We finished the previous article on the first shots of the Asama, fired at 12.20, about a couple of minutes before the Russian ships left the territorial Korean waters. However, absolute accuracy is hardly possible here, but nevertheless our compatriots believed that they left the boundaries of neutral waters only two minutes later. Immediately after the start of the battle, in the interval between 12.20 and 12.22, the Varyag and Koreets increased the revolutions of the vehicles to the corresponding speed of 7 knots (apparently, for this they had to slow down, but this is not accurate) and at about 9-10 knots taking the current into account, we moved further along the fairway.
At about the same time (12.20-12.22) the flagship cruiser Naniwa weighed anchor. The flagship believed that they did it at 12.22, but at the same time they indicated that it was done simultaneously with the first salvo of the Asama, and the armored cruiser had started the battle two minutes earlier. The speed was increased to 12 knots, the left side guns were made for firing.
Incidentally, here the Japanese reports have certain contradictions: the commander of the Takachiho Murakami claims that his cruiser weighed anchor and set sail at 12.25, while the report of the commander of the Naniwa says: “I started following Chiyoda at a speed of 12 knots. . This phrase can hardly be interpreted in the sense that “Naniwa” followed “Chiyoda”, because neither domestic nor Japanese battle schemes show the moment when “Naniwa” would follow “Chiyoda” into the wake.
Accordingly, this phrase of the "Battle Report" should be understood so that "Naniwa" made a move after "Chiyoda" did it, but this "does not fit" with the report of its commander …
In fact, reading the Japanese "War Reports", we will find many such inconsistencies, some of which we will mention in our series of articles. However, one should not see in these discrepancies malicious intent, or a desire to confuse someone: the whole point is that the perception of reality of people in battle changes greatly, and they, alas, often see (and then describe in reports) not quite that (and sometimes and not at all) what actually happened. This is not to mention the fact that often this or that time is indicated very approximately, or rounded to the nearest 5 minutes.
12.22 - "Varyag" came out of the territorial waters and opened return fire on "Asam", using armor-piercing shells (apparently, it was with them that the gunmen of "Varyag" fired the entire battle). For the Koreyets, the distance to the Japanese ships was still too great. And then an event took place, which is interpreted by many as evidence of the unprofessionalism of Russian officers. The fact is that the junior navigator of the Varyag, warrant officer Alexei Mikhailovich Nirod, who is responsible for determining the distance to the enemy, incorrectly measured the distance to the Asama, indicating 45 cables, while according to Japanese data, the distance was only 37-38 cables (7,000 m).
Most likely, it was the Japanese who were right - although they managed to achieve the first hit only 15 minutes after the opening of fire, their first salvo fell on the Varyag "with a short flight." In fact, the word "flight" is used here in a very peculiar way, because from the descriptions it follows that the shells fell in front of the "Varyag", that is, from the point of view of the gunners of the "Asama" it was not a flight, but an undershoot. But, obviously, small, so the Japanese estimate of the distance between Asama and Varyag at the beginning of the battle looks much more accurate than the Russian one.
So, everything seems to be clear - midshipman A. M. Nirod made a gross mistake by giving the distance 20% more than the actual distance. But here's what is interesting - judging by the description of V. Kataev, on the "Koreyets" it was also believed that "Asama" was separated from the gunboat by about 45 cables: "the distance was reported - it turned out to be over 45 cables." In the "Koreyets" logbook, we can also read: "The battle was at a distance of 45 cables and our shells did not reach the enemy." However, the description of the battle itself is very short and blurry, so it is not even clear to what time the mention of 45 cables refers, either to the moment of the whole battle before the Varyag turns back to the anchorage, or to that particular moment. However, in the report of the commander of the "Koreyets" G. P. Belyaev said quite unambiguously: "At 11 and three quarters of the day, when I moved 4 miles from the anchor point, the Japanese opened fire from a distance of 45 cables."
In other words, apparently, the distance of 45 cables to the Asama was determined both on the Varyag and on the Koreyets. Of course, the gunboat could also make a mistake, but it is surprising that on two ships, almost at the same time, a mistake was made with the same error.
Now let us recall that the distances to the Japanese were determined using a Lyuzhol-Myakishev micrometer: without going into a detailed description of his work, we note that in order to correctly determine the distance, it was necessary to know exactly the height of the target, that is, the distance from the waterline to the tops of the masts. Only in this case the micrometer made it possible to calculate the distance correctly. And therefore, having set out to understand whether A. M. Nirod made a mistake in determining the distances, it is necessary to check how correct the height of the armored cruiser Asama was indicated in the Russian reference books. After all, it is obvious that if it is indicated incorrectly, then this would perfectly explain the reason for the "synchronous" error of "Varyag" and "Koreyets" in determining the distance to the Japanese cruiser at the beginning of the battle. However, such work, unfortunately, is beyond the capabilities of the author of this article.
