We will start this article with a little work on the errors: in the previous article on the main caliber of the battleship "Pennsylvania", we indicated that the device providing a small delay during the salvo (0.06 sec) between the shots of the outer and central guns was first installed on American battleships in 1918. But in fact, this happened only in 1935: the Americans were really able in 1918 to reduce the dispersion of shells of the main caliber by half during salvo firing, but they achieved this by other means, including by reducing the initial velocity of the projectile.
How did the American battleships shoot? Dear A. V. Mandel, in his monograph "Battleships of the United States", gives a detailed description of two such episodes, and the first of them is the record firing of the battleship "Nevada" in 1924-25. (more precisely, one of the test shooting). Judging by the description, during this period of time, the Americans used a progressive shooting training system, which, as far as the author of this article knows, was the first to be used by the Germans even before the First World War. As you know, the classic naval artillery exercise is shooting at the shield, but it has one serious drawback: the shield cannot be towed at high speed. Thus, shooting at a shield is always shooting at a very slow-moving target.
The Germans decided this issue radically. They conducted practice shooting at a real target; a fast cruiser was usually used for battleships. The idea was that the battleship artillerymen determined the data for firing at a real high-speed ship (the cruiser usually went at a speed of 18-20 knots), but at the same time adjusted the horizontal guidance angle so that the volleys would fall not on the cruiser, but in several cables behind it. … Thus, the ship imitating the target was, as it were, out of danger, at the same time there were artillery observers on it, who recorded the fall of the salvoes of the exercising ship relative to the wake of the "target". So, in fact, the effectiveness of the shooting was determined.
Judging by the description of A. V. Mandel, this is exactly how the Nevada firing took place, while the target ship was moving at a speed of 20 knots. probably 90 cables at a distance. The word "probably" is used because the respected author indicates not cables, but meters (16,500 m), however, in the English-language literature, as a rule, not meters are indicated, but yards, in this case the distance was only 80 cables. Shooting was supposed to start when the course angle to the target was 90 degrees, but the order to open fire came earlier, when the target was at 57 degrees. and the battleship made the first two volleys during the ongoing turn, which, in general, did not contribute to the accuracy of the shooting. In total, during the firing, the battleship fired 7 volleys in 5 minutes. 15 sec.
After the first salvo, the turning mechanism of one of the towers went out of order, but it was apparently managed to be “reanimated” by the second salvo, so there was no pass. However, the left gun of the first turret missed the first and second volleys due to a failure in the electric launch circuit. After the fifth salvo, a failure of the vertical aiming drive of the 4th turret was recorded, but it was also put into operation and the turret continued to participate in firing. During the 6th volley, the left gun of the third turret gave a pass due to a defective fuse, and in the final 7th volley, one gun fired an incomplete charge (3 caps instead of 4), and the vertical aiming drive failed again, now in turret no. 2.
A. V. Mandel writes that such malfunctions were quite rare, and, moreover, they were quickly corrected on the Nevada during the shooting, but here it is not easy to agree with the respected author. If we were talking about some kind of unscheduled exercises, or about firing that took place shortly after commissioning, when many mechanisms still require improvement, then this would somehow be understandable. But after all, the date of valid shooting is known in advance, both the crew and materiel are being prepared for it - and, despite all this, there is such an abundance of minor failures. Let us note that the refusals were caused only by their own shooting, but what would have happened if the Nevada had been in battle and had been exposed to the enemy's large-caliber shells?
As we said earlier, American battleships fired full volleys, and taking into account three passes, for 7 volleys, Nevada fired 67 shells, one of which obviously could not hit the target, since it was fired with an incomplete charge. But this is not a breakdown of equipment, but a mistake by the loaders, who did not report one cap to the chamber, so we have no reason to exclude this projectile from the overall result of firing.
The first four volleys covered, but there were no hits, on the 5th the observers counted the battleship one hit, and two more hits each on the 6th and 7th volleys. And only 5 hits on 67 spent shells, respectively, the accuracy was 7.46%.
