So, in the previous article we came to a fairly obvious conclusion - unfortunately, the battlecruisers of the "Izmail" class looked good only against the background of the battlecruisers of England and Germany ("Tiger" and "Lutzov") simultaneously laid down with them. At the same time, the sailors themselves saw the Ishmaels as a kind of battleships, and it was not for nothing that on March 5, 1912, the specialists of the Naval General Staff (MGSh) in the note presented to the State Duma "On the issue of the program of reinforced shipbuilding in 1912-1916." pointed out: "These cruisers are only a kind of battleships, not inferior to the latter in the strength of artillery weapons, armor and surpassing them in speed and area of action."
However, the frankly weak armor of the Izmailov was significantly inferior to that of modern battleships (for example, the British Queen Elizabeth, laid down even earlier than domestic battle cruisers), with the exception, perhaps, only of horizontal protection. If the domestic 356-mm / 52 gun had reached the passport performance characteristics, then the 12 * 356-mm guns could be considered the equivalent of 8 * 381-mm, but taking into account the fact that the real muzzle velocity of the domestic 747, 8 kg of the projectile turned out to be almost 100 m / sec lower than planned, in terms of armament "Izmail" was significantly inferior to any battleship armed with 380-mm guns. Thus, the only advantage of these Russian ships was their relatively high speed, but it could not, of course, compensate for the lag in other parameters - good high-speed battleships from Izmail did not work out. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the process of their construction a number of projects for their improvement arose.
Let's consider them in more detail.
The first large-scale project of cardinal strengthening of protection was drawn up on the initiative of Vice Admiral M. V. Bubnov, who, without asking permission from his immediate superiors, authorized the development of this project by the Baltic plant in 1913, after firing at the "experimental ship" Chesma ". I must say that on the one hand, this project is described in the literature in sufficient detail, but on the other … it is very unclear.
The fact is that the main "chips" of this project usually indicate an increase in the thickness of the armor belt from 241.3 mm (in fact it was 237.5 mm) to 300 or even 305 mm, and the armor of the turrets - from 305 mm (forehead) and 254 mm (side plates) up to 406 mm both there and there, while the roof was supposed to consist of 254 mm armor plates instead of 200 mm. However, in other documents, completely different thicknesses appear - a belt of 273 mm, while the armoring of the rotating part of the towers remains unchanged. How so?
Most likely, the matter is as follows. Initially, the designers of the Baltic plant were guided precisely by 300 or 305 mm armor belts and reinforced turret armor. But when it turned out that the domestic industry could not produce armor plates of the required size thicker than 273 mm and that the strengthening of the armor of the towers would lead to the need to rework their design, since the mechanisms were not designed to set such a weight in motion, the engineers "backed down" a little, and now what they did.
The main armor belt was proposed to be increased from 241, 3 mm to 273 mm, while the 50, 8 armor bulkhead between the middle and lower decks remained. The bevels of the lower deck also remained, but their thickness decreased from 76.2 mm to 50.8 mm. Outside the citadel, the thickness of the main armor belt increased from 127-100 mm (in fact, the armor had from 112.5 to 125 mm) to 203 mm. Thus, in general, we can talk about strengthening the vertical protection at the level of the main armor belt.
But the upper armor belt was weakened. In the original version, along the citadel (and even a little beyond), its thickness was supposed to be 102 mm, while behind it along the towers of the main caliber there was an additional 25.4 mm armor bulkhead from the middle to the upper deck. Further in the bow and stern, the upper belt had a thickness of 76, 2 mm. In the project of the Baltic plant, the upper belt had a thickness of 76.2 mm throughout, while the 25.4 mm armored bulkhead was removed behind it. In addition to weakening the upper armored belt, the designers of the Bali plant removed 25.4 mm of armored bulkheads between the casemates, thereby returning the Izmals in the days of the first armored "Rurik".
The protection of the rotating part of the turrets remained the same - forehead / side / roof 305/254/203 mm. But on the other hand, the barbet was strengthened - from 254 mm (upper ring) and 127 mm (lower) to 273 mm and 216 mm, respectively.
Alas, the vertical armoring of the hull above the main deck was canceled, from the word "absolutely" (the barbet of the tower, of course, was retained).
