At 17.40 (tentatively) V. K. Vitgeft was killed by a burst of a Japanese shell, and the command actually passed to the commander of the flagship "Tsarevich" N. M. Ivanov 2nd. But he was given only ten minutes to lead the squadron - as he later reported to the Investigative Commission:
“Seeing that the enemy was perfectly aiming at 60 cables and that our shooting, on the contrary, at this great distance was of little validity, I decided to approach at once, and began to slowly dodge to the right, putting the left rudder, but noticed that the enemy did not give come up to me and also began to lean to the right and I, in order to stop the battleship from rolling, I remember, put the right rudder. This was my last team in this fight. Then I remember a terrible shine over the head of Lieutenant Dragicevic-Niksic, who was standing next to me, and I don’t remember anything further. I woke up, as it turned out later, at about 11 o'clock in the morning …"
Undoubtedly, the testimony of N. M. Ivanov 2nd raises many questions - during his command, i.e. somewhere from 17.40 to 17.50 the Japanese line could not be 60 kbt away from the "Tsarevich", according to many other testimonies, it did not exceed 21-23 kbt. At this time, "Mikasa" had already overtaken the "Tsesarevich", having passed its traverse at about 17.30, it is very likely that "Tsesarevich" overtook "Asahi". In these conditions, the turn to the enemy, about which the commander of the "Tsarevich" speaks, and even with the subsequent turn of the ships of H. Togo, looks extremely doubtful.
Was the 1st rank captain lying? This is practically out of the question: firstly, N. M. Ivanov 2nd commanded by no means alone and should have understood that there would be a sufficient number of people capable of challenging his statement. Secondly, any lie must have some kind of intention, but the turn on the Japanese between 17.40 and 17.50 did not contain anything like that - it would be an erroneous maneuver that could help the Japanese to cover the head of the Russian squadron, if they so wished it. On the contrary, a turn to the left, away from the enemy, would have forced the Japanese to move in an outer arc and thus made it difficult to reach and concentrate fire on the head Russian battleships. And, finally, thirdly, if the commander of the "Tsarevich" considered his behavior at that moment reprehensible and decided to lie, then he would surely have come up with something more plausible than the maneuvers of 60 kb from the Japanese.
The certificate of N. M. Ivanov 2nd will remain one of the many mysteries of that battle. But it should be remembered that before his "entry into the position of commander" he was heavily attached by a Japanese shell (although N. M. Ivanov himself claimed that he did not lose consciousness), and after some 10 minutes he was again wounded and out of action before nights. It can be assumed that N. M. Ivanov 2nd, various episodes of the battle simply mixed in his memory, which is why he provided incorrect information, in which, nevertheless, he sincerely believed.
Be that as it may, at 17.40 all the advantages were lost by the Russians, their artillery, despite the excellent position in which the 1st Pacific Squadron was until 17.30, could not knock out Mikasa, and the moment when it would be possible to attack the enemy in formation front was overlooked. But now there was not so much left until dusk, and all that remained for the Russians was to play for time. The Japanese lapel served this purpose admirably. Alas, when the rudder was put to the right, and it happened at approximately 17.50, a new Japanese projectile, falling undershot into the water, ricocheted from its surface and exploded so successfully (for the Japanese, of course) that the commander of the "Tsarevich" was wounded, and the steering wheel of the hydraulic steering drive - broken and jammed. As a result, the uncontrollable "Tsesarevich" rolled to the left - it fell out of order, and now it took time for its officers (senior officer D. P. Shumov took command) to restore control of the ship. This could not be done all at once - according to the charter, the senior officer of the ship in battle should be anywhere, but not on the bridge and not in the wheelhouse together with the commander of the ship, and now, obviously, it took time to find him and report on the transfer of command. In addition, 4 lieutenants were wounded together in Ivanov 2nd (one of whom later died), and the staff officers were knocked out even earlier.
But the point was not even that there was no one to command. The steering did not work and now it was only possible to keep the course by cars, despite the fact that due to damage in the wheelhouse, commands could only be transmitted via voice communication. At about 18.15 (i.e., 25 minutes after the hit), the control was transferred to the central post, where there was a machine telegraph - but there was little sense from this, because nothing was visible from the central post, and the commander still had to stay in the wheelhouse, transmitting commands to the central post all over the same voice communication. As a result of all this, control of the ship was extremely difficult - the newest battleship was no longer part of the squadron, since it was not able to enter service and hold its place in it, responding in a timely manner to the flagship's maneuvers.
