comparison with the combat version: for centering, an ogival blank weighing 700 kg was installed there. The materials and construction of the NM-1 corresponded to the construction and materials of the "PCR". The fuel system has been significantly lightened in terms of fuel volume and those. equipment (the fuel did not need to be pumped back and forth, since the achievement of the wave crisis and the longitudinal imbalance associated with it was not planned). The management also did not have any fundamental differences from the "PCR". It included hydraulic boosters, rigid rods, loading mechanisms and shafts. The chassis was completely different. It was made according to the type of the landing device of the preliminary design "PC", that is, with the location of the main support in front of the aircraft's center of gravity, but with significant relief to match the lower mass of the NM-1. Instead of a two-wheeled landing trolley, a lightweight ski was introduced, made of a 10-mm duralumin plate 2.1 m long and 0.1 m wide. It was designed for several landings with further replacement with a new one. A wheel axle with two pneumatics, which was called a launch cart, was attached to the side ski nodes for takeoff. Depreciation of the chassis during taxiing and during takeoff was carried out by squeezing high-pressure pneumatics and a hydraulic cylinder of the rack. The flight was to be carried out in the following order: takeoff, accompanied by separation of the wheel axle from the ski; climb 1, 2-1, 5 thousand m and speed from 480 to 500 km / h; box flight; ski landing. The time of the first flight was not supposed to exceed 15 minutes.
Basically, the construction of the NM-1 was completed by the middle of 1958, but its roll-out to the airfield occurred much earlier than full readiness, in order to demonstrate the shock pace of work and the implementation of the plan. Therefore, some finishing work was carried out in the open air, which delayed and complicated them, since the car had to be rolled into the hangar during the rain and at night. The first test taxiing was carried out on 01.10.1958. At the same time, they made the first flight into the air, lasting 17 seconds. But permission for the first flight and for the continuation of tests could not be obtained due to bad weather and some minor malfunctions in the operation of on-board systems. Then there were doubts about the durability of the landing ski, and then winter came. "Good" for flights was given only in the spring of next year. On March 18, 1959, repeated taxiing was carried out, and on April 7, at 10:53, test pilot Amet-Khan Sultan made the first flight on NM-1. The separation of the machine from the runway was carried out as if in 3 stages. First, the NM-1 at a speed of 285 km / h separated from the strip 26 seconds after the start of the takeoff run. The second separation occurred at a speed of 305 km / h at the 28th second. For the third time, the plane separated 30 seconds after the start. At the end of the takeoff run, the speed was 325 km / h, while the effort on the handle was 15 kg (reduced by the CPGO trimmer from 26 kg). The takeoff was performed with a lower angle of attack and a slight increase in speed, and therefore the launch cart, dropped at a speed of 400 km / h from a height of 40 meters, crashed on the runway. According to measurements made by the accompanying Yak-25 aircraft, the NM-1 speed was up to 500 km / h, and the flight altitude was 1.5 km. In flight, the pilot felt weak roll of the machine, compensated by the ailerons. At an altitude of 200 meters, the pilot took off the throttle, starting gliding with a decrease in speed to 275 km / h. The aircraft landed at a lower angle of attack and at a higher speed than was prescribed by the test program. After 4 seconds after touching the concrete, a braking parachute was released. During the run at a speed of 186 km / h, the duralumin sole of the ski caught fire, but after a complete stop, the flame disappeared. Due to the higher landing speed, the run length was not 740 m (calculated) but 1100 m. At landing, the shock loads ranged from 0.6 to 1.95 units. The duration of the first flight is 12 minutes.
Two more flights took place on June 3 and 9, 1959. In total, Amet-Khan performed 6 flights on NM-1, and later another 7 flights were performed by Radiya Zakharova. In total, in the period from 1959 to 1960.10 test pilots flew on NM-1, performing 32 flights lasting 11-40 minutes at altitudes of 1-4 km. It was not possible to achieve a speed of more than 490 km / h, since an aircraft with a low aspect ratio wing, having a thrust of two turbojet engines of 4000 kgf, flew with a high angle of attack - 10-12 degrees.
Flights have shown that an aircraft with such a wing can fly! During the research, some particulars were revealed: the aircraft steadily maintains the take-off direction, the effectiveness of the controls begins at a speed of 60 km / h. At speeds of 110-120 km / h, shaking is observed during the takeoff and run. Takeoff is hampered by large efforts on the handle. During the flight, the roll takes place. NM-1 is distinguished by good "volatility" both in flight and on landing. NM-1 for control on takeoff, during the construction of the calculation for landing, as well as its implementation is much easier than the Su-7, Su-9 and MiG-19, MiG-21.
