"God forbid you to live in an era of change." This famous phrase is attributed to Confucius or interpreted as ancient Chinese wisdom in general. Naturally, change is not the same, the whole difference is whether for better or for worse changes are taking place. Recently I had a chance to read one commentary on Voennoye Obozreniye, the meaning of which boiled down to the fact that, as the author put it, “thanks to the accursed Taburetkin, Makarov, Popovkin (his kingdom of heaven), that at one time they put a demand and an ultimatum before the military-industrial complex to create new samples tracked and wheeled armored vehicles ".
Indeed, the reforms significantly affected our army, most of the "glorious deeds" of these reformers were repeatedly spoken about, much had to be redone afterwards, but such a phenomenon as a single platform also began to be implemented under them, and this somehow remained without special attention. So is it really one of the few that they gave our army as a boon? Let's try to figure it out, the topic is interesting, and, one might say, rare in discussions.
It is now known that four basic platforms are being developed for the ground forces of the Russian Federation, on the basis of which vehicles of different types should be created. Firstly, it is the Armata heavy tracked platform (weight category up to 65 tons), on the basis of which, in addition to the T-14 tank, a heavy infantry fighting vehicle was created and other combat and auxiliary vehicles should appear. Secondly, this is the Kurganets-25 medium tracked platform (25 tons), on the basis of which a family of equipment should also be built. Initially, it was supposed to divide such equipment into heavy and medium brigades, respectively. Closing the list are two wheeled platforms - the medium "Boomerang" in the same 25-ton category and the light one in the weight category up to 10 tons (presumably "Tiger").
It was announced that Russia was the first in the world to switch to unified combat platforms in the aforementioned main categories of ground equipment.
As explained, single platforms should simplify, reduce the cost of production and maintenance of equipment, as well as facilitate the creation of machines for various purposes due to modular design.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, our armed forces inherited a huge fleet of tracked and wheeled armored vehicles, which turned out to be a headache for the reformers. The cumbersome and “ununified” legacy, as it was imagined, did not fit into the new requirements of a compact army, despite the seeming impossibility of a global war. It was said that NATO partners are disarming, reducing their armies, and we still have thousands and thousands of units of useless armored vehicles.
It must be admitted that the concept of a single platform, which was ideally desired, was raised by engineers for a long time. However, what is interesting, they began to radically implement it in military technology not in the United States or NATO, not during the power of the Soviet Union, but in the new Russia, after the pogrom of industry, science, the rupture of cooperation ties, extensive redundancies in the army, in this very era of change and grandiose reforms.
Why did the reformers need a fundamentally new technique, why did everything created earlier and in the future appear instantly obsolete?
When the Russian Ministry of Defense suspended the purchase of armored vehicles for five years (as reported by RIA Novosti), the then Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Nikolai Makarov just said that the military had given such time to designers to develop new types of military equipment.“We have a difficult situation with the ground forces. We stopped buying armored vehicles,”explained Makarov.
What was this “difficult situation”, why did the defense officials suddenly hate everything that was domestic, read - Soviet? In 2011, it was repeatedly stated about the technical backwardness of Russian military equipment. In particular, the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Alexander Postnikov, then said: "Those types of weapons that industry produces, including armored weapons, artillery and small arms, do not correspond in their parameters to those of NATO and even China." Makarov himself at that time also said that some samples of Russian weapons and military equipment, in terms of their tactical and technical characteristics, are inferior to the most successful foreign counterparts. The already mentioned commander-in-chief of the Russian ground forces, General Alexander Postnikov, spoke very dismissively about the combat qualities of the main Russian battle tank T-90, which, in his words, "is actually the 17th modification of the Soviet T-72," produced since 1973. Postnikov owns that the defense industry made its products so unusable even terribly expensive (Uralvagonzavod offered the T-90 for 118 million rubles apiece). His famous pearl: “It's easier for us to buy three Leopards for the same money (Leopard-2 cost about $ 6 million on the world market, that is, then a little over 170 million rubles).