It was this hit (and not the death of VK Vitgeft) that ultimately led the 1st Pacific Squadron to chaos. Of course, the loss of the commander was a tragedy, but as a result of the actions of N. M. Ivanov 2nd, no one in the squadron knew about this, and the battleships continued to fight without losing formation. Most interestingly, the failure of the flagship battleship in itself did not affect the squadron's ability to fight.
Let us analyze in detail how and why the Russian battleships acted during this period. So, at about 17.50 "Tsesarevich" falls out of order to the left, turns 180 degrees and goes along the line of Russian battleships, but in the opposite direction.
"Retvizan" - at first follows the "Tsarevich", and even begins to turn left after him, but, "having passed a quarter of a circle," the battleship understands that the "Tsarevich" is no longer leading the squadron. All eyes are turned to the "Peresvet" of Prince P. P. Ukhtomsky, but what do they see from Retvizan? The battleship of the junior flagship is badly beaten (it would be the Russian battleship most damaged in an artillery battle), its topmails and halyards are torn off, the flag of the junior flagship is gone. "Peresvet" does nothing on its own, but simply goes to the wake of "Pobeda". From everything seen on the "Retvizan" they draw a completely logical (but incorrect) conclusion - most likely, P. P. Ukhtomsky also suffered and cannot lead the squadron, accordingly, the "Retvizan" will have to do this. E. N. Schensnovich returns his battleship to the opposite course.
"Pobeda" - the battleship, noticing the failure of the "Tsarevich", continues to go to the wake behind the "Retvizan", but now the ship is closely watching the "Peresvet". The tactic is the most correct: of course, "Pobeda" should enter the wake of "Peresvet", but the signal "Follow me" by P. P. Ukhtomsky did not give (and it can be done on a neighboring battleship even with a semaphore). And while the junior flagship does not take any action, Pobeda does not break the existing formation, but the Pobeda commander is ready to react to the signal or change in the course of Peresvet. Everything seems to be correct: only the Tsesarevich, unable to control, is moving closer, the trajectory of its movement is incomprehensible and can change at any moment, which is why the Pobeda is forced, without following the Retvizan, to turn to the right and thus disrupt the formation.
"Peresvet". The actions of Prince P. P. Ukhtomsky is also completely logical - he follows in the wake of "Victory", maintaining his place in the ranks. Then on the battleship they see the "Tsarevich" falling out of order, but, like on "Pobeda", they do not want to break the formation at all, however, the uncontrolled circulation of the flagship battleship threatens not only "Victory", but also "Peresvet", which is why the latter is also forced to take to the right … At this time, the Peresvet finally noticed the Tsarevich's signal. "The Admiral is transferring command" and P. P. Everything finally became clear to Ukhtomsky. Having dodged the "Tsarevich", they raised the signal "Follow me" on the "Peresvet"
If it were not for the threat of a battering ram that was created by the uncontrollable "Tsarevich", the prince followed into the wake of the "Victory" going in front of him - after all, he walked that way, even when the "Tsarevich" had already left the system, but had not yet "attacked" the "Victory" and "Peresvet". In this case, with a high degree of probability, the squadron would not have lost the ranks: "Sevastopol" and "Poltava" would have followed P. P. Ukhtomsky, and the passivity of the latter would give the "Retvizan" (and the next "Victory") the right to lead the squadron. However, "Peresvet" was forced to dodge the "Tsarevich" - and went on a new course. How could the commanders understand what their new flagship wants? Did he turn because he was forced to evade the "Tsarevich", or did he want to enter the lead and lead the squadron on a new course? By that time, "Peresvet" was badly damaged (it received the maximum hits among all ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron), all its halyards were shot down, and it could not pick up signals, except on the handrails of its bridge, but from there they were poorly visible.
"Sevastopol" - the battleship was commanded by N. O. von Essen, and that says it all. By 17.50 his ship lagged somewhat behind the Peresvet, and then on the battleship they saw how the Tsarevich was rolling across its course (as a result, he cut the line between Peresvet and Sevastopol). Nikolai Ottovich was forced to evade, taking to the right, and then he saw how the squadron formation was mixed. In this situation, he acted splendidly: since our affairs are bad, it means we have to attack, and then, God willing, we'll figure it out … Therefore, N. O. von Essen turns to approach the enemy, trying to bypass the "heap-mala" of the Russian battleships on their starboard side. But … "Sevastopol" and so did not differ in speed, and just at that moment the successful hit of the Japanese in the casing of the aft pipe knocked out part of the steam pipes, which made it necessary to stop the steam in one of the stoker. The speed of the Sevastopol immediately dropped to 8 knots and, of course, there was no question of any attacks. The ship simply could not keep up with the ships of H. Togo departing from it.
