The battle of the Varyag itself is described in sufficient detail in the literature, but nevertheless we will try to detail the events that took place in time as much as possible, including the description of the damage received by the Varyag as it was received. We will use the Japanese time, which differed from the Russian in Chemulpo, by 35 minutes: for example, Asama opened fire on the Varyag at 11.45 Russian time and at 12.20 Japanese time. Why is it so unpatriotic? The only thing, for the purpose of unification with the battle scheme, there is a huge number of them “on the Internet”, but one of the very high-quality ones is the scheme presented by the respected A. V. Polutov in his book Landing Operation of the Japanese Army and Navy in February 1904 in Incheon, and in it the author adheres to Japanese time.
11.45 "All upstairs, remove from the anchor!"
11.55 "Varyag" and "Korean" weighed anchor and went past the English and Italian cruisers to the exit from the roadstead. The "Korean" followed the "Varyag" into the wake, lagging behind the cruiser by about 1-1.5 kabeltov.
12.00 A combat alarm was sounded.
12.05 Sotokichi Uriu receives a message from "Chiyoda" that "Varyag" and "Koreets" have left the roadstead and are moving along the fairway.
12.10 The information of the Chiyoda is confirmed by the cruiser Asama.
I must say that the Japanese commander did not expect such a turn of events at all, and in general, the strange behavior of S. Uriu before the start of the battle should be noted. The fact is that the rear admiral drew up a battle plan in case of a breakthrough of the Varyag at sea - without going into details that we will consider later, let's just say that S. Uriu intended to line up his ships in as many as three echelons so that the breakthrough " Varyag "had to deal consistently with each of them. This plan was set forth and communicated to the commanders of the Japanese ships by Order No. 30, a part of which, devoted to the actions of the Japanese squadron in the event that the Russian stationers remain on the roads, we have already quoted earlier.
So, in fact, if they have already decided, and even an order from a distance, then it would be logical to take positions in advance, in the early morning. Indeed, after the delivery of the ultimatum to V. F. Rudnev should have expected the Russian ships to leave at any moment. It would be difficult to do this after the release of Varyag, because, for example, from Fr. Harido, near which the Japanese ships were stationed and to the islets Humann (Soobol), where the position of "Naniwa" and "Niitaki" was assigned, the distance is about 8 miles, while from the site of the "Varyag" to about Phalmido (Yodolmi) - no more than 6, 5 miles. Accordingly, there was no way, having found a Russian cruiser in the fairway, to have time to wean anchor and get into position, especially since S. Uriu expected a speed of at least 20 knots from the Varyag (the author has come across references that the Japanese commander believed that Russian cruiser will break through alone, without a gunboat). Obviously, "Naniwa" and "Niitaka" were not able to develop such a speed, so that the plan of S. Uriu could only be carried out with advance deployment. Nevertheless, the Japanese ships remained at anchor off the islet of Herido. Then, at 10.53 the commander of "Chiyoda" Murakami arrived on the flagship cruiser, where he reported to the rear admiral:
"At the time of my departure from the anchorage on the Russian ships, the situation continued to remain unchanged, and by all indications they are not going to leave the Incheon anchorage."
Apparently, this finally convinced S. Uriu is that the Russians will not go for a breakthrough, so he immediately ordered the commanders of the ships not to move to the positions indicated in order number 30 until his special order. But it did not follow: instead S. Uriu summoned the commander of the Hayabusa (destroyer of the 14th detachment) in order to clarify with him the plan of attack of the Varyag and Koreyets on the Chemulpo raid … And suddenly, he report that Russian ships are going to break through.
12.12 Two minutes after Asama confirmed that the Varyag and the Koreets were sailing along the fairway, Sotokichi Uriu gave an order for an emergency de-anchor. The commanders of the Hayabusa and Chiyoda were forced to hastily leave the Naniwa and return to their ships. The cruisers had no time to raise the anchors - the anchor chains had to be riveted just to give speed faster. Naturally, the plan of the Japanese rear admiral, outlined by him in order No. 30, "ordered to live a long time" - it could no longer be executed, so S. Uriu had to improvise on the go.
