The termination of the recruitment of cadets to the higher educational institutions of the Russian Ministry of Defense, of course, shocked many prominent representatives of both the military and civil society of our country. However, it is just right here again to talk about the amazing passivity of the relevant structures in the leadership of the Armed Forces, which are obliged to explain the essence of reforming the army and navy.
But in connection with the decision not to accept, either this year or next year, statements from those wishing to devote their lives to the military cause, many questions arise. Yes, perhaps we really have a surplus of officers (the only explanation that came from the mouth of a representative of the Ministry of Defense), but this does not mean that now they are not needed at all. In addition, it is not known where to go now for young people who want to become, for example, combat commanders or military engineers? Wait, no one knows how long, until recruitment to universities in the Moscow region resumes, or are they forced to go to civilian ones? What should the teachers of schools, institutes, academies of the Ministry of Defense do without cadets, even if they continue to receive monetary allowances? And how will such a break in continuity affect the combat readiness of the Armed Forces?
WE CANNOT WITHOUT EXTREMES
In the course of the current reform, the officer corps has already been cut beyond measure, and mostly the best, not the worst, have left it. Here, inevitably, you will remember one precedent. After the defeat in the First World War, Germany practically lost its army, since it was allowed to maintain only a 100-thousandth Reichswehr. But she was able to keep the officer corps. And the one when the situation changed, became the basis of the command staff of the Wehrmacht, which steadily achieved amazing successes until the middle of the Second World War. In the end, he was simply crushed by the masses, it was impossible to fight simultaneously against the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, but even in these impossible conditions the Germans were several times one step away from a common victory. And largely thanks to their officers. There are officers - there is an army, there are no officers - there is no army. This is absolutely obvious.
True, we are now going to deploy mass training of sergeants and foremen. Their actual absence in our Armed Forces since the end of the 60s is an unparalleled phenomenon in military practice of all times and peoples. It gave rise to another shameful phenomenon - hazing. Therefore, the restoration of the institution of junior commanders is a matter of paramount importance. At the same time, I would like to note that sergeants and petty officers cannot completely replace officers.
It seems that Russia cannot be without extremes. For 40 years there were no sergeants and foremen at all, but now there will be only them. Interestingly, the command of the brigades and ships will also be trusted?
In addition, I am sure that not every young man who dreams of an officer's shoulder straps will become sergeants - this is a completely different level of competence, a completely different nature of a military career. However, you can set a strict rule: if you want to become an officer, first serve as a private by conscription, and then as a sergeant (foreman) under a contract. I think it would be advisable, but so far no one has said anything about such an innovation (and it’s probably premature to raise this question).
However, there is one more fundamentally important aspect in this problem, which for some reason practically no one notices, although, in my opinion, it is the most important. What should be taught to Russian officers? What wars should the RF Armed Forces prepare for? This should, I believe, determine not only the content of higher military education, but in general the entire military development in Russia. And it is precisely these questions that I would like to discuss.
FROM CLASSIC WAR TO REVOLUTION
Since about the middle of the 17th century (the birth of the "Westphalian system"), war has traditionally been thought of as an armed confrontation between two or more states with regular armies. This type of war, which was systematized and in some way canonized by Clausewitz, dominated almost until the end of the 20th century. The brightest personification of this type of military conflict is the armed struggle of 1939-1945. And the failed clash on the battlefields of NATO and the Warsaw Pact troops was also seen by both sides as "World War II with missiles and an atomic bomb." "Rehearsals" of this war took place in the course of local conflicts. The most ambitious and, apparently, the last classic war in history was the October War of 1973 in the Middle East (after it Iran and Iraq, Ethiopia and Eritrea fought each other, hot spots in other parts of the planet flared with fire, but the level of those who fought was too primitive) …
The first changes in the nature of the classic war appeared in June 1982, when the Israeli Air Force attacked the Syrian air defense force in the Bekaa Valley, using a number of completely new tactics and techniques. However, the turning point was Desert Storm, an operation in which the United States and its allies defeated Iraq in early 1991. The classic war turned into a high-tech one, after which, over the past two decades, it has evolved into a network-centric war. In the "MIC" this process is described in sufficient detail in the article "Instead of" small and large "-" many and small "(see No. 13, 2010), there is probably no point in repeating.
Meanwhile, back in the mid-50s, the Russian emigrant of the first wave, Colonel Yevgeny Messner, who lived in Argentina, formulated the concept of "world rebellion", in which not only and not so much armies and states would participate, but popular movements and irregular formations, but psychology, agitation and propaganda will be more important than weapons. However, practically no one noticed Messner's predictions even in the West (there is nothing to say about the USSR). And to this day his name is almost unknown, although in fact he is a genius, a Clausewitz of the 20th century.