"Poltava" - everything is simple here. This battleship was never able to reduce its lag behind the squadron and all the time after the resumption of the battle followed it at some distance and, in fact, out of order. Now, thanks to the confusion that arose, he took the opportunity to catch up with the squadron. It is interesting that at the Poltava they still disassembled the Peresvet signal "Follow me" and even transmitted it by a semaphore to Sevastopol.
Thus, we see that:
1) At 17.40 V. K. Vitgeft was killed. However, the squadron kept formation and fought.
2) At 17.50 the commander of "Tsesarevich" N. M. was wounded. Ivanov 2nd, and the battleship itself left the line. But the squadron was still in formation and fighting.
3) And only after the "Tsarevich" almost rammed the Russian battleships, forcing the "Victory", "Peresvet" and "Sevastopol" to evade, the squadron formation was disrupted, although the battleships continued to fight.
At the same time, all the commanders acted reasonably - to the extent of their understanding of the situation. Undoubtedly, chaos touched the formation of the Russian battleships, but not the slightest trace of it is visible in the heads of their commanders - their actions are logical and do not have the slightest hint of confusion or panic. Interestingly, all this, in essence, does not represent some kind of "secret of the boarded-up attic"; it is enough to study the reports of the command personnel of the ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron and their testimony from the Investigative Commission. It is all the more surprising today in many publications to read about how, with the death of V. K. The Witgeft squadron IMMEDIATELY collapsed and lost control.
In fact, the only problem was the lack of instructions in the event of the death of the commander, which V. K. Vitgeft simply had to give before the battle: but he did not give them and now the ship commanders could only guess how they should behave in such a situation.
And what was the Japanese commander doing at that time? It would seem that fate presented him with a magnificent gift - the formation of Russian ships collapsed, and it was worth taking advantage of it immediately. Having turned sharply to the left, Heihachiro Togo could have led his detachment of 15-20 kbt along the course of the Russian squadron, at point-blank shooting the crowded battleships of the 1st Pacific Ocean, but he did not. H. Togo really turned to the left, but went in a wide arc, so instead of getting closer to the Russian ships, it was rather an increase in the distance, but why? What prevented the commander of the United Fleet from trying to end this battle with a convincing victory this time?
Apparently, this was due to several reasons - the natural caution of Heihachiro Togo, the position of the Russian ships and the actions of the battleship Retvizan. As for the first, the state of the Russian squadron was not completely determined and it was unclear how the Russian commanders would behave: H. Togo had little time to make a decision, and the Japanese commander did not want to risk it. An attempt to pass under the noses of the Russian battleships could turn into a dump if the Russians increase their speed and rush to the Japanese, and yet with them cruisers and destroyers … moment at hand H. Togo they were not. Generally speaking, the fact that the Japanese commander did not hold several cruisers and at least a dozen destroyers with his main forces looks like a clear mistake of H. Togo.
On the other hand, the Russian ships, having mixed the formation, nevertheless did not huddle together, but rather formed something similar to the formation of a front or, rather, even a ledge along which Kh would have to go. … “Crossing T” still wouldn't work. As for the "Retvizan", its movement on the enemy also could not but influence the decisions of the Japanese admiral - he saw that the Russian squadron either mixed, or turned into a front line and that at least one battleship was going directly to his ships.
The commander of the Retvizan, E. N. Schensnovich, believing that the junior flagship of P. P. Ukhtomsky killed or wounded, was still trying to lead the squadron to the enemy. However, the formation was disrupted and "Retvizan" was left alone, despite the fact that the distance between it and "Pobeda", "dodging" from the "Tsarevich", rapidly increased and could reach 20 kbt (although the figure is somewhat doubtful). Why did it happen?
As for the "Sevastopol" and "Poltava", everything is clear with them - the first was knocked down by the Japanese shell, and the second was too far from the squadron and had not yet caught up with it. P. P. Ukhtomsky, seeing that the squadron's formation had disintegrated, now tried to gather it into a column, which he was going to lead, raising the signal "Follow me." Apparently, the commander of the "Victory", the captain of the 1st rank Zatsarenny, did not understand what he should do - whether to go to the wake of the "Retvizan", or try to follow the "Peresvet", but he was inclined towards the second. On "Pobeda" they did not understand what the "Retvizan" was doing, but they knew perfectly well the importance of formation in a naval battle, they saw that the Japanese were very close and the need to re-establish the line of battle was quite obvious. How else to restore it, if not following the flagship?
E. N. himself Schensnovich described what was happening:
“Having moved away for a certain interval from our ships, as it turned out later - about 20 cables and, seeing that the nose of the Retvizan was hanging, I decided that I would not get to Vladivostok. I wanted to ram the terminal enemy ship. I announced this in the wheelhouse."
