Warsaw burned on the other side of the Vistula for six weeks. It was not only a city where Poles fought and died. This was the capital of my country. There was only one decision I could make, and I made it without hesitation. I gave the order to go on the offensive across the Vistula to help the warring city, - wrote in his memoirs General Zygmunt Berling, the former commander of the 1st Army of the Polish People's Army.
Burling, however, was lying in his memoirs. An active army differs from an amateur theater in that it is subordinate to a single command and a single operational plan of hostilities. The Polish army was subordinate to the 1st Belorussian Front, whose troops liberated the right-bank region of Warsaw - Prague on September 10-15, 1944 and tied the German troops to the north, in the so-called "wet triangle" between the Vistula and Bugo-Narev, where the 47th and The 70th armies fought for Jablonnu and Legionowo with the task of crossing the Vistula and seizing bridgeheads on its left bank in the region of Młocin and Lomianki.
In the right-bank Warsaw, units of the 1st Polish Army were located: in the north, the 2nd Infantry Division took up positions in the Peltsovizna and Brudna area, and in the south, in the Prague and Saska Kemp area, the 3rd Infantry Division was located. Between them, opposite the Citadel and the Old Town to the Poniatowski Bridge, the 1st cavalry was wedged in. In the second echelon in Prague, the 4th Infantry Division was located, and the 1st Infantry Division, after losses in the battles for Prague, was withdrawn to the reserve in the Rembertov area.
The task of the 1st Polish Army was the defense of the right bank of the Vistula in the area from Peltsovizna to Saska Kempa and the suburb of Zbytka and reconnaissance of the left bank, where by that time German troops had dismembered the insurgent forces into two parts - the northern one, which fought surrounded in the Zoliborz area, and the southern, pressed against the Vistula in the Center, on Mokotów and in Powisle.
The tragedy unfolding in Warsaw haunted. The consciousness of the impossibility of undertaking a major operation in order to rescue the rebels was painful, - later recalled Marshal Rokossovsky.
I have already mentioned that on September 13, the supply of weapons, ammunition, food and medicine to the rebels began by air. This was done by our Po-2 night bombers. They dropped cargo from low altitudes at points indicated by the rebels. From September 13 to October 1, 1944, the aviation of the front made 4821 sorties to the insurgents, including 2535 sorties for the insurgent troops. Our planes, at the request of the insurgents, covered their areas from the air, bombed and stormed German troops in the city.
The anti-aircraft artillery of the front began to cover the insurgent forces from enemy air raids, and ground artillery began to suppress enemy artillery and mortar batteries with fire that tried to fire on the insurgents. For communication and adjustment of fire, officers were dropped by parachute. We managed to get the German planes to stop showing themselves over the insurgents' locations. Polish comrades who managed to get to us from Warsaw spoke with enthusiasm about the actions of our pilots and artillerymen.
But the Poles expected more.
Since September 13, Berling and the Minister of War of the Polish government in Lublin, General Michal ymerski-Rola, literally besieged the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front and his chief of staff, General Mikhail Malinin, with the demand to start an operation to force the Vistula in the city, opposite a strong German group. holding the left-bank Warsaw.
“During this period, Stalin talked to me on HF,” wrote Rokossovsky. - I reported on the situation at the front and on everything connected with Warsaw. Stalin asked if the front troops were in a position to undertake an operation to liberate Warsaw. Having received a negative answer from me, he asked to provide the insurgents with possible assistance, to alleviate their situation. He approved my suggestions, how and how we will help”.
Under such circumstances, Berling proposed his own version of a limited operation: to cross the Vistula with part of the forces from the Saska Kempa area to the Chernyakov area, where it was supposed to capture the bridgehead, followed by an offensive to the west and southwest to join the rebel forces of Center and Mokotov. The achievement of this goal was to create the starting positions for the further liberation of the entire Polish capital.
Even from the perspective of 75 post-war years, it is difficult to give an unambiguous answer to the question, was Beurling's plan realistic in the situation that developed in September 1944?