12.24 Immediately after shooting from anchor, the Naniva turned to the left, and lay down on an approximately parallel course to the Varyag, following in the same direction as the Varyag. At the time of the turnaround, when the Varyag was in the direction of 3 rumba (approximately 17 degrees) on the left side, they began zeroing in from 152-mm gun No. 2 at a distance of 6 800 m. However, as the combat report of the commander of the Naniva says: “Distance until it allowed to fire to kill”- this remark seems to us extremely interesting.
As we said earlier, the Asama was moving in the same direction as the Varyag, and their courses were close to parallel ones, that is, the Japanese armored cruiser was leaving the Russian, keeping the latter at a sharp stern angle. The exact speed of the Asama is currently unknown, but in the "Battle Report" its commander, Yashiro Rokuro, indicated that the distance to the Varyag did not increase, which allows us to assume the speed of the Asama was 10-12 knots. In other words, in the first minutes of the battle J. Rokuro tried to maintain a distance of about 7,000 m. in 40 calibers and a firing range of 9,140 m. Thus, technically, these guns could easily reach the Varyag from a distance of 6,800 - 7,000 m, but … nevertheless, the Naniva commander believed that at these distances, shooting at defeat is impossible. Perhaps this means that Asama preferred to engage in battle with the Varyag at a distance from which its 152-mm guns cannot provide accurate shooting even by Japanese standards, while the Russian gunners were in fact even worse prepared, and in addition, they did not have optical sights …
As for the "Naniva", its gunners fired several sighting shots, but the "Varyag" disappeared behind Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi) and the Japanese flagship were forced to cease fire.
12.25 - Takachiho, Akashi and Niitaka weighed anchor, with the first two cruisers supposedly lifting anchors between 12.20-12.25. “Chiyoda”, as we have already said, “reported” that he made a move at 12.25, but this is most likely a mistake. Most likely, Niitaka was the last to get off the anchor, which, moreover, moved three minutes later, at 12.28. At this time, the Japanese cruisers were not observed from the Varyag in the best way, as they were obscured by Fr. Phalmido.
The actions of the Japanese ships were as follows - since the Naniwa at 12.20 raised the signal "Follow the destination in accordance with the order," the Takachiho began to carry it out. It was about order number 30, in which Sotokichi Uriu appointed the following disposition for the ships of his squadron:
“-“Naniwa”and“Niitaka”are on patrol to position N of Soobol (Humann) islets.
- "Asama" occupies the most favorable position for him to E1 / 4S from the island of Gerido
- "Takachiho", "Akashi" and "Chiyoda" jointly carry out a combat patrol off the island of Changseo (Cat)
- "Chihaya" carries a combat patrol more seaward of the islet of Moktokto
If enemy ships leave, Asama attacks them, and Naniwa and Niitaka support his attack. If this line of attack is broken by the enemy, then the Takachiho and other ships will attack him on the second line of the attack.
The 9th destroyer detachment, if the need arises, goes to Masanpo Bay of Asanman Bay and fills up with coal and water from the Kasuga-maru, and then, together with the 14th destroyer, takes a position next to the flagship."
In other words, the situation was like this - "Asama" should have settled down somewhere closer to Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi), and it was assumed that his presence would make it impossible for Russian ships to move around the island of Marolles from the north, and thus direct the "Varyag" and "Koreets" to the Eastern Channel - on the way to it, in the narrowness between about … The Marolles and Yung Hung Do were the Soobol islands (Humann, located about 9 miles from Phalmido Island), where the breaking ships were to meet the Naniwa and Niitaka with mininos. And if the Russians, by some miracle, managed to break through and past them, then, about 4 miles in the direction of the eastern channel, three other cruisers would be waiting for them (at the island of Chanso - Cat).
Accordingly, having weaned, "Takachiho" moved towards about. Chanso - this course almost completely coincided with the course of "Varyag" and "Koreyets", that is, "Takachiho", like "Asama", had to accept the battle on the retreat - however, the "Varyag" was still too far away, so that the Takachiho gunners could take part in the battle, nevertheless at 12.25 the battle flag was raised. The Akashi followed the Takachiho, and the Chiyoda, although it did not attempt to enter the Takachiho's wake, walked in the same direction towards Soobol-Chanso (Humann-Cat).
As for the Russian ships, at 12.25 (probably on a signal from the Varyag) the Koreets opened fire from the right 203-mm gun. The first shot gave a large undershoot, the second, set to the maximum range, also fell undershot, and the fire was crushed, not wanting a senseless waste of ammunition.