In this episode, there is a lot of unclear, for example - why the nose of the battleship "sagged" now, and not earlier? The only reasonable reason for the "sagging" could only be the hit of a Japanese 12-inch high-explosive projectile (although it is possible that it was a ten-inch Kasuga) into the bow of the Retvizan from the starboard side.
The shell hit the upper part of the 51 mm armor plate that protected the bow. Of course, the two-inch armor could not really protect against such a blow - although the armor was not pierced, the plate had cracks and did not prevent water from entering the hull. As luck would have it, the compartment was flooded, in which the newest American-built battleship had no water pumping facilities … But this happened in the first phase of the battle, and although the battleship received a certain amount of water, the flooding did not seem to progress. According to E. N. Shchensnovich, who inspected the damage to the ship in the interval between the phases, when the Japanese lagged behind:
"… the water reached the threshold of the bulkhead compartment of the bow tower"
But that was all. On the other hand, in the evening the weather cleared up, and the direction of the swell was such that the waves hit exactly the right cheekbone of the Retvizan, where the damaged slab was located. And yet - the speed of water inflow could be influenced by the energetic maneuvers of the Retvizan, when he first tried to move after the Tsarevich, and then returned to the previous course. The second version looks the most plausible - given that when the Retvizan went against the wave for a ram, the flooding increased so much that the senior officer, who left his place in the aft artillery tower and rushed into the nose, worried to figure out what happened there. But first things first.
Seeing the "sagging nose" of the battleship, or having some other reasons, E. N. Schensnovich makes an attempt to ram the end ship of the Japanese. The attempt at ramming itself is beyond doubt, because E. N. Shchensnovich announced this publicly and would never have invented such a detail later. After all, if he had not actually announced the ramming, then it would have been enough for him to simply report to the Investigative Commission: "He turned to ram the enemy." This would not raise any questions, for who is given to know what thoughts the commander could have at one time or another of the battle? But he reported that he informed everyone in the wheelhouse about this, and if it turned out to be a lie, then E. N. Szczensnovich risked exposure extremely. In addition, many observers (including N. O. von Essen) interpreted the Retvizan's maneuvers in this way, observing them from the side. But why did the ram fail to reach its goal?
The first thing I would like to note is that E. N. Schensnovich had very little time to fulfill his plan. Suppose that at the moment of turning to the ram, the Retvizan was 20 kbt away from the Japanese line, but even if the speeds of the Russian and Japanese ships were equal, then while the Retvizan overcomes these 20 kbt, the Japanese line will also move ahead for 20 cables, i.e. 2 miles. Is it a lot or a little? Even if we accept that the intervals between the Japanese armored ships were 500 m, then in this case the length of their line of 7 ships did not exceed 3.5 miles, but rather it was shorter.
And besides, the problem was that the Retvizan did not go at all with the speed of the 1st combat detachment of the Japanese - V. K. Vitgeft led the 1st Pacific squadron at 13 knots, and it was impossible to accelerate to the same 15-16 knots at once, and the battleship was also wasting time on a turn … 8 minutes. But "Mikasa" had long gone ahead, and, in fact, only the turn of the Japanese column to the left gave the "Retvizan" any chances to attack at least the end ships of the Japanese.
So, the count went on for minutes, and "Retvizan" went to the ram, and then the Japanese gunners concentrated their fire on the crazy Russian battleship. But suddenly it turned out that the Japanese, shooting very well on parallel courses, did not at all shine with accuracy in close combat against the ship attacking their formation: according to eyewitnesses, the sea around the Retvizan was boiling, only the squadron battleship, according to the commander, hit everything one shell. But there was a moment when the Russian ship was separated from the Japanese by only 15-17 cables!
Why did Retvizan not reach the Japanese line? The answer is very simple - at the very time when every minute was counting, E. N. Shchensnovich received an abdominal contusion - a splinter of a Japanese shell that exploded on the water hit him in the stomach. There was no penetrating wound, but one should not underestimate such an effect - for some time E. N. Shchensnovich lost the ability to command the ship. They sent for a senior officer, but could not quickly find him - and as a result, having no control, "Retvizan" missed the available minutes and lost the chance to ram the next end "Nissin" or "Yakumo".