Undoubtedly, there was some possibility of success, but it depended on an incredibly favorable combination of circumstances - if on this sector of the front the German defense turned out to be weak, if the main headquarters (Commandant's Office) of the Home Army showed the will to cooperate with the Red Army and the Polish People's Army …
But in any case, Beurling's plan was unreasonably optimistic. The German defense proved to be strong and constantly strengthened to resist the encirclement and loss of Warsaw. The defense of the AK on Zoliborz and in Powisle was melting from day to day; on Chernyakov, the rebels had only 400 weakly armed men, and Mokotow had already been cut off from the center. Interaction with the Red Army did not work out either.
True, after the liberation of Prague, the commandant of the AK, General Tadeusz Komorowski (Boer), in anticipation of the development of the situation, interrupted negotiations on the surrender of the insurgent forces of Warsaw, but did not change his attitude towards the Red Army and continued to refuse to recognize the Polish People's Army. In the Commandant's office, they still tried to appear before the Soviet forces in the role of legitimate Polish power and to consider the Polish People's Army as a foreign and hostile organization. The proposal of the leadership of the United Armed Forces (led by the People's Army) on September 12 to concentrate all the rebel forces over the Vistula, even at the cost of surrendering the areas west of Marshalkowska Street, was rejected.
In addition, in order to carry out a large-scale operation to force such a significant water barrier as the Vistula, the troops involved did not have enough funds, although from the units of the 1st Belorussian Front they were allocated the 4th pontoon bridge regiment, the 20th separate flamethrower battalion, 124th anti-aircraft artillery brigade, 75th guards mortar regiment, 58th corrective reconnaissance aviation regiment and 274th separate motorized special-purpose battalion, armed with amphibious vehicles.
But there were still not enough ferry means and ammunition. Additional artillery and an armored train were allocated to the Poles for fire support.
September 15th
On the night of September 14-15, a group of scouts (about 30 people), detached from the 1st Infantry Division, crossed from Saska Kempa to Chernyakov, which came into contact with the rebels from the group and took a liaison officer with them. Thanks to this, Berling received the first data on the position of the rebels and the Powisl districts held by them in the Chernyakov and Kempa Potocka areas, which he immediately transferred to the headquarters of General Malinin. The decision to cross the Vistula came from Malinin on September 15, after which Berling gave an order no less than to unite with units of the Home Army and the People's Army and liberate Warsaw.
16 of September
The first, on the night of September 15-16, and, in fact, already on September 16 at 2:00, began the crossing of the 3rd Infantry Division (General Stanislav Galitsky). First, a reconnaissance company of the 9th regiment, consisting of two platoons and a platoon of anti-tank rifles, crossed over. The company, unnoticed by the Germans, reached the left bank in the area of Kempa Chernyakovskaya, south of the Poniatovsky bridge. There she came into contact with the rebels and began to organize cover for the crossing of the following units.
From 4:00 until sunrise, the 1st battalion of the 9th regiment, the reconnaissance platoon of the 9th regiment and auxiliary units crossed the Vistula. In total, 420 soldiers with two 45-mm cannons, 12 mortars, 16 anti-tank guns and 14 machine guns landed on the left bank in the quarters between Zagurnaya, Vilanovskaya and Chernyakovskaya streets. The group was commanded by Lieutenant Sergiusz Kononkov. In addition to his group, artillery observers from the 3rd light artillery regiment crossed over to the left bank to adjust the artillery support of the landing. From the air, the crossing was covered by a night bomber regiment, which dropped containers with weapons, ammunition and food over the rebel positions and bombed the German positions.
Having landed on Chernyakov and joined with the group of Lieutenant Colonel Jan Mazurkevich (Radoslav), Lieutenant Kononkov established his command post at 39 Solets Street and took action to expand and strengthen the bridgehead in the face of strong enemy opposition, under mortar fire and repeated counterattacks.
By the end of September 16, the 1st battalion and the rebels cleared the quarter between Zagurnaya, Chernyakovskaya and Vilanovskaya streets from the Germans. On the night of September 16-17, a group of Captain Stanislav Olekhnovich crossed over there as part of the reconnaissance groups of the 7th and 9th regiments, then the 3rd battalion of the 9th regiment and other units - 450 people, five 45-mm cannons, 14 mortars, 16 ptr and 20 machine guns.