And here's what's interesting: all this confusion caused by the unexpected appearance of the "Varyag", the Japanese official historiography "Description of military operations at sea in 37-38. Meiji "describes it as follows:
“Having received the signal that the Russian ships were leaving, Admiral Uriu immediately ordered the ships of his detachment to take their assigned places. When the order was executed and everyone was in full readiness, the Russian ships were already passing the northern tip of Fr. Yodolmi.
It seems that they were not deceived in anything, but the general impression is that S. Uriu acted according to the plan - meanwhile, nothing like that happened.
12.15 An anchor chain was riveted on the Asam.
12.12-12.20 One event occurred, the exact time of which is unknown. V. F. Rudnev, in a report to the head of the Naval Ministry, describes him as follows: "The admiral offered to surrender with a signal, but did not receive an answer, which the Japanese took for disdain for them."
It is reliably known that Sotokichi Uriu treated Vsevolod Fedorovich with great respect - no signal was raised with the proposal to surrender on the Naniwa. This fact was the reason to reproach V. F. Rudnev in a deliberate lie: they say, the story of the offer of surrender and proud refusal was invented by the commander of the "Varyag" for a catchphrase. The author of this article cannot refute this statement. However, it should be borne in mind that around 12.12, after the order was given for an emergency shooting from anchor, but even before the opening of fire, the Japanese flagship raised “Prepare for battle. Raise the battle flags. " In addition, on the "Naniwa" they raised "to follow the destination in accordance with the order" (this order was noticed and accepted for execution on the "Takachiho" just at 12.20). It should also be noted that the distance between "Varyag" and "Naniva" was quite large at that moment (according to the report of the commander of "Naniva" - 9,000 m or about 48, 5 cables), and in addition, "Naniva", apparently, partially covered Asama. So it is not too surprising that the Russians, seeing that the Japanese flagship is raising numerous signals, read not what was actually raised, but what they expected to see - not the first, and not the last time in a combat situation. In other words, this phrase of the report, of course, could be a deliberate lie, but with the same success it could be the result of a conscientious delusion. However, it is also possible that the Varyag decided that this was a signal of surrender, without even starting to disassemble it - just for the sake of "what else can they pick up at the beginning of the battle?"
12.20 pm "Asama" set in motion and, at the same time, began zeroing in on the "Varyag" from a distance of 7,000 m (about 38 cables). The battle on January 27, 1904 began. At this time, "Asama" seemed to be leaving the "Varyag", having the latter on the sharp aft corners on the left, and the direction to the "Varyag" was such that the bow turret of 203-mm guns could not operate. According to V. Kataev, "Varyag" at the moment of opening fire saw "Asama" at the right heading angle of 35 degrees.
12.22 "Varyag" went out of the territorial waters of Korea and opened fire in return. However, in the interval between 12.20 and 12.22 a very, very interesting event took place, which in various sources is interpreted in completely different ways.
A. V. Polutov claimed that after the opening of fire, the Varyag increased the speed (literally: “The Varyag immediately answered and increased the speed”). Taking into account the fact that the respected historian composed the description of the battle according to Japanese sources, this can be considered the point of view of the Japanese side, but there is a nuance. A. V. Polutov provided translations of "Combat reports" - that is, reports of Japanese commanders about the battle, as well as a telegram to S. Uriu describing the battle on January 27, 1904, but they do not contain messages about an increase in the speed of the "Varyag" after it opened fire. “Description of military operations at sea in 37-38 years. Meiji "also does not contain anything like that. We in no way reproach A. V. Polutov in disinformation, we simply state that the source from which he took the indicated information remains unclear to us.
On the other hand, V. Kataev in the book “Korean in the rays of glory of the Varyag. Everything about the legendary gunboat "writes that after the fall of the shells of the first Japanese salvo:" On a signal from the cruiser, the speed was reduced to 7 knots. " Alas, V. Kataev also does not say from what source this information was taken, at the same time, neither the reports or memoirs of V. F. Rudnev, neither the Work of the Historical Commission, nor the logbooks of both Russian ships (at least in the form available to the author of this article) do not report anything like that.