At the same time, it is completely unclear how the issue with the casemates of 130-mm anti-mine guns located in the forecastle was resolved - apparently, it was proposed to leave them completely unprotected. The booking of the chimney bases was also canceled. The thickness of the conning tower also decreased - its walls above the deck remained 406 mm, but below the main deck their protection decreased from 305 mm to 203 mm, the roof of the conning tower - from 254 mm to 203 mm.
However, the most unpleasant changes awaited horizontal armor protection. The upper deck, which was supposed to receive 38.1 mm armor (and even 50.8 mm above the casemates, however, in the final project, the entire upper deck was armored with 37.5 mm), according to the project of the Baltic plant, it was thinned to 25.4 mm. The middle deck, which in the project had 57 mm between 50, 8 vertical armored bulkheads (in the final version - 60 mm) and 19 mm closer to the sides (above the bevels), received 50, 8 mm across the entire width. The horizontal part of the lower deck did not carry armor, and the bevels, as we said earlier, were reduced from 76.2 mm to 50.8 mm. At the same time, according to the final project, "Izmail" was supposed to receive two armored decks outside the citadel below the waterline: it is known that in the very first version of the Baltic Shipyard project they were abandoned (at least partially), and whether they were later returned - alas, it is unclear.
I must say that such a rebooking left, at least, a very ambiguous impression. On the one hand, an increase in the thickness of the main armor belt and barbets could only be welcomed. But on the other …
Strictly speaking, neither 238.5 mm, nor 241.3 mm, nor 273 mm armor were reliable protection against high-quality armor-piercing 343-381 mm shells. Such projectiles were quite confidently pierced by any of these armor plates at a distance of 70-75 kbt, with small deviations from the normal. At the same time, the 50.8 mm armor bulkhead and bevels did not represent serious protection against an armor-piercing projectile that passed through the main armor belt - even if it exploded immediately after passing through the 273 mm armor plate, they would not be able to keep its fragments, which was shown by artillery experiments in 1920 d. But usually the fuses of armor-piercing projectiles were set at such a deceleration that would allow them to detonate not immediately behind the pierced armor, but at some distance - this was done so that such a projectile could go deep inside the ship, reaching the engine rooms, boiler rooms, and even artillery cellars.
Thus, it was to be expected that an armor-piercing projectile that pierced the 273 mm belt of Ishmael would not explode immediately, but continued its flight, hitting an armored bulkhead or a bevel - but in this case, even if it detonated immediately, 50, 8 mm armor could not hold him even in principle. Even 75 mm armor could withstand the explosion of such a projectile 1-1.5 m away from itself, but in no case on the armor plate.
And now it turns out interesting. On the one hand, of course, an armor plate with a thickness of 273 mm will noticeably surpass 238.5 mm in its ability not to miss an enemy armor-piercing projectile inside the ship as a whole. But … if we use the calculations of E. A. Berkalov, then we will come to very interesting conclusions.
According to him, a 356-mm projectile at a distance of 70 kbt penetrates 273-mm armor, passing through it as a whole at an angle of deviation from the normal up to 33 degrees. (that is, the angle between the trajectory of the projectile and the plate will be 57 degrees or more). If such a projectile hits the armor plate at an angle to the normal from 34 to about 45 degrees, then it will pierce the armor, but - exploding in the process of overcoming it. However, in this case, fragments of armor and a projectile may well hit the 50.8 mm armor of the bevels behind the pierced armor plate (with a high probability - at an angle of 33 and with a near-zero angle - at 45).
At the same time, the 356-mm projectile as a whole will overcome the 238.5 mm armor plate at an angle of deviation from the normal of 38-39 degrees, and will explode in the process of overcoming it at an angle of 40 to approximately 49 degrees. But at the same time, not the shell fragments that exploded in the armor plate, in any case, will not pierce the 75 mm bevel.
It turns out interesting - of course, the armor resistance of the 273-mm plate is better, but at the same time the old protection scheme (238.5 mm side + 75 mm bevel) provides protection against the projectile and its fragments when it deviates from the normal by 40 degrees or more (that is, under angle to the plate 50 degrees). A 273 mm armor belt plus a 50.8 mm bevel can theoretically be pierced at an angle of deviation of the projectile from the normal of 45 degrees (at an angle to the plate of 45 degrees). - that is, it turns out that, taking into account the impact of fragments, the protection of 238.5 mm + 75 mm bevel is actually even better than the 273 mm plus 50.8 mm offered by the Baltic plant!