Today, the rebellion has indeed taken on the character of a worldwide disaster. Most of the conflicts now take place in this form. Moreover, this is such a routine that almost no attention is paid to it. For example, at the very border of the United States, south of the Rio Grande, blood literally flows like a river today. In the confrontation between the drug mafia and the Mexican government, at least 25 thousand people have died in the past four years alone, and the situation is constantly worsening. The number of victims is growing rapidly. So many people are being killed in Mexico that everything that happens in this country is quite comparable to the Iraqi and Afghan campaigns.
The numerous wars in Africa demonstrate how the line between classic war and rebellious war is blurring. The most obvious example is the war in the territory of the former Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), in which several regular armies of neighboring countries and many local and foreign irregular formations participated. It even earned the title "World War I in Africa".
If high-tech and network-centric wars destroy the concept of a classic war "from above", then insurgency - "from below".
FIRST HOPES
Alas, the Russian army is currently not ready for a high-tech war. Unfortunately, it has practically nothing that helped the Americans to defeat Saddam Hussein's troops so quickly and effectively. It does not yet have comparable performance characteristics with the world's best ACS models, which make it possible to effectively manage various groups. The global navigation system GLONASS is in the process of being deployed, so we have to use the American GPS system. There is no possibility of receiving data from space reconnaissance in real time. Space communications have not yet been brought to the level of the battalion. Precision aircraft weapons are presented, as a rule, in several copies for demonstration at exhibitions. Air and sea-based cruise missiles are equipped only with nuclear warheads, which makes it impossible to use them in local wars. Several AWACS aircraft can transmit information to fighter aircraft only about the air situation and are unable to detect ground targets. A huge disadvantage is the lack of special RTR and electronic warfare aircraft. Frontline and army aviation (except for the Su-24 bombers) are not able to fly and use weapons at night. Tactical UAVs seem to be there, but this is almost as exotic as an airplane in 1914, let alone operational and strategic drones. Two dozen refueling aircraft several times a year carry out several air refueling of strategic bombers, for front-line aviation aircraft refueling in the air is an absolutely exceptional thing. And it is clearly premature to talk about network centricity in relation to our aircraft.
Domestic military theorists have long understood that we are incapable of opposing the United States in a high-tech war, and the situation is rapidly aggravating, but they continue to view America as the main, if not the only potential enemy. Some time ago, in our military leaders, the idea was born to impose on the enemy "daring Russian combat, our hand-to-hand combat", that is, a classic war. This was directly written in the "Actual tasks of the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation": to the immediate conduct (possibly, by separate autonomous detachments or groups) of offensive actions in direct contact with the ground forces of the aggressor or his allies. It is required to turn a “contactless” war into a “contact” one as the most undesirable for an adversary equipped with a long-range WTO at the first stage, in the initial period of the war”.
It can be recalled that this is exactly how the Iraqi army tried to act in March 2003. However, the US Air Force, which possessed complete air and air superiority, bombed it before it could enter "direct contact with the ground forces of the aggressor or his allies." And in the few cases when Saddam's soldiers still managed to “turn a“contactless”war into a“contact”war as the most undesirable for the enemy,” it turned out that it was not so “undesirable” for the Americans: the Iraqis were constantly suffering complete defeat. Here, by the way, it should be noted that the thesis, which is very popular both in Russia and in a number of foreign countries, that the Americans "do not know how to fight", has no historical evidence.
If the overseas "adversary" decides to remove our strategic nuclear forces using cruise missiles (and this is the most likely scenario), then its ground forces will not be involved in principle. We simply will not be given the "happy" opportunity to "turn a" contactless "war into a" contact "one …
… The last classic war to date was won by Russia. The matter concerns the events of August 2008 in the Caucasus. However, one should not delude oneself - in terms of morale and combat qualities, the Georgian army does not represent a full-fledged enemy. However, the actions of the Russian aviation (the most high-tech type of the RF Armed Forces) showed that we have no chance in a war against a powerful enemy with the most modern weapons. The NATO Allied Armed Forces, the Russian army and navy cannot oppose today either quantitatively or qualitatively. The only consolation is the psychological unpreparedness of the Europeans for a serious war, but you cannot sew psychology to business. In addition, one cannot fail to notice that the armed forces of the European NATO countries are very rapidly reducing, nevertheless, so far their quantitative superiority over us is very significant, and their qualitative one is only growing.
It is sad to state this, but a similar situation is developing in the confrontation with China. As for the quantity, everything is clear here, but in terms of the quality of weapons, the PLA, with our help, almost completely eliminated its backlog. It is retained only for certain classes of weapons and military equipment. In general, Chinese weapons are no worse than ours. This is especially true of the armaments and military equipment of the ground forces, where China has completely overcome the qualitative gap with Russia, while having a huge quantitative superiority. Moreover, the PLA is starting to implement the principles of network-centric war faster than the RF Armed Forces.