Workers of OKB-256 during flight tests and adjustments of NM-1 produced working drawings of the "RSR" in full swing, hoping to receive from the Perm plant No. 19 bypass engines D-21. But neither in 1958 nor in 1959 did this happen. The main reason for the non-delivery of engines for the "PCR" was the strong opposition of A. N. Tupolev. The D-20 engines (represented the non-afterburning version of the D-21 engine, or D-20F), according to the OKB-156 work plan, were intended for the passenger Tu-124, the serial production of which was established in 1959 at the Kharkov aircraft plant No. 135. According to Tupolev, the parallel production of D-20 and D-21 would lead to interruptions in the supply of solid fuel engines for his aircraft. In the Kremlin, Tupolev's authority was very high, especially after the creation of the Tu-104 and the sensational non-stop flights of NS Khrushchev. and Kozlova F. R. (the first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers) to the United States on the Tu-114 (passenger version of the Tu-95). Tupolev A. N. demanded to increase the production of the D-20 to the detriment of the D-21 (and, consequently, "RSR"), and these requirements were met. Tu-124 entered the medium and local lines of Aeroflot, and the "PCR" again remained without a motor, but now without a carrier, and without a power plant designed for independent takeoff …
The issue of obtaining a range of 12000-13000 km, calculated for the 2RS and ZRS aircraft (using the carrier), haunted the leaders, and on 1958-20-03 the task to create the Tu-95N was confirmed by a government decree once again. However, Tupolev again gave a justified refusal. The adoption of the final decision was postponed to the time of the meeting on experimental aircraft construction, which took place in the Kremlin on 1958-15-05. Myasishchev V. M. on the recommendation of A. N. Tupolev was instructed to contact P. V. Tsybin. and to provide a carrier for the "RSR" aircraft as well as for other OKB-256 products. This was the first step to unite the two subjects, disagreeable and inconvenient for Tupolev, to deal with them in one fell swoop …
For many, the intention was obvious. The start of work by Tsybin and Myasishchev would at least mean slowing down current affairs in OKB-23, as well as distracting OKB-256 from completing the work of the previously adopted version of the "RSR" and having an independent start.
In a desperate attempt to save the case, Tsybin P. V. appealed to the Politburo of the Central Committee, the command of the Air Force and TsAGI. They met him halfway by moving the RSR readiness deadline until the end of 1960, with a corresponding increase in the estimate. To speed up the work, Mikoyan A. I., the chief designer of OKB-155, was instructed to help with the development of the power plant, and Tumansky S. K. - to supply R-11F engines.
The main and last version of the "PCR" was equipped with two R-11F engines, equipped with input devices like the MiG-21F. The design and forms of the reconnaissance aircraft during the work on this model changed again (not counting the updated turbojet engine nacelle). New, more advanced systems, air navigation equipment units were installed, and the layout of photographic equipment was improved. Instead of separate mounting of cameras, they were installed on a common single platform, which was installed in the pressurized compartment before the flight. After completing the task, the platform with cameras was sent to the laboratory for processing. To ensure the normal functioning of the photographic equipment, the middle part of the fuselage (5, 3 meters) was transformed into a half-hexagon with a lower horizontal platform, which was partially glazed in the sealing zone. Inside this sealed compartment (3.5 meters), aerial cameras AFA-33, -34 and -40 were installed. Two cameras, having a focal length of 1000 millimeters and two at 200 millimeters, could be replaced by a combination consisting of one camera with 1800 mm focal length and a pair of cameras with 200 mm. Both options for completing the "PCR" photographic equipment are interchangeable units that are installed on universal platforms with glazing in the pressurized compartment. Also, the special reconnaissance equipment included a radio reconnaissance station and a radar sight with a photo attachment installed in the bow coque (the main purpose was to conduct reconnaissance of industrial centers from a distance of 250 kilometers and detect radar at distances that are 125-130 percent of their range), and an optical sight for monitoring the functioning of photographic equipment, a warning station for radar irradiation of an aircraft, equipment for setting passive and active jamming of enemy radars.
The main photographic equipment of the aircraft was intended for planned, planned-long-term and long-term aerial photography. The cameras were mounted sequentially, and before they were included in the work on the target, the glazing was opened using a controlled shutter. The compartment was sealed around the termination at a perimeter of 7500 mm by means of an inflatable hose installed in the fuselage opening. This measure was introduced on the latest modification of the "PCP" to avoid deterioration of the transparency of the lenses from icing of the general glazing and moisture condensation. The presence of this very complex element of the fuselage filling increased its length to 28 meters, however, not without taking into account the tapered tail section to increase the arms of the tail units in order to maintain controllability and stability of the aircraft in the track and longitudinal channels.
