How much do we know about the so-called Joint Air Defense System of the CIS Member States (CIS Air Defense System)? At best, we just know that it is. And it might work.
A bit of history: the CIS air defense OS was created on the basis of an agreement between ten countries of the commonwealth, signed on February 10, 1995 in Alma-Ata. 22 years is a fair amount of time, so it is not surprising that by now there are actually 6 participating countries left in the treaty:
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan.
Plus, Uzbekistan, which withdrew from the CSTO in 2012, but continues to take part in the joint exercises of the CIS air defense forces and maintains bilateral cooperation with Russia on air defense issues.
To date, the air defense system has proved to be a tenacious and stable system. And now, recently, high-level conversations have begun about the need to strengthen the capabilities and modernize the existing ones.
Not for nothing.
Moreover, if you look at the documents with one eye, it means that in the event of a threat of a military conflict, the air defense forces are coordinated from Moscow.
This is logical. But: the coordinator and the commander are positions that are somewhat different from each other. Especially when it comes to such serious things. But in fact, it turns out that the CIS air defense OS simply does not have a single command. And each "if something happens" will decide with his own head. Let me remind you, there are six of them.
Naturally, no one encroaches on the independence of the air defense forces of each of the participating countries, but it is precisely in the event of a threat that is repelled that orders must come from one place and be carried out unquestioningly. It's an army, after all, not a parliament …
At present, Russia is intensively implementing, again, within the framework of the CIS air defense system, the idea of "united regional air defense systems" or ORS. What's the point?
The bottom line is in bilateral direct agreements with the countries participating in the air defense system and the creation on their basis of these very air defense missile defense systems. In the East European, Caucasian and Central Asian regions of collective security. As an example, I will cite the ORS of the air defense of Russia and Belarus, which is already working.
In April 2016, Russia and Belarus completed the formation of the first unified system of this type in the Eastern European region. Everything is transparent here, Belarus is strategically important for Russia for a reason. Nearby are Poland and the Baltic states with NATO bases and airfields with American planes. Therefore, after Moscow, Minsk has the most significant air defense forces in the Commonwealth, here Lukashenka spares no money, and Russia is helping as much as it can. Including modernized MiG-29, S-400 air defense systems and Protivnik-GE radar.
The meaning of the ERS air defense is that in peacetime the air defense systems of states operate as usual, separately from each other. But in the event of a "threatened period", a joint command is urgently created to control the ERS air defense. And coordination is carried out from the Central Command Post of the commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces.
And the question immediately arises: what is the "threatened period"? According to the text, this is a period of time that precedes the start of the war and is characterized by an extreme aggravation of the international situation. It is vague, but if you look at the news bulletins of today, we have almost this "threatened period" in the yard.
It turns out that the Russian Aerospace Forces take command immediately before the start of hostilities. And when did we have enough time, if we look into history, in situations like this? Yes, never to anyone.
But the logic of reason still prevailed, and on March 14 of this year, Lukashenko approved amendments and additions to the agreement on the ERS air defense. The "threatened period" was replaced by the "period of imminent threat of aggression". This is a more accurate concept.
As an example, this is how the threat to the Russian contingent in Syria can be interpreted. Both military and civilian.
Everything seems to be fine. Of course, Lukashenka's dancing with a tambourine around a possible withdrawal from the CSTO is a bit straining, but even in this case, the ERS Air Defense Treaty is still valid. For this is a direct bilateral interstate agreement.
In addition to the East European system, two more EPCs are being created: the Caucasian and Central Asian. Documents with Armenia and Kazakhstan have already been signed, negotiations are underway with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
From whom are the air defense forces of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan protected? From China? Doubtful, to be honest.
The air defense of Kazakhstan is the S-300, S-200 and S-75 air defense systems, which, to put it mildly, are not the first freshness. The air defense of Kyrgyzstan is even more modest - mainly the S-75, S-125, and the Krug air defense system. The situation is approximately the same in Tajikistan - S-75 and S-125.
But Russia and China do not have disagreements, such as with the West. And the sale of the new S-400 and Su-35 fighters would hardly have taken place if everything were different.
So it’s not China, and certainly not India. The question arises: against whom, in fact, are we friends?
And it turns out, there is someone against. There are two states in the region. One of which is the generally accepted Central Asian hotbed of Wahhabism and other pleasures under the banner of pseudo-Islam. And the second, albeit not so radical, but at one time expressed protests against the launches of "Caliber" from the Caspian Sea.
So there is someone against. Considering that air defense is an absolutely defensive weapon, there can be no claims from the former Soviet republics and states. And, since we are talking about creating a system to counter the threat from the air, then we, that is, Russia, will have to take serious care of this.
As for the Caucasian EPC, everything is clear there. He's still a cauldron. And taking into account both the Black Sea water area and the presence of Turkey, where Erdogan apparently will not figure out whose friend he is and how much in the time period, then the need for the same actions is obvious.
Although work in this direction has been carried out for several years. Yes, the air defense of the participating countries has progressed somewhat, thanks to the Russian side. It should be especially borne in mind that the military budgets of the participating countries are far from the world tops.
Nevertheless, the acquisitions were made largely due to the ability (and desire) of Russia to provide weapons at affordable prices.
In 2015-2016, Kazakhstan received 5 divisions of S-300PS complexes, and Belarus received 4 divisions. The complexes were not new, but withdrawn from the Russian air defense when replaced with the S-400. But they were provided free of charge.
Special financial conditions allowed Belarus and Armenia to acquire several new short-range Tor-M2E and medium-range Buk-M2 systems.
Of course, first of all, everyone is interested in the S-400. But the new (and expensive) complex is the subject of a separate topic of conversation. The fact that the S-400 as a guardian of the sky in these regions is necessary is not discussed. Only the price for its use is discussed.
The participating countries are unlikely to be able to buy the S-400 at their full disposal. Placing Russian air defense systems on its territory under Russian control is a matter of diplomacy. And again, money.
Meanwhile, air defense is not only an air defense system, it is also an aircraft. And here, too, the process is underway.
Kazakhstan received the first batch of four Su-30SMs in April 2015, and then two more fighters in December 2016. It is likely that Belarus will receive these planes as well.
On the whole, the CIS air defense OS may well become an effective military tool. The limited capabilities of Russia's allies in air defense (and still much more than modest in the framework of missile defense) may become an obstacle to the creation of an effective unified regional air defense system. Or they will delay the creation of an air defense system, which is aimed at repelling attacks from the air. Unfortunately, money is the most fundamental factor here.
However, the political situation in the world is rather unstable, when, as practice shows, not a single country that has chosen an independent path of development can be insured against "restoring order" and "resolving crises" by forces of "peacekeepers" from NATO in general and the United States in particular, shows that it is better to be not fully prepared than to be completely unprepared for such actions.
For Russia, closer interaction with the network of allied air defense systems and the creation of unified regional systems will provide its own air defense / missile defense forces with more opportunities to organize response measures, thanks to the earlier receipt of information about threats.
Doubts about how realistic it is in the near future to create really effective systems exist, and they are justified. Yes, and the air force and air defense of the allies are much inferior to the Russian ones, to say the least. But the first steps in this direction have been made, and as you know, only the one walking will master the road.