There were flaws in everything "Soviet", for example, our paratroopers liked the BMD-4M, but the military department did not need it, then they refused to purchase, the Marines liked the BMP-3F, but, again, the officials did not like it. The logical development of the evolution of wheeled armored personnel carriers, the BTR-90, was rejected because it had insufficient protection against explosions on landmines and there was no landing through the rear doors. Moreover, everything was decided not by those for whom the equipment was intended, but by intermediaries, buyers from the defense, who had their own idea of weapons as a commodity, the army was already actually excluded from the right to choose and order. In order to enhance the effect of the unfitness of domestic technology, in contrast, they talked about the advantages of foreign technology, the purchases of which in all seriousness could acquire a global character, become the basic basis.
At that time, the chief of armaments, Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin spoke at a round table dedicated specifically to the issues of the expediency of purchasing weapons abroad. From his words it followed that this issue had been resolved. The Russian army will be equipped, inter alia, with imported weapons. According to the chief of armaments, the Ministry of Defense is closing a number of programs, which yesterday were considered as very promising from domestic developments. Instead, as Popovkin said then, there is another simple way out - to buy similar equipment abroad. Moreover, it is necessary to start immediately with both large and small, with a landing ship of the Mistral type and sniper rifles, for which you can buy Israeli drones, Italian Iveco armored vehicles Lynx and German light armor of the Rheinmetall company. In this they were easily ready to spend billions, without demanding from foreign producers either a price reduction or broad unification. It was Vladimir Popovkin who announced in 2010 that funding for the development of an almost finished T-95 tank was stopped (the tank passed state tests with a list of individual comments) and the project was closed. According to him, the project of the vehicle is "morally obsolete", and the tank was also called too expensive and difficult for conscripts to master.
From the moment when the intrigue about the T-95 tank was replaced by news about the "Armata", it became known about such a concept as a "platform" of military equipment, the development of which the military department, presumably, allotted five years.
So, for the first time in the world and only here, there is a single platform. Until this moment, the world did not know such a large-scale phenomenon in military affairs, and many associated the word "platform" with something completely different.
In technology, the first appearance of the concept of "platform" is attributed to IBM, their principle of "open architecture" made it possible to popularize the product, to make the IBM PC one of the main computer platforms. Automobile corporations used the platform as an opportunity to increase sales by diversifying the lineup on the basis of the adopted chassis. In both cases, these are marketing moves, where profit came first. If, according to the generally accepted opinion, the car platform is its lower part, which includes power elements, suspension and its attachment points, that is, at present, the interpretation of the concept of "car platform" is close enough to the interpretation of the concept of "frame chassis" that then, is the "platform" for our reformers?
In the "backward" USSR, on the basis of the T-72, a variety of combat vehicles have long been produced - the MTU-72 bridgelayer, the TOS-1 Buratino flamethrower system, the IMR-3M engineering barrage vehicle, the Berloga radio and chemical reconnaissance vehicle, and the recovery vehicle BREM-1, BMR-3M demining combat vehicle, BMO-T flamethrower combat vehicle, tank support combat vehicle (BMPT), 152 mm Msta-S self-propelled guns were created.
A successful and well-proven base was used in other countries of the former Warsaw Pact, and not only, for example, in South Africa, a self-propelled anti-aircraft gun ZSU ZA-35 was created on the T-72 chassis, and a 155 mm self-propelled gun by the French company GIAT.
On the basis of BMD, "Nona", "Sprut", "Shell" were created. Equipment was produced on the basis of other types, for example, on the successful MT-LB chassis. Nothing prevented the subsequent use of the T-95 base, whether it was adopted for service. Here, the way of creating technology based on the existing one does not fundamentally differ from the options that are now presented as platforms. Let's try to figure out these new "platforms".
Much has been said about the unification of new platforms. How is this expressed? Maybe they were completely unified, if not with the existing technology, then between the platforms themselves? No, all the unification of new platforms implies this unification within its own weight segment. So, the entire model range based on "Armata" will be unified mainly on the "Armata" platform, the same can be said about medium and light platforms. Here, all the innovation is perhaps only in the novelty of the technology itself.