A. V. Mandel calls such accuracy an outstanding result, citing the fact that the famous "Bismarck" showed less accuracy during the battle in the Danish Strait. But such a comparison is completely incorrect. Yes, indeed, the Bismarck used 93 rounds in that battle, having achieved three hits in the Prince of Wells and at least one in the Hood. It is possible that the gunners of the Bismarck achieved a greater number of hits on the dead British cruiser, but even counting at a minimum, we get that the Bismarck showed an accuracy of 4.3%. This, of course, is lower than the Nevada figure in the shooting described above. But it should be borne in mind that the American battleship fired at one target following a constant course, while the Bismarck fired sequentially on two different ships, so it needed a re-zeroing, and, accordingly, an increased consumption of shells for it. In addition, during the battle, the British ships maneuvered and it was much more difficult to get into them. Also, we must not forget that the Nevada fired at 90 cables, and in the Danish Strait, the battle began at 120 cables and, possibly, the Bismarck destroyed the Hood before the distance between these ships was reduced to 90 cables. There are still some doubts that the visibility during the battle in the Danish Strait was as good as during the firing of the Nevada: the fact is that the Americans tried to conduct their shooting practice in clear, good weather, so that without interference watch the falling volleys of the training ships. Interestingly, in the United States itself there were opponents of such "preferential" combat training, but their objections were usually countered by the fact that in the tropical regions of the Pacific Ocean, where, according to the admirals, they were to fight the Japanese fleet, such visibility was the norm.
But the main objection of A. V. Mandela is that, as a rule, in battle, the accuracy of shooting is several times, or even orders of magnitude, reduced relative to that which was achieved in the pre-war shooting. So, at the beginning of 1913, in the presence of the First Lord of the Admiralty, the battleship "Tanderer" was adjusting its firing at a range of 51 kbt. with the help of the latest fire control devices at that time, he achieved 82% of hits. But in the Battle of Jutland, the 3rd battlecruiser squadron, fighting at a distance of 40-60 cables, achieved only 4.56% of hits and this was the best result of the Royal Navy. Of course, "Nevada" fired in much more difficult conditions and at a longer range, but still its indicator of 7.46% does not look very good.
In addition, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the first 4 volleys, although they were covered, but did not give hits - of course, anything can happen at sea, but still there is a persistent feeling that, despite measures to reduce dispersion, it remained with the American battleships excessively large. This is indirectly confirmed by the fact that the Americans did not stop at the double reduction in dispersion achieved by them in 1918, but continued to work in this direction further.
The second shooting, described by A. V. Mandel, produced the battleship New York in 1931. Despite the fact that ships of this type were equipped with two-gun turrets, in which the guns had an individual cradle, when firing at 60 cables, the ship achieved fairly moderate results: 7 hits in 6 volleys, or 11.67%. In comparison with the English pre-war firing, this is not an indicative result, but, in fairness, we note that the New York fired at a “conditional 20-node target” with a shift in the aiming point, the mechanism of which was described by us above, and not at the shield, and fired the first 4 volleys at one target and three others at the other.
In general, we can state that the accuracy of the shooting of American battleships raises questions even in the period after the First World War, that is, after the US sailors were "shaken up" by joint exercises with the British fleet, before that the results were obviously worse. No wonder that D. Beatty, who commanded the battle cruisers of the British, and later became the First Lord of the Admiralty, argued that for parity with the United States, England would be enough to have a fleet, 30% less than the American one.
But back to the design of the American three-gun turrets. In addition to placing guns in one cradle and the presence of only two shell and the same number of charging lifts for three guns, the American turrets were distinguished by another very unusual "innovation", namely, the placement of ammunition. On all battleships of those years, artillery cellars with shells and charges were located at the very bottom of the tower installation, under the barbette and the protection of the citadel - but not in American ships! More precisely, their charge storage facilities were located approximately in the same place as those of European battleships, but the shells … Shells were stored directly in the towers and barbets of the main caliber installations.
55 shells were placed directly in the turret, including 22 on the sides of the guns, 18 at the rear wall of the turret and 18 at the level of the loading chute. The main ammunition was stored on the so-called "shell deck of the tower" - it was at the level, as V. N. Chausov "second ship" deck. What was meant here, the author of this article is unclear (was the forecastle deck taken into account?), But in any case it was located above the main armored deck, outside the battleship's citadel. It could store up to 242 shells (174 at the walls of the barbette and another 68 in the reloading compartment). In addition, below, already within the citadel, there were 2 more reserve storages: the first of them was located on the barbet section, located under the main armored deck, there could be up to 50 shells, and another 27 shells could be placed at the level of charge storage. These reserves were considered auxiliary, since the supply of shells from the lower tier of the barbette and the lower storage was extremely difficult and was not designed to ensure the normal rate of fire of the guns in battle.
