This article opens a cycle devoted to the history of the creation and service of the armored cruiser of the 2nd rank "Novik". We must say right away that the ship turned out to be very unusual - neither during its design and laying down, nor during its entry into service, the Novik had no direct analogs either in the Russian or in foreign navies. He became, to a certain extent, a landmark not only for domestic, but also for world military shipbuilding, becoming the ancestor of a new subclass of cruisers, later called scouts.
On the other hand, the ship's design turned out to be very controversial, because the undoubted advantages of the project were combined with very significant disadvantages, but perhaps this could have been avoided? The fighting in Port Arthur made the Novik a famous and famous ship in Russia, but was its potential fully unleashed? How competently were the admirals able to dispose of the capabilities of this very specific ship? What success was he able to achieve in battle? Was it used according to its tactical purpose, was it suitable for it? To what extent was the construction of a series of such ships justified, considering the "Pearls" and "Emerald", which were very different from the prototype, and also the "Boyarin", which was built according to a separate project? Did the fleet need small cruisers at all, and if so, was the Novik the optimal type of such a ship? In this series of articles we will try to answer these and many other questions.
The history of the armored cruiser "Novik" can be counted from a special meeting held in November 1895, at which, perhaps, for the first time, the question of the need for small reconnaissance cruisers with a displacement of 2-3 thousand tons, intended for service with squadrons, was raised. But then a positive decision about this type of ships was not made, and the question was "postponed" on the back burner.
However, they returned to it in 1897, when, during two meetings held on December 12 and 27, a radical strengthening of the naval forces in the Far East was planned. Unfortunately, in 1895 the danger of strengthening the Imperial Japanese Navy had not yet been adequately assessed, but by 1897 the need to build a powerful Pacific Fleet, even to the detriment of the Baltic, had become quite obvious. It was clear that the Pacific Fleet needed to be built, but … which one? A special meeting was not only to make a decision on strengthening our naval forces in the Far East, but also to determine the composition of the Pacific Squadron, that is, the number and types of warships to be created for the Far Eastern needs.
In the intervals between these two meetings, some of the admirals who participated in them expressed their views in writing. Perhaps the most conservative (if not mossy) were the views of Vice Admiral N. I. Kazakov, who believed that the Russian battleships were good enough and did not need an increase in speed and displacement, and said absolutely nothing about the reconnaissance cruiser. Vice-Admiral I. M. Dikov, in his note, recommended setting the proportion according to which one battleship of the squadron should have one small reconnaissance cruiser and one destroyer.
Perhaps the most interesting and sensible program was presented by Vice Admiral N. I. Skrydlov: in addition to the three battleships of the "Poltava" and "Peresvet" type with the "Oslyabey", he proposed to build another "battleship-cruiser" of the "Peresvet" class and three large 15,000-ton battleships. Thus, the Pacific Squadron would receive nine battleships of three types, three units each, while the latter could be created completely equal to those that Japan ordered for itself in England. To these formidable line forces N. I. Skrydlov recommended adding the same number of reconnaissance cruisers (one for each battleship) with a displacement of 3,000 - 4,000 tons.
But the most "florid" structure was proposed by the future governor of His Imperial Majesty in the Far East, and at that time so far "only" Vice-Admiral Ye. A. Alekseev, who proposed to form a squadron of eight battleships, eight armored cruisers, eight large armored cruisers with a displacement of 5,000 - 6,000 tons and eight small reconnaissance cruisers, but not one, but two whole types. E. A. Alekseev proposed building four small cruisers of 3,000 - 3,500 tons each, and the same amount with a displacement of less than 1,500 tons.
As we have already said, the reconnaissance cruiser was a new type of warship, which had no analogues in the Russian Imperial Navy before. The squadron battleships, although they did not trace their ancestry from the sailing battleships of the gray times, performed the same function and task - the defeat of the main enemy forces in a linear battle. Domestic cruisers, as a class of ships, gradually grew out of frigates, corvettes and clippers, but here, in fact, everything is not easy. The evolution of frigates is most understandable - the latter, having first received steam engines and iron hulls, then turned into armored cruisers.
But the development of corvettes and clippers went in a more confusing way. At the time of the sailing fleet, the corvette was intended for reconnaissance and messenger service, and as such could be considered a distant ancestor of the Novik, but the fact is that with the advent of the steam era, this class of ships in the domestic fleet very quickly evolved into a "purebred" cruiser, then there is a ship whose main task is to disrupt enemy shipping. As for the clippers, their first propeller-driven representatives in the domestic fleet were generally intended for the defense of the White Sea in the north, and could be seen rather as a kind of high-speed version of a gunboat. However, a little later it was considered necessary to charge clippers with ocean cruising. And it turned out that Russia began to design and build corvettes and clippers as light ocean cruisers: accordingly, having similar tasks, the ships of these classes quickly approached in their tactical and technical characteristics. In fact, in the 1860s, the Russian clipper was a ship, about a quarter lighter than a corvette and with lighter armament, but at the same time surpassing the corvette in speed.
