Yes, since January 1 of this year, such a country as Holland does not officially exist, so our story is about the light cruiser of the Netherlands Navy "De Ruyter".
It so happened that, starting the story with the participants in the battle in the Java Sea from the Japanese side, it turned out to go to the opposite side. Exeter was the first, and now it was the turn of another participant: the light cruiser of the Dutch fleet De Ruyter.
Netherlands. Holland. The neutrals in the First World War, who managed to slip through, despite the fact that the Dutch ships sank all sides with great pleasure, and the colonies were plundered in the same way.
In general, with regard to the fleet, the Netherlands needed a fleet. Not only to resist external enemies, but also to protect their own large colonies.
It must be said that the Dutch colonies, rich in oil, tin and rubber, looked with interest in such a way as the Japanese Empire, which somewhat imagined itself and believed in its own invincibility.
The Dutch, realizing the impending problems, decided to create a fleet to protect their colonies. Mainly for the defense of Indonesia. The main role in the protection of sea areas was assigned to submarines (32 units), and 4 cruisers and 24 destroyers were supposed to cover them. However, due to the outbreak of the next crisis, funding was cut, and more than once.
So the existing cruisers Java, Sumatra and destroyers had to be completed with a cruiser, 4 destroyers and 6 submarines.
This is how the assistant to Java and Sumatra, the cruiser De Ruyter, appeared. The crisis that was taking place in Holland did not allow the construction of something Washington-based. The money was actually enough for a light cruiser, which they planned to equip the family with 150-mm guns.
The De Ruyter was laid down on September 14, 1933, launched on May 11, 1935, and commissioned on October 3, 1936. On February 27, 1942, she was torpedoed and sunk in the battle in the Java Sea.
Displacement:
- standard 6442 t;
- full 7548 t.
Length 170.8 m.
Width 15.7 m.
Draft 5, 1 m.
Reservation:
- board: 30-50 mm;
- deck: 30 mm;
- towers: 100 mm;
- barbets: 50 mm;
- deckhouse: 30 mm.
Engines: 2 TZA "Parsons", 6 boilers "Yarrow", 66,000 hp. with.
Travel speed 32 knots.
Cruising range: 11,000 miles at 12 knots.
Armament:
3 x 2 and 1 x 1 guns 150 mm;
5 х 2 anti-aircraft guns 40 mm;
4 х 2 machine guns 12, 7 mm;
2 machine guns 7, 7 mm.
Aviation group: 1 catapult, 2 seaplanes.
The designers from the "Krupp" firm firmly attached themselves to the creation of the ship, therefore the features of the cruising series "K" are clearly traced in the ship's design. The booking scheme was very similar to the "Cologne", but the experience of building the "Java" made it possible to create a more modern model, when the hull was recruited from armor plates.
We did a fair amount of work on the contours, in general they paid enough attention to hydrodynamics, as a result of which the cruiser turned out to be nimble. Moreover, with the same power plant as the Java, De Ruyter was 2 knots faster. Plus, the turbines could be forced, and then for 15 minutes the cruiser could reach a speed of 33.4 knots.
The ship was divided into compartments by 21 bulkheads. Each compartment was equipped with a system to remove water in case of flooding.
In addition to a comprehensively thought-out system for ensuring the unsinkability of the ship, it had a powerful fire extinguishing system. Powder and slug cellars, boiler rooms were equipped with a fire irrigation system. Moreover, it was possible to extinguish fires in several ways at once:
- outboard sea water from the hose system;
- foam from two foam generators;
- water that was under steam pressure in the boiler room;
- water from the fire extinguishing system of fuel tanks;
- carbon dioxide from the generating unit in the boiler room.
A few words about weapons.
The main guns were German-made Bofors with a caliber of 150 mm. The same as on the "Cologne" and some German destroyers, quite modern and rapid-fire.
They were located according to a retired scheme, six guns in three two-gun turrets and one on a pin machine, covered with a shield. Two towers were installed at the stern.
This scheme was preferred when firing in retreat, which was not at all surprising given the difference between the Dutch and Japanese navies.
