So, we see that the cruisers of Project 68 were to become at least one of the best, (or rather the best) light cruisers in the world. But they were unlucky - seven ships, laid down in 1939-1941, could not have time to get into service before the start of the Great Patriotic War, and there their construction was frozen. Of course, when the question arose about their completion, the sailors wanted to take into account as much as possible the military experience acquired at such a high price.
However, in fairness, it should be noted that even before the start of the war, various options for adjusting project 68 were considered. People's Commissar of the Navy N. G. Kuznetsov in July 1940 approved the TTZ for the rearmament of one cruiser with German artillery and an MSA. The project was named 68I ("foreign"). It was supposed to install twelve German 150-mm guns (apparently, it was about 150-mm / 55 SK C / 28) in the German towers and replace the two-gun 100-mm B-54 turrets with 105-mm LC / 31 deck mounts. This installation was originally created for an 88-mm gun and had separate vertical guidance of the barrels. Subsequently, the Germans moved away from this, "packing" both 105-mm guns in one cradle, which achieved a weight saving of 750 kg, and the new installation was called LC / 37. It was already being carried out by the time of the negotiations, but, apparently, in this case, the Germans preferred to equip their fleet with them, and not sell them to a potential enemy.
However, the question of 150-mm German guns disappeared at the end of 1940. Firstly, it turned out that these guns, turrets and FCS were not in the metal yet, and it would be necessary to wait for their manufacture, which completely made the deal meaningless. It was believed that the domestic B-38 and the MSA should turn out better than the German ones, and the delivery times were comparable. And, in addition, the very first calculations showed that German equipment is significantly heavier than Soviet equipment, requires more space and electricity, as a result of which the displacement of a light cruiser should have increased by 700 tons, which was also considered unacceptable.
So, the German main caliber was abandoned almost immediately, but the 105-mm station wagon is a different matter. Here, the gains from the acquisition were undeniable, including the fact that the German installations were stabilized, but we did not know how to do this yet. In addition, the replacement of the B-54 with the LC / 31 had practically no effect on the ship's displacement, since the mass of the installations was comparable. Therefore, it was decided to purchase four such installations together with two fire control posts and install them on the Valery Chkalov laid down on 1939-31-08.
True, this did not end well, since the Germans did not supply anything anyway, and the Soviet shipbuilders had to make changes to the project, which delayed the launch of the Chkalov.
An even more radical option was worked out on its own initiative by TsNII-45 - the light cruiser "Chapaev" was supposed to become … a small aircraft carrier: 10,500 tons of displacement, 33 knots, 30-32 aircraft and even two catapults. However, work on the domestic aircraft carrier was not developed in those years.
The first "Preliminary TTZ for adjusting the project, in relation to the mothballed ships of the 1st series, based on the conclusions from the combat experience of the Navy ships in the current war," was issued in September 1942, the second - in March 1944. weapons of light cruisers. The number of 100-mm guns should have been increased to 12, and instead of the originally planned four two-gun B-54s, it was now required to install six new stabilized S-44 installations. Instead of six 37-mm "twin" 66-K, it was required to install twenty newest B-11, thereby increasing the number of 37-mm barrels from 12 to 40! In another version, it was proposed to install only a dozen B-11s, but they should have been supplemented with four quad 23-mm installations 4-U-23 (created on the basis of the VYa cannon).
The TsKB-17, who designed the project 68 cruiser, completed the corresponding studies, but it was not possible to accommodate such firepower while retaining the four MK-5 three-gun turrets of the main caliber. As a result, TsKB-17 specialists proposed their own version of a radical reorganization of the cruiser's artillery weapons. The designers guaranteed the placement of not even 12, but 14 100-mm ZKDB cannons and 40 barrels of 37-mm machine guns, but on condition that a dozen 152-mm guns were replaced with nine 180-mm guns in three MK-3-180 turrets. And then the fun begins.