And was there really such an opportunity? Let's say no splinter hit E. N. Shchensnovich in the stomach, and with an unwavering hand he led his ship across the course of the "Nissin" … What prevented H. Togo, seeing such an unpleasant picture for him, to raise "Turn all suddenly" and go from the "Retvizan"? Indeed, in this case, finding himself in the position of catching up, he could no longer ram the Japanese ships, they would simply shoot him if he tried to chase them …
The Retvizan turned in the direction of the Russian squadron and, diverging from the end Japanese ships on a countercourse, headed towards Port Arthur at high speed. This action caused many interpretations … but it cannot be denied that the Retvizan at the most dangerous moment, when the squadron mixed, diverted the attention and fire of the Japanese, and thereby enabled the Russian battleships to restore formation - as far as possible.
P. P. Ukhtomsky, having raised (on the handrails of the bridge) the order "Follow me", turned to the left, from the 1st combat detachment of the Japanese, and this was, of course, the right decision. First, control of the squadron had to be resumed at any cost, and this was an extremely difficult task, given the lack of any acceptable means of communication on the Peresvet. Secondly, the resumption of the battle was completely not in the interests of the 1st Pacific - as we have already noted above, she should have "endured" until nightfall, and by no means go head-on to the 1st combat detachment that blocked the road to Vladivostok. After all, it would have been far more sensible to try to slip past the Japanese in the darkness of the night (which there was very little left) than to continue the duel of fire, in which, and this was obvious to everyone, the Japanese were superior to the Russians. But whatever plan Prince P. P. Ukhtomsky, his first task, obviously, was to restore the formation of the battleships of the 1st Pacific squadron - which he tried to do.
However, it cannot be said that he did it well. "Retvizan", so distinguished in attacking the entire Japanese fleet, now "distinguished" in a completely different direction. E. N. Schensnovich continued to consider P. P. Ukhtomsky out of action and decided to return the squadron to Port Arthur. To this end, he passed along the battleships of the 1st Pacific Squadron and headed for Arthur in the hope that the rest would go to his wake and the formation would be restored. On "Peresvet" they tried to contact the "Retvizan", signaling to him and trying to give him a semaphore - wherever there! They saw nothing on the Retvizan. E. N. Shchensnovich should not have done this - he should have gotten closer to "Peresvet" and asked him about the state of P. P. Ukhtomsky. By that time, the Japanese fire had already subsided or even stopped altogether, their 1st combat detachment did not try to get close to the Russian battleships - on the contrary, if the Russian ships went north-west, H. Togo led his battleships almost exactly to the east, and when the distance between "Peresvet" and "Mikasa" reached about 40 kbt, the shooting stopped.
Thus, nothing prevented E. N. Schensnovich to figure out who exactly is in command of the squadron, but he did not do this, but made an independent decision to return the squadron to Port Arthur. Of course, E. N. Shchensnovich had reason to bring "Retvizan" there - V. K. Vitgeft gave him such a right in connection with a hole in the underwater part, but could he decide for the whole squadron? Be that as it may, "Retvizan" went to Port Arthur, P. P. Ukhtomsky went after the Retvizan (which, it seems, finally strengthened EN Shchensnovich in the correctness of the decision he had chosen), and the rest of the ships tried to follow P. P. Ukhtomsky … "Peresvet" bypassed "Victory" and he joined P. P. Ukhtomsky in the wake, but "Sevastopol", which, it seems, had even less than 8 knots, no matter how hard it tried to do it, still lagged behind. "Poltava" managed to enter service after "Victory" when P. P. Ukhtomsky passed by. The "Tsarevich" was still trying to regain control, but this only led to the fact that the battleship, having laid two full circulation, and then somehow settled behind the "Sevastopol" (but not in the wake).
So, closer to 18.50 the position of the squadron was as follows: "Retvizan" was going to Arthur at a speed of about 11, perhaps 13 knots. Behind him, gradually lagging behind, followed Peresvet, who was trying to assemble a squadron under his command - despite the fact that he went no more than 8-9 knots and at such and such a speed, it would seem, one should expect a quick recovery of the wake column, in fact he had only "Pobeda" and "Poltava" in service. "Sevastopol" was clearly trying to enter service, but, despite the low speed of "Peresvet", lagged behind, and "Tsarevich", despite his attempts to enter the wake of "Sevastopol", in essence, went out of order "somewhere in that direction ". "Retvizan", going in front of "Peresvet", although it was formally in the ranks, but in fact remained for P. P. Ukhtomsky uncontrollable.
In general, it can be stated that the Russian battleships did not disperse at all "some into the forest, some for firewood," but made every effort to restore the system (with the exception of "Retvizan"), but E. N. Shchensnovich was led to "dual power" - both he and the junior flagship tried to command the squadron at the same time. However, out of 6 Russian battleships, two received such damage that they could not enter service, even when it followed only 8-9 knots, which is why the resumption of the battle did not bode well for the Russians …