Of course, this is nothing more than theoretical calculations. And, of course, the 273 mm belt is much more preferable against projectiles less than 343 mm, as well as semi-armor-piercing projectiles of a larger caliber - here the chances of not letting the explosion energy inside are much greater than for armor plates with a thickness of 238.5 mm. But in general, we have to admit that the Baltic plant project did not give any global superiority over the old scheme in terms of the main armor belt at the level of bevels. Above, at the level of 50.8 mm armor bulkheads, the improvement was more noticeable - where the armor space was protected by 238.5 mm armor plus a vertical bulkhead of the specified thickness, now the protection was 273 + 50.8 mm. Not too much of an advantage, but still we must remember that behind them the barbets of the turrets of the main caliber had no armor at all - here, not a single extra millimeter would be superfluous.
Enhanced armoring of extremities is a highly controversial innovation. Actually, neither the armor intended for installation of 102-127 mm, nor the proposed 203 mm from armor-piercing shells, almost completely protected, however, from semi-armor-piercing and high-explosive, the protection of 203 mm was certainly better, but was such an increase in the mass of the armor spent on it worth it? Barbet protection has also received a boost, but not as much as it might seem. Of course, the top ring, which has grown from 254 (in fact, even from 247.5 mm) to 273 mm thick, has become stronger. But this cannot be said so unequivocally about the lower one.
No, of course, 216 mm is noticeably thicker than 122, 5-147, 5 mm in the final draft, but you need to understand that in addition to the latter, 102 mm of armor of the upper belt and 25, 4 mm of an armored partition were also attached, thus the total thickness reached 249, 9-274, 9 mm, while according to the Baltic project, the total thickness of the barbets and armor belt was 216 + 76, 2 = 292, 2 mm. However, it should be noted that spaced armor "holds the punch" worse than monolithic, and in this respect, the 216 mm barbet was still preferable. But, again, this was not a dramatic improvement - strictly speaking, all of this would have been pierced by quality 343-381 mm shells quite well.
But the price to pay for these improvements was the drastic weakening of the horizontal defense. The fact is that the Izmail's one was very good, especially from shells with a caliber of 305 mm and below - the upper deck 37, 5 mm thick practically guaranteed their detonation when hit, and then they hit the armor space in the form of fragments. And here 60 mm of the middle deck (or at the sides of the 19 mm middle and 75 mm bevels) was, perhaps, enough to hold the fragments of exploding shells. And even if the enemy projectile did not hit the upper deck, but the side of the battle cruiser, the 102-mm belt and 25.4 mm bulkhead gave at least some hope that the high-explosive projectile would detonate, and the armor-piercing projectile would normalize (that is will reduce the angle of incidence), which gave some chances of a ricochet or a shell burst above the deck.
And for the project of the Baltic Shipyard, the upper deck was only 25.4 mm, which was not enough for the detonation of shells during its passage. Thus, the enemy shell, hitting the upper deck, broke through it almost certainly, and then only 50.8 mm of armor separated it from the engine, boiler rooms and supply pipes of the main caliber towers. That is, such a reservation did not guarantee protection even against 305-mm shells. In the case of hitting the upper belt, it also turned out badly - the place was 102 + 25 mm of vertical protection and 60 mm of horizontal, enemy shells met only 76, 2 mm of vertical and 50, 8 mm of horizontal protection.
In view of the above, we can safely say that the project of the Baltic Shipyard was a classic "Trishkin caftan", when in order to strengthen (and not total) individual elements of protection, others were radically weakened. The overall protection of the cruiser practically did not increase, but its normal displacement increased from the initial 32,500 tons to 35,417 tons, while the speed dropped from 26, 5 to 26 knots, and the readiness time shifted from 1916 to 1918. re-equipment of the battle cruisers did not make any sense, and therefore it is not surprising that the project was never given a go and the Ishmaels were built with minimal changes from the original project.
We will not dwell on the vicissitudes of the construction of these ships.
