Questions about the use of US carrier-based aircraft in Vietnam ().
The number of aircraft carriers that took part in the hostilities? ().
The number of military campaigns of aircraft carrier strike groups to the shores of Vietnam? ().
The total number of days spent by aircraft carriers in the Yankee position? ().
What is Yankee Position? ().
Which of the aircraft carriers made the greatest contribution to the victory over the enemy? ().
The importance of carrier-based aircraft in Vietnam? ().
What's behind the TF 77 acronym?
77th Task Force (Task Force 77) - ex. designation of an aircraft carrier strike formation as part of the US Seventh Fleet (the fleet's area of responsibility is the entire western part of the Pacific Ocean and the eastern part of the Indian Ocean). Unlike domestic practice, where each warship is constantly part of a particular fleet or flotilla, the American Seventh Fleet exists only on paper: any ship that crosses the 180th meridian of west longitude is automatically included in its composition. If we are talking about an aircraft carrier strike group, then the commander of the AUG is appointed to the post of commander of the Seventh Fleet.
In an effort to perpetuate the memory of the feats of naval aviation, after the war, the Americans hastily renamed Operational Formation 77 into the Guards 70s. So that no one has any associations with the heroes who dropped bombs on Hanoi.
But these are all general remarks. What were the details?
Let me cite facts and excerpts from the chapter “Participation of the US Navy in the Vietnam War” (by V. Dotsenko), which describe the details of the organization and combat work of the 77th Task Force.
To solve the tasks of destroying ground military and industrial facilities of the DRV, the Americans attracted significant forces of the fleet. As part of the 77th task force, there were always from 1 to 5 aircraft carriers with powerful security, which included up to 5 missile cruisers, up to 15 destroyers and frigates.
Despite the absence of opposition at sea, the American command carried out a full range of measures to organize all types of defense of the AUG. The close order of protection, consisted of cruisers, destroyers and frigates, which accompanied the aircraft carrier at a distance of 20-30 cab. In the air, AWACS planes patrolled around the clock, cover fighters were on duty either in the air or on catapults in full readiness. PLO was assigned to a specially organized anti-submarine search and strike group, incl. base patrol aircraft "Orion" and "Neptune", patrolling in the near and far zones.
The average stay of aircraft carriers in the 7th Fleet was 175-250 days, including 5-6 exits into the combat zone with a maximum duration of up to 50 days. The time spent by aircraft carriers in the combat maneuvering area was 108-136 days, on transitions it took up to 45 days on average, and up to 60 days for parking in bases. Current repairs and combat training took an average of 170 to 210 days. The transition of aircraft carriers from the west coast of the United States to the operational zone of the 7th fleet took 14 days, and from the east - twice as long.
While in the area of combat maneuvering, each aircraft carrier continuously participated in hostilities for one to two weeks, after which the day was provided for personnel rest and aircraft repair. When there were 3 aircraft carriers in the area, one of them, as a rule, was in reserve, from the other two aircraft operated on average 12 hours a day.
The area of combat maneuvering ("Yankee") of the forces of the 77th task force from February 1965 to January 1973 was in the Gulf of Tonkin. Its dimensions were 140x160 miles, and the distance from the coastline reached 40 - 80 miles (the far edge was 100 - 120 miles). Each of the carrier strike groups had its own sub-area. Within this area, points of replenishment were assigned, where one of the groups of the service connection, or the so-called "floating rear", was constantly located. American aviation operated at distances of 200 - 650 km from the center of the combat maneuvering area (the front of strikes reached 400 - 650 km).
The aviation composition of the 77th operational formation is assessed as follows: if there were 2 aircraft carriers in the position, 152 - 166 aircraft could take part in hostilities (including 86 - 96 attack aircraft, 48 fighters); at 3 - 240 - 250 (including 130-150 attack aircraft, 72 - 84 fighters); at 4 - 312 - 324 (including 166-184 attack aircraft, 96 fighters). The Vietnamese air defense system significantly influenced the change in the number of the air wing.
In total, during the war, the aircraft-carrying ships of the 77th task force lost 860 aircraft (the main reason was combat losses).
