At the Army 2020 forum of the Rubin Central Design Bureau, the Vityaz autonomous unmanned underwater vehicle (AUV), which visited the bottom of the Mariana Trench, was presented. Together with him, other Ruby's AUVs were presented. The Vityaz deep-sea dive was widely advertised in the media and had a significant resonance in society, which is not surprising: this event is undoubtedly a positive one.
Only now thunderous applause from Vityaz and Rubin drowns out the very bad questions that objectively arise about other domestic underwater vehicles - both Rubin and other developers.
As a matter of fact, in the very descent to the bottom of the Mariana Trench there is nothing exceptional after the manned bathyscaphe "Trieste" by Auguste Picard and the US Navy did it in 1960. That is, thunderous applause should be reduced …
Yes, new materials, an established team of developers (including young ones) within the framework of successful work is certainly good.
But what is the real usefulness of this work, given that more than 95% of the ocean is less than 6,000 m deep?
There would be no questions about the "Vityaz" and the costs for it, if together with such demonstrators of technologies (and this is it) were created and applicable in practice, various types of illegal weapons, useful as a means of armed struggle.
In order not to dodge and not to waste time, I will say right away: the main tasks that can and should be used by various small-sized NPA in the fleet are mine countermeasures.
Also, an important type of similar devices are various self-propelled hydroacoustic countermeasures, designed incl. for diverting torpedoes from submarines evading defeat.
A related issue with the topic of self-propelled instruments is the creation of drifting instruments of the same purpose. They do not belong to NPVs, but the same technological developments are used to create them, especially in terms of hydroacoustics.
And only in the form of a superstructure over all this boring, but key reality are experiments like "Vityaz". Rather, they should. Everything is different with us.
From the point of view of practical applicability, there are questions to literally all of our promising developments.
Engineer Games
In the film "Military Acceptance" for "Knight" and the conquest of the Mariana Trench, the authors did not pass by other AUVs of the Rubina Central Design Bureau, especially noting the "spectacular" AUVs "Amulet-2".
The authors of the film forgot to mention only one thing - that these "spectacular" AUVs are absolutely ineffective in solving any practical problems.
We look at the characteristics from the developer.
With an accuracy of keeping on the course of 5 degrees and a meager payload, this AUV is, in fact, a toy. Those. the question of effectively solving real problems was not even posed to its developers; budget funds were simply mastered.
As a matter of fact, the fact that instead of combat vehicles, we create, at best, demonstrators of technology, and at worst, banal toys is nothing new, we can recall the first independent Ruby AUV "Juno" Maybe "). Created "Juno" / "Avos" with a claim to real tasks. The problem was that they approached this according to the "warehouse principle" - just put the nomenclature of search tools.
We did not even think about the fact that the solution of serious problems should be approached from the analysis of the requirements of the problem itself. For example, the minimum requirements for the accuracy of data on targets in solving mine defense (MMP) problems were given in the public works of the famous acoustician S. A. Smirnov. ("At least 1 meter") back in 2004
As a result, the Yunona developers (by the way, not only they are alone, but also, for example, Korabelka specialists, and a number of AUV developers) made a mistake (unreasonably underestimated) in the diameter of the AUV hull. As soon as the question arose of installing effective search means, the length increased sharply, and the "sausage" of the AUV "stretched" to the point of loss of controllability.
Let me emphasize that this mistake would not have happened if the AUV's appearance had been formed from the tasks (and it was, alas: “the artist sees it this way”).
The objective (and shameful) result of all these "AUV-drawings" of the Rubin Central Design Bureau is that the Indian Navy is forced to install Western (and outdated) anti-torpedo protection systems on our project 877EKM export submarines. In this respect, the Rubin Central Design Bureau, the TRV Corporation and the MPO Gidropribor concern, in fact, have nothing to present (except for the outdated self-propelled device MG-74ME and the same obsolete drifting device Vist-E (CJSC Aquamarine) under the ancient submarine VIPS apparatus).
And this shameful situation did not arise now, but back in the 2000s. That is, there was more than enough time to resolve it. However, instead of real, badly needed work both for export, for the fleet, and for the country (Central Design Bureau "Rubin" - the developer of our SSBNs) "Rubin" is actually engaged in AUV toys, small ("Amulet") and large ("Vityaz") with their near-zero practical usefulness.