The above proposal of TsKB-17 sounded in 1944, when all the features of the operation of the domestic 180-mm artillery were identified and taken into account. And there is no doubt that if our 180-mm B-1-P were a completely unusable weapon, as many modern sources like to describe it, the fleet would immediately refuse such a proposal. However, the Main Directorate of Shipbuilding supported TsKB-17, and the Operations Directorate of the Main Naval Headquarters noted that the replacement of MK-5 with MK-3-180 with the above-described strengthening of anti-aircraft weapons:
"For tactical reasons, it would be the most expedient solution to the issue of choosing a variant of artillery armament for the new light cruiser"
The return to the 180mm caliber is certainly quite interesting. In the first article of the series, we described in detail why the 152-mm cannons were much more consistent with the tasks of the Project 68 cruiser compared to the 180-mm caliber, and suddenly … But in fact, there is no contradiction here. The fact is that 152-mm guns larger than 180-mm corresponded to the tasks of a cruiser for service with a squadron, and we were going to build a Big Fleet - but at the end of the war, in 1944-45, it was quite obvious that there would be no such fleet in the near future. we won't have time. Back in 1940, the construction of heavy warships was significantly limited: by order of the NKSP No. 178 of October 22, 1940, on the basis of the decree of the Government of the USSR "On the plan of naval shipbuilding for 1941", plans to create a large fleet were largely curtailed.
So, of the six battleships and heavy cruisers under construction, it was necessary to focus on completing only three (the battleship "Soviet Russia", the heavy cruisers "Kronstadt" and "Sevastopol"), the construction of two battleships should be "limited" and one more - "Soviet Belarus" - disassemble on the slipway. But the construction of light cruisers was supposed to continue - it was necessary to lay down 6 more light cruisers of project 68 by the end of 1941. As for the post-war programs, they had not yet been drawn up, but it was clear that the country exhausted by the war would not be able to immediately start creating an ocean-going fleet … Thus, it turned out that the main ship of the USSR Navy for the coming years will be a light cruiser, while there will be no "squadrons" in which it was intended to serve. And this returned the fleet, if not to the theory of a small naval war, then to actions against the superior forces of the enemy fleet off our coast, for which the 180-mm caliber was better suited to six-inch guns. Well, taking into account the fact that the required air defense could be provided only when 180-mm cannons were placed on the ship, the TsKB-17 version was indeed optimal.
And yet, the Chapaev-class cruisers did not receive the MK-3-180, however, for reasons not of a tactical, but of an industrial nature: to resume production and ensure the supply of 180-mm guns and turrets a year later than 152-mm B-38 and MK -5. This was supposed to delay the commissioning of the newest light cruisers, while the Navy needed them extremely urgently.
As a result, the modernization of the 68-K project was much more "sparing" in nature: its main directions were the strengthening of anti-aircraft weapons, although not to the extent that was originally planned, the second - equipping cruisers with radar stations of various kinds. The rest of the decisions, for the most part, turned out to be a consequence of the above.
The long-range anti-aircraft caliber was now represented by four two-gun 100-mm SM-5-1 mounts, and I must say that this artillery system provided everything that domestic anti-aircraft gunners could dream of during the war years. Outwardly, the SM-5-1 was very similar to the German 105-mm installation LC / 37, they had a lot in common: both installations were stabilized; both had a remote control - i.e. the vertical and horizontal guidance angles could be set directly from the command and rangefinder station (in the SM-5-1, the D-5S system was responsible for this), for both the guns were located in the same cradle.
But there was also a difference - the German installations were deck-mounted, and the domestic SM-5-1 were turreted. They, of course, were not fully automated, but nevertheless, the supply of shells to the fighting compartment with the help of elevators looked noticeably more progressive - the calculation had only to shift the shot to the swinging tray, the rest of the operations were carried out automatically. In addition, the calculation was covered from shrapnel. The weight of the projectile of the Soviet artillery system is insignificantly higher - 15, 6-15, 9 kg versus 15, 1 kg of the German one, but the initial speed (1000 m / s) exceeded that of the "German" by 100 m / s. The speed of vertical and horizontal guidance of the SM-5-1 was also higher than the German one - 16-17 deg / s versus 12 deg / s.