The assertions that Soviet technology did not have wide unification and was flawed in this matter in front of new platforms, to put it mildly, is very controversial. The issues of unification in the Soviet Union have always been given importance. According to the Soviet principle, now the same BMD-4M is unified with the BMP-3, as, accordingly, all the equipment based on them. The NATO countries and the United States in particular did not and did not do more, it is unlikely that the Americans created a whole family of wheeled combat vehicles "Stryker" and adopted the unified family of trucks FMTV (Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles) somehow particularly distinguished themselves in this. Moreover, it should be noted that in the case of the Stryker, it was not possible to fully implement their plans; their armored fire support vehicle with a 105-mm tank gun on the Stryker chassis turned out to be extremely overweight and capricious.
Such statements that, for example, our three infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-1, BMP-2, BMP-3) were on two structurally different chassis are quite natural for technical evolution, the same can be said about BMD or other equipment. Having a chassis once created for all times and occasions, maybe an economical, but very dubious decision. Unification is designed to reduce the cost of production, improve maintainability, but unification is not an end in itself to the detriment of combat qualities and capabilities. The pre-assigned "platform", and not the one chosen during operation, can not only not reduce the cost of production, but also make the entire range of equipment unsuccessful on its own, which did not meet expectations, base.
Further, there is a lot of talk about the "modularity" of new platforms. How is their modularity revolutionary? Combat modules have long been created and their appearance is not associated with a new understanding of platforms, for example, such as "Berezhok" and "Bakhcha" for infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers or tank, Tagil "Breakthrough" and Omsk "Burlak", designed to significantly increase the power and protection of T tanks -80 and T-72 / T-90. Various combat modules have been used all over the world for a long time.
Converting the engine from aft to forward? This is also not a discovery, and it is not a fact that it is such an urgent need. On the basis of Soviet T-64s (of which we also had stocks), a heavy infantry fighting vehicle was received in Kharkov by moving the engine in the tank hull. The Germans did this even earlier on the Leopard chassis, creating the Marder BMP.
Finally, the most important thing for lean reformers. Economy issues. Let's take a look at the economy. As already mentioned, General Makarov set aside "eternity", whole five years, for the creation of a fundamentally new technology, and it appeared, however, not yet adopted for service, and not even passed the entire cycle of tests. They refused from the powerful T-95 tank with a 152-mm gun, but only in the development of the "Armata", R&D and R&D, according to Vladimir Putin, they invested another 64 billion rubles, the T-14 tank itself (already with a 125-mm cannon) is estimated 400 million apiece. We spent almost five more years to roll out the unfinished T-14 of the Armata platform for the Victory Parade.
At the same time, it is proposed to make other equipment on this expensive chassis. How economical is this, if the same self-propelled gun "Coalition", which does not need powerful armor, can be quite successfully produced on the mastered, cheaper T-90 chassis (as seen at the parade)? The same can be asked about various bridgelayers, repair and recovery vehicles, all other equipment that does not need thick armor and a separate armored capsule for the crew. Finally, how reasonable is it in general to dissipate forces, making instead of new tanks, which themselves will not be enough, equipment based on it? In general, if we talk about economy, then here we would remember the same thrifty Israel, which at one time used captured T-54 / T-55 and outdated "Centurions" for alterations into heavy armored personnel carriers, remembered the story when the Germans during the Second World War During the war, all their SPGs widely used the chassis of tanks, even those that were already outdated and out of production. In our country, all reserves of armored vehicles are expected to be significantly reduced, simply destroyed.
What prevents the use of T-72 stocks for alterations in BMPTs, for their operation together with tanks in the first line, what prevents the creation of a similarity of the Israeli heavy armored personnel carrier "Akhzarit" for the infantry on this tank base? They do not want to see unification and economy here at close range, although there are already many interesting projects and developments.
They talk about the special protection of new platforms. The protection of the T-95, if it was adopted, would be no worse now than what is supposed to be on the T-14.
On the T-95, the separation of the crew into a separate armored capsule was largely due to the use of a powerful 152 mm 2A83 gun, in an uninhabited turret and an additional 30 mm 2A42 automatic cannon. With a 125 mm cannon (2A82-1M) on the T-14, this already raises doubts before the solution used on the Black Eagle tank or solutions in new tank modules for existing tanks.