Thus, we have the statements of two respected historians, directly contradicting each other, but at the same time we cannot confirm their words with sources. Whom to believe? On the one hand, the works of A. V. Polutova are distinguished by a much deeper study of individual issues than V. Kataev usually does, and, frankly, the description of the battle on January 27, 1904, as edited by V. Kataev, contains a number of errors that A. V. Polutova. But on the other hand A. V. Polutov directly reported that he was giving a description of the battle on the basis of Japanese documents, and this has its drawbacks - in a battle from sufficiently large distances, enemy actions often seem completely different from what they really are.
Let's try to figure it out on our own, especially since the speed of the "Varyag" going to the breakthrough has long been a controversial issue. As we said earlier, from the Varyag parking lot to about. Pkhalmido (Yodolmi) was no more than 6.5 miles - considering that the cruiser made a move at 11.55 and taking into account the fact that, according to the Varyag logbook, the traverse of Pkhalmido Island was passed at 12.05 Russian time, and, accordingly, at 12.40 by Japanese time, the cruiser and gunboat spent 45 minutes to overcome this distance, that is, their average speed did not exceed 8, 7 knots. It should be borne in mind that we are not talking about the speed of the "Varyag" and "Koreyets" proper, since they were "helped" by a strong current, the speed of which probably reached 4 knots at the roadstead and reached 3 knots at about. Phalmido. In other words, our calculated average speed of 8.7 knots is the sum of the speed of the ships and the current. However, as far as the author knows, the direction of this current did not quite coincide with the direction of movement of the "Varyag" and "Koreyets"; rather, it "pushed" the ships to the starboard side at an angle of approximately 45 degrees from the stern. Thus, the Russian ships received additional acceleration on the one hand, but on the other, they had to take more to the left, so as not to be carried off the starboard side of the channel, which reduced their speed relative to that which they would develop in calm water, with the same machine speed. Therefore, it is rather difficult to say exactly what kind of "their" speed the "Varyag" and "Koreets" had and what the accompanying current gave them. But for our purposes this is not necessary, since to assess the maneuvering of Russian ships, one needs to know the "speed relative to land", and not the reasons for which it was caused. Therefore, here and below we (unless the opposite is explicitly stated) when speaking about the speed of the Varyag and Koreyets, we mean not the speed that the machines reported to them, but the overall speed, that is, given both by machines and by the current.
So, the "Varyag" changed its speed between 12.20 and 12.22 and just about the same time it left the territorial waters. That is, until about. Phalmido he had about 3 miles to go, and on the traverse of the island he left at 12.40, which means that it took the cruiser 18-20 minutes to overcome 3 miles. This corresponds to an average speed of 9-10 knots and is very similar to the description of V. Kataev, who reported on the command from the Varyag to keep the speed of 7 knots. The fact is that the speed of ships in those years was measured by the number of revolutions of their machines, and the command from the Varyag, naturally, should not be understood as “keeping the speed of 7 knots relative to about. Phalmido ", but how to" give the speed of the cars corresponding to the speed of 7 knots. " It was these 7 knots, plus the speed of the current, that informed the small Russian detachment the very 9-10 knots on which the Varyag and Koreets were sailing along the fairway to about. Phalmido.
Since the 9-10 knots calculated by us is higher than the average speed on the entire route of 8.7 knots, it seems that it turns out that A. V. is right. Polutov, and the cruiser, after the first shots of the Asama, nevertheless increased its speed. But, nevertheless, in the opinion of the author of this article, V. Kataev is right after all, and the Varyag, after they opened fire on it, nevertheless reduced its speed, but the point is this.
Taking into account the fact that the cruiser had to go about 3.5 miles to the border of the territorial waters, and he covered this distance in 25-27 minutes, his average speed was 7, 8-8, 4 knots. At 11.55, the Varyag had just taken off anchor: only 10 minutes had passed since the moment of the order “To remove from the anchor”. If someone doubts, then let us remember that in order to give a move 8 minutes after the order, "Asama" needed to rivet the anchor chain - on the "Varyag", as you know, nothing of the kind was done. Accordingly, at 11.55 the Russian cruiser had just started to move, but it needed time to accelerate: and it is unlikely that it immediately, even before leaving the raid, developed the indicated speed. Most likely, "Varyag" slowly paraded past "Talbot" and "Elba", and only then began to accelerate, that is, it made some part of its way to the border of territorial waters at a speed less than 7, 8-8, 4 knots and then accelerated over these values. This is also supported by the presentation of V. Kataev, who asserts that even before the start of the battle, the Koreyets 'vehicles developed 110 rpm, that is, the gunboat was moving at a maximum speed for itself (at the acceptance tests of the Koreyets' vehicle developed 114 rpm.).