At the same time, one cannot say that "Rubin" does nothing in terms of anti-torpedo protection systems (PTZ). He does, but the results are such that there is frankly nothing to demonstrate at the salons. Some scandalous details about the preliminary results of this work are contained in the materials of the arbitration courts, and experts have known and warned about this since 2012. Briefly, and this is only one of the reasons: the weight and dimensions of the complex's products obviously did not provide the required efficiency. And this is not the private opinion of the author. While working on the issues of promising PTZ, the author not only discussed this in detail with the leading specialists of the State Research and Production Enterprise "Region", but also with the specialists of Gidropribor and with a major domestic specialist, Professor B. P. Belov. Moreover, all their assessments were very close to each other (and very distant from Ruby's project). Did those who made this complex understand this? Yes, everyone understood perfectly. But (literally):
- We are under tough administrative pressure …
Moreover, these words meant not "Rubin", but USC (United Shipbuilding Corporation). This is understandable: USC officials do not have to fight, they need to push any complex on the submarines, and then completely different people will face the questions of its combat effectiveness. And there will be no war anyway, and if there is, then who will then deal with the wreckage at a kilometer depth …
How will the story with "PTZ ot Rubin" end? Taking into account the current realities, I believe that it will end badly - according to the principle “the third grade is not a marriage”. For the effective managers of USC and Rubin need to be accountable for the funds spent somehow.
Let me emphasize: PTZ is the most critical issue for Rubin's submarines, incl. export. This problem is much more acute than the lack of an anaerobic facility. And instead of taking tough and decisive measures to resolve this shameful situation, there are “toys” with practically useless AUVs.
ANPA IPMT FEB RAS
At the same time, it is necessary to remember how the subject of the AUV ended up in Rubin.
When a child's parents change on the birth certificate, this clearly indicates certain dramatic events. It's the same in military technology. Initially, the AUV "Harpsichord" was developed by the IPMT FEB RAS (Vladivostok), which at the time of the great Ageev M. D. was a valid Firm (with a capital letter) of underwater technology. However, Ageev died in 2005.
Obviously, the customer of the "Harpsichord" had serious force majeure circumstances that forced to replace the developer (with the transfer of the development itself to "Rubin"). CDB "Rubin" has vast experience in creating deep-water marine equipment, and "Harpsichord" is to a large extent the heir of the Ageev devices. Plus to this the customer, who understands well what he needs (in contrast to the Navy).
For the Navy, IPMT FEB RAS has created and is trying to promote the AUV "Galtel-Alevrit" complex.
On the part of the IPMT, there are attempts to supplement this complex with remotely controlled vehicles (ROV), which was demonstrated, for example, in the film "Military Acceptance" about the work of "Galteli" in the waters of Syria. The question is that the Galtel complex itself has a number of major system errors, primarily in navigation support. The author made a public analysis of this issue in a discussion with one of the leaders of the IPMT at the round table of the Army forum several months before the Syrian trip. Short conclusion: the complex is unsuitable for solving PMO problems. And the Syrian business trip of Galteli confirmed this conclusion, contrary to the PR in the media.
The problem is the same: no one thought about the task itself, the conditions and requirements for its implementation. And if the developers can still be understood, it is unlikely that the Navy (Ministry of Defense) has seriously financed this development, then on the part of authorized (including "scientific") organizations of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense, such mistakes are simply unacceptable.
Toys instead of functional devices
Galteli's questions are quite solvable, but the problem is much deeper. We urgently need to move from the production of "toys" to those that are really applicable in the war of the NLA.
It should be noted that the issue has been raised harshly and publicly for a long time. It is appropriate to recall the article (2010) of a prominent Russian specialist, retired Rear Admiral A. N. Lutsky. "Urgently required underwater robots and anti-torpedo protection".
In the article by Maxim Klimov, published on the pages of the "Military-Industrial Courier", "Marine Underwater Weapons: Problems and Opportunities", the current state of the MPS of the Russian military fleet is frankly, sharply and critically shown. But the publication not only sounds the alarm, it also draws attention to the need to develop a concept for the development of domestic marine underwater weapons that is adequate to modern and future requirements. We have to agree with many of the author's statements.