It is not surprising that the construction of two classes of ships for the Russian fleet, designed to solve practically the same tasks, could not be justified: sooner or later, corvettes and clippers had to either merge into one class, or else receive different tasks that justify the existence of both classes. For some time, the first way prevailed: with the advent of the era of metal hulls, the construction of corvettes stopped, only frigates and clippers were laid. Of course, we are talking about clippers of the "Cruiser" type - but alas, it would be difficult to come up with a ship less suitable for use as a reconnaissance officer in a squadron than Russian clippers with a metal hull.
With their small size (1,334 tons) and, accordingly, cost, the “Cruiser” clippers were very slow-moving, losing in speed even to much larger domestic armored frigates. Laid down in 1873The "cruiser" under the steam engine was supposed to give 12 knots, but the armored "General-Admiral" and "Duke of Edinburgh", the construction of which began in 1869 and 1872. accordingly, they were calculated for a speed of 14 knots, although in fact, due to overload, it developed a little more than 13 knots. But the advanced sailing armament of the "Cruiser" was supposed to provide it with a sailing speed of up to 13 knots, which, of course, was not expected from armored frigates. The high speed under sail, no doubt, seriously increased the autonomy of the clippers, but did not help at all for service with the squadron. Yes, as a matter of fact, they did not need it, because at the time of the construction of the "Cruisers" no squadron in which they could serve did not exist in nature. The Russian empire, constrained in funds, then abandoned the construction of battleships, preferring a cruising strategy and focusing on armored frigates and clippers. Thus, “in the face” of “Cruiser” clippers, the Russian fleet received very specific ships, specialized for operations on enemy communications, and in addition, capable of displaying the flag and representing the interests of Russia abroad. As for the corvettes, they were not built … or rather, not quite so, because the armored "General-Admiral" and "Duke of Edinburgh" were originally designed as armored corvettes, but then were enlisted in the "frigate" rank.
As the years passed, it became clear that the clipper concept no longer justified itself, and that faster and more powerful ships were needed for operations on ocean communications. These were the "Vityaz" and "Rynda" - the first armored cruisers of the Russian Empire, which were not very fast, but much larger (3,000 tons), and better armed ships than the "Cruiser".
Since the "Vityaz" and "Rynda" took an intermediate position between armored frigates and clippers, they were called corvettes when they were laid down, so this class of ships was briefly revived in the Russian fleet - only to give rise to armored cruisers. But the history of clippers in the domestic shipbuilding ended there.
Thus, despite the presence in the Russian Imperial Navy of two classes of ships, identical to a light cruiser, both corvettes and clippers were created primarily for ocean cruising, and could in no way be considered a prototype of a reconnaissance cruiser with a squadron, and the same, in general, refers to the first armored cruisers of the Russian fleet - "Vityaz" and "Rynda", and then came a long vacation in the construction of ships of this class. In the period from 1883 to 1896, only two such ships were ordered: the armored cruisers Admiral Kornilov and Svetlana. But the first of them continued the line of development of the "Vityaz" in the direction of the ocean cruiser to fight on communications - it was a very large ship, whose normal displacement was calculated to be 5,300 tons
As for the "Svetlana", its dimensions were more modest (a little more than 3,900 tons of normal displacement), but you need to understand that this ship was not the embodiment of the tactical views of the admirals, but a whim of Admiral General Alexei Alexandrovich, who was impatient (another word and not pick up) to have a personal yacht in the form of an armored cruiser, for which he picked up a French prototype that suits him. In other words, the fighting qualities of "Svetlana" during its design and construction faded into the background, this cruiser did not fit into the concept of the domestic fleet and, accordingly, there could be no talk of building a series of such ships at domestic shipyards - admirals of the Russian fleet this type of ships seemed unnecessary.
Further development of armored cruisers led to the appearance of ships of the "Pallada" type, laid down at domestic shipyards in 1897. Here, our naval thought swung (I must say, very unsuccessfully) to create a cruiser capable of both raiding the ocean and conducting reconnaissance and patrol service with the squadron. Naturally, such versatility had to be paid for in size, and in general, of course, the Pallada, Diana and Aurora did not at all resemble a specialized reconnaissance squadron cruiser.
It so happened that until 1897 (well, well, until 1895) a ship of this type was completely unnecessary, but then our admirals suddenly needed it in large quantities. What tasks did they set for this subclass of cruisers? E. A. Alekseev believed that such ships: "should serve as forzails, scouts, and messenger cruisers with the squadron to convey important and urgent orders to detachments or ships operating separately from the fleet" ships less than 1,500 tons must also make measurements and reconnaissance off the coast and at port entrances, which is why they needed a shallow draft.
