In November 1941, Army Group South, commanded by Field Marshal G. von Runstedt, achieved another success. On November 19, the advanced units of the 1st Panzer Group division of Colonel-General E. von Kleist, breaking through a heavy snowfall, captured Rostov-on-Don. Reading the victorious report on the capture of Rostov, Hitler believed that the gates to the Caucasus were open and were in his hands. However, after a while, the Fuhrer learned that as a result of an unexpected and rapid onslaught of the troops of the Southwestern Front, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Tymoshenko, Kleist was forced to retreat. Not understanding what had happened near Rostov, Hitler did not agree to the withdrawal of German troops to the line of the Mius River.
In December 1941, German troops were also unable to comply with Hitler's order to seize the Soviet capital. The plan of Operation Typhoon, during which German troops were to be in Moscow, was thwarted by a counter-offensive by the Red Army.
During the Battle of Moscow, the German divisions suffered their first major defeat. The troops of Army Group Center, commanded by Field Marshal F. von Bock, retreated in January 1942, leaving the space they had already conquered.
The Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive in the Battle of Moscow stunned Hitler. The Fuhrer could not believe that his troops, who had won victories over the armies of almost all European states, were retreating. In an attempt to change the situation, Hitler dismissed Field Marshal von Bock.
On the eastern front, a situation was developing that could disrupt the plans of the German command in the war against the USSR. Therefore, Hitler began to take measures that were supposed to change the situation, allow him to regain control of the strategic initiative and create the conditions for achieving a decisive success in the 1942 summer campaign. One of the emergency measures provided for the use of chemical toxic substances (OV) against the troops of the Red Army, which were in abundance in Germany, but the use of which was prohibited by international agreements.
However, this decision of Hitler in the spring of 1942 was thwarted. The successful actions of Soviet military intelligence officers and the joint concerted efforts of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I. V. Stalin and British Prime Minister W. Churchill.
Reports from military intelligence officers aroused special attention
At the beginning of 1942, reports were sent to Moscow from military intelligence officers operating in the capitals of a number of European states, which reflected the transfer of German troops from Germany and France to the eastern front, indicated the numbers of enemy divisions, their future deployment locations, the state of the German military industry, and production volumes of weapons and ammunition.
On January 24, 1942, from Switzerland resident Sandor Rado, who was in charge of the Dora station, whose sources had access to important German military secrets, the Center received an unexpected message that the work of chemical factories producing toxic substances was activated in Germany. The resident reported that he received information from the chief of the anti-chemical defense of the Swiss Ministry of War, which testifies to a sharp increase in the production of chemical agents in Germany and signs that may indicate the preparation of special units by the German command for the use of toxic agents against the troops of the Red Army.
Sandor Rado, head of station "Dora"
In his coded report to the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, Shandor Rado reported: “… The Germans manufacture the following substances in large quantities: mustard gas, phosgene, diphosgene, diphenylarsine cyanide …
Against all these agents, with the exception of mustard gas, only a three-layer filtering gas mask serves as protection in the German army. The filter consists of absorbent substances, two parts of coke with 3 parts of urotropine or other absorbent substances … Only an antipyretic suit serves as protection against loost or mustard gas."
Sandor Rado reported that he still does not know why and for what specific purposes the Germans are increasing the production of chemical toxic substances and promised to obtain new information on this issue.
In the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, Sh. Rado's message attracted the attention of specialists. Interest was aroused by the fact that Germany began to increase the production of chemical poisonous substances at a time when German troops, under the onslaught of the Red Army, suffered a crushing defeat in the battle of Moscow.
Several other military intelligence officers also reported on the revitalization of chemical factories in Germany. This information could indicate that Hitler, after the defeat of the German troops in the battle of Moscow, made a serious decision to use chemical weapons on the eastern front. The use of chemical poisonous substances by the enemy could incapacitate a significant number of personnel of the fronts defending Moscow, produce a strong psychological effect on Soviet soldiers, and even disrupt the Soviet counteroffensive. The danger was great. The consequences of the use of chemical agents by the enemy were unpredictable. Therefore, the reports of Sh. Rado and other scouts aroused special attention from the command of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army.
The use of chemical weapons and bacteriological agents during the conduct of hostilities was prohibited in 1925 by the Geneva Protocol. The signing of this international treaty was caused by the dangerous consequences of the use of chemical gases during the First World War, when about 1.3 million people suffered from poisonous gases, of which about 100 thousand died.