Here, however, a question arises. Passport speed "Koreets" - 13, 5 knots, and if he developed such a speed only due to cars, then it turns out that the gunboat was sailing along the fairway (taking into account the additional speed of the current) at 16-16, 5 knots? Of course not, but the fact is that we do not know what maximum speed the "Koreets" could develop on January 27, 1904. On tests, with a displacement of 1,213.5 tons, the boat at 114 rpm developed an average of 13.44 knots, but this was 17 years before the events described, and, most likely, the displacement of the Koreyets before the battle was much greater than the one with which the tests were carried out (the total displacement of the ship according to the project was 1,335 tons, and what it was in reality for a day battle?) Thus, it is very likely that immediately after anchoring the Varyag and Koreets moved very slowly, then, after leaving the roadstead, they gradually accelerated, possibly up to 13.5-14 knots, but then, going beyond limits of territorial waters and entering the battle, dropped the speed to 9-10 knots and that is how they went to the traverse about. Phalmido.
I must say that all this reconstruction is entirely on the author's conscience, dear readers may accept his version, or may not. The only fact that can be surely vouched for is that from the beginning of the battle to the traverse about. Pkhalmido "Varyag" and "Koreets" were traveling at a speed of no more than 9-10 knots.
Movement at such a low speed became one of the many reasons to reproach Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev that he was not going to break into the sea and did not want to fight a serious battle at all, but only wanted to mark a breakthrough, fight a little and retreat as quickly as possible. to save the honor of the uniform, and risk life at the same time to a minimum. Those who are inclined to blame V. F. Rudnev, in neglect of debt, seems to be quite rightly claiming that they go anywhere at such a speed, but not for a breakthrough. Those who continue to consider Vsevolod Fedorovich a worthy commander usually appeal to their opponents that it would be wrong to develop high speed in a narrow fairway, and even in a combat situation, since it would be easy to run aground. An example is usually given the accident of the French cruiser "Admiral Gaydon", just the same, and flew out on the stones near about. Phalmido (Yodolmi) in a completely peaceful environment, as well as the crash of the destroyer Tsubame, who was trying to chase the Korean at full speed on the day of her unsuccessful departure to Port Arthur.
Usually these examples are counter-argued, referring to the exit to the sea of "Chiyoda", which took place on the night of January 25-26, 1904, because if it took a Russian cruiser 45 minutes in broad daylight to get from the Chemulpo raid to Fr. Phalmido, the Japanese ship - only 35 minutes on a dark moonless night ("Chiyoda" weighed anchor at 23.55). And this despite the fact that the "Chiyoda" only once passed this fairway, while the navigator of the "Varyag" E. A. Behrens went to them 5 times - three times on the cruiser and twice on the Koreyets. All of the above, in the opinion of many fans of the history of the navies, just testifies that the "Varyag", having the desire of its commander, could move along the fairway much faster.
What can be said in response to this? Yes, indeed, there is a fact - the cruiser "Chiyoda", having in its "asset" only one single passage along the fairway, really passed the second time from the roadstead to about. Phalmido in 35 minutes. On a moonless night And, apparently, his commander and navigators gained the necessary experience during this exit, as well as an understanding of the dangers of following the Chemulpo fairway at relatively high speeds. It is impossible to explain in any other way the fact that after a little more than a day, the same "Chiyoda", which left on the morning of January 27 (on the day of the battle with "Varyag") from the same raid, was able to join S. Uriu's squadron only two hours after leaving the raid … We simply read the “Battle report” of the cruiser commander: “At 08.30 on February 9 (January 27, according to the old style), I left the anchorage of Chemulpo and at 10.30 connected with the 4th combat detachment located off the island of Philip” - the latter is located next to about. Harido, 3 miles from about. Phalmido, and S. Uriu's squadron was located between these three islands. In other words, having passed the Chemulpo fairway once at 12, possibly even 13 knots in the dark, the commander of the Chiyoda Murakami, even in the morning light, did not at all crave a repetition of the previous "record" …
It is likely that with a certain luck, the Chemulpo fairway could have been slipped in the daytime and at 20 knots, there were probably theoretical prerequisites for this. But at the same time, according to the author, movement at speeds greater than 12, maximum - 13 knots posed a danger to the ship going into battle. Even a short-term loss of control could lead to the cruiser going out of the fairway and landing on stones.