Vice-Admiral I. M. Dikov considered speed as the main quality of a reconnaissance cruiser. Such a ship, in his opinion, “can and should evade any battle, during reconnaissance, caring not about small victories and military distinction of personnel, but about the execution of the instructions given to him … … intelligence services are proportional not to the speeds, but to almost the squares of the speeds of the scouts."
It seems to be a rather strange picture - almost all vice admirals spoke in favor of the construction of small reconnaissance cruisers, highly specialized for service with the squadron in huge numbers (one for each battleship), and yet some two years ago the question of their construction was "Safely" released on the brakes. Such a paradox can be explained by the fact that by 1897 in the Baltic the fleet received an armored squadron of relatively modern ships and already had some experience of their joint actions. We are talking about two "battleships-battering rams" of the "Emperor Alexander II" type, as well as "Sisoy the Great" and "Navarino", of which the first three at the end of 1896 - beginning of 1897. together with the mine cruisers and destroyers attached to them, they formed the Mediterranean squadron. The latter even had to take part in an "operation close to combat" - the blockade of Fr. Crete, declared 6 March 1897 (old style). And it can be assumed that it was the practice of driving an armored squadron that showed the extreme need for specialized cruisers for squadron service. After all, creating the newest battleships, the Russian Empire did not bother with the ships "serving" them at all, and those that were in the fleet were not suitable for such work. The armored cruisers were large oceanic raiders, the clippers that remained in service were too slow-moving (even slower than battleships), mine cruisers did not have enough speed and seaworthiness, and the destroyers, although they had sufficient speed (Sokol-class ships developed 26.5 knots), but they had too small a displacement and, as a result, quickly lost this speed during rough seas, without having sufficient autonomy.
During the Special Meeting, the Admiral General, who, apparently, was somewhat shocked by the admirals' demand to build such a number of reconnaissance cruisers, proposed to abandon them, and to strengthen the Pacific Squadron with one or even a pair of the latest battleships with the saved funds. But the rest of the admirals rejected this proposal in chorus, pointing out, among other things, that now, in the absence of other ships, service with the squadron has to be assigned to gunboats of the Koreets and Thundering types, which were completely unsuitable for this role. It can be assumed that despite the fact that gunboats were never intended for squadron service at all, other ships of the domestic navy were even less suitable for it.
True, on the Black Sea, such a formation has existed since 1899, when the first three battleships of the "Catherine II" type entered service, and, in theory, the need for reconnaissance cruisers should have been identified a long time ago. What prevented this is difficult to say: perhaps it was the fact that the Black Sea battleships were considered primarily as a means of capturing the Bosphorus and a counter battle with the ships of the European powers in it, if the latter stood up for Turkey. Perhaps, the remoteness of the Black Sea theater from St. Petersburg had an effect, due to which the latter was not as "in sight" as the Baltic one, and less attention was paid to its problems. But in any case, it should be noted that Vice Admiral I. M. Dikov, in his note, referred to some "experiments in the Black Sea", which irrefutably testified to the need for small high-speed cruisers as part of an armored squadron. Unfortunately, the author of this article could not find out what kind of "experiments" they were, but it is obvious that the Black Sea squadron, which by the end of 1897 already consisted of six battleships (four types "Catherine II", "Twelve Apostles" and "Three Saints"), also experienced a great need for ships of this type.
A special meeting determined the composition of the Pacific squadron in 10 squadron battleships (including three ships of the Sevastopol type and two Peresvet types under construction), four armored cruisers, 10 armored cruisers of the 1st rank and 10 armored cruisers of the 2nd rank - the same scout cruisers. In addition, it was also planned to bring the total number of mine forces in the Far East to 2 minelayers, 36 "fighters" and 11 destroyers. Subsequently, however, by the Special Meeting of 1898, this composition underwent some changes - one armored cruiser was added, and the armored cruisers of the 2nd rank were reduced to six. Despite all this, the shipbuilding program for the needs of the Far East should be recognized as quite timely and adequate - but alas, its adoption was marked by events that largely predetermined the outcome of the Russian-Japanese war.