Deck aircraft were used with high voltage. In 1966, an average of 111 sorties per day were performed from 1 aircraft carrier, and 178 from 2. In 1969, these numbers were 178 and 311, and in 1972 - 132 and 233, respectively. At the same time, the intense combat aviation was: for attack aircraft - 1, 2-1, 3 sorties per day; for fighters - 0, 5-0, 9; for electronic warfare aircraft - 1, 43-1, 7; for AWACS aircraft - 1, 25-1, 5; for reconnaissance aircraft - 0, 58-0, 83.
On my own behalf, I note that there is a logical inconsistency in the above figures. If there are two attack aircraft carriers in position (86-96 attack aircraft, 48 fighters) and the indicated intensity of combat use (1, 2-1, 3 sorties per day for attack aircraft, 0, 5-0, 9 for fighters), it is impossible to get the daily rate 200-300 sorties. The actions of electronic warfare aircraft, AWACS and reconnaissance aircraft can be neglected in the calculation, due to their relatively small number.
In general, the indicated average (!) Number of sorties (178 from one AB per day, and more than 300 from two AB) causes great mistrust.
The emergence of new types of aircraft played a significant role. By the time the war began (1965), the Navy had adopted two new aircraft, which significantly expanded the scope of carrier-based aviation. We are talking about the E-2 Hawkeye long-range radar detection aircraft (which replaced the obsolete E-1 Tracker AWACS aircraft at the combat post) and the A-6 Intruder all-weather attack aircraft, which, in spite of sluggish flight performance, had an important advantage: it was capable of acting in the dark.
The attack aircraft was equipped with the DIANE sighting and navigation system, consisting of two radars. The search radar provided tracking and attack of ground targets in any weather conditions. The second (navigation) radar served for automatic tracking of point targets and terrain mapping.
His one aircraft development during the Vietnam War was the light carrier-based attack aircraft A-7 "Corsair II". Created on the basis of and outwardly little distinguishable from the F-8 Crusader fighter, the new widow attack aircraft exceeded the range and payload of the outdated A-4 Skyhawk.
Powerful warships, state-of-the-art aircraft, well-thought-out measures for organizing defense and attack in any conditions. Sophisticated tactics when attacking ground targets. Precision air-to-surface weapons.
The American plan to attack Vietnam had 100 advantages and only one disadvantage. He flew to hell.
* * *
As we already know, carrier-based aviation is a unique instrument of the fleet, capable of solving strategic tasks. Before accepting this statement as true, let me know the size of Vietnam.
When do Americans celebrate Victory Day over Vietnam?
Then how are the statements about the “strategic nature” of aircraft carrier groups connected with the shameful loss in a local war?
Having combined the abyss with the height,
Triumph of victories with the shame of defeat …
Well, let's continue our acquaintance with little-known facts about the Vietnam War.
Who and where did the main blows against Vietnam come from?
What airbases were used directly on the territory of Vietnam?
Where did the B-52 strategic bombers fly from?
The main type of strike aircraft that completed 75% of the strike missions in the initial period of the war? ().
Due to the high flight characteristics and the exceptional capabilities of their onboard electronic complex (NASARR), capable of directing the aircraft to the target in any conditions and flying at an ultra-low altitude, automatically distinguishing the terrain features, determining the slant range to the selected point and signaling obstacles along the course, "Tandrchifs" used to attack the most important and well-defended targets. Among them are the main oil depot in the suburbs of Hanoi, the metallurgical plant in Taynguyen, the railway bridge over the Red River on the border with China, the Katbi airfield, where the helicopters delivered from the USSR were assembled, the main "lair of MiGs" - the Fukyen airbase.
The intensity of use and the role of the US Air Force in the Vietnam War is eloquently evidenced by the losses: 2,197 aircraft that did not return.
The Air Force bore the brunt of the air battles and flew 2/3 of the sorties in that war. In absolute terms - about a million sorties, two times more than the air wings of all AUGs made in sixty-six military campaigns to the coast of Vietnam.
Fans of carrier-based aircraft will rightly note that this structure nevertheless made a significant contribution to the war. At the same time, they themselves are not funny because:
a) 17 aircraft carriers “blew through” the war with a tiny coastal country;
b) it turned out that even in a war with a tiny coastal country, one had to rely entirely on the classic air force.
This is the natural ending of the epic with carrier-based aircraft and the fleet's attempts to declare itself in the skies over land.