TWO OPTIONS
At the end of September 2009, the Chief of Staff of the RF Ground Forces, Lieutenant General Sergei Skokov, spoke about where and how our army will have to fight in the foreseeable future.
"The methods of conducting operations and combat actions of a potential enemy in various theaters of military operations - western, eastern and southern - are fundamentally different," the general said. According to him, in the western strategic direction, Russian groupings can be counteracted by innovative armies with non-contact forms and methods of using the latest forces and means.
“If we are talking about the east, then it can be a multimillion-dollar army with traditional approaches to the conduct of hostilities: straightforward, with a large concentration of manpower and firepower in certain areas,” Skokov said. “As for the south of Russia, there we can be opposed by irregular formations and sabotage and reconnaissance groups waging a fight against federal authorities using the methods of guerrilla warfare.”
Thus, both NATO and China were named among the Russian potential adversaries. At the same time, it is quite obvious that our Armed Forces today cannot wage war with either one or the other. Neither classic, let alone high-tech. All that remains is to hope for nuclear weapons, just do not make them absolutized, as the "military-industrial complex" wrote about in the material "The Illusion of Nuclear Deterrence" (No. 11, 2010).
To the greatest extent, of course, our army today is ready for rebellion, since for a quarter of a century it has been participating in it almost without interruption. The army has gained a unique experience of counter-guerrilla warfare in mountainous desert (Afghanistan) and mountainous wooded (Chechnya) areas. Even the Americans, we can teach something in this regard, especially considering the fact that the importance of technological superiority in such a war is significantly reduced in comparison with the war of the army against the army.
Moreover, we unexpectedly created a branch of the military for such a war - the Airborne Forces (although initially, of course, they were built for a large classical war). It is quite clear that the landing force with its "aluminum tanks" (BMD), without normal artillery and air defense (MANPADS cannot be considered as such in any way) cannot conduct a normal combined arms battle with a strong modern army. Moreover, our Air Force (neither combat nor military transport aviation) is currently unable to organize any large amphibious operations (neither the transfer of a sufficient number of paratroopers, nor the provision of air superiority along the flight route and over the landing site). But the Airborne Forces are perfectly "sharpened" for a brutal contact war with irregular formations in a variety of natural and climatic conditions. There is a vast experience of such a war, and a psychological readiness for it. And, in general, mobility is sufficient for this type of war.
However, on its territory, the task of combating irregular formations should still be solved by the Internal Troops. The Airborne Forces can strengthen them, in addition, their task is to participate in rebellions outside Russia (but hardly outside Eurasia). And, of course, the trend, which is fashionable in the West today, is completely unacceptable for Russia, when the Armed Forces are completely reorienting themselves to the "fight against terrorism", losing the ability to wage a classic war (it does not matter whether it is high-tech or not). However, objectively speaking, the Europeans can afford this, since they have no one to defend their own country. And we have someone from.
That is why it is necessary to understand what kind of aircraft we need. The current surplus for rebellion is completely insufficient for a classic war. With the weapons and military equipment available today, unfortunately, they are not able to wage a high-tech war and can certainly be considered only as an army and navy of a transitional type. The question is where?
Apparently, there are two options for the further construction of the aircraft.
The first is to concentrate most of its forces and resources on the development of strategic nuclear forces and tactical nuclear weapons, officially declaring that any aggression against itself, even with the use of only conventional weapons, Russia will first respond with a limited nuclear strike on enemy forces (forces), and if this does not help - a massive nuclear strike for the complete destruction of the enemy. In this case, the task of the ground forces, the air force and air defense will be to cover the strategic nuclear forces and carriers of TNW from the ground and air. In addition, a grouping of troops will be needed in the North Caucasus, since only in this region are local conflicts possible, where nuclear weapons can hardly be used.
The second is to create a modern Armed Forces capable of waging an armed struggle only with the use of conventional weapons. It is quite obvious that in any case they cannot be equal to either the NATO forces or the PLA, even separately: we do not have the resources for this. But they must be such as to create very serious problems for both in the event of a conventional war. This option is more expensive, but more effective, reliable and realistic in terms of defense capability. Naturally, this option does not imply a rejection of nuclear weapons. But in this case, the country's leadership should significantly increase defense spending. Otherwise, a high-tech army will not work.
Only after choosing one of the options for building the Armed Forces can a military-technical policy be seriously planned. And based on this, develop military education. From this point of view, the current break in the recruitment of cadets could even be considered correct - after all, officers should be taught not what they are being taught now. And if the army is brilliantly ready for a war that it will never have to wage, but is completely unprepared for the war that it really faces, then it is simply uselessly devouring the people's money.