Sh. Rado's message from Switzerland testified not only to the fact that Hitler might violate one of the important international treaties, but also plans to change the situation on the Soviet-German front with the help of the sudden use of chemical weapons.
On January 28, 1942, the acting chief of military intelligence, Major General A. P. Panfilov sent instructions to Shandor Rado as follows: “… Comrade. Dore. There is evidence that the Germans decided in principle in connection with the advance of the Red Army to use en masse toxic substances on the Eastern Front. Check immediately through all your sources, especially Groot, Lucie, Long and Salter:
a) whether there is a decision of Hitler and the headquarters of the high command on this issue. At what stage and in what areas is the use of toxic substances (OM) planned?
b) Where are the transports with chemistry going?
c) Which factories in Germany and France are currently producing toxic substances, which chemicals are produced and in what quantity?
d) Are there any new OVs? Which?
All this data should be sent out of turn. Director.
On the basis of the data received by the Center from Sandor Rado and other residents, the chief of military intelligence prepared and sent on January 30, 1942 to the members of the State Defense Committee a special message: "On the preparation of the German army for the use of chemical agents."
At the same time, on February 1, 1942, the Center sent to all residents operating in European countries an order to obtain information about the state of the chemical industry in Germany, about the location of factories that produce chemical warfare agents, and asked to obtain the chemical formulas of these agents.
Sandor Rado, who had good opportunities to obtain information about the composition of the Wehrmacht units, was sent an additional task in which it was required to establish:
“… 1) Do the Germans have chemical divisions and where are they stationed.
2) What is the organization and armament of these divisions? ….
The chiefs of the intelligence departments of the headquarters of the fronts of the western direction were also sent instructions to obtain information that could indicate the preparation of the enemy for the use of chemical poisonous substances against the troops of the Red Army.
The officers of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Front, commanded by General of the Army G. K. Zhukov, obtained information that in the prisoner of war camp, which was located in Varvarovo (26 km southeast of the settlement of Kholm Zhurkovsky), the Germans tested some kind of poisonous substance of a new type.
The head of the intelligence department of the front headquarters, Colonel Yakov Timofeevich Ilnitsky, reported to the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army that the Germans carried out these barbaric tests on Soviet prisoners of war equipped with Soviet gas masks. The experiment ended tragically - all the prisoners of war who were forced to take part in this experiment died.
Information about Germany's preparation for the use of chemical toxic substances on the eastern front came to the Center from a resident with the pseudonym "Konrad". On February 2, 1942, "Konrad" reported to the Center that "… the Germans prepared a large amount of containers for the transportation of chemical toxic substances for sending to the Eastern Front. The information was obtained from the instructions received by the Directorate of Railways … ".
Fulfilling the assignment of the chief of military intelligence, Sandor Rado in February 1942 obtained new information that the German army was not only taking measures that indicate the beginning of preparations for the sudden use of chemical agents against the troops of the Red Army, but also measures were being taken to strengthen anti-chemical protection in case response actions of the Soviet command. According to the data of Sh. Rado, who entered the Center on February 12, 1942, “… chemical training is being intensively conducted in the German anti-tank forces. Each company has a non-commissioned officer as a chemical instructor."
The Supreme Command headquarters required accurate information about the enemy's plans
On February 16, 1942, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 0033, the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft was transformed into the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army (GRU General Staff of the Spacecraft). Major General A. P. Panfilov.
Chief of the GRU General Staff of the Spacecraft Major General Alexei Pavlovich Panfilov
The new position of the central body of military intelligence in the General Staff system not only raised the status of the command of military intelligence, but also indicated that military intelligence was the most important organ of ensuring the activities of the highest political leadership of the USSR and the command of the Red Army with information about the enemy necessary for organizing effective defense and opening plans of the German command. The results of the activities of military intelligence during the period of the Moscow battle testified that military intelligence officers are capable of obtaining valuable information about the enemy of a military, military-political and military-technical nature. It was still far from the end of the war. The enemy was still strong. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK) required accurate information about its plans. Only military intelligence officers could get them.
In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters, measures were taken to improve the interaction of the GRU General Staff of the SC with the General Staff, which was supposed to regularly determine the tasks of reconnaissance of the enemy in the interests of planning and conducting combat operations by the troops of the Red Army. The GRU GSh KA concentrated in its hands the leadership of strategic, operational and tactical reconnaissance.