The ZKDB fire was controlled by two SPN-200-RL, each of which, in addition to optical surveillance equipment, had its own Vympel-2 radar station. In addition, each SM-5-1 installation was equipped with its own Shtag-B radio range finder. Of course, not everything worked out right away - the same Vympel-2 turned out to be an unsuccessful radar, which in the end was "demoted" to radio range finders. But unable to provide tracking of an air target in three coordinates. However, in the course of subsequent upgrades (early 50s), more advanced Yakor and Yakor-M radars were installed on the ships, thanks to which, for the first time in the USSR, it was possible to solve the problem of combining the instrumental method of firing anti-aircraft artillery with automatic tracking (in three coordinates) air targets.
As for ammunition, the SM-5-1, along with high-explosive and high-explosive fragmentation ammunition for firing at sea or coastal targets, used two types of anti-aircraft shells: containing 1.35 kg of the ZS-55 explosive weighing 15.6 kg and equipped with a radio fuse ZS- 55P, which had a slightly higher weight (15, 9 kg), but, alas, a significantly lower content of explosives - only 816 grams. In addition (possibly due to the difference in masses), the initial speed of the ZS-55R is 5 m / s lower and amounted to 995 m / s. Unfortunately, the author of this article was unable to find out the date when this projectile entered service.
In general, we can say that the SM-5-1 and the universal artillery fire control system used on the 68-K project cruisers brought it to a completely new level compared to the original, pre-war version.
The situation with 37-mm assault rifles has also improved significantly. Although instead of 20 installations had to be limited to fourteen, the new B-11 assault rifles were very successful. Their ballistics corresponded to the 70-K, with which our fleet went through the entire war, but unlike its "ancestor" the B-11 received water-cooled barrels, which approximately doubled the number of shots that the machine gun could fire before the barrel overheated critically. The V-11 was guided only manually, but the installation was stabilized. Unfortunately, the reliable stabilization of such machines turned out to be too tough for the domestic industry, therefore, during service, it was usually turned off. The anti-aircraft guns had their own control gear … as if it did not exist, although the presence of a certain MZA-68K launcher is mentioned, although the author could not find what it was like. But it is reliably known that the Zenit 68K launcher, which controls the fire of the universal 100-mm artillery, also issued target designations for anti-aircraft guns. It is not entirely clear how effective such target designation could be at that technological level, but nevertheless it should be noted that, unlike optical means (stereo range finders), one radar can observe and control the movement of several targets. At the same time, it is reliably known that the PUS of the main caliber of the project 68-K cruisers could provide simultaneous shelling of four different targets.
There were no other anti-aircraft weapons on the ships of Project 68-K - anti-aircraft 12, 7-mm machine guns were abandoned due to low combat effectiveness.
As for the radar weapons, it was planned to be quite diverse for the Chapaev-class cruisers: according to the original plan, it was supposed to install radar stations for monitoring the surface (Rif) and air (Huys) situations, but this did not exhaust their capabilities. For example, "Rif" could detect targets of the "cruiser" type at a distance of 200-220 kbt, "torpedo boat" - 30-50 kbt, bursts from the falls of 152-mm high-explosive or fragmentation shells - from 25 to 100 kb, and could be used for issuing target designation of the main caliber artillery. "Guys-2", although it was considered a survey, capable of detecting a flying aircraft, starting from a distance of 80 km, it could also provide a control center for universal artillery.
In addition, of course, there were artillery radars - to control the fire of 152-mm artillery, two Redan-2 radars were used, located on the roofs of both command and control centers. "Redan-2" performed all the necessary measurements, determining both the distance to the target and the distance to bursts from the fall of shells and the distance between the target and bursts. Unfortunately, these radars also turned out to be not very good, and in the early 50s they were replaced by the new Zalp radar, which coped well with its "duties". In addition, the towers of the cruisers received the Shtag-B radio rangefinder, which was able to “see” a destroyer-type target with 120 kbt and track the target, starting from a distance of 100 kbt, while the error in determining the distance did not exceed 15 meters. The lower towers did not receive the "Stag-B", most likely, because the muzzle gases of towers No. 2 and 3 could damage them when firing at sharp bow (stern) angles.