The solution in the current situation: real tests, mine ranges (in different fleets and conditions), incl. with inconspicuous and silted mines, and real work on them by AUVs of all domestic developers. As Tsar Peter I used to say, "so that everyone's stupidity can be seen better."
Real work will give a real disclosure of problems and real requirements, a real look of either new AUVs, or modified existing ones.
Why only this question has to be raised in the media, literally "whipping" the Navy (and the corresponding structures of the Ministry of Defense)? And the answer is simple: we have become not just toys, but golden toys, and the questions of the effectiveness of those who “played” in them did not interest them (in contrast to the development of budgetary funds).
As a result, today we do not have a single anti-mine AUV in the Russian Navy
By the way, here is a question for the command of the Navy (and the General Staff). How are you going to fight mines in ice conditions (for example, when setting self-transporting mines in the throat of Avacha Bay in winter)? The same problem is in Primorye.
Why are these questions asked in the media? But because earlier they were put (as well as proposals for their solution) in a closed manner. However, these questions did not arouse the interest of the Navy. What for? After all, "Military Acceptance" will remove another popular print about the "victories" of our AUVs in the Mariana Trench or Syria. And the president will be shown another apparatus, "unparalleled" (sometimes very similar to the Western one).
But what if there is a war? For example, with Japan. How will the fleet fight? A strong proletarian word? Or collective worship?
There is no doubt that the media, which are excitedly singing today about the alleged effectiveness of the allegedly Russian complexes of PMO "Diamand" (and giving similar popular news), tomorrow will glorify the heroic self-sacrifice of the next "Varangians". In a specific case - the crews of our obsolete minesweepers that have lost their real combat effectiveness, which the command will drive "belly on mines." In fact, to the slaughter, and without any prospect of real fulfillment of the combat mission
Let me remind you that today in the Pacific Fleet there is not a single anti-mine ship with modern weapons, not a single anti-mine UOA. At the same time, the Pacific Fleet has 3 SSBNs, of which two are the newest, Project 955.
Surrogate
Those who wish can easily read a lot of enthusiastic publications about this self-propelled simulator, and not only in popular print media, but also in open specialized editions. The only problem is that in reality there is not a single "Surrogate" in the Navy, and, moreover, making of it an "underwater tsar-cannon", the managers of this project deliberately exclude any significant serial production.
"Rubin" carried out studies on a much larger "unmanned submarine" intended for conducting exercises. This boat, tentatively named "Surrogate", has a displacement of about 60 tons, a cruising range of about 600 miles at a speed of 5 knots, and a maximum speed of 24 knots. All this makes it possible to conduct exercises up to 15-16 hours long, reproducing the maneuvering of enemy submarines, including at relatively high travel speeds.
Comparatively large dimensions (length about 17 meters) and the ability to carry towed antennas for various purposes makes it possible to realistically reproduce the physical fields of the submarine.
For "luboks" and showing to VIPs it will go, but the fleet - "as usual, somehow."
At the same time, the navies of Western countries have long and massively (the account goes to tens of thousands of applications) use AUV simulators in combat training. Yes, this is not a Surrogate in terms of its characteristics, but it is something that every ship, anti-submarine aircraft, and submarine can use. Those. in the “wild west”, they make non-commercial weapons for real mass work and combat training, in our country - for showing to VIPs (and, in fact, the same toys as the “Vityaz”).
Cephalopod
Work on this combat AUV will be deliberately disrupted. And this is the result of not even an analysis of public procurement on this topic (although only very disappointing conclusions could be drawn from them), but most importantly, a fundamentally incorrect conceptual way of creating such AUVs in our country.
In fact, combat AUVs have been in service with many countries for a long time. These are torpedoes. At the same time, the minimum development period for torpedoes is about 6 years (and this figure is approximately the same for all countries). Heavy combat AUVs are a much more complex combat complex than a torpedo. Accordingly, conventional approaches to their design require a significant increase in the duration of work, at which the AUV begins to become obsolete even on the computers of developers.