In the organizational structure of the GRU General Staff of the Spacecraft, two directorates were created: an agent and an information one. Employees of the first were responsible for organizing intelligence intelligence. The department consisted of departments: German, European, Far Eastern, Middle East, sabotage, as well as frontline, army and district intelligence. The second department also included German, European, Far Eastern and other departments. The officers of this department developed intelligence reports, special messages for the top political leadership of the USSR and the command of the Red Army, daily reports, maps with the situation at the front, reference books and other documents. The number of personnel of the GRU General Staff of the KA was increased.
It was planned to improve the material support of military intelligence, specific tasks were set to equip its forces with means of agent radio communications and transport aviation, measures were determined to improve the quality of training of military intelligence personnel.
At a time when organizational changes were taking place in the Intelligence Directorate, the Center continued to receive reports from military intelligence officers about the situation at the front and the plans of the German command. Among those reports were reports of Hitler's plans to use chemical agents on the Soviet-German front. On February 22, 1942, this information was used by the command of military intelligence in the next special message "On the ongoing preparation of the German army for the use of chemical agents." This top secret document, the head of military intelligence, Major General A. P. Panfilov sent I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, G. M. Malenkov, N. A. Voznesensky, L. P. Beria, A. I. Mikoyan, L. M. Kaganovich, A. M. Vasilevsky and B. M. Shaposhnikov.
“… The data received by the Glavrazvedadmina for February 1942,” reported Major General A. P. Panfilov, - confirm the ongoing accelerated preparation of the enemy for the use of chemical weapons against the Red Army.
The measures of the German command are aimed at preparing for chemical warfare not only at the front, but also in the deep rear.
On the Eastern Front, the arrival of chemical troops in the Bryansk and Kharkov directions was noted … According to a number of sources, the beginning of the chemical war is timed to coincide with this spring in connection with the proposed offensive."
A significant confirmation of the enemy's preparation for chemical warfare was the assignment of the German command to their intelligence obtained by military intelligence officers. Head of the Abwehr Admiral F. V. Canaris demanded "… to establish the degree of readiness of the Red Army to conduct chemical warfare."
Concluding this special message, the chief of military intelligence made an unambiguous conclusion: "… Accelerated preparation of the German army for the use of toxic substances is an indisputable fact."
In March 1942, in accordance with the assignment of the General Staff, military intelligence had to solve the following tasks:
1. Determine Germany's human resources capabilities to continue the war in 1942.
2. Obtain data on the number and composition of new formations prepared by Germany in the interior of the country.
3. Determine the timing of the readiness of new formations and the time of their transfer to the Eastern Front.
4. To reveal the intentions of the German high command on the Eastern Front for 1942:
a) Obtain information about the main line of defense to which the German army should withdraw on the Eastern Front and about the intermediate defensive lines in front of the Volkhov, North-Western, Kalinin and Western fronts of the Soviet troops. Establish the initial front line south of Bryansk and Orel, from which the Germans are preparing to go on the offensive in the spring of 1942.
b) Determine the strategic reserves of the Germans, both inside Germany and on the territory of the countries occupied by it.
c) Monitor and timely warn about the transfer of these forces from one front to another, and especially to the Eastern Front.
5. To establish the real production capabilities of Germany in 1942 for the production of the main types of weapons (tanks, aircraft, artillery weapons).
6. Establish fuel reserves for the continuation of the war and the possibility of its replenishment.
7. To establish the provision of personnel for the most important specialties (flight technical personnel, specialists of tank units).
8. Establish what new types of weapons are being prepared by Germany and can be used on a massive scale in 1942 (new types of aircraft, tanks and artillery systems)."
The measures taken by the Supreme Command Headquarters have increased the effectiveness of military intelligence.
In the spring of 1942, the Center received a significant amount of valuable information about the enemy from foreign military intelligence stations. So, from Sandor Rado from Switzerland, reports were received not only about the direction of the main attack on the eastern front in the summer campaign of 1942, but also about the state of the chemical industry in Germany and the preparation of the German army for the use of chemical agents on the eastern front.
Reports from military intelligence officers about the preparation by the German command of a chemical strike against the troops of the Red Army continued to arrive at the Intelligence Directorate. The analysis of this information was carried out by specialists of the Center, trained at the Military Chemical Academy of the RKKA.