Due to heavy artillery and machine-gun shelling of the crossing area, the 3rd division was unable to fully fulfill the plan for the transfer of units to the left bank of the Vistula. Due to the lack of heavy pontoons, it was not possible to transport regimental and divisional artillery guns to the left bank, but groups of artillery spotters from the 3rd light artillery regiment and the 5th heavy artillery brigade landed there.
September 17
On the morning of September 17, the crossing had to be interrupted. Insofar as neither the regimental commander nor his headquarters crossed to Chernyakov, Lieutenant Kononkov continued to command the Polish group on the bridgehead, and after his death, Captain Olekhnovich.
New detachments went straight into battle. On September 17, the Germans attacked the Polish bridgehead eight times. Forces from company to battalion supported by 10 tanks. Although all attacks were repulsed, the Poles suffered heavy casualties, and in addition, their positions were constantly under mortar fire. The situation became especially difficult due to the fact that the enemy was constantly reinforcing and replacing the belligerent units.
On the same day, other divisions of the 1st Army went into battle: the 2nd Regiment from the 1st Division, under the cover of the 6th Light Artillery Regiment, began a diversionary crossing in the direction of Sekerki. The crossing diverted heavy artillery fire on itself, which allowed reconnaissance of the positions of the German batteries. Elsewhere, the 1st cavalry unit crossed the wreckage of the now defunct Kerbedzia Bridge (now the Silesian-Dombrowski Bridge stands on this site) to the Palace Square area and captured a group of German artillery observers.
September 18
The crossing of parts of the 9th regiment resumed at night from 17 to 18 September. Due to heavy artillery fire, by morning only 70 people from the 3rd battalion with two cannons and three mortars were able to be transported. With them crossed the chief of staff of the 9th regiment, Major Stanislav Latyshonek, who took command of all Polish forces on the Chernyakovsky bridgehead.
At this time, the Germans launched a decisive offensive in order to completely cut off the bridgehead from the river. Artillery had already actually cut it off from the right bank of the Vistula, and at the same time strong German units, supported by tanks, attacked the Poles from all sides: between Wilanowska and Zgurna Streets, through warehouse buildings in the direction of ul. Idzikovskogo and along Vilanovskaya and Solets streets towards the Church of the Holy Trinity and the insurgent hospital, where the Germans shot some of the wounded.
Particularly heavy fighting broke out for residential buildings on the streets of Zgurnaya and Idzikovsky and in the ruins of a paint factory. Despite desperate resistance, heavy losses lowered the fighting efficiency of the Polish group. In order to somehow alleviate the situation of the units fighting for the Vistula, the Polish command took a number of new steps.
Artillery from the right bank covered the area of the National Museum, the Seim and the Bank of the National Economy, and in the Seim they managed to undermine the ammunition depot arranged by the Germans. Opposite oliborz, a group of 73 soldiers from the 6th regiment of the 2nd division with two machine guns and three anti-tank rifles crossed the Vistula across the Vistula. They held out there until morning. A small success was crowned with the landing on Kemp Chernyakovskaya of 63 people with 2 cannons, who prepared the crossing for the units of the 7th regiment. However, due to heavy artillery fire along the river bed, the crossing of further units had to be stopped.
Despite the difficult situation, on September 18, the Polish command did not abandon attempts to force the Vistula and even expand the bridgehead. For this, it was supposed to move the starting positions to the north, to the area between the Poniatovsky bridge and the railway bridge. In the first wave of the landing on the left bank, the 8th regiment from the 3rd division was supposed to land, and in the second - the 7th regiment. After capturing new bridgeheads, they had to go along the Vistula to connect with the Chernyakovsky bridgehead. This plan never came to fruition.
Despite the concentration of all the means of crossing the 1st Polish Army and even the 47th and 70th armies, which at that time were bogged down in battles with the 4th SS Panzer Corps between the Vistula and Bugo-Narew, it was possible to collect only 60% of the necessary funds … The crossing on September 18 had to be abandoned.