Thus, we have two widespread versions: V. F. Rudnev did not develop high speed, because he did not want to engage in a decisive battle, and that V. F. Rudnev did not develop a high speed, because he was afraid to put the Varyag on the stones. With all due respect to the speakers, the author of this article believes that both are incorrect.
More precisely, we will never know what Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev thought when he performed this or that action or deed. However, the author of this series of articles is ready to offer, in addition to the existing two versions, a third, internally consistent and fully explaining the behavior of the Varyag commander. This will not be proof that the first two versions are erroneous (we repeat - we will never know the true motives of Vsevolod Fedorovich), but, according to the author, his version will at least have the same right to life as the others.
V. F. Rudnev was the commander of a 1st rank battleship, and, of course, being a professional military man, he had to somehow plan a future battle. Any planning is based on assumptions about what will be achieved and how the enemy will act in the upcoming battle. The goal of the Japanese was quite clear - to destroy the Russian stationary. But there were several ways in which this could have been achieved. The first, and the simplest, was that the Japanese squadron could simply "block up" the exit from the fairway at about. Phalmido. That is, the first 6 miles from the Chemulpo raid, the Russian ships were doomed to follow a rather narrow fairway; near the island, this fairway would lead the Russian ships to a fairly wide reach. So Sotokichi Uriu could well position his ships so as to block the exit from the fairway, concentrating the fire of his six cruisers on it. In this case, everything would have ended very quickly for the Varyag and Koreets going to the breakthrough.
As you know, the side salvo of six Japanese cruisers consisted of 4 * 203-mm, 23 * 152-mm and 9 * 120-mm guns. And they could be opposed, perhaps, no more than 4 Varyag guns and one, possibly two 203-mm guns of the Koreyets - moving along the fairway towards the Japanese ships it was impossible to fire full side salvos. Taking into account the level of training of the Varyag artillerymen, it would be easy to predict the result of such a confrontation.
But on the other hand, the reach in the area of about. Phalmido was not wide, and concentrating 6 cruisers there so that they could fire at the fairway at the same time would be a very difficult task. The Japanese ships would either have to maneuver at the smallest speed, or even anchor at all, and then the Russian stationers had the opportunity, having developed a large speed, to quickly get close to the enemy.
If the Japanese used similar tactics, then V. F. Rudnev would have won nothing by walking along the fairway at low speed - on the contrary, the only way to inflict any harm on the enemy would just be to quickly get close to him, to the distance from which the Russian gunners to (very fast!) deaths of "Varyag" and "Koreyets" could provide a somewhat significant number of hits on Japanese ships. In such a collision, a gunboat could inflict a lot of harm on the Japanese - if they concentrate their fire on the most dangerous Varyag and allow the Koreyets to come closer, then even a few hits of heavy 203-mm shells could cause sensitive damage to small ones (with the exception of Asama) to Japanese cruisers. Of course, today we know that, taking into account the quality of Russian shells, such calculations could not have been justified, but Russian naval officers were confident in their weapons and could hardly have considered otherwise.
In other words, if S. Uriu had chosen the tactic of blocking the exit from the channel with superior forces, then the Varyag and Koreyets should have made a breakthrough together, and then, having convinced of the enemy's intentions, develop full speed in order to get closer to each other as soon as possible. with him.
The second option was to disperse the squadron across the reach, and S. Uriu wanted to do so, but he failed. On the "Varyag" we saw Japanese cruisers crowding at about. Harido, it was clear that they were not dispersed, so we will not consider such a disposition of the Japanese forces.