On the Orel, not the crew was allocated into a separate armored capsule, but a new automatic loader and ammunition for the 125-mm cannon, freeing up space inside the tank and strengthening its protection. Penetration of an armored capsule can lead to the death of the entire crowded crew at the same time. On the "Black Eagle", the crew, being in a spacious, well-booked volume, was spaced apart and had an individual hatch for each, breaking through an armored capsule of ammunition, leading the explosion through the escape hatches upwards. Similar solutions for the separation and separation of ammunition were also used on new tank modules, already mentioned "Breakthrough" and "Burlak", when modernizing old tanks or releasing T-90MS. All this was cheaper and no less effective in the complex for arming the army.
The appearance in our army of the heavy BMP T-15 of the Armata platform, presumably an event, for this we had to adapt the body of the T-14 tank to the possibility of the front and rear engine layout, but what is the feasibility of this? It is unlikely that such violence over the layout improved the dimensions of the tank itself, and in terms of economy (an expensive tank base) and the combat expediency of a heavy infantry fighting vehicle, not everything looks smooth.
The defeat of a tank in battle is fraught with the loss of the crew, we have three tankers, the defeat of a heavy infantry fighting vehicle walking nearby is fraught with the loss of not only its crew, but also the entire infantry landing, for the BMP T-15, it will already be eleven people. Here, again, it is useful to remember Israel, whose concern for protection is so fond of emphasizing here, advocating for heavy infantry fighting vehicles. First, the IDF does not use heavy infantry fighting vehicles, but heavy armored personnel carriers. Secondly, only auxiliary machine-gun armament is put on the armored personnel carrier, so that it would not occur to anyone to use them instead of tanks. Remembering someone else's experience, one must also remember that Israel is half the size of the Moscow region, that there is a dry climate and a dry region, and the IDF's operations are largely police-oriented against militants. If you need a "police tank" for the special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, perhaps there is a reason to make mastodons of the BMP T-15, as far as the army needs it, the question is.
In the USSR, for the first time in the world, an infantry fighting vehicle, a universal and maneuverable vehicle, appeared. Also, for the first time in the world, BMPT became a logical development of Soviet military thought, embodied in a heavy, well-armored vehicle designed to help attacking tanks. Having protection that is not only not inferior, but also superior to tank, special weapons, lacking tanks, and rifle operators, instead of infantry at loopholes, BMPTs were supposed to become the best alternative to heavy BMPs. But, the BMPT did not find a place in the army, which, as if they did not specifically want to prepare for the possibility of waging a large-scale war.
Speaking about the protection of Kurganets-25, we can say the same thing as for the T-15, adding that all of its reinforcement of booking can be nullified by its size as a target.
The modernized BMP-2 ("Berezhok") in this seems to be even more preferable, both in terms of development, price-quality ratio, and reserves in the army.
Boomerang platform, where special protection against explosions and unloading of infantry from the rear of the vehicle are distinguished. In general, this monster is impressive if it was created only because the militants planted landmines on the roads of the marching columns of our equipment, so a land mine can always be laid more powerful, marching columns will always be vulnerable here. The best defense of the column is its competent security, good reconnaissance and skillful sappers, and not the endless reinforcement of the bottom of armored cars, under increasingly powerful land mines, especially since no one will fight in minefields, as well as forever only marching columns along the mined in rear roads.
What is the meaning of the new platforms, why did our reformers in the field of this "ballet" with platforms in the army turn out to be ahead of the rest of the planet? For what was the "garden fencing", all army armored vehicles were going to rewrite from scratch, billions were glad to spend on raw equipment, and they decided to reject the finished proven equipment and throw thousands of pieces into scrap?
Here again we will have to recall the era of Anatoly Eduardovich Serdyukov (who has already forgotten - the Minister of Defense of Russia in 2007-2012). It should be noted that the decision of Vladimir Putin to appoint Anatoly Eduardovich can be explained by the fact that Serdyukov proved during his service in the Federal Tax Service (FTS) the ability to control huge financial flows. The President then stressed that Serdyukov has experience in the field of economics and finance, and here it is necessary to control "huge budget funds" for the modernization of the armed forces. So the first is the "financial flows" in the military. For rearmament, they had to be identified and implemented.