Let's just note that on the one hand, the experience of building dreadnoughts of the "Sevastopol" type had a very beneficial effect both on domestic shipbuilding and on the understanding of the need for timely financing of military orders. In general, before the start of the First World War, the construction deadlines were more or less respected, and some emerging lag, in general, was not critical. But two factors greatly affected the readiness of battle cruisers - firstly, the inability of the Russian Empire to build such large ships completely independently, as a result of which a number of important components (such as metal balls for shoulder straps of rotating turret parts) had to be ordered abroad. The second factor was the outbreak of the First World War - the parts that were ordered by Germany and Austria-Hungary (I wonder who guessed to order them there?) The Entente, alas, was also "in no hurry" to enter the warehouses. Yes, and in Russia itself, many changes took place at the enterprises, since no one expected that the war would drag on for many years, and when it turned out - the enterprises were inundated with orders from the front, many workers were mobilized, in addition, naturally there were priority tasks for repair and maintenance. combat capability of the operating fleet. All this greatly slowed down the construction of Izmail-class battlecruisers, and already on July 4, 1915, three of the four battlecruisers were transferred to the second stage (that is, they deliberately refused to complete them until the end of the war). In fact, the construction of 356-mm turret installations was so strongly "torpedoed" by the lack of components that even for the lead "Izmail" they could have been assembled with great difficulty unless in 1918, and even that is far from a fact.
In principle, having gathered its strength, the Russian Empire, perhaps, could have transferred Izmail to the fleet at the beginning of 1918, but this was prevented by other military orders, including the construction of submarines of the AG series and the creation of two-gun 356-mm towers for the fortress. Peter the Great. The fleet would be ready to sacrifice the latter in favor of the completion of the Ishmael, but on condition that the latter will definitely go into operation at least in the spring of 1918 - alas, at the time of the decision (May 1916) even such terms were not guaranteed. As a result, the navy preferred a "tit in hand" - it was assumed that the coastal battery of turret 356-mm guns could be ready in 1917. This decision may have completely destroyed the possibility of completing the battle cruiser "Izmail" during the war years, or, at least, bringing it to a state in which the ship could be completed after the war, in the USSR. As of April 1917, Izmail had 65% readiness for the hull, 36% for the installed armor, 66% for the boilers and mechanisms, but the readiness of the towers was pushed back to 1919, and not even to the beginning. and at the end of the year - and even that was considered a fairly optimistic period.
Work on "Izmail" was finally stopped on December 1, 1917.
The second attempt to redesign the Ishmael on a large scale was made already in Soviet times, but before proceeding to its description, it is worth saying a few words about the development of 406-mm artillery systems in tsarist Russia.
This question was raised on July 18, 1912 by the head of the artillery department of the Main Directorate of the General Administration, Lieutenant General A. F. Brink, who presented a report on the advantages of the 406-mm artillery system over the 356-mm. According to the data provided by him, it turned out:
“… even if only 8 406-mm / 45 guns had to be installed instead of 12 356-mm / 52 guns, then, with the same accuracy, the weight of the metal of the shells and the explosive introduced into the enemy ship per unit of time would remain the same, the destructive the effect of 406-mm shells, due to the significant superiority of the penetrating effect and the higher concentration of the explosive, will be much greater ….
But then, alas, everything went as usual. The Obukhov plant, overwhelmed with orders, openly "dynamic" the development and production of an experimental 406-mm cannon (in fact, at that time they could barely cope with the 356-mm). As a result, it turned out like this: the preliminary design of the gun was ready in 1912, work on the creation of an experimental machine for it was going on in 1913, and at the same time it was decided to consider this gun the main caliber of the fleet for future battleships. The project for the modernization of the Obukhov plant, as well as the construction of the new Tsaritsyn plant, included machines and equipment for the serial production of 406-mm artillery systems. But the order for the manufacture of an experimental gun, alas, was not issued in 1913. The outfit for its manufacture, alas, was issued only on February 28, 1914, and although work on it began, the war put an end to these undertakings.
At the same time, apparently well understanding the problems of the Obukhov plant, which missed all the deadlines for the creation of a 356-mm / 52 gun, on which a new 406-mm artillery system was now "loaded", the GUK proposed at the beginning of 1914, without stopping work on a 406-mm gun in his native country, order the development of a similar gun abroad. The choice fell on the Vickers company, with which he already had considerable experience of fruitful work, and which also had its own interest in this matter.
