After years of decline, the Russian navy is gradually recovering its potential. New ships are being built, new trips to remote regions are being organized, and real combat operations are being carried out. Nevertheless, so far the Russian fleet in its power cannot be compared with the fleet of the Soviet Union at the peak of its development. This situation attracts the attention of domestic and foreign experts, and therefore often becomes a topic for discussions and analytical articles.
On August 6, the American edition of The National Interest published another article by international security specialist Robert Farley under The Buzz. The topic of the publication entitled "Why Russia's Once Superpower Navy Is in Big Trouble" was the current state of affairs in the Russian Navy, as well as the prospects for its development. Based on the analysis of the available information, the American expert came to negative conclusions.
At the beginning of his article, R. Farley recalls recent events. For example, last year the Russian navy carried out several large and notable operations. A naval group headed by the aircraft carrier "Admiral Kuznetsov" worked off the coast of Syria, and ships of the Caspian flotilla launched cruise missiles. The activity of the submarine forces has also increased, although not yet to the level of the past Cold War.
However, the author believes that Moscow, when making plans for the development of the fleet, should listen to the Gospel of Matthew: “watch and pray so as not to fall into temptation: the spirit is cheerful, the flesh is weak”. The Russian fleet is in a disorderly state and in the future, this situation is likely to only worsen.
Current situation
R. Farley recalls that Russia inherited from the USSR a large and modern fleet of submarines and surface ships. However, the young state could not support such a navy, which is why a significant part of the ships was quickly decommissioned. The rest of the large combat units are currently distinguished by their great age and ambiguous technical condition. So, out of 24 large surface ships, only three (Project 11356 frigates) were laid down after the collapse of the USSR. At the same time, a significant number of ships are approaching the end of their life cycle, despite all efforts to upgrade and modernize.
How long the only aircraft carrier "Admiral Kuznetsov" will be able to remain in combat is a big question. However, despite all the ambitious proposals and projects, it cannot be replaced in the near future. The heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser Peter the Great continues to serve, and in the foreseeable future the Admiral Nakhimov of the same type will join it. Nevertheless, the age of these cruisers has already passed 30 years.
Future projects
R. Farley notes not the most pleasant tendency observed in the course of the development of the Russian Navy. If Moscow had built every ship it promised to build over the past decade, it would now have a world-class fleet. In the context of national security, the Russian state has succeeded in announcing major projects, but lags behind in their implementation. The actual situation with the construction of ships and submarines, by global standards, looks rather gloomy.
The biggest successes of modern Russian shipbuilding are frigates of projects 11356 (Admiral Grigorovich-class) and 22350 (Admiral Gorshkov-class). The former have a displacement of 4000 tons, the latter - 5400 tons. The construction of the lead ship "11356" took about seven years, the first frigate of Project 22350 was built about nine. Two frigates of project 11356 have already entered the combat composition of the fleet, and the lead "Admiral Gorshkov" of project 22350 will have to begin service by the end of this year.
Here the author recalls the pace of construction of lead ships of some modern foreign projects. So, the first British destroyer Type 45 was under construction for about six years. The lead American ship of the Arleigh Burke class was built in four years. The same amount was spent by Japan and China on the construction of the first destroyers of the Atago and 052D projects, respectively. At the same time, R. Farley notes that all the listed foreign ships differ from Russian frigates by almost twice their displacement.
12 promising Leader-class destroyers with a displacement of 17 thousand tons could become a good replacement for the aging ships currently in service. However, so far there is little to say that the Kremlin is really going to build such ships, not to mention the completion of construction within a reasonable time frame. The recent economic crisis has led to an additional deterioration in the situation in the field of military shipbuilding. The annexation of Crimea and the subsequent sanctions of third countries seriously limited the ability to acquire foreign-built ships, as was the case with the Mistral-class universal amphibious assault ships. Nevertheless, the possibility of an order for Chinese-built ships cannot be ruled out.
Submarines
The central element of Russia's naval power is the submarine fleet, primarily nuclear submarines of various classes. According to the American author, nuclear submarines - both strategic and multipurpose submarine cruisers - actually became the only area in which Russian shipbuilding succeeded after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The composition of the submarine forces was noticeably reduced - in certain periods, only 13 submarines with ballistic missiles, 7 carriers of cruise missiles, 17 nuclear submarines with torpedo weapons and about two dozen diesel-electric ships remained in service. Nevertheless, despite all the difficulties, the Russian fleet was working on replacements for decommissioned submarines and preparing new projects.
In the foreseeable future, eight Project 955 Borey submarines will become a strategic deterrent. Three of them have already been built, and the rest are already at various stages of construction and will be commissioned over the next few years. The existing multipurpose nuclear submarines of projects 945, 949 and 971 will be supplemented with the newest cruisers of project 885 "Ash" in the amount of seven units.