In October 2008, Anatoly Serdyukov announced the beginning of the transition to a "new look" for the Russian army. The transition to a new look is significant in that in three years the Russian army ceased to be a smaller copy of the Soviet one, mass mobilization for a big war was no longer envisaged (accordingly, and reserve equipment is not needed), as well as the global armed conflict itself was viewed as unlikely. Russia should have received a compact, professional army capable of solving the problems of various local conflicts and conducting anti-terrorist operations (for which the military equipment of a global war has become less in demand, in front of equipment for police, anti-terrorist operations).
The size of the wartime army was set at 1.7 million against 5 million in 2008, and the cadre of incomplete personnel deployed for mobilization have been largely eliminated. This made the Russian army more like the separate armies of small NATO countries and some of our other friends and partners. In 2008-2010, the number of officers was reduced from 350,000 to 150,000 (although in 2011 it was decided to increase it to 220,000), more than 1,000 cadre units and storage bases were liquidated, 24 divisions of the ground forces were reorganized into about 90 brigades. and 72 air regiments and 14 air bases - in seven air bases of the first and seven second categories, the number of military educational institutions was reduced from 65 to 10.
In the same financial channel, a grandiose sale of non-core property of the Ministry of Defense began, the transfer of supplies to outsourcing and a reform of the procurement of weapons began.
The very purchase of weapons, housing and materials was removed from the control of the military under Serdyukov, and the Ministry of Defense staffed with civilian structures began to deal with them. Anatoly Eduardovich, the helmsman of financial flows, did not understand much about army affairs, for this, Nikolai Makarov, a reliable ally in reform, a great innovator and tactician, the future winner of Georgia and Hero of Russia, was called in. Plus a big fan of Mercedes and Leopards, Alexander Postnikov, plus a patriot of someone's interests, Vladimir Popovkin.
The theory of a compact army for local wars has acquired an idea, a single economical platform, a kind of armored transforming headset. If common sense can be stepped over somewhere, then the laws of physics cannot be ignored, the platforms had to be divided into weight categories and decided on the tracked and wheelbase. It was announced that the main condition for creating families of armored vehicles is the maximum possible use of all types of vehicles on the chassis of unified components (assemblies, assemblies, assembly units). For example, the use of motors of the same size range. Of this series, for vehicles of the middle category, there is a structurally unified series based on a tank engine, and for vehicles of a light category, its own series based on an engine for an infantry fighting vehicle. Respectively for engine systems, transmissions and so on.
They dream of implementing the principles of broad unification most fully when creating the next enlargement, concern (holding) BTT or BTVT (armored weapons and equipment).
What is the only fundamental innovation here, especially if you still have to divide equipment into families?
It's just that there will be fewer bases for technology, as it is assumed, only four. Still old stocks that "pull the pocket" will be destroyed, that's all.
It is noteworthy how the foreign media gleefully commented on the appearance of new "platforms" at the parade, as if they recognized "their own" and saw "their own". Thus, the Japanese edition of The Diplomat enthusiastically noted: "Russian armored vehicles on the Armata platform demonstrate a complete break with the legacy of the Soviet era in weapons systems."
Indeed, you look at new "platforms" and think: hello, capitalist relatives of the colonial-expeditionary "Bradleys", "Warriors", LAV-25 and "Strykers", so now we can do this.
Goodbye, "backward" Soviet tank school, your armored graceful children will be scrapped.
However, before planning extensive reductions of our tanks, throwing money on new and controversial ideas, it would be worthwhile to think hard about the fact that now we can only build in pieces and dozens (trying to sell for export), and are ready to dispose of in hundreds and thousands. If there is not a local, but a large-scale war, there will be no time to make new tanks, there is nothing and nowhere. In fact, we already have only one UVZ.