The fact is that the Vickers specialists perfectly understood that the classical scheme according to which the English guns were created (wire) had already exhausted itself, and that the future belongs to the fastened guns (which were done in Germany and Russia). And, of course, it would be quite nice to get experience in creating a heavy weapon of this design - for Russian money. Thus, there was a complete unity of interests between the customer and the manufacturer, and it is not surprising that the business went well and quickly.
However - not entirely good, because our Naval Ministry strangely did not bother with the creation of 406-mm shells for this gun - while the gun itself was made by the British and ready for testing in August 1916, 100 shells for it "Vickers" ordered only in October 1916. Accordingly, the tests were started a year later, in August 1917. Had the shells been ordered on time, and, in all likelihood, the Russian Empire would have had time to receive samples of the 406-mm cannon before its fall, but well …
Nevertheless, the 406-mm / 45 Vickers cannon demonstrated excellent results in every respect. A projectile weighing 1,116 kg with a charge of Russian gunpowder weighing 332 kg reached an initial speed of 766, 5 m / s, which exceeded the calculated one (758 m / s). Moreover, after conducting the tests, the British considered that the gun was capable of more: it was assumed that it was possible to increase the mass of the charge up to 350 kg, with which the gun, without prejudice to its design, could provide an initial projectile speed of 799 m / s! But even with an initial speed of 766.5 m / s, the new artillery system surpassed in muzzle energy the British 381 mm / 42 gun by 33%, and the domestic 356 mm / 52 gun (taking into account the actually achieved initial projectile speed of 731.5 m / sec) - almost 64%!
So, back to the Ishmaels. At the beginning of the 1920s, the following idea arose from them: to complete the construction of the lead ship "as is", because work on the hull, mechanisms and turrets of the main caliber had gone far enough (however, the terms of completion of the fourth tower were at least 24 months, and individual mechanisms - possibly 30 months). The second ship - "Borodino" - was to be built with some changes, the main one of which would be the replacement of three-gun 356-mm turrets with two-gun 406-mm / 52. And, finally, to study the possibility of completing the "Kinburn" and "Navarin" according to a completely changed project, taking into account the experience of the just past World War I as much as possible.
Professor of the Maritime Academy L. G. Goncharov (the author of the very work "Course of Naval Tactics. Artillery and Armor", which is regularly referred to by the author of this article) and engineer P. G. Goinkis. Thanks to their efforts, four variants of modernization of the Izmail-class battle cruisers were prepared. We will consider the most perfect option # 4, and start with the changes concerning the ship's armor system. In fact, it is extremely simple: in terms of hull armor, 238.5 mm armor plates of the main belt were replaced with 300 mm armor, and the middle deck, which, according to the initial project, consisted of 20 mm steel substrate, on top of which 40 mm of armor steel was laid (total thickness 60 mm), received an additional 35 mm of armor (total thickness 95 mm).
It is interesting that the respected L. A. Kuznetsov, whose monograph has become one of the main sources in the preparation of this series of articles, considers the best booking scheme for option number 3, but there is something to argue about. This option meant the elimination of bevels and 50, 8 mm armored bulkheads between the lower and middle decks (their thickness was reduced to 20 and 15 mm, respectively, while ordinary steel should have been used for their manufacture), but the middle deck received 95 mm thickness. only between 50, 8 mm armored partitions, and from side to side, becoming solid. However, the upper belt of 100 mm of armor was reduced to 12 + 25 mm (probably one-inch armor, laid on top of 12 mm of the side plating).
On the one hand, a solid 95 mm deck is, of course, a definite plus. But a plus, achieved at a very high price - the fact is that such protection had the hope of holding a 343 mm projectile and above only if it would have collided with the upper 37.5 mm deck before. If the projectile flew through the side between the upper and middle decks (where there used to be a 100 mm belt), then it, "not noticing" the thin side sheathing, hit the deck, and even if it did not pass through it as a whole, it still caused would be hit by shell fragments and the very deck of the armored space. But in variant No. 4, the projectile would first have to overcome the 100 mm belt, which, perhaps, had some chances to normalize the high-explosive or semi-armor-piercing projectiles and make them explode not on the 95 mm deck, but above it - in this case, the protection is probably the same as would hold out. I must say that option No. 4 was also not devoid of shortcomings, there was a trajectory in which the projectile, hitting the 100 mm upper belt, then pierces the 12 mm deck and 50, 8 mm armored partition, passing into the armor space, but it is relatively small … But in variant No. 3, almost any hit of a heavy projectile between the upper and middle decks, perhaps, would have led to the penetration of the protection and destruction of vehicles, boilers, etc. shrapnel. In addition, as far as is known, the projects did not provide for the re-booking of barbets - and in this case, in the absence of a 100 mm armored belt and 25 mm armored partitions, the lower part of the barbet, which had a thickness of only 122, 5-147, 5 mm, would not have had any additional protection. which was completely unacceptable. As for countering aerial bombs, here option No. 3 had a preference - after all, the combination of 37.5 mm of the upper deck and 95 mm of the middle deck is better than the 37.5 + 75 mm bevel.