The fact is that such a naval construction, of course, was a very costly business and required about 200 million rubles. The naval department wished to receive this money before 1903, since its specialists were able to accurately predict the year when Japan would complete its rearmament at sea and would be ready to enter the war. This is exactly what happened in reality. However, the domestic Ministry of Finance, represented by its head S. Yu. Witte opposed this, for some reason deciding that Japan would not be able to arm itself until 1905. Therefore, the Minister of Finance proposed extending the financing of the program until 1905, and in addition, reducing it by at least 50 million. The naval department categorically disagreed with such proposals, as a result of which a meeting was held on February 20, 1898 under the chairmanship of the tsar. On it, a compromise decision was made - to retain funding in the amount of 200 million rubles, but to stretch it until 1905. As a result, the Russian Empire did not manage to concentrate the necessary forces in the Far East before the outbreak of the war in January 1904 business, if by the winter of 1903 the squadron of Port Arthur had not 7, but 10 battleships? The "great standing" in Port Arthur was justified by the inappropriateness of giving a general battle with the 5 remaining battleships and the Bayan to H. Togo's squadron, which, even after the separation of four Kamimura armored cruisers from it, consisted of 6 battleships and 2 large armored cruisers (which were soon joined by Nissin "and" Kasuga ", but what if at the beginning of the war the Russians hadeven taking into account the failure of the Retvizan and the Tsarevich, would eight battleships remain on the move? The statistics of the battle on January 27, 1904 at Port Arthur irrefutably testifies that at the beginning of the war the Japanese were not at all so superior to the Russian gunners so that it guaranteed them victory … And after S. O. Makarov, with such a balance of forces, a general battle would have been predetermined.
But back to the scout cruisers.
Having decided to build the latter, it was necessary to determine the tactical and technical characteristics of the ships. Oddly enough, there were no particular differences of opinion among the admirals, and in March 1898 the Marine Technical Committee (MTK) formulated the following tactical and technical elements (TTE) of the future cruiser:
Normal displacement - 3,000 tons with a coal reserve of 360 tons;
Speed - 25 knots;
The cruising range is 5,000 miles at an economic speed of 10 knots;
Armament - 6 * 120-mm, 6 * 47-mm, one 63 landing, 5-mm Baranovsky cannon, 6 torpedo tubes with 12 torpedoes, 25 min.
Armor is the thickest deck that can be obtained without compromising the above characteristics.
These characteristics suited everyone … well, almost everyone. Vice-Admiral S. O. Makarov, as you know, promoted the idea of "armored ship", which, with a similar displacement, would have completely different qualities. For the first time, Stepan Osipovich voiced the idea of his cruiser in Chifu, in 1895, and remained a supporter of it until his death.
"Armorless ship", according to S. O. Makarov, was supposed to be an armored, very heavily armed (2 * 203-mm, 4 * 152-mm, 12 * 75-mm guns) cruiser of a very moderate speed (20 knots) and a displacement (3,000 tons), but a fairly long cruising range - up to 6,000 miles.
Usually, sources indicate that Stepan Osipovich, without rejecting the need for long-range reconnaissance, believed that high speed for the ships performing it was not mandatory, and explained this by the fact that the situation would still constantly change, and the data of such intelligence would, in any case, be outdated … This is not entirely true, because S. O. Makarov recognized the importance of speed in reconnaissance, but did not see the point in building a large number of reconnaissance ships, whose fighting qualities were sacrificed for speed. In his essay "Battleships or Armorless Ships?" he wrote:
“It is recognized the need to have ships for the intelligence service, and that such ships should sail faster than enemy ships, so that, having opened them, it would be possible to evade the battle and report the news to their ships. If for this it was necessary for every 100,000 tons of combat strength to have 10,000 tons of reconnaissance ships, then it would be possible to make peace with the weakness of artillery and their other combat shortcomings, but it is believed that reconnaissance ships are needed much more, and then the question arises, is it not better reconnaissance should be carried out by such vessels that are built for artillery and mine combat, and in a decisive battle they can fight in line with everyone else."
As you know, S. O. Makarov believed that his "armored ships" could not only fight alongside battleships, but could even replace them.
In general, of course, the vice admiral's opinion seemed too unusual and could not be accepted (much later Stepan Osipovich still “pushed through” the construction of one such ship, but these plans were immediately canceled after his death). We will not now assess the proposal of S. O. Makarov and will return to it already at the final stage of this series of articles, when we will analyze the actions and capabilities of Novik and the high-speed domestic cruisers of the 2nd rank that followed. Now we just state that, when developing the technical specifications for the design of reconnaissance cruisers, Stepan Osipovich's opinion was ignored.
I must say that two design assignments were developed: the first of them contained the above TTE for a three-thousand-ton 25-knot ship, and the second involved bringing the cruiser speed … up to 30 knots. Unfortunately, some detailed performance characteristics of the "30-knot" cruiser have not yet been found, but it can be assumed that the firms were asked to determine the reduction in performance characteristics of the "25-knot" cruiser, which would be required to ensure a speed of 30 knots.
The exact date of the announcement of the competition for the design of the future Novik, unfortunately, is unknown to the author, presumably - the first days of April 1898. And the first response was received by the Maritime Department on April 10 - the German company Hovaldswerke from Kiel sent its proposals.