How effective was the domestic radar weaponry? In this respect, the shooting that took place on October 28, 1958, in which the cruisers Kuibyshev and Frunze took part, are very indicative. The firing was carried out at night and exclusively according to the radar data, the shield was towed by the destroyer of the project 30-bis "Buyny", which was going completely shaded, so that the cruisers could not use the optics to observe the towing vehicle.
The cruisers traveling at a speed of over 28 knots detected a target from a distance of 190 kbt and laid down on a combat course, and when the distance was reduced to 131 kbt, they began zeroing in. Kuibyshev fired two sighting volleys, waited for the shells to fall, gave another sighting volley, and then both cruisers opened fire to kill. The shooting lasted 3 minutes (unfortunately, it is not clear in the source - whether the fire to kill lasted 3 minutes or the entire shooting, including zeroing) and ended when the target shield was separated from the cruisers by 117 kbt. The target was hit by 3 shells, including two in the cloth and one in the shield body. The command rated the shooting as "excellent", and we have no reason to lower the rating received by the cruisers - for such distances and relatively light 152-mm guns, this is really a brilliant result.
Since we are talking about the main caliber, we note that the control of a dozen 152-mm guns was entrusted to the new Molniya-ATs-68K launchers, which were a significant modernization of the Molniya-ATs, which was installed on the 26-bis cruisers, including the capable take full account of the data provided by the radar, combining them with the data of optical observation devices. Duplication of fire control systems would make, perhaps, even the German heavy cruisers of the Admiral Hipper class blush with envy. Ships of the "Chapaev" type had two automatic firearms, two reserve automatic firearms and four turrets (in each turret).
The radar armament of cruisers was constantly being improved. So, for example, starting from 1958, the air surveillance radar station on all cruisers (with the exception of Frunze) was replaced by a new one - Foot-B, as a result, the aircraft's detection range increased from 80 to 150 km. And in general, it can be stated that the cruisers of Project 68-K possessed sufficiently modern radar equipment, which was quite adequate for the tasks facing ships of this type.
Of course, the list of new equipment was not limited to only one radar and anti-aircraft weapons and CCP. For example, the ships received a wider range of radio stations and receivers, Burun-K radio direction finders, Tamir-5N hydroacoustic station, but the most interesting innovation was the equipment of the Zveno combat information post. Surprisingly, it is a fact - in 1949, NII-10 developed a prototype of modern automated control systems and was intended to coordinate the work of shipborne surface and air conditions lighting and reflect it on special tablets and - most interestingly - to guide their own aircraft and torpedo boats. The Zveno equipment was capable of simultaneously processing data on 4-5 surface and 7-9 air targets, directing a group of fighters at one air target and two groups of torpedo boats at one surface target.
But all these advantages of the modernized cruisers were bought at a very high price. I had to abandon aviation and torpedo armament, but even taking this into account, the overload reached 826 tons, as a result of which the standard displacement was 11 450 tons, the draft increased by 30 cm, the margin of combat survivability and longitudinal stability decreased, although, in fairness, it follows indicate that even in this state, the ship retained superiority in these indicators over the cruisers of the 26 and 26-bis project. Full speed dropped to 32.6 knots (when forcing - 33.5 knots). It should be noted that, despite the overload of the cruiser, they managed to surpass the design task in terms of the cruising range. The range with the maximum fuel reserve on the economic course of the project was supposed to reach 5,500 miles, in fact, for cruisers, it fluctuated in the range of 6,070-6,980 miles.
The freeboard still turned out to be insufficient - already at 4-5 point excitement, when moving against the wave, the optics of the nose 152-mm towers, the wallpaper of stabilized anti-aircraft artillery guidance posts and B-11 machine guns located in the area of the bow superstructure were splashed and flooded.