At the same time, we still cannot make a good universal torpedo for submarines, despite the fact that tales of fantastic "Cephalopods" are already beginning to excite the public in our country.
Regional "sausage"
At the Army 2020 forum, a small-sized TNPA GNPP Region was publicly presented, which first appeared at the show to the President of the Russian Federation in December 2019 in Sevastopol.
They tried to tell about it in more detail (more precisely, to advertise it) in the film "Military Acceptance".
It is worth noting that in the interval between the filming of the film and the showing to the president of this TNLA something fell off, namely the stabilizers, a kind of "sausage" turned out.
The reason for this is "it would be very funny if it weren't so sad." The author's publications on torpedo and, especially, mine action were closely monitored by the State Scientific and Production Enterprise "Region" (with extremely clumsy attempts to argue in the media). The author sharply raised the question of the lack of small-sized TNLA PMO and the urgent need to include them in the ISPUM complex.
But specifically for this small-sized TNLA, the question was immediately raised about the adequacy of the reproduction of the unsuccessful French TNLA SeaScan, the identity of which with the TNLA "Region" simply cut the eye. Now the question of similarity has been resolved by "sawing off" the stabilizers.
Note:
French toys for the Russian fleet
The background of the question is as follows. Under the contract with the ECA company (France), as part of the DIAMAND complex, we were to be supplied with small TNLA-destroyers of K-Ster mines. TNLA is not cheap even for the French, and taking into account our "gaskets", its price turned out to be simply exorbitant (especially taking into account the one-time use).
However, the year 2014 came, after which a number of delivery points, including K-Ster, were excluded by the French side due to sanctions. Instead of the K-Ster (destroyers), ESA urgently developed the SeaScan survey TNLA (in fact, the K-Ster with a removed warhead module).
However, the close acquaintance of our specialists with the means of the DIAMAND complex was shocking, they did not have to talk about the real solution of mine countermeasures in any difficult conditions. A similar disappointment was received by the Kazakh Navy (where the complex was delivered in full version). For ESA TNLA see material: "Anti-mine" thirty-four ": TNPA RAR-104".
The least complaints were about SeaScan: for all the "tenderness" of the design of the ROV (for example, it does not recognize subzero temperatures), the apparatus for survey tasks was quite working (the K-Ster ROV was made in the old ECA, in the early 2000s, when the engineering and the management staff of the firm was still at their best).
The most disastrous was the control system of the DIAMAND complex. In an attempt to save the situation, the effective managers of the Russian operator of the DIAMAND complex turned to their acquaintances (even from the Ministry of Defense), the effective managers of the Region State Scientific and Production Enterprise in order to correct the flaws of the Diamand and dock it with ISPUM. So GNPP "Region" entered the theme "Diamanda".
Accordingly, having received a "working TNLA" and its documentation, they did not want to think. For example, why the old engineers of the ECA company installed a warhead on a rotary drive on the K-Ster ROV. Especially if there were other long-standing acquaintances in the development of budgetary funds nearby who offered beautiful small-sized ammunition.
The flight of thought of the authors of this "sausage" is evidenced by the variety of versions and applications and even the willingness to destroy underwater robots.
True, in order to destroy them, they must be discovered. And here the question arises: by what? Optics (which was stuck in the "muzzle" of the TNLA)? But it has a range of several meters. Tiddly antenna of a high-frequency sonar on the "chin" of a TNLA with a ridiculous detection range?
At the same time, the task of intercepting underwater robots in the State Scientific and Production Enterprise "Region" was solved a long time ago, and in its most difficult version - the destruction of attacking torpedoes by anti-torpedoes, incl. in the problematic near-surface layer.
Those. there is a groundwork (and moreover, the development of effective small-sized products, including for such tasks were made more than ten years ago), there are excellent acoustics specialists. However, it is obvious that they were not attracted to the "sausage".
Separately, it is necessary to raise the question of the frequency range of the TNLA sonar, namely, the absolutely unreasonable choice by the developers of a number of foreign NLA PMOs of the high-frequency range (often slightly less than 1 MHz). Where the development was managed by engineers, this was not the case (unlike those who like beautiful pictures on the sonar screen of effective managers). We also got carried away with such "pictures". The author had personal experience of a long-standing dispute with one leader, which was eventually resolved at sea. The dummies of mines were accidentally placed in a thicket of algae at the bottom, with a high-frequency sonar being considered the main test tool. There were, to put it mildly, serious problems with the detection of layouts. At the same time, they were confidently observed by sonar with a significantly lower operating frequency.