The ballistic data of the De Ruyter's guns were approximately the same as that of the Java artillery, the firing range was 21 km, the mass of an armor-piercing projectile was 46.7 kg, and a fragmentation shell was 46.0 kg.
However, the De Ruyter could fire exactly the same volley as the Java, which had 10 such guns, but only 7 out of 10 barrels could participate in the side salvo.
But anti-aircraft weapons require special analysis. It was truly unique. Due to cost savings, the Dutch decided not to arm the cruiser with universal guns at all. Therefore, instead of the usual station wagons with a caliber of 76-127 mm, ten 40-mm Bofors anti-aircraft guns of the Mk III model were installed on De Ruyter in twin installations.
The assault rifles were quite fast-firing, the passport rate of fire was declared as 120 rounds per minute, the real one could be even higher, up to 150 rounds per minute, if there was a well-trained crew that reloaded clips of 4 shells manually.
"Zeiss" rangefinders, coupled with their own computing devices, and even stabilized in three planes, had a remote guidance system from anti-aircraft fire control posts.
The case when the Dutch were able to. So much so that the British immediately began to copy their anti-aircraft fire control system. The control system was excellent, but everything that could be spoiled was not only spoiled by the Dutch military, but deceived.
The superb capabilities of this revolutionary system were virtually nullified by its extremely unfortunate layout. It is very difficult to say what the creators of the ship thought, but the anti-aircraft guns were concentrated in one place: on the stern superstructure.
As a result, the cruiser turned out to be highly vulnerable to aviation from the bow heading angles and for the same reason there was a serious threat of the destruction of the entire air defense of the ship as a result of a single successful hit in the stern superstructure.
There was, however, still light anti-aircraft weapons. Four twin mounts of 12.7 mm Soloturn machine guns. Two were installed on the navigating bridge, and two above the bow rangefinder post. This could, of course, create some interference for aircraft attacking from the nose, but nothing more.
Well, four 7, 7-mm machine guns in deck mounts should not be taken into account at all as anti-aircraft weapons. As well as two seemingly anti-aircraft, but training guns with a caliber of 37 mm.
But the cruiser had no torpedo tubes at all. In Dutch naval doctrine, torpedo launching was the exclusive domain of submarines and destroyers.
The cruiser's crew consisted of 35 officers and 438 non-commissioned officers and sailors. It is worth noting that all the living quarters of the ship, which was supposed to serve in the tropics, were spacious, well-ventilated and even equipped with ventilation systems.
The cruiser in general was extremely widely provided with various electrical household equipment: electric laundries, car washes, floor polishers, in general, everything that could facilitate the crew's service.
In general, "De Ruyter" could well serve as a model in terms of thoughtfulness of small details, modern systems and innovative approaches. It is a pity that all the innovations did not help him at all in a real battle, where the cruiser ran into opponents not quite equal to him.
But let's go in order.
When the Netherlands ended abruptly on May 15, 1940, surrendering to Germany, the Dutch fleet in the colonies joined the Allies. The Dutch ships were mainly engaged in protecting communications and escorting convoys.
After the invasion of the German troops into Holland and the surrender of the Dutch army, the troops and navy in the colonies remained on the side of the Allies. The East India Squadron was engaged in the protection of communications and escorting convoys in the Java Sea and the Indian Ocean.
On December 7, 1941, Japan and the United States entered the war. And on February 4, 1942, the first collision of Dutch ships with the enemy took place. The Allied squadron, whose flagship was "De Ruyter", which consisted of the Dutch cruiser "Tromp" and the American cruisers "Houston" and "Marblehead" with the American destroyers "Baker", "Bulmer", "Edwards", "Stewart" and the Dutch " Piet Hain”and“Van Gent”was attacked by Japanese planes.
The Japanese pilots refined the Marblehead in such a way that it had to be sent to the United States for repairs. But this, as it turned out, was not the worst scenario.
The American-Dutch squadron was also approached by British, Australian and American ships. The allies gathered all their forces to counter the Japanese attack on Indonesia. During February, the allied squadron tried to oppose something to the Japanese. Having safely lost Singapore, Palembang, the Allies were preparing to lose Sumatra and Java.