Comparison
R. Farley suggests comparing the current situation in the Russian Navy with the state of affairs that took place in the past. To do this, he recalls the main events and trends of the 20th century, including those that took place shortly before the formation of the modern Russian fleet.
In the context of the history of the Russian Navy, the last century was a very interesting period. In 1905, Russia was a developed "second tier" naval power. She had large and modern fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas, as well as in the Pacific Ocean. Losses during the Russo-Japanese War led to a real crisis, but the situation was soon rectified. 13 years after the Battle of Tsushima, despite the withdrawal from the First World War, the Russian fleet will receive seven new dreadnoughts. These ships allowed Russia to become on a par with such maritime powers as France and Italy. However, she still could not compete in this respect with Great Britain, the USA, Germany or Japan.
The October Revolution of 1917, in contrast to the process of the collapse of the Soviet Union, simultaneously led to the consolidation of efforts and the temporary suspension of a number of ambitious military projects. Like the Russian Federation several decades later, the USSR in the first 20 years of its existence did not have a clear idea of the further development of the navy. Just before the start of the Great Patriotic War, a large-scale construction program was launched.
However, the outbreak of the war stopped the implementation of the existing plans, and also led to obvious conclusions. It became clear that the power and security of the state, first of all, are associated with the ground forces, but not with the navy. At the same time, the country's leadership did not abandon the further development of the Navy. As a result, at a certain point - already during the Cold War - the fleet of the Soviet Union surpassed the French and British navies in size and power, becoming the second in the world.
But then it all fell apart again. The newly independent Russia could no longer support the navy that it inherited. In addition, the capabilities of the young state were insufficient to maintain the pace of building new ships and maintain a full-fledged "healthy" shipbuilding. The fleet entered a death spiral. The cost of maintaining the technical condition of old ships increased, as did the construction time for new ones. At the same time, the quality of construction and maintenance fell. The last blow to date has been the economic crisis of recent years. According to R. Farley, foreign sanctions and falling energy prices have led to the fact that only the construction of submarines is now showing signs of life.
Also, the author of The National Interest writes that in the current situation, comparisons of the Russian fleet with foreign navies are far from in his favor. By the time Russia builds its second aircraft carrier, the Chinese fleet will have received at least three such ships. India and Great Britain will have two ships each with an air group. From the point of view of other surface ships, the situation looks even worse. France, Britain, Japan and China have built and commissioned new large surface warships over the past decade. According to R. Farley, all such foreign novelties are superior to the old Russian ships in terms of technological complexity.
It is especially noted that comparison with Chinese shipbuilding gives even more noticeable results. Since 2000, Russia has ordered and received five surface ships, of which three were laid down during the Soviet era. During this time, the Chinese fleet managed to order about 40 ships. In the future, it is likely that such a ratio of numerical indicators will only get worse.
Outcomes
The current situation in the development of the Russian navy is illustrated by Robert Farley with a quote from Dmitry Gorenburg's recent article "Russia’s New and Unrealistic Naval Doctrine", published at the end of July in War on the Rock. The author of this publication wrote that Moscow's naval ambitions at the moment look painfully unrealistic. Until Russia rebuilds its naval shipbuilding industry, it will not be able to compete with China, Japan or South Korea. Until Russia restructures its economy, it will not be able to restore shipbuilding.
Despite large investments in the defense sector, so far Russia can claim leadership only in some areas of military shipbuilding. These are nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles and other weapons, as well as frigates and other middle class ships. At the same time, a great achievement can be considered the adaptation of the latest missile systems to be installed on existing platforms of different classes.
R. Farley considered it necessary to remind that the modern Russian Federation is forced to live with the same problems as its predecessors in the person of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. The Russian Navy is divided into four main operational and strategic formations. However, none of them can easily support the others. Because of this, in particular, the campaign of "Admiral Kuznetsov" in the eastern regions of the Mediterranean Sea with the subsequent return without serious damage was considered a great success. For comparison, the author cites the Chinese Navy, divided into three regional fleets, capable of helping each other without much difficulty.
After reviewing various known data and drawing some conclusions, the author of The National Interest summarizes. He writes that at present the Russian fleet is in poor condition, and the country simply is not able to rebuild it, getting rid of its existing shortcomings. For the foreseeable future, Russian shipbuilding should only engage in projects that can be guaranteed to be implemented in the current situation. First of all, it is necessary to develop a nuclear submarine fleet for strategic and other purposes, as well as build a relatively small group of surface ships capable of solving certain tasks. Apparently, these plans should not be supplemented due to the complexity or impossibility of completing new tasks.