During a long-standing discussion of this issue with the chief designer of Mayevka, he stated that the algae were "acoustically transparent." Correct, but only if the frequency range of the NPA PMO sonars is selected correctly (as was the case at Mayevka). If, as with effective managers, then the "Quickstrike" in the thickets of algae in the throat of Avacha Bay "sausage", most likely, will not see the sonar (optics - all the more so).
I am sure that this (this very word will be accurate) small TNLA was not considered by the scientific and technical council of the State Scientific and Production Enterprise "Region", because the specialists would have a lot of bad questions about it.
However, the main question is different: as long as we have effective managers from AUVs and chase underwater robots (in their presentations and videos paid for big money), a very simple question remains: who will destroy the mines?
"Sausage"? Partially it can do this (in simple conditions), however, high speed for racing robots automatically means the high cost of such a TNLA, a significant level of physical fields and, accordingly, a high probability of undermining. Moreover, the cost of such a TNLA turns out to be much higher (not less than an order of magnitude) than mines.
Taking into account the probable number of mines delivered in the event of hostilities (many thousands), the Ministry of Defense will have to "cut" other programs for the sake of the required number of "sausages" (including "Caliber", after all, money is not taken out of thin air), publications on specialized forums, there is a tendency to purchase one ammunition. Those. in the event of a real war, there is a chance to be virtually unarmed. But at exhibitions and parades there will be something to show.
They may object to me: after all, the speed of western small ROVs is the same (and even more), yes, but with one important condition - short-term speed. But the long-term is already much less. Those. the question of the model of the use of small TNLA arises. About which hardly anyone thought. And the foreign experience, which already exists and is quite accessible, was simply ignored (except for the documentation on the French).
What if the conditions are difficult? Let's say, like in 1991 in the Persian Gulf? What will this "sausage" do with the "Manta" washed into the sand? We won't talk about a number of very “bad places” …
By the way, with such pictures of execution options, our effective managers do not want to get lawsuits? They are strongly encouraged to familiarize themselves with the arbitration on this topic in the English courts of German (small cumulative warhead with a COBRA perforator) and Anglo-Swedish developers (product BALLISTA). This is an excellent example of judicial trickery for every letter and comma (given that the technical essence is the same, and, moreover, was first proposed by a “third party” at all).
A small clarification from the author: a perforator is needed to fix a small-sized shaped charge on the mine body, and the real differences in the technical solutions of the Germans and Swedes are in the power of the perforator. Figuratively speaking, "according to Zadornov," Atlas's COBRA "weakens gently, without disturbing sleep." BALLISTA, on the other hand, pounds so that questions arise, and after such a perforator, do you really need explosives?
At the same time, it is necessary to understand that small anti-mine charges, really allowing to increase the capabilities of anti-mine forces, have a number of serious limitations. Therefore, the NATO Navy uses a fairly wide range of anti-mine charges, weighing from several to 140 kg. Moreover, the requirements for the PMO ammunition directly depend on the appearance, maneuverability and physical fields of the TNLA (which the creators of the "sausage" obviously have no idea about).
Once again, I emphasize that the criteria for effective mine action are:
1. The productivity of the anti-mine forces in the search for mine-like objects.
2. Productivity for their classification and destruction.
3. Correspondence of the capabilities of the anti-mine forces to the mine threat (both in the types of mines and in their number).
4. Conducting effective mine action with a minimum expenditure of resources for this (criterion "efficiency - cost").
Obviously, the "sausage" of the "Region" corresponds to this in an extremely small way. Moreover, the presentation of such a dubious product is evidence of the intellectual degradation of the once leading enterprise in the field of naval underwater weapons in the world (just one example: what Region did in 1998 on the topic of anti-torpedoes, the United States and Germany could not repeat until so far!). Successful Package? Yes, but this is not the merit of the current effective managers, but of the former leadership of the State Scientific and Production Enterprise "Region", first of all E. S. Shakhidzhanov. It will not be long to rest on the laurels of the "Package", and the United States, Turkey and China are already overtaking us in these matters. We are still eating up the backlog of the 90s and early 2000s, see here: "Anti-torpedoes. We are still ahead, but they are already overtaking us ".