Due to the long length of the aircraft, its bicycle chassis was reconfigured with the simultaneous replacement of the 2-wheeled bogie with a 4-wheeled one with reduced pneumatics. The retention of the specific wing loading with the fuselage of a greater mass was achieved by the widespread lightening of the structure. So, for example, a five-spar power scheme, the development of which took three years, was replaced by a 16-wall openwork scheme using roller welding of the joints of the sheathing panels. From the beginning of the work, the head of the wing brigade Belko Yu. I., who, in the end, achieved his goal, advocated the use of just such a design. All elements of the internal structure of the aircraft and airframe units were given special attention to reduce weight. The structure has become thin-walled in almost all details, nodes and links with minimal use of bolted connections. Many so-called "locomotive" units and parts were replaced and revised. Even riveted joints gave way to welding in many cases. The main reason for such a total relief (perhaps to the detriment of durability) was the specificity of the use of "PC" and "PCP". The aircraft was designed for only 3 flights with a total flight time of 200-250 hours before the appearance of deformations of 0.2 percent. The weighers have even revised standard products of foreign origin. Elements of communications and electrical wiring were ordered by subcontractors in a lightweight and reduced design. For example, plug connectors were made half the size and weight. This ensured the installation of pipelines, harnesses and cables without unnecessary complications in terms of labor costs for installation and unnecessary structural reinforcement in the area of mounting holes and openings.
As a result, the design of the airframe, and of the aircraft as a whole, turned out to be so light that the culture of weight (a new characteristic for that time) sometimes exceeded world standards.
The most effective means of reducing the mass of the PCR aircraft was the rejection of the use of supersonic suspended tanks. This idea did not come to the minds of the creators immediately, but "afterwards". If you do not drag heavy and huge containers to a speed of 1540 kilometers per hour (at which they wanted to drop them), but hang tanks of much smaller capacity and get rid of them at a speed of about 850 km / h, in order to overcome the M = 1 number only for a "clean" aircraft … They calculated, and then concluded: the old suspended tanks (each with a capacity of 2200 kg) should not be created or suspended, but new tanks (each with a capacity of 1300 kg) should be used! So they did it. The weight of the fuel decreased without reducing the range, while the take-off weight dropped by more than 1 ton.
Innovations in this area for the conservatives of the old guard from the Soviet aircraft industry seemed completely unsuitable because of their own retrograde. The innovations that were proposed by the employees of OKB-256 and embodied in the products of "RSR" within the framework of the ministry were categorically rejected. And the standards that existed at that time, the same for bombers and fighters, are still in effect. Official strength standards are in themselves, and the actual strength of structural elements, which is provided with considerable reinsurance, and today contributes to the "improvement" of performance characteristics and "saves" fuel …
The main material of the aircraft was duralumin. An attempt to use beryllium turned out to be premature due to the unfinished technology, insufficient purity of beryllium alloys and a fair amount of toxicity of work (open contact during the application of anticorrosive coatings caused skin diseases of workers). Aprons and protective gloves quickly deteriorated. The use of steel parts was limited: only in particularly critical areas with concentrated loads (chassis assemblies, embedding of spars, wing mechanization, hinge assemblies for all-turning controls, fastening of outboard tanks, bombs, and so on). The fuselage frames, mainly in its middle part, were framed (precision stamping with further machining), open at the bottom for installing a platform with lower glazing and cameras. A particularly difficult task was the development of the wing design, which was associated with its thin profile. The size of the building heights at the main points of termination to the mating nodes of the fuselage was 230 millimeters (I-beam with shelves of 25-250 millimeters). It was difficult to install the engines on the wingtips, where the building heights were 86 millimeters.
In this form, the construction of a prototype "PCR" was finally started at the plant №256. But it was not possible to completely assemble it at this enterprise, since the production areas and premises of the OKB were transferred to the deputy. Chief Designer Mikoyan A. I. on unmanned missile topics Bereznyak A. Ya.
On 1959-01-10 the entire staff of OKB-256 was transferred to OKB-23 of chief designer V. M. Myasishchev, who was instructed to sort out the documentation for the "RSR" aircraft and report to 28.05. 1960 to the State Committee of Aviation Technology (former MAP). All design documentation, as well as production and technological papers at the new location were checked. Drawings of units and parts were inspected, reissued with sighting by the heads of similar divisions of OKB-23. Almost no changes were made to the documentation, and the work began again. Busy with his own theme - strategic bombers M-4-6, Myasishchev V. M.did not interfere with the work of VP Tsybin's employees, who continued to improve and refine the "PCR", preparing it for flight tests. 1960-29-09 the first prototype of the "RSR" was taken in Zhukovsky to a test airfield. At the same time, in Ulan-Ude, at the former repair plant No. 99, an experimental pilot batch of "PCR" was created, which passed under the designation R-020. Myasishcheva V. M. In October 1960, he was removed from his post as the chief designer of OKB-23, transferring to the head of TsAGI. The staff of production workers and designers who worked with him was completely reassigned to Chelomey V. N., the chief designer of OKB-52. OKB-23 became, in fact, a branch of OKB-52, the production and laboratory base of which was located in Reutov. Plant No. 23 was redesigned for serial production of Proton carrier rockets and other rocket and space technology. The works of the team of P. V. Tsybin by this time they were terminated by violent order. Decreased subsidies for the issuance of wages, a new neighbor was given the authority to take full command of the plant's services. By the summer of 1961, the entire staff of OKB-256, together with the leadership, was transferred to the subordination of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building. Tsybin was later engaged in the development of the Soyuz spacecraft.