But the most unpleasant thing was the explosive increase in the number of the crew - after all, all additional weapons and equipment required personnel for their service. Initially, according to the pre-war project, the crew was supposed to be 742 people, but during the post-war redesign of the ship, this number should have increased by almost 60% - up to 1,184 people! As a result, it was necessary to simplify the equipment of living quarters, eliminate lockers (!), Use three-tier collapsible bunks for the team, while the bed nets were stored outside the living quarters - there was simply no room inside them. In addition, if there was still a wardroom for the officers, the sailors were forced to be content with tank food in the cockpits. On the other hand, one should not think that the designers completely forgot about the crew - the Chapaevs were distinguished by a well-developed "communal" infrastructure, incl. large supplies of fresh water and provisions, refrigeration units, adequate medical and bath and laundry facilities, etc. On the American light cruisers of the Cleveland class, a similar problem was observed - with a similar standard displacement, the crew size was 1,255 and living conditions were perhaps the worst among all American cruisers.
In addition, the project 68K cruisers had other, not so obvious, but unpleasant drawbacks in everyday operation. So, for example, the electric power system operated on direct current, which for the 50s was considered an anachronism, there were no active stabilizers, there was no system for collecting and purifying water, which is why the cruiser was forced to simply drain all the mud into the sea, which created well-known difficulties as when returning in their own and when entering foreign ports. Ships of the 68K project were distinguished by an increased level of noise (including due to the need for powerful ventilation systems for the increased crew), the absence of a wooden covering of the upper deck and forecastle made it difficult for the personnel to work on them. It seemed to be trifles - but the overloading of the ship did not allow anything to be fixed.
It is very difficult to compare the ships of the 68K project with the cruisers of foreign powers for the simple reason that in the post-war world almost no one was involved in the creation of classic light cruisers. What for? A large number of them remained after the war, and the situation in the world has changed so much that the huge cruising fleets of the USA and England turned out to be redundant and, in general, unnecessary. The same Americans en masse withdrawn to the reserve the cruisers of the Brooklyn and Cleveland class and even the later Fargo. The countries lost their fleets, France was in a rather deplorable economic condition, and had neither the desire nor the ability to build a strong fleet.
We have already compared Project 68 with the Cleveland-class light cruisers, and we can only note that the superiority of Project 68K in everything, except for anti-aircraft artillery, only increased, and in terms of anti-aircraft guns, the gap was no longer fatal. Much more interesting is the American "work on the mistakes" of the Clevelands - light cruisers of the "Fargo" class. These ships, having a displacement similar to the 68K project (11,890 tons), had the Cleveland armament: 12-152-mm / 47 guns, inferior in firing range, but superior in rate of fire to domestic B-38s, as well as 12 * 127- mm / 38 universal guns, 24 barrels of 40-mm assault rifles and 14 20-mm "Erlikons" (paired). But if the Clevelands had many shortcomings, the Fargo were, for the most part, spared from them, which is why they became full-fledged light cruisers. In addition, a series of these cruisers was laid down at the end of 1943, when the Americans were already fully armed with military experience and perfectly understood what they wanted from their light cruisers - therefore, although the Fargo entered service in 1945-46, and “Chapaevs”- in 1950, they can be considered to some extent as peers.
Since the guns of the main caliber and the armor of the Fargo matched the Clevelands, they were losing in artillery combat by the Chapaev-class cruisers for the reasons stated in the previous article, but I would like to note that with the advent of artillery radars for the Americans, things only got worse. Now Soviet cruisers could conduct effective combat at a distance of at least 130 kbt (which was demonstrated by the firing on October 28, 1958), while for American six-inch aircraft, such distances were limiting in range (with corresponding consequences for accuracy, etc.), so that the advantage of Soviet cruisers at increased combat distances became even greater than before.
It is more difficult to assess the anti-aircraft weapons of the "Fargo" and "Chapaev". The rhombic position of the universal 127-mm / 38 guns of the American cruiser gave it the best firing angles, while 8 * 127-mm barrels could act on board, while the Soviet cruiser had only 4 * 100-mm. At the same time, the American projectile won due to the higher content of explosives - 3, 3 kg, against only 1, 35 kg of the Soviet "weave", which gave the American installation a much larger radius of destruction. In terms of fire control devices, the Chapaevs obviously did not have an advantage over the Americans (although, apparently, there was no lag either), but at the time the Chapaevs were put into operation, the SM-5-1 artillery cellars did not have shells with a radio fuse … Of course, Soviet artillery mounts had certain advantages - superiority in the initial velocity of the projectile (1000 m / s, versus 762-792 m / s) made it possible to reduce the time of arrival of Soviet projectiles, which increased the chances of hitting a maneuvering aircraft. The stabilization of the Soviet installation significantly simplified its aiming, due to which, perhaps, the real rate of fire could be higher than the American one (this is the author's assumption, such information was not found in the sources). But, in any case, these advantages could not compensate for the lag in other parameters listed above. Thus, the American universal battery "Fargo" looks preferable.