Thus, the advantages of option No. 3 in terms of horizontal booking, although there are, are far from indisputable, but the price paid for them is too high. The fact is that the 300 mm citadel looked great against 305 mm shells, decently against 343 mm, somehow against - 356 mm, but against heavier shells, alas, it did not represent serious protection. Here it would be more likely to count not on the fact that an enemy armor-piercing one would not be able to penetrate 300 mm armor plate, but on the fact that it would not pass through it as a whole, and it was here that 75 mm bevels and 50, 8 mm armor plates could play a key role. But in project No. 3 they were not, as a result, a shell hitting the main belt, opposite the supply pipes of the main battery towers, pierced 300 mm of armor and hit right "on purpose" - the barbets of the towers were armored only up to the level of the middle deck.
Accordingly, we still allow ourselves to assert that the best booking option was option No. 4.
In addition to the above, in both versions, it was envisaged to strengthen the armor of the towers: the forehead is 400 mm, the side walls are 300 mm, the roof is 250 mm. Any other somewhat significant differences from the original booking option by projects compiled by L. G. Goncharov and P. G. Goinkis was not provided.
As for the weapons, in both cases, 24 130-mm guns were retained as mine-action artillery, but the main caliber was supposed to be 8 * 406-mm / 45 based on the artillery system made by Vickers. It was assumed that the leadership of Foggy Albion would not prevent this company from supplying such weapons to the USSR. Leaving the peculiarities of the then international diplomacy outside the scope of the article, we note that the weapons of the Izmailovs with 8 * 406-mm cannons transferred them to a completely different level. We have already said that the muzzle energy of this artillery system was 33% higher than that of the famous British 15-inch. Taking into account the fact that in the post-war tests an armor-piercing shell of the British 381-mm / 42 artillery system at a distance of 77.5 cables easily penetrated the 350-mm armor of the frontal plate of the Baden turret, it can be stated that not a single battleship in the world, before the appearance of battleships of the era Second World War, did not have protection against 406-mm / 45 guns of the firm "Vickers".
Of course, the ship's armament with 12 guns had certain advantages (for example, the possibility of zeroing in with a "double ledge", which ships with 8 guns were deprived of), but in terms of the totality of qualities 8 * 406-mm / 45 were much more preferable than 12 * 356/52. Yes, 12 barrels are one and a half times larger than 8, but the 406-mm projectile was 1.49 times in weight superior to the domestic 356-mm. And its armor penetration, so to speak, 356-mm projectile "never dreamed of." The option of arming the Izmailov with 10 guns 406-mm / 45 (three-gun bow and stern turrets) was considered, but it had to be abandoned - the fact is that the two-gun 406-mm tower fit perfectly into the barbet of the three-gun 356-mm, but for the three-gun 406-mm would have to be redone, which greatly increased the cost of modernization.
It is noteworthy that despite the significant increase in armor and cardinal - weapons, the main dimensions of the modernized "Izmail" remained unchanged, and their displacement … even slightly decreased. Taking into account all the pre-revolutionary improvements, the normal displacement of domestic battle cruisers should have been 33,986.2 tons, while for projects No. 3 and 4 it was 33,911, 2 and 33,958, 2 tons, respectively. How could this happen?