On March 11, 1942, on the basis of information received from residents, the chief of military intelligence, Major General A. P. Panfilov prepared in the name of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I. V. Stalin's one more special message "On the ongoing preparation of the German fascist troops for a chemical attack." The head of the GRU reported: “… the German command continues to prepare for chemical warfare. It has been established that the chemical training of German troops is carried out along the entire front. Enemy units located in the cities of Krasnogvardeysk, Priluki, Nizhyn, Kharkov, Taganrog are intensively trained in the use of chemical agents and anti-chemical protection measures. Units of "SS" in Warsaw were ordered to hastily begin gas mask training. There have been cases of the issuance of gas masks of the 1941 model to the troops.
The transfer of toxic substances and chemical munitions to the Eastern Front, mainly chemical shells and aerial bombs, continues …
Output:
The enemy continues intensive preparations for a chemical attack …”.
Specialists of the Main Intelligence Directorate at the same time prepared for the members of the Supreme Command Headquarters and the Chief of the General Staff a special message "On new means of chemical attack and preparation for the massive use of flamethrowers by the German army." In this special message, it was argued, not without reason, that the special units of the German army are armed with technical means that allow them to use chemical toxic substances on a large scale.
The threat of the use of chemical agents by German troops on the eastern front was identified in the Main Intelligence Directorate as an independent area of work for analytical officers. These specialists continued to monitor the signs of the preparation of the Germans for the use of chemical warfare agents against the troops of the Red Army.
Additional instructions were sent to the reconnaissance departments of the headquarters of the fronts operating on the Soviet-German front to uncover enemy measures aimed at preparing for the use of chemical toxic substances.
Following the instructions of the Center, the scouts obtained the newest German gas mask "FE-41". At the Center, it was carefully studied and transferred to specialists of the Main Military-Chemical Directorate of the Red Army.
Specialists of the Main Chemistry Directorate assessed the new type of German gas mask as follows:
“… Studies of the new German gas mask FE-41 have shown that this gas mask is of great interest to us, since it is structurally, especially in terms of protective power, significantly different from the old models of the FE-37. To date, the FE-41 gas mask is the first foreign model with a universal protective power …
It is very important to establish what percentage of the German troops are equipped with these gas masks. In addition, for further study of the FE-41 gas masks, it is necessary to obtain as many of them as possible ….
Studying the reports of the residents "Dora", "Konrad", "Eduard", reports of the chiefs of the intelligence departments of the headquarters of the western fronts, the specialists of the Center came to the conclusion that the threat of the use of various toxic substances and poisonous gases by the German command on the eastern front continues to grow.
Churchill issued a public warning to Germany
The reports of military intelligence, which came to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, passed an expert assessment at the Main Military-Chemical Directorate of the Red Army. The data obtained by the residents of the military intelligence were recognized as reliable and deserving special attention from the top political leadership of the USSR.
Stalin and the Red Army command had several options for preventing Hitler's chemical strike on the eastern front. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief could order to strengthen the anti-chemical protection of the troops. But from the reports of military intelligence in the Kremlin, it was already known that the Germans created new weapons, from the effects of which Soviet gas masks were unable to protect the personnel of the Red Army.
Stalin could have issued an official statement and said that in the event that Germany used poisonous substances against the troops of the Red Army, the Soviet government reserves the right to also use its own arsenal of chemical weapons against Germany. However, such a statement by Stalin could hardly have stopped Hitler. He had already made his decision and was ready to implement it.
A third decision was made in Moscow. In a strictly secret order, I. V. Stalin through the Soviet ambassador in London I. M. Maisky informed British Prime Minister W. Churchill that Germany plans to use chemical warfare agents on the eastern front.
Churchill took seriously the information that the Soviet ambassador told him on Stalin's instructions. He undoubtedly understood that if Hitler succeeded in using chemical agents with impunity on the eastern front, then Germany would be able to use chemical weapons against the inhabitants of the British Isles.
On March 21, 1942, the British Prime Minister sent a personal secret message to Stalin, in which he reported: “… Ambassador Maisky was at my breakfast last week and mentioned some signs that the Germans, when attempting their spring offensive, could use gases against your country. After consulting with my colleagues and chiefs of staff, I want to assure you that His Majesty's Government will treat any use of poisonous gases as a weapon against Russia just as if these weapons were directed against us. I have created colossal reserves of gas bombs to be dropped from aircraft, and we will not hesitate to use these bombs for dropping on all suitable targets in West Germany, from the moment when your armies and people are attacked by such means …”.
Churchill went on to say: “… It seems necessary to consider whether we should, at the appropriate moment, issue a public warning that this is our decision. Such a warning might deter the Germans from adding new terror to the many into which they have already plunged the world. I ask you to let me know what you think about this, and also whether the signs of the preparation of a gas war by the Germans justify this warning …”.