In other words, in order to be able to use the standard ammunition in full (100 rounds per barrel), it had to be placed partly in the turret, and partly on the shell deck inside the barbet, but outside the citadel. The latter protected only the powder magazines.
Such a decision is extremely difficult to call rational. Undoubtedly, the American battleships had very good armoring of barbets and turrets - running a little ahead, we note that the thickness of the frontal plate of the three-gun 356 mm turret was 457 mm, the side plates - 254 mm and 229 mm. The thickness decreased towards the rear wall, which also had a thickness of 229 mm, the roof was 127 mm. At the same time, the barbet, right up to the armored deck, consisted of monolithic armor with a thickness of 330 mm. Again, looking ahead, it can be noted that such protection justifiably claims, if not the best, then at least one of the best in the world, but, alas, it was not impenetrable either: the English 381-mm "greenboy" was quite capable pierce armor of this thickness from 80 cables, or even more.
At the same time, the Explosive D used by the Americans as an explosive, although not a "shimosa", was still ready to detonate at a temperature of 300-320 degrees, that is, a strong fire in the turret of an American battleship is fraught with a powerful explosion.
All of the above does not allow us to consider the design of the 356-mm turret mounts of the Pennsylvania-class battleships as successful. They have only 2 significant advantages: compactness, and good (but, alas, far from absolute) security. But these advantages were achieved at the expense of very significant shortcomings, and the author of this article is inclined to consider the three-gun turrets of the United States of those times as one of the most unsuccessful in the world.
Mine artillery
Battleships of the "Pennsylvania" type were supposed to protect 22 * 127-mm / 51 artillery systems from destroyers. And again, as in the case of the main caliber, formally, the anti-mine artillery of battleships was very powerful, and it seemed even one of the strongest in the world, but in practice it had a number of shortcomings that significantly reduced its capabilities.
The 127-mm / 51 gun of the 1910/11 g model (developed in 1910, put into service in 1911) was very powerful, it was capable of sending a projectile weighing 22.7 kg into flight with an initial speed of 960 m / s. The firing range at a maximum elevation angle of 20 degrees was approximately 78 cables. At the same time, the gun was not overpowered, the resource of its barrel reached a very solid 900 rounds. Armor-piercing and high-explosive projectiles had the same mass, but the content of explosives in the armor-piercing one was 0.77 kg, and in the high-explosive one - 1.66 kg, while the same Explosive D was used as an explosive.
However, it is somewhat surprising that almost all the sources available to the author on US battleships describe exclusively an armor-piercing projectile. Strictly speaking, this, of course, is not proof that high-explosive shells were absent in the ammunition load of the US battleships, but … there is no indication that the guns were equipped with such shells. And, as we know, the Americans provided the main caliber of their battleships only with armor-piercing shells until World War II.
But even if we assume that the anti-mine caliber of "Pennsylvania" and "Arizona" initially received high-explosive shells, it should be noted that the content of explosives in them is very low. So, in the 120-mm / 50 guns of the model 1905 (Vickers) used in the Russian fleet in 20, 48 kg high-explosive projectile mod. 1907 there was 2, 56 kg of trinitrotoluene, and in semi-armor-piercing shells arr. 1911 g with a mass of 28, 97 kg, the content of explosives reached 3, 73 kg, that is, more than twice that in the American high-explosive projectile 127 mm / 51 guns! Yes, our gun lost to the American one in ballistics, having a significantly lower muzzle velocity - 823 m / s for a lighter 20, 48 kg projectile, and 792.5 m / s for 28, 97 kg, but the impact of Russian shells on a destroyer-type target "Would be much more significant.
The next, and very significant, drawback of the American gun is the cap-loading. Here, of course, one can recall that the above-mentioned 120-mm / 50 gun also had a cap-loading, but the whole question is that on Russian ships these guns were installed either in an armored casemate (battleships of the "Sevastopol" type, armored cruiser "Rurik"), or even in the towers ("Shkval" monitors), but on American battleships, with their "all or nothing" booking scheme, 127-mm / 51 anti-mine battery guns did not have armor protection. And this created certain difficulties in battle.