And, finally, the third reasonable tactic "for the Japanese" was to destroy the Russian ships in retreat. In order to understand this, let's take a little time for the geography of the "battlefield". Alas, on all schemes of the battle, only a small fragment of it is usually transmitted, capturing the fairway from Chemulpo, yes Fr. Pkhalmido, where, in fact, hostilities unfolded, but in order to deal with the situation in which the Varyag fell, a larger map is required. Of course, there are sailing directions, like this one, for example, but not everyone will have the patience to deal with such a detailed map.
Therefore, we will proceed more simply and give a brief description of the possible routes for the Varyag's breakthrough into the sea. So, first, as we said earlier, "Varyag" had to overcome the fairway separating the Chemulpo raid from the reach, which begins beyond about. Pkhalmido - for this the cruiser had to go 6 miles from the beginning of the fairway (and approximately 6, 5 miles from the place of its anchorage), and then the Varyag went out into a fairly wide reach. But the breakthrough of the Varyag was just beginning.
Very primitively, this reach can be described as a triangle stretching from the southwest to the northeast, while its base was in the southwest, and the top rested on about. Phalmido in the northeast. From the base of the triangle there were three channels that could go out to sea - the Western, the Flying Fish Channel and the Eastern. In the middle of this triangle there was a fairly large island (on the above map it is designated as Marolles, although the author does not vouch for the first two letters), and in order for the Varyag to approach one of these straits, he had to go around this island with north or south. Skirting the island from the north, it would be possible to go by the shortest route to the Western Channel or the Flying Fish Channel, but to get to the Eastern one it was necessary to bypass the island from the south.
For a breakthrough, the Varyag was suitable for the Flying Fish and the East - West was relatively shallow, and was intended for low-tonnage ships.
So, the ships of S. Uriu were located at about. Harido, that is, near the top of our reach triangle. And if they, having found the "Varyag" in the fairway, gave a course and went approximately parallel to the breaking through "Varyag" course to the island of Marolles, then they would put the Russian ships in a completely hopeless position. The fact is that in this case the "Varyag" would be at their stern, at sharp heading angles, and the artillery of all six Japanese cruisers could "work" along it, which, with such a movement, would not be hampered by anything. In this case, "Varyag" would have to catch up with S. Uriu's squadron. The Varyag could not break through bypassing the Marolles from the north - the Japanese squadron cut off its way there, all that remained was to bypass the Marolles from the south and try to break into the sea with the Eastern Strait. But from Fr. Phalmido to Marolles is about 9 miles, and, bypassing the Marolles from the south, the Varyag had to pass the narrowness between Marolles and Yung Hung Do island, which did not exceed 3 miles.
Let's say the Varyag makes 20 knots in the fairway and goes for a breakthrough. The Japanese, seeing the Russian cruiser in the fairway, at a speed of 15 knots head for the Marolles ahead of the Varyag by 3-4 miles. To the islands of Humann (Soobol), located exactly between Marolles and Yung Hung Do, the Russians have to go 12-13 miles, and the Varyag at 20 knots will make this way in 35-40 minutes. The Japanese have only 9 miles to go to Humann, and after 35-40 minutes they will be at these islets just at the same time as the Varyag. That is, it turns out like this - if S. Uriu prefers to fight on the retreat, and the Varyag rushes into the breakthrough at 20 knots, then the Russian cruiser will first have to go 30-40 minutes under fire from most (if not all) of S. Uriu's cruisers, and then he would find himself in a three-mile strait at the same time as the Japanese squadron. And even if by some miracle an armored Russian cruiser can survive such a neighborhood, then from the islands of Humann to the beginning of the Eastern Strait to go another 6 miles, while if some Japanese cruisers begin to lag behind, then they will still be able to fire in pursuit, and "Asama" without any problems will be able to "accompany" the "Varyag" moving side by side with it. Hardly anyone on the Varyag doubted that the Japanese armored cruiser was capable of developing 20 knots …
In general, with such Japanese tactics, the Varyag did not have any chances, worse, an attempt at a 20-knot breakthrough led to a fairly quick and, in general, senseless death of the cruiser. But in order to fight for a longer time and sell your life at a higher price, you should have acted differently: you should not chase the Japanese squadron, but you had to let it go ahead. Did the Japanese go to the Marolles? It would be a good deal, in this case the Varyag should have reduced its speed and tried to pass under the stern of the Japanese ships. It would not have helped to break through, but at least in this case the Japanese would no longer be able to shoot the Varyag with the entire squadron, because their end caps would interfere with the lead ones, and the Varyag, having reached the reach, could have turned to act artillery of the entire side. The chances of a breakthrough are zero, the chances of winning are zero, but this option gave the opportunity to hold out longer and inflict more damage on the Japanese.
