As you know, all current Russian generals and officers once took a course in military history both in schools and academies. However, it seems that not every member of the highest and senior commanders has pondered the essence of the events of the long and recent past, drawing lessons from the experience of famous military leaders. Meanwhile, a superficial acquaintance with the military chronicle of the Fatherland is fraught with sad consequences. I will try to show this by examples of two assaults - the Izmail fortress on December 11, 1790 and the city of Grozny on January 1, 1995.
The capture of Ishmael is an unprecedented case in military practice. Indeed, "not Izmail, but the Turkish army was exterminated in the extensive fortifications." Not only were the walls, considered an insurmountable obstacle, defended by a numerous brave enemy, were overcome, but the army that had settled behind them was also destroyed. After such a convincing Victoria, it became necessary to comprehend how it was possible to achieve incredible success.
Explanations usually boil down to basically two points. Supposedly, Suvorov developed an extremely original plan for mastering the fortress. However, in reality, the disposition of the commander, even if you read it with passion, is extremely simple and was based not so much on all sorts of military wisdom as on common sense.
In addition, it tells about some special innovations in the combat training of Russian soldiers on the eve of the assault. In particular, there is a legend according to which Alexander Vasilyevich ordered to build ramparts and open ditches like those of Izmail, and at night the "miracle heroes" under the leadership of Suvorov learned to overcome them. However, here's the problem: the height of the rampart reached 9-12 m, it was surrounded by a ditch about 12 m wide and 6-10 m deep (in places with water up to the shoulders). To train troops, it is necessary to equip the place of training at least for a battalion (or better for a regiment). Now it remains to estimate how long this section will be along the front, take a pencil, a calculator and calculate the amount of necessary engineering work. Then draw up a schedule for the withdrawal of the units to the appropriate exercises. The most important thing is not to forget that Suvorov had eight days for everything, and things were no less bad with the entrenching tool in those days than two centuries later. If all of the above is taken into account, stories about fortifications identical to those of Izmail will no longer look so convincing.
What actually happened? Let's turn to the facts
When news came to the Russian camp near Izmail that Suvorov had been appointed commander of the troops assembled to storm the fortress, this news, like a spark, flew around companies, squadrons, hundreds, batteries. Contemporaries note: everyone came to life, everyone knew how the siege would end. “As soon as Suvorov arrives, the fortress will be taken by storm,” said the soldiers, officers and generals.
And now let's imagine the mood in the United Group units on the eve of the new 1995, when they were informed about the change of commander. The servicemen were absolutely indifferent to who was in charge - Ivanov or Petrov.
Early in the morning on December 2, 1790, having overcome over 100 miles, two horsemen, splashed with mud, approached Ishmael: Suvorov and a Cossack accompanying him, who was carrying all the property of the 60-year-old general-in-chief in a small bundle. There was a welcome firing, general joy spread in the Russian camp - victory itself appeared in the small, wrinkled old man!
For comparison: the commander, who was still in charge of the North Caucasian Military District in mid-December 1994, was taken to the troops from some country residence for half a day. Then half a day was spent on the road to the place of dinner and overnight. At the same time, not the slightest enthusiasm was observed at the Russian bivouacs.
Before the assault, Suvorov walked around the camp, talked with soldiers and officers, recalled previous victories, listed the difficulties of the upcoming attack. “You see this fortress,” he said, pointing to Ishmael, “its walls are high, the ditches are deep, but still we need to take it. Mother Queen gave orders, and we must obey her. " Eyewitnesses recalled simple lively speeches of the adored commander, inflamed the hearts of people, everyone was eager to show themselves worthy of praise. "We'll take everything with you!" - the soldiers answered enthusiastically.
In December 1994, no one noticed the commander of the North Caucasus Military District, who walked through the army camps, talking with soldiers and commanders. And even more so no one promised him: "We'll take everything with you!"
And the last thing. During the assault on Izmail, the column of General Mikhail Golenishchev-Kutuzov, which attacked the bastion at the Kiliyskie Gate, wavered under heavy enemy fire and halted its movement. Suvorov, noticing this, sent to say that Kutuzov had already been appointed commandant of the fortress and a report on its capture had been sent to Petersburg. Today, the essence of this episode is usually not understood. And meanwhile, according to the laws of honor of the nobleman Golenishchev-Kutuzov, there was only one of two things left - either to capture the Kiliya gate, or to die in battle.
The current Russian military leader, in such a case, would probably begin to threaten his subordinate with dismissal from his post, a military court, and, finally, execution.
This seems to be just a few comparisons - and what is the difference in the result. On the one hand - a dazzling victory, on the other - an indelible shame.