On the one hand, the range of domestic 203-mm cannons installed on the Koreyets at a maximum elevation angle of 12 degrees. was supposed to be 38 cables - this is how the Japanese determined the distance from "Asama" to "Varyag". But, most likely, they were a little mistaken and the true distance was somewhat greater (it was not for nothing that the first salvo did not reach the Russian cruiser), and besides, shooting in pursuit has its own characteristics. As you know, at long distances, it is necessary to take a lead on a moving ship, but if the distance to the retreating target ship is equal to the maximum firing range, then it is impossible to take a lead, and during the flight of the projectile the target manages to go ahead, which will prevent the projectile from falling into it, falling short … Therefore, the undershoots of the Koreyets do not disprove the Asama's measurements - if the armored cruiser's rangekeepers were mistaken, it is unlikely that their mistake was significant.
12.28 “Niitaka” finally gave a move and followed “Naniwa”, but fell behind and was able to take his place in the ranks only after 6 minutes.
12.30 On "Naniwa" the order of "Chiyoda" was raised to enter the wake of "Asame". Thus, S. Uriu formed a new tactical group, not provided for by Order No. 30, and (judging by the text of the Rear Admiral's report, simultaneously with the order of "Chiode") S. Uriu ordered "Asame" to act independently.
12.34 "Niitaka" finally entered the wake of "Naniwe" and is preparing to fire on the port side, but has not yet opened fire. It should be noted that in the interval from 12.20 to 12.35, that is, in the first quarter of an hour of the battle, only Asam fired at the Varyag, and Naniva also fired several sighting shots. The rest of the Japanese cruisers had not yet opened fire, and no one had fired at the Koreyets.
As we said, from the beginning of the battle "Asam" went almost parallel to the "Varyag" course, but that was almost - the courses nevertheless converged, albeit at a very small angle. In addition, "Asama", probably, gradually accelerated to 15 knots (this was the speed indicated by Ya. Rokuro in his "Battle Report") and began to pull ahead: this led to the fact that the aft corner, on which the "Varyag" was located, became too sharp, so that most of the Asama's artillery was turned off from the battle. This could not please the commander of the armored cruiser, and he "turned to the right, opened fire with the artillery of the starboard side" - perhaps this happened just somewhere at 12.34-12.35. Because "Battle report" Ya. Rokuro reports that the first hit in "Varyag" (12.35) took place after "Asama" opened fire on the starboard side.
The problem is that according to other sources (N. Chornovil with reference to "The Russo-Japanese war: British naval attaches reports" Battery Press, 2003. pp6-9) reports that the hit from "Asama" at 12.37 into the bridge " Varyag "(which killed the warrant officer AM Nirod) was produced from the left stern gun. Obviously, it could not have fired at 13.37, if by that time "Asama" had already turned to starboard towards the Russian ships. Thus, we can reliably assert only that at about this time "Asama" began to turn to the right, but when it turned around enough to activate the starboard artillery, alas, it is impossible to say for sure.
12.35 Many interesting events took place at once, the exact sequence of which, apparently, can no longer be determined.
First, Asama tries to get into the Varyag. A 203-mm projectile hits the quarterdecks directly behind the stern guns, on the Asam it was recorded as "hitting the area of the stern bridge" and a massive fire was noted.
Interestingly, the Varyaga logbook and the memoirs of V. F. Rudnev did not describe the consequences of the explosion of this shell, the description of the damage of the "Varyag" begins with the next hit, which damaged the front bridge and killed Warrant Officer A. M. Niroda. But further in the logbook, a detailed description of the hit in the stern that caused the fire is given:
“Continuously following shells set off a fire on the quarterdecks, which was extinguished by the efforts of the inspector, Midshipman Chernilovsky-Sokol, whose dress was torn by shrapnel; the fire was very serious, since the deck and whaleboat No. 1 were burning cartridges with smokeless gunpowder. The fire occurred from a shell that exploded on the deck while knocking out: 6-inch guns No. VIII and No. IX and 75-mm guns No. 21, 47 -mm guns No. 27 and 28.
There is an assumption that the above passage is the description of the first hit in the "Varyag". The violation of the sequence is explained by the fact that the ship itself was obviously poorly visible from the Varyag's conning tower and could well fail to record the time of the explosion in the stern, which is why the shells that hit the bridge with a difference of several minutes 12.37) and "swapped places" in the description. The author of this article is inclined to the same opinion, but it should be noted that it is possible (although unlikely, but more on that later) that the fragment quoted above could refer to another hit to the cruiser, which happened ten minutes later, at 12.45, and practically at the same place.