Before the last battle on February 26, the unit commanded by Karl Doorman, a Dutchman, had:
5 cruisers - the Dutch "De Ruyter" (flagship) and "Java", the American "Houston", the English "Exeter" and the Australian "Perth";
9 destroyers - Dutch Witte de Witt and Cortenar, British Jupiter, Electra, Encounter, American Edwards, Alden, Ford and Paul Jones.
Doorman took his ships to the base in Surabao when he received word of a large Japanese convoy literally 60 miles away. The admiral led the squadron to intercept the convoy and requested air cover, which he was not given. True, the Japanese aviation did not bother the Allies much.
But this was done by a detachment of Japanese ships, consisting of three groups of ships.
The first: the cruiser "Jintsu", the destroyers "Yukikaze", "Tokitsukaze", "Amatsukaze", "Hatsukaze". Second: the heavy cruisers Nachi and Haguro, the destroyers Ushio, Sazanami, Yamakaze and Kawakaze. Third: the cruiser "Naka", the destroyers "Asagumo", "Minegumo", "Murasame", "Samidare", "Harusame" and "Yudachi".
In principle, the Japanese had an advantage, but not fatal. It is worth noting that Doorman had an order to attack the convoy only at night, what the devil he climbed on the superior enemy forces during the day, it is difficult to say today.
De Ruyter was the first to receive a direct hit from a Haguro shell. Further, the battle in the Java Sea took place under the complete control of the Japanese, who damaged Exeter and sank the destroyers Cortenar and Elektra.
Further, Doorman continued to lose ships mediocrely, the flagship "De Ruyter" got on a par with the others, the radio station was disabled and all commands were given by the searchlight. One can only imagine how efficient and intelligible such management was.
At night, the remnants of Doorman's squadron came across the heavy cruisers Nachi and Haguro. In the battle that began, the Haguro gunners planted a 203-mm projectile in the stern of the De Ruyter, and when the cruiser, which had lost its speed, began to turn away, they hit him with a torpedo.
At the same time, the Java received a torpedo. Both cruisers sank, reducing the size of the Dutch fleet by two-thirds. Doorman's last brilliant order was not to recruit the crews of the Java and De Ruyter, so as not to endanger other ships.
The surviving "Houston" and "Perth" escaped safely. Exeter was finished off the next day.
In total, De Ruyter was hit by two 203-mm shells and one 610-mm torpedo from the Japanese heavy cruiser Haguro. He stayed afloat for about 3 hours and sank, taking with him almost 80% of the crew, along with would-be Admiral Doorman.
In principle, the course of the battle in the Java Sea confirmed the initial intentions and alignments of the allies. The Dutch were eager to fight and almost all of them died, the Anglo-Saxons tried to withdraw the ships to the rear, so at the first opportunity they took both Exeter and Perth with Houston.
Indeed, why would the British, Australians and Americans die for some kind of Dutch colonies?
In general, the death of "De Ruyter" is surprising. Well, really, what is one torpedo and two shells, albeit 203-mm? Completely frivolous, in my opinion.
The cruiser, which was equipped with a very good damage control system, sank from far from fatal damage. Yes, the Long Lance is a very powerful weapon, almost half a ton of explosives, but a cruiser is not a destroyer either. It is a large ship, even light in class.
If you familiarize yourself with the course of the battle in the Java Sea, you begin to think that both De Ruyter and Java were lost due to the complete unwillingness of the crews to fight for their ships.
In fact, a very good ship was lost out of the blue, in a completely meaningless battle. Without inflicting any damage on the enemy, because 4 Japanese transports sunk by the allied squadron at the cost of the death of 3 cruisers and 5 destroyers - well, obviously, the result cannot be called successful.
And if you evaluate, then "De Ruyter" was a very interesting and beautiful ship. Advanced in terms of weapons and equipment. Another question is what to do with 150-mm guns against the "Nachi" and "Haguro" he had nothing to do.
But as a project, you must agree, the light cruiser "De Ruyter" was a rather high result of Dutch shipbuilding.
The anti-aircraft guns should be placed differently - and it could be called an example for everyone.