But for this it was necessary not to fly headlong at 20 knots to the enemy squadron, but, on the contrary, to go slower than the Japanese cruisers and let them go ahead.
What did Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev see when the Japanese opened fire? The fact that their cruisers are still motionless, with the exception of "Asam", which departs from Palmido Island and leads into battle, turning stern to the Russian ships. That is, apparently, S. Uriu still preferred to fight on the retreat, since their strongest ship is retreating. But, on the other hand, the rest of the Japanese cruisers have not yet shown their intentions and it would be nice to let them do this before Fr. Phalmido.
In other words, having slowed down, Vsevolod Fedorovich solved several tactical problems at once. For some time he could observe the armored Japanese cruisers in order to pinpoint their intentions when they finally get going. But at the same time, the distance to "Naniwa" and others was too great for aimed shooting, so, having reduced the speed of V. F. Rudnev did not risk falling under the concentrated fire of the entire squadron - and so it actually happened. Well, then, as the distance decreases, between the Varyag and the Korean on the one hand, and the Naniva, Chiyoda, Takachiho, Niitaka and Akashi, there would be O. Phalmido, interfering with the shooting. Thus, for some time, the battle with the Japanese squadron would have boiled down to a duel between the Varyag and the Asama, and this would also be in the interests of the Russian ships - even if not to fight under the gunfire of an entire squadron, again, this is a chance to hold out longer, inflict more damage to the Japanese. And if the Japanese flagship, not understanding the speed at which the Varyag is going to break through, nevertheless leads its ships to the Marolles, then there is a good chance after leaving the island. Pkhalmido pass under their stern … In addition, one could count on the fact that the gunners of the Asama, believing that the Varyag is flying at full steam, and not expecting such a low speed from him, they will not immediately figure out what the matter is, and take wrong sight (which, again, actually happened!). And finally, 9-11 knots, this is exactly the standard speed of Russian ships in pre-war firing. It is clear that the Varyag gunmen are not very skillful, so at least to give them the opportunity to shoot in their usual conditions - maybe they will hit someone …
In other words, there were many reasons to reduce the speed after Asama had determined his intentions, leading the Varyag to an acute aft corner - and none of them was associated with the desire to “stay away from the battle” or “not engage in a decisive battle. " But what would V. F. Rudnev a 20-knot jerk? Well, the Varyag would have taken off at full steam because of Fr. Phalmido to the Japanese squadron, which had just taken off the anchors, and they would have shot him point-blank. The rapprochement with the enemy cruisers would make some sense only if the Korean could also develop 20 knots and "fly out of the island" together with the Varyag, then its 203-mm cannons could say their weighty in short word. But the "Korean" could not do anything like that, he could not even support the "Varyag" rushing forward with fire, because Fr. Phalmido. As a result, heroically rushing forward, V. F. Rudnev would have put his detachment under the defeat in parts, without giving him a chance to harm the enemy. And today, numerous critics would write about the tactically illiterate bungler-Rudnev, who, for the sake of external effects (of course - a heroic dash at the enemy on a cruiser, whose mechanisms are on fire, and even along a narrow fairway!) Shamefully "leaked" the battle …
All of the above irrefutably testifies to one thing - the movement of "Varyag" and "Koreyets" at a speed of 9-10 knots at the beginning of the battle is tactically competent, and at that moment, perhaps, the only correct decision, aimed primarily at inflicting maximum damage, while minimizing your losses.