At the same time, in the "Region" there were quite adequate studies of small-sized products, even more than 10 years ago. Yes, now something needs to be changed there, but the main technical solutions were engineering literate. In the old films about the State Scientific and Production Enterprise "Region" there is a video of a small TNLA, who played "aerobatics" in an acoustic pool back in the 90s. Where is its creator now (he is also the chief designer of Mayevka)? Everything was done to make him leave the "Region". There was not even a place for his photograph in the anniversary edition of the State Scientific and Production Enterprise "Region". And this was not an accident. It's just that there are those who work for the result, and there are those who are for the process. And the last ones are very painful for the eyes. Especially if the latter are effective managers.
Let's draw a line on the new TNLA from the "Region":
- there is no sane concept of this TNLA;
- suboptimal high-frequency range of the sonar (a consequence of poor layout and copying of the SeaScan);
- TNLA has a deliberately overstated cost, which excludes the possibility of creating the necessary ammunition for the Navy;
- the layout of the TNLA does not provide the high maneuverability required for the use of small ammunition in flowing conditions;
- the issues of physical fields during its creation, obviously, were not worked out;
- and also glad of shortcomings, public discussion of which is inappropriate.
In fact, this is a mock-up demonstrator, in order to lure the Ministry of Defense into a full-fledged R&D (development work) on this topic. However, the extremely low level of the layout ("sausages") raises the question of the ability of the State Scientific and Production Enterprise "Region" in its current state (and effective managers) to actually fulfill this ROC.
Problems and Conclusions
Problem 1. Import. I would like to emphasize that the author is in no way opposed to importing, not only successful Western samples, but also dubious ones (it is better to learn from the mistakes of others). But not at the cost of crushing domestic developments, what we had. A vivid example is the massive purchase of imported legal acts in the 2000s. (after "Kursk") with complete disregard for the Navy of successful domestic developers (except for the only ROC "Mayevka").
This was followed by a French scam. Only one example of assistance to domestic developments on the part of responsible officials during this period: the requirements for domestic small-sized TNLA deliberately include those that can be technically implemented only with its mass an order of magnitude greater than the specified one. Those. imports were accepted openly dubious and without any real verification, and domestic developments were deliberately sabotaged, driving them into impossible conditions.
Problem 2: effective managers. The tough irony of the situation is that a number of people who "took part" in the suppression of domestic legal acts in early 2010. in favor of import to the Ministry of Defense, have now become high-ranking effective managers in the defense industry, and their whims and preferences largely determine what the Navy needs to buy.
The main conclusion is that we have a good technical groundwork, effective developers, and even Rubin's toys are a definite plus in training young engineers. The question is in the correct formulation of the problem.
And this requires large-scale (in different conditions, on different fleets) tests in conditions close to the real ones of all NLA, all developers (regardless of the presence or absence of a certificate of a pedigree dog, i.e. licenses). It doesn't matter what is written on the paper, the main thing is that the dog is a good bloodhound.
Only large-scale comparative tests in real conditions will allow the fleet to maximally "turn off" the influence of effective managers, to understand what it needs, to strictly demand this from the industry and to achieve massive deliveries of effective NLA to the fleet.
At the same time, at the moment, our fleet has anti-mine UOA:
- 4 TNPA (1 "Mayevka" and 3 STA ISPUM), while at the Pacific Fleet and Northern Fleet (where our NSNF are deployed) there is not a single one, and "Mayevka" and STA ISPUM will blow up on the very first "defender mine" (for more details: "What's wrong with our minesweepers?" and "What's wrong with the newest PMK project 12700");
- ANPA PMO - none.
But we have 11 SSBNs in the Navy, which are not provided in any way in mine action and in terms of anti-torpedo protection. (more details: "APKR" Severdvinsk "handed over with critical deficiencies for combat capability").
Like the entire fleet.