For your information, as reported, Omsktransmash (Omsk Tank Plant) has been going through bankruptcy proceedings since 2002. For almost 14 years, almost all the property of the enterprise was sold out in the process of transferring to other owners or was sold. Of all the assets, only two non-residential premises remained in Omsk on the street. Karelo-Finnskaya and 10th Cheredova - no one wanted to buy them for the price the creditors insist on. Two more premises on the street. Grizodubova, 20, were sold, but for some reason the money for them was not received. To bring the bankruptcy procedure to the end and sign the liquidation acts with a light heart, the bankruptcy manager of the plant, Yuri Remizov, asked the court to extend the bankruptcy proceedings for another six months. After examining the presented arguments, the arbitration agreed with it, but the requested period was cut down to two months. The day of the end of bankruptcy proceedings, that is, in fact, the liquidation of one of the largest tank manufacturers in the USSR, fell, by a strange coincidence, on May 9 - Victory Day.
So, if we are to thank Anatoly Eduardovich and his “brothers in arms” for the new platforms, it is only for the fact that these platforms did not become imported, that they have not yet managed to destroy everything Soviet. In general, it is somehow difficult to believe in the good deeds of those who have done so much harm to the defense of our country. They always want "the best", justifying short-sighted or criminal decisions. If we are talking about unification, this will bring the matter to the point of absurdity, and the good efforts of the reformers will turn into even greater problems for the army. If the economy, so under its slogans will be thrown away and stolen billions.
Of course, there is no point in denying the benefits of the new and modern, of everything that is being done for the good of Russia, the whole question is when, who and how will do it. It is useful to remember that many technologies were lost, entire design schools perished. In addition, the Ministry of Defense, while ordering new equipment then, simultaneously liquidated its own research institutes and test sites. It is not enough to design and even build new equipment, it must be tested according to specially developed programs, first on closed training grounds, then in the army. Only after that, make a decision whether what has been done is suitable for service in the troops, or requires serious revision. The introduction of a new model into operation is a whole science that has practically been lost in a quarter of a century. Much remains to be revived.
The President gave the command to equip the army with armored novelties, and they are still "raw". Will they all be accepted now anyway?
The enterprising gentlemen would not have messed up firewood here, the newfangled "platform" for our army would not become a bitter "panel" in the interests of the selfish business, even worse - the fatal mistake of a grandiose experiment under a good pretext.
Any technique gets old, something better always appears, and it's one thing to make replacements, having a more diverse technique, it's another thing if everything becomes obsolete at the same time, if you have to rewrite everything from scratch again. Is it good when common "platforms" begin to be presented as a panacea for military progress? Let us recall the initial idea of IBM (at one time each new Pentium, II, III, IV, buried the previous one together with the already broken dream of an eternal “open architecture”). There was no universal modularity at all times and in all cases even on the basis of one computer platform. Let's create a precedent, there will be more than one, even four platforms for armored vehicles, we will write off the "old" for scrap. But these platforms will become obsolete, at the same time the entire uncontested fleet of armored vehicles on it will become obsolete, even worse if the very concept of such a universal "economy" becomes obsolete or becomes untenable earlier. In this case, either you will have to return to the "variety of types", leaving the technique from the previous platform, or every time you start all over again, completely re-equipping everything with new "platforms".
The country's security and military equipment are hardly the level when it can be measured by the same yardstick as changing the population of mobile phones or renewing the fleet of cars.
Naturally, I can be wrong, sincerely mistaken, and "carry beautiful nonsense." There are doubts, inevitable questions arise, and it would be strange if questions do not arise for those who make fateful decisions on Russia's security. A war is on the doorstep, it’s one thing, if I’m mistaken, even make myself a fool here, we won’t lose the war from this, and it is incomparably worse if our leaders and fathers-commanders are mistaken.
It remains to hope and simply believe that smart people will figure everything out and make the right decisions, both with new and old technology, and with a competent understanding of Russia's defense in war.
He said, as he could, hardly many people will like my sad thoughts. Who cares, let us know in the comments. Maybe something will change for the better from our thoughts, after all, the main thing is not personal ambitions, but order in tank units and a strong defense of Russia. Peace to your home!