Three R-020 airplanes equipped with R-11F engines were built on the territory of plant No. 99; another 10 sets of units, parts and assembly units were in preparation for assembly. The previously worked out possibility of assembling the "PCR" at plant No. 23 was consigned to oblivion, and the finished aircraft and the backlog were sent to scrap metal according to the annual plan for 1961.
Flight tests of the NM-1 aircraft were stopped, and the experimental PCR was not carried out at all. Both devices in a semi-disassembled state were brought to Moscow and transferred to the Department of Aircraft Engineering at the Moscow Aviation Institute as a teaching aid. Some of the fragments of the "PCP" are there to this day …
Before the final reorientation of plant No. 23 to missiles from aircraft was carried out, from TsAGI to OKB-23 in the name of P. V. Tsybin. a business letter arrived. The envelope contained a recommendation from the specialists of this institute on supersonic aerodynamics. The chief designer of the "RSR" received a general view of this device, reconfigured into the most acceptable form for flights at subsonic, transonic and supersonic speeds. The sections of the wing, which had a large sweep along the leading edge, were clearly marked, which would allow to overcome the sound barrier with minimal changes in longitudinal balancing. This is probably V. M. Myasishchev. found a stale document (possibly not sent on purpose in 1958) and forwarded it to his former Filyovskiy neighbor, in good old memory. Of course, by the end, or rather, the termination of work on the "PCP", this dispatch was useless, and resembled "a herring served for tea."
As already mentioned, competitors often intervened in the work on "PC", "2PC", NM-1 and "PCR" with the sole purpose of interfering, probably out of envy. An important role in slowing down the work of OKB-256 was played by the most powerful and oldest of the aircraft magnates three times Hero of Socialist Labor, Academician, General Designer A. N. Tupolev. The patriarch of the domestic aircraft industry did everything to ensure that the successes achieved by the Tsybin Design Bureau were multiplied by zero. According to information received from Tsybin himself, Golyaev, Shavrov and other employees of the design bureau, Tupolev walked around the shops, halls and offices and shouted: "You won't get shit! You won't get anything!" Then he took and abandoned the carrier aircraft for the "2RS". But Tsybin and his specialists did it! And even without the Tu-95N and D-21! The NM-1 flew well, and serial production of the RSR (R-020) was started in Ulan-Ude.
The closure of a promising topic on the "RSR", as well as the liquidation of the Tsybin Design Bureau are more dramatic, since another influential person of the Aviation Industry - Mikoyan Artem Ivanovich, had a hand in these "events". According to one of Mikoyan's assistants, later the first deputy minister of the aviation industry AV Minaev, there were 3 reasons for this. First, the RSR aircraft did not receive the promised engines, since the R-11Fs were necessary for the MiG-21. Secondly, he took away the plant No. 256 for his own unmanned theme, planting A. Ya. Bereznyak there as his deputy. and loading the enterprise with parallel production of units for MiG. Thirdly, Mikoyan A. I. promised the government to create a three-speed intelligence officer named "ed. 155". For this topic, the team of the MiG experimental design bureau had all the initial prerequisites: the R-15B turbojet engine and the photographic equipment that was created for the RSR, mounted and tested on it.
Mikoyan A. I. led his OKB along a rather difficult path. The flight speeds that correspond to M = 3 were not achieved. In the second half of the 1960s. what happened was that Tsybin had proposed back in 1956, that is, the speed corresponding to the number M = 2.85. The Mikoyan aircraft did not have the flight range planned for the "RSR", and the MiG-25R turned into a tactical reconnaissance aircraft.
Flight technical characteristics:
Modification - NM-1;
Wingspan - 10, 80 m;
Length - 26, 60 m;
Wing area - 64, 00 m2;
Normal takeoff weight - 7850 kg;
Maximum takeoff weight - 9200 kg;
Engine type - 2 turbojet engines AL-5;
Thrust - 2x2000 kgf;
Maximum speed - 500 km / h;
Service ceiling - 4000 m;
Crew - 1 person.