September 19
True, on September 19, the 2nd battalion from the 8th regiment managed to cross the Vistula without great losses, but the Germans spotted a new crossing and concentrated a hurricane of artillery fire on it, which brought heavy losses to the Poles. The crossing had to be interrupted, and the detachments cut off on the left bank were defeated and destroyed.
The attempts to transfer additional forces to the Chernyakovsky bridgehead did not bring the desired results, where the Germans launched another major offensive from Chernyakovskaya, Solec and Gurnoshlonskaya streets to Zgurnaya and Idzikovsky, and from Okrong street to Vilanovskaya in order to dismember the Polish defense. The fighting went on with varying success, but by the evening the Germans managed to knock out the insurgent group and detachments of the 1st battalion from the quarter between Okrong and Vilanovskaya streets and develop an offensive along Idzikovskogo street.
Interestingly, in other sectors still engulfed in the uprising, the Germans were passive.
September 20
On the night of September 19-20, Mazurkevich decided to withdraw the remnants of the group subordinated to him through the sewer canals to Mokotow, leaving on Chernyakov a detachment of the People's Army under the command of Lieutenant Stanislav Pashkovsky, the remnants of battalions and, wounded and a large number of civilians. Among the latter, the withdrawal of the main rebel forces sparked panic, which was hardly brought under control. There was still hope for the approach of detachments of the 8th regiment and the transfer of the 7th regiment, but these hopes did not come true. It was only possible to transfer to the left bank a certain amount of ammunition and food supplies for 4 days.
In the end, the command of the 3rd division decided to stop trying to force the Vistula, and throw all the forces and means to evacuate the bridgehead, including civilians.
September 22nd
September 22 was the last day of organized defense at the Chernyakovsky bridgehead. In the morning, the defenders still repelled another attack by the Germans, after which they bombarded the Polish positions with leaflets calling for surrender and sent envoys with an ultimatum. The ultimatum was dropped, but the Poles used the respite to evacuate as many wounded and civilians as possible. In addition, individual groups, on their own initiative, tried to swim to the right bank or infiltrate into other quarters of Warsaw, but only a few succeeded.
23 September
The last clashes on Chernyakov took place on 23 September. On this day, the 1st Polish Army received an order to stop its actions and go on the defensive along the entire length from Peltsovizna to Karchev.
Thus, an attempt to come directly to the aid of the rebel forces surrounded in Warsaw was defeated due to the strong and well-organized, echeloned defense of the German forces and the unwillingness of the Home Army leadership to assist units of the Polish People's Army.
“The operation was difficult. The first drop of the landing force managed to catch on to the shore with difficulty. All new forces had to be brought into battle. The losses were growing. And the leaders of the rebels not only did not provide any assistance to the landing party, but did not even try to contact him, '' Rokossovsky summed up. - In such conditions it was impossible to stay on the western bank of the Vistula. I decided to stop the operation. Helped the paratroopers to return to our shore. By September 23, these units of the three infantry regiments of the 1st Polish Army had joined their units."
In the battles for bridgeheads on the western bank of the Vistula from 16 to 23 September 1944, the 1st Army of the Polish People's Army suffered heavy losses - 2,267 killed, wounded and missing on the left bank and 1,488 on the right, a total of 3,755. comparisons: in the battle of Lenino on October 12-13, 1943, the unfired, hastily trained 1st Polish Infantry Division lost a little more than 3,000 people, which is considered bloody losses, and during the assault on Monte Cassino in the inaccessible Italian mountains on May 12-19, 1944, the Polish 2 The 1st Corps lost almost 4,200 soldiers and officers. But if those battles ended in significant military and political successes, then the attempt to force the Vistula in 1944 with the forces of an incomplete infantry division turned out to be a complete failure.
As a result of the defeat, General Berling was removed from the command of the 1st Army on September 30 and sent to study at the Academy. Voroshilov in Moscow. General Galitsky survived a psychological breakdown and resigned command of the 3rd division himself. Until the end of their military careers, both served in secondary positions and did not advance in the service.
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A. Borkiewicz. … Instytut Wydawniczy Pax, 1969.
J. Margules. … Wydawnictwo MON, 1967.
J. Bordziłowski., volume 2. Wydawnictwo MON, 1972.
T. Sawicki. … Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1989.