The answer lies, firstly, in the use of lighter and more advanced thin-tube boilers for oil heating, similar to those installed on destroyers of the "Lieutenant Ilyin" type: due to their higher characteristics, it became possible to free two boiler rooms. But the second "know-how", oddly enough, lay in the change in the composition of weapons. The fact is that despite a significant increase in armor and a colossal increase in combat power, four two-gun 406-mm towers weighed less than four three-gun 356-mm - 5,040 tons versus 5,560 tons. This fact further emphasizes the advantages of placing on a smaller warship the number of heavy guns (however, their number should not have been less than eight to ensure effective zeroing).
Since the developers managed to keep the displacement at the same level, the power of the mechanisms and the speed remained practically the same - 68,000 hp. and 26.5 knots without forcing, and up to 28 knots when forcing mechanisms.
However, L. G. Goncharov and P. G. Goiknis quite rightly believed that all the above measures would not make the Ishmaels modern ships, which would have fully taken into account the lessons of the First World War. Significantly enhanced armor protection still remained insufficient (remember the 356 mm sides and 203 mm decks of British battle cruisers of the "G-3" type), in addition, let's not forget that, unlike the sides and towers, the barbets of the modernized ships should have the same thickness as in the original design, that is, 247.5 mm for the upper ring and 122.5-147.5 mm for the lower one.
In addition, there were other shortcomings behind the upgraded ships. Extremely weak longitudinal fire in the bow and stern - only 2 guns, which was very critical for a ship fighting according to the "hit-and-run" concept (there was no other way to resist the "imperialist" fleets of potential adversaries on the high seas by the Council). … The weakness of the anti-torpedo protection was noted - the project did not provide for boules, and installing them meant reducing the speed, which the designers did not want to go to at all. The speed of 28 knots when forcing mechanisms for a battle cruiser was then considered insufficient. In addition, (although even in the early 1920s it was still completely unobvious), the linear layout of the main battery, although it fully met the tasks of the First World War, did not allow placing numerous anti-aircraft artillery on ships without significantly limiting the firing angles of the main battery. This drawback was completely uncritical for battleships and battle cruisers of the First World War, but now the dawn of naval aviation domination was slowly on the horizon, and, of course, the linear artillery scheme was no longer suitable for the post-war "capital" ship.
Nevertheless, of course, one can only regret that not a single ship of this type was included in the domestic fleet. For all its shortcomings, the modernized Ishmael in its armor protection roughly corresponded to the British modernized battleships of the Queen Elizabeth class, and in terms of artillery of the main caliber and speed, it was definitely superior to them. As you know, battleships of this type passed with honor through the hell of World War II. The modernized "Ishmaels" in their combat potential would have surpassed the British "Repals", the Japanese "Congo", "Ise", "Fuso" there would have been no equal before Richelieu, Vittorio Veneto and Bismarck, respectively. Our sailors quite rightly believed that even the unmodernized Izmail, if completed according to the original design, in its combat potential corresponded to two battleships of the Sevastopol type, and, in the author's opinion, this is a completely fair assessment.
But, of course, the young Land of Soviets had nowhere to take funds and opportunities for such projects. Note that the cost of completing the modernized ships was up to half of their initial cost (it makes no sense to provide data in rubles, since they do not take into account inflation in comparison with the pre-war period and the changed price structures in the post-war country). Moreover, to complete the construction of the ships (even the lead "Izmail"), it was necessary to restore the mass of production facilities, which in the 1920s at best were mothballed, at worst they were stolen. At that time, all that the young power could afford was the completion of light cruisers and destroyers, and the repair and modernization of the ships in the fleet.
As a result, it was decided to include the completion of Izmail in the 1925-1930 program, but this time as an aircraft carrier, not a battle cruiser. In the new incarnation, the ship was supposed to carry up to 50 aircraft - the preliminary composition of the air group was determined by 12 "torpedo-bombers", 27 fighters, 6 reconnaissance aircraft and 5 spotters, but the real economic possibilities did not allow even this.
"Borodino", "Navarin" and "Kinburn" on June 19, 1922 were excluded from the fleet, and the next, 1923, were sold to the German company "Alfred Kubats", which carried out their cutting into metal. "Izmail" remained for some time - after it became clear that it would not be possible to finish building it even as an aircraft carrier, they thought to use it as an experimental vessel to test the effects of various naval munitions. Alas, there was no money even for this, and the ship was handed over for scrap in 1930.
Thus ended the history of the battlecruisers of the Russian Empire. We, in turn, are completing our series of articles devoted to ships of this class in various fleets of the world.