When repelling an attack from destroyers, the anti-mine battery should develop a maximum rate of fire (not at the expense of accuracy, of course), but for this it was necessary to have a certain stock of shells and charges from 127-mm / 50 guns. These stocks were not covered by armor, and here the presence of shells could give them at least some protection, the hope that if such a stock detonates from the impact of fragments or fire, then at least not completely. Again, keeping the crews at unprotected guns during the battle of the linear forces did not make much sense, so in the event of a fire, they could not quickly intervene and correct the situation.
In other words, it turned out that the Americans had to either lay out and leave unattended stocks of ammunition before the battle, risking fires and explosions, but still be able, if necessary, to call the crews to the guns and immediately open fire. Or not to do this, but then put up with the fact that in the event of a sudden threat of a mine attack, it will not be possible to open fire quickly. At the same time, the situation was aggravated by the fact that the ammunition hoists at the time of the destroyers' attack could be damaged (outside the citadel), and in this case, the lack of an "emergency reserve" for the guns would be completely bad.
In general, all of the above is to a certain extent true for casemate guns, but nevertheless, the latter have better protection for guns and their crews than an example, and are also able to provide much better safety for ammunition in guns.
In addition to all of the above, the anti-mine batteries of battleships of the "Pennsylvania" class, although they had a slightly better placement relative to the ships of the previous type, remained very "wet", prone to flooding. However, this drawback was extremely widespread in those years, so we will not reproach the creators of ships of this type with it.
Fire control is a different matter. In contrast to the main caliber, to which a completely modern centralized fire system was "attached" on the "Pennsylvania" and "Arizona" European MSA, centralized control anti-mine guns for a long time did not have centralized control at all and were guided individually. True, there were officers of the fire control group, whose combat posts were located on the bridges of the lattice masts, but they gave only the most general instructions. Centralized control of mine artillery fire appeared on American battleships only in 1918.
Anti-aircraft armament
When the battleships entered service, 4 guns of the 76 mm / 50 caliber were presented. These guns were quite equivalent to many other guns of the same purpose, which had appeared by that time on the battleships of the world. Anti-aircraft "three-inches" fired a projectile weighing 6, 8 kg with an initial speed of 823 m / sec., The rate of fire could reach 15-20 rounds / min. When firing, unitary cartridges were used, while the maximum barrel lift angle reached 85 degrees. The maximum firing range (at an angle of 45 degrees) was 13 350 m or 72 cables, the maximum reach in height was 9 266 m. These guns, of course, did not have centralized control.
Torpedo armament
It must be said that torpedoes were not very popular in the American navy. Assuming to conduct their battles overseas, the American admirals did not consider it necessary to build large numbers of destroyers and destroyers, which they saw, in essence, coastal ships. This point of view changed only during the First World War, when the United States began the massive construction of ships of this class.
Such views could not but affect the quality of American torpedoes. The fleet used 533-mm "self-propelled mines" manufactured by the company "Bliss" (the so-called "Bliss-Levitt"), various modifications of which were adopted in 1904, 1905 and 1906. However, all of them were inferior in their performance characteristics to European torpedoes, had a very weak charge, which consisted, moreover, of gunpowder, not trinitrotoluene, and a very low technical reliability. The share of unsuccessful launches of these torpedoes during exercises reached 25%. At the same time, American torpedoes had a very unpleasant habit of straying off course, gradually turning 180 degrees, while US battleships usually operated in wake formation: thus there was a hefty danger of hitting their own battleships following the ship that launched the torpedo.
The situation somewhat improved with the adoption in 1915 of the Bliss-Levitt Mk9 torpedo, which had a charge of 95 kg TNT, although this was very small. The cruising range, according to some sources, was 6,400 m at 27 knots, according to others - 8,230 m at 27 knots. or 5,030 m at 34.5 knots, length - 5, 004 m, weight - 914 or 934 kg. However, the author of this article does not know exactly what torpedoes the Pennsylvania-class battleships were equipped with at the time of commissioning.
"Pennsylvania" and "Arizona" were equipped with two traverse torpedo tubes located in the hull in front of the bow turrets of the main caliber. In general, such minimalism could only be welcomed if it were not for … the ammunition load, which consisted of as many as 24 torpedoes. At the same time, the width of the ship was not enough to ensure loading from the end of the torpedo tube, which was the classic way: so the Americans had to come up with a very cunning (and extremely complicated, in the opinion of the British, who had the opportunity to inspect the US torpedo tubes) side loading design.
This concludes the description of the armament of battleships of the "Pennsylvania" class and pass on to the "highlight" of the project - the reservation system.