Second, Chiyoda entered the battle. According to the "Battle Report" of its commander, Murakami Kakuichi, fire was fired from the bow and stern 120-mm guns, as well as cannons of the same caliber on the left side, while the distance to the "Varyag" was 6,000 m. However, given that the Chiyoda did not register hits on the cruiser, this distance could be determined incorrectly.
Third, on the "Naniwa" they raised the "Do not go far" signal addressed to "Takachiho". Obviously, S. Uriu no longer saw any reason to build an "echeloned defense" against the breakthrough of the "Varyag", placing his cruisers on several lines, preferring to "clamp it in a vice" immediately after leaving the fairway to reach the reach.
And, finally, the fourth - at about the same time with the turn of "Asama", "Varyag" turned to the left. The fact is that before that, the Varyag, most likely, was going somewhere closer to the middle of the fairway, possibly closer to its right side. As we have already said, the courses and speeds of the Asama and Varyag were close to parallel, but nevertheless converged and led to the fact that the heading angle (aft for the Japanese and bow for the Russians) became sharper - the turn to the left increased it for "Varyag" and, apparently, made it possible to enter into battle 152-mm guns located in the stern of the cruiser. At the same time, the new course of the "Varyag" could not lead to an accident, since the Russian cruiser was quite close to the exit from the fairway: following the new course, it did not "crash" into its left border, but went out into the reach. Judging by the Japanese descriptions, starting from 12.35 there was an increase in fire from the cruiser, so we can reasonably assume that the Varyag was able to open fire with the whole board only at 12.35, and before that it fired only from 3, possibly 4 bow guns.
12.37 - the second hit on the Varyag - a 152-mm shell from the Asam hit the right wing of the front bridge. It is interesting that the "Battle report" of the commander of "Asama" does not mention him, this hit was observed and recorded on the "Naniwa". The description of this hit in the "Varyag" logbook looks like this:
“One of the first shells of the Japanese who hit the cruiser destroyed the right wing of the front bridge, started a fire in the navigator's cabin and interrupted the fore-guys, and the junior navigator, who was determining the distance, Warrant Officer Count Alexei Nirod, was killed and all the range finders of station No. 1 were killed or wounded. After this shot, the shells began to hit the cruiser more often, and the incomplete shells exploded on impact on the water and showered with fragments and destroyed superstructures and boats."
Surprisingly, this recording became the reason for numerous "revelations" of Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev "on the Internet" and not only. One complaint was that this text was the first description of a Japanese hit, and many believed on this basis that hitting the Varyag bridge was the first hit in the battle. And if so, the phrase “one of the first shells hitting the cruiser” is false (it was necessary to write “the first hit”) and is aimed at creating the impression of many hits on the reader, while at that moment it was only just one thing.
However, as we can see, this point of view is refuted by the "Combat report" of the commander of "Asama", which recorded the first hit of the "Varyag" in the area of the aft bridge two minutes earlier and noted the strong fire that it caused. At the same time, judging by the fact that the description of hitting the quarterdeck (cited by us above) in the Varyag logbook was put after, and not before the description of hitting the bridge, and the exact time of hits is not indicated, most likely indicates that on the cruiser they simply did not understand their order and were not sure which of them happened first. Hence, the indication "one of the first shells", by the way, is completely fair, because hitting the bridge was still the second.
Another claim was made by one of the most detailed critics V. F. Rudnev, historian N. Chornovil in his "Review at Cape Chemulpo", and such casuistry is quite worthy of being quoted by us in full:
“In the cruiser's logbook, shortly after the battle, V. F. Rudnev describes it like this: "One of the first Japanese shells that hit the cruiser destroyed the right wing of the forward bridge." That is, the Japanese were shooting and after a while they began to hit. This hit was among the first (in fact, the first). But in 2 years V. F. Rudnev significantly changed his “line of defense”. Here is how the same event is given in his memoirs: "One of the first Japanese shells hit the cruiser, destroyed the upper bridge." Here, the hit is attributed to the first Japanese shells in general. Did the Japanese start shooting at 11:45? It was then that there was a hit! With this unpretentious technique, V. F. Rudnev is trying to create the impression that long before approaching the traverse about. Iodolmi, “Varyag” had been suffering from Japanese fire for a long time … It already had a lot of damage … It was already not quite combat-ready …"
Let's leave aside the fact that "two years later" V. F. Rudnev absolutely did not need any kind of protection there for the simple reason that both he and the cruiser Varyag had long been considered universally recognized heroes, and hardly anything could shake this. Even if, we repeat, even if, under the spitz, already in retrospect, and considered the behavior of the commander of the "Varyag" in the battle on January 27, 1904, no one would discredit the popular hero. We'd better pay attention to the fact that in fact the words "caught in the cruiser" for the first time disappeared not in the memoirs of V. F. Rudnev two years later, and already from the report of Vsevolod Fedorovich to the Head of the Marine Ministry dated March 5, 1905, that is, drawn up much earlier than his memoirs.