From Churchill's message, Stalin learned that the British government was alarmed by Hitler's preparations for the use of chemical weapons on the eastern front, and the British were ready to take action against Germany. It was clear from Churchill's letter that Great Britain could use chemical weapons only against cities in West Germany. Objects on the territory of East Germany were to be hit with the appropriate means of the Red Army. Churchill, apparently, in this way wanted to share with Stalin the historical responsibility for the use of chemical weapons against Germany.
The main thing in Churchill's message was that he shares Stalin's anxiety about the possibility of a chemical war and is ready to support the USSR in that war, if Hitler implements his plans.
Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, Major General A. P. Panfilov in March 1942 continued to report to I. V. Stalin new facts of Germany's preparation for chemical warfare.
On March 29, 1942, Stalin replied to Churchill: “… I express my gratitude to the Soviet Government for the assurance that the British Government will consider any use of poisonous gases by the Germans against the USSR as if these weapons were directed against Great Britain, and that the British air force the forces will not hesitate to immediately use the large stocks of gas bombs available in England for dropping on suitable targets in Germany ….
“I think,” Stalin wrote to Churchill, “that it would be quite expedient if the British Government issued a public warning in the near future that Britain would consider the use of poisonous gases against the USSR by Germany or Finland in the same way as if this attack was made against England itself, and that England would respond to this by using gases against Germany ….
Important in Stalin's message was also a proposal to Churchill, from which it followed that: "… if the British Government wishes, the USSR is ready, in turn, to issue a similar warning to Germany, bearing in mind a possible German gas attack on England."
Churchill accepted Stalin's proposals. On April 10, 1942, the British Prime Minister wrote to the Soviet leader: “… In early May, I will make a statement in which the Nazis will be warned about our use of poisonous gases in response to similar attacks on your country. The warning, of course, will apply equally to Finland, and it will also be mentioned, although I do not see how we will get to it."
The British Prime Minister agreed to host a Soviet specialist in chemical defense and counter-attack in London in order to implement Stalin's request to transfer to the Soviet Union some chemical defenses, as well as chemical retaliatory weapons.
Concluding his message, Churchill reported: “… Of course, if necessary, we will be able to provide you with at least a thousand tons of mustard gas and a thousand tons of chlorine before receiving the message from this specialist. Spraying with mustard gas poses a greater danger to troops in the open field than to residents in cities …”.
Stalin expressed his readiness to send A. Kasatkin, Deputy People's Commissar of the Chemical Industry, to London as his expert on chemical protection.
In the spring of 1942, Sandor Rado, a resident of military intelligence in Switzerland, showed exceptional persistence in obtaining information about the chemical weapons of the German army. On April 22, he told the head of military intelligence: "… the Germans are preparing, as a last resort to disrupt the Russian resistance, the massive use of chemical bombs stuffed with tear gases …".
Supreme Commander-in-Chief I. V. Stalin continued to conduct secret correspondence with British Prime Minister W. Churchill on this issue. The leaders of the two states of the anti-Hitler coalition tried to work out a solution that would help thwart Hitler's plans to use chemical poisonous substances.
On May 11, 1942, Churchill told Stalin: “… When I speak on the radio tomorrow night (Sunday), I intend to make a statement warning the Germans that if they start a chemical war against the Russian armies, we will, of course, immediately we will repay Germany with the same …”.
Churchill kept his promise.
On May 14, 1942, one of the residents of Soviet intelligence, who had sources in Germany, reported to the Center: “… Churchill's speech on the use of gases against Germany in the event that the Germans use poisonous substances on the Eastern Front made a huge impression on the civilian population of Germany … There are very few reliable gas shelters in German cities, which can cover no more than 40% of the population …”.
According to this resident of military intelligence, "… if Hitler used chemical weapons on the Eastern Front, about 60 percent of the German population would have died from British gas bombs in the course of a very real retaliatory strike."
Fearing an imminent retaliation, Hitler in 1942 refused to use chemical agents on the eastern and western fronts. These plans were thwarted by the successful actions of military intelligence officers, the persistent reports of the head of the GRU General Staff of the Red Army to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the concerted actions of the leaders of the USSR and Great Britain. The failure of Hitler's plans saved the lives of thousands of Soviet soldiers and officers, and also prevented the German leadership from using poisonous substances against British and American troops during World War II.