It would seem that this only confirms the point of view of N. Chornovil. But the fact is that, as we will see later, both reports of Vsevolod Fedorovich: both the first, compiled hot on the heels of the Governor's name, and the second, drawn up more than a year after the battle for the Head of the Naval Ministry, fairly accurately describe the damage to the cruiser received by him before the passage of the traverse about. Phalmido (Yodolmi). And if so, then what's the point of V. F. Rudnev to mislead someone about the time of hits? After all, if a certain number of shells hit the cruiser in the interval from 12.20 to 12.40, then is there much difference in the exact time at which they hit? The only meaning such a statement (about the death of Count A. M. Niroda at the very beginning of the battle) would have to justify the poor shooting of the Varyag - they say, they didn’t hit, because the “main distance meter” was killed, but the fact is that in his second report and memoirs of V. F. Rudnev describes the very large losses of the Japanese, so that there can be no talk of any bad shooting (and therefore of its justification). In general, with such a lie V. F. Rudnev won absolutely nothing, so is it worth it then to blame him?
And if you look at things impartially, then the phrase "One of the first Japanese shells that hit the cruiser" reads in two ways - on the one hand, V. F. Rudnev did not say anything superfluous here and his words are true, but on the other hand, it can be understood as if several shells hit the cruiser, and the cruiser's logbook describes only one of them. Thus, having removed from the second report and the memories "those who got into the cruiser", Vsevolod Fedorovich, on the contrary, ruled out the possibility of an erroneous interpretation, which suggests that more of these shells hit the cruiser than described.
But one more point should be noted. The fact is that the study of reports and memoirs of V. F. Rudnev's irrefutable testimony is that their author was completely devoid of literary talent. Without a doubt, Vsevolod Fedorovich, like any educated person of that era, knew how to clearly and concisely express his thoughts on paper, but … that's all. His report to the governor was almost a verbatim extract from the Varyag logbook, the report to the Governor of the Naval Ministry was almost a complete copy of the report to the Governor, with some details added, and the memories, again, look nothing more than an expanded copy of the report to the Governor of the Naval Ministry. The author of this article, who, by the nature of his profession, had a lot to do with documents and the people that make them up, knows from personal experience that it is very difficult for people of this kind to give an exhaustive written description of an event. Even knowing exactly how everything happened in reality, it is difficult for them to put it on paper so as not to miss anything and at the same time avoid ambiguous interpretations of what was written.
But back to the battle of the Varyag.
12.38 The cruiser and the gunboat had only a few minutes left to traverse about. Phalmido (Yodolmi). Let's briefly summarize what happened during those 18 minutes of the battle:
1. The cruisers of the Japanese squadron did not try to block the exit from the fairway at about. Phalmido (Yodolmi), and in three groups (Asama and Chiyoda, Naniwa and Niitaka, Takachiho and Akashi) went towards the eastern channel. At the same time, their courses were almost parallel to the one followed by the Russian ships, and they went in one direction - while the "Varyag" and "Koreets" were approaching about. Phalmido, the Japanese were moving away from him. And only at the end of the first 18 minutes of the battle, "Asama" began to turn back.
2. Thanks to such a maneuver of the Japanese and the low speed of the Russian detachment, in the first 15 minutes, the Varyag fought with only one Japanese cruiser out of six - Asama, which turned out to be closer to it than the others. Then the Chiyoda joined the Japanese armored cruiser and developed intense fire on the Varyag, but by 12.38 she had been in action for only three minutes. "Naniwa" fired several sighting shots, and, without achieving any success, hid behind Fr. Phalmido, other cruisers did not open fire at all.
3. The Russian ships have almost overcome the most unpleasant place for them - the Chemulpo fairway, and with minimal losses for themselves: "Varyag" received 2 hits, "Korean" - none. Now the cruiser and the gunboat were entering "operational space", that is, on a very wide reach, on which they could already fight not only with fire, but also with maneuver. Of course, here they fell under the concentrated fire of the Japanese squadron, but in any case, this should have happened sometime.
And here Vsevolod Fedorovich gave an order, which, according to the author, became the culmination of the history of the "Varyag": it is in it that the answers to the numerous questions raised by the opponents of the official point of view on the battle on January 27, 1904 are hidden.