As for the anti-aircraft guns, here the Soviet and American cruisers have approximate equality - 40-mm and 37-mm shells had a similar damaging effect, and in general, the capabilities of the B-11 approximately corresponded to the double 40-mm Bofors, and in terms of the number of barrels in the Americans had no superiority. Unfortunately, it is impossible to assess the difference in the quality of fire control of rapid-firing assault rifles due to the author's lack of data on Soviet fire control systems. As for the "Erlikons", in the 50s they were more of a psychological defense.
Thus, the American light cruiser "Fargo" was inferior to the domestic 68K in artillery combat, but had some (and no longer overwhelming) superiority in air defense. Soviet cruisers had the advantage in speed, and American cruisers in range.
The very extravagant light cruisers of the Worcester class, which had as many as 6 twin-gun turrets with 152-mm guns, became a real peer (by the day they entered service) of the Chapaev-class cruisers. These ships will be really interesting to compare.
The Americans understood that, despite all the advantages that the excellent 127 mm / 38 installation gave them, it was still too heavy for cruisers. Therefore, back in 1941, the idea was born of abandoning universal artillery on light cruisers, and instead using a universal six-inch caliber. For this, it was necessary "quite a bit" - to provide a significantly higher rate of fire of the guns, a large elevation angle, and, of course, a high aiming speed, both horizontally and vertically.
The basis was taken all the same time-tested 152-mm / 47 gun, which was still on the "Brooklyn". Then they tried to create a turret installation for it, which had a slightly lower rate of fire (12 rds / min versus 15-20 rds / min), but otherwise (elevation angle and vertical / horizontal aiming speed) corresponding to the 127-mm "twin". The result is a monster weighing 208 tons (we are talking only about the rotating part), while the three-gun tower of the Cleveland weighed 173 tons. Thus, the difference in the weight of the rotating parts alone of the 4 towers of the cruiser Cleveland and 6 twin-turrets Worcester was 556 tons. It is interesting that the weight of the two-gun 127-mm installation Mark 32 Mod 0, which were installed on cruisers like "Cleveland" and "Fargo", was only 47, 9 tons - that is. the six Worcester towers weighed as much as the 4 Cleveland towers plus ELEVEN and a half twin 127mm mounts. That is, giving up on versatility, the Americans could get in the same weight not only 12 six-inch guns for naval combat, but also 22 127-mm barrels, from which there would be much more sense for air defense than from a dozen six-inch guns " Worcester ". But the most important thing is that the installations turned out to be not only heavy, but also unreliable, and during operation they were constantly pursued by mechanical breakdowns, which is why the planned rate of fire was 12 rds / min. almost never achieved.
The Worcester's booking scheme was repeated by Brooklyn, Fargo, and so on.with all its faults. True, the horizontal armor has increased greatly, the Americans have brought it to 89 mm that are completely unkillable for a six-inch artillery, but two aspects should be taken into account here. Firstly, this reservation did not cover the entire deck, and secondly - unfortunately, the Americans often tend to overestimate the characteristics of their ships in comparison with the real ones (remember the same 406-457 mm armor belt of the battleships "Iowa", which turned out to be 305 mm). Cruisers of the "Worcester" type are assigned a citadel of quite decent length (112 m) and thickness (127 mm) and an armored deck of 89 mm, and all this (except for the length of the citadel) significantly exceeds the domestic cruiser (133 m, 100 mm and 50 mm, respectively) … But for some reason, the weight of the Chapaev's armor is 2,339 tons, and the Worcester's - 2,119 tons.
To control the fire of the main caliber, as many as four directors Mk.37 with a round antenna radar Mk 28 were used. From the point of view of air defense, this was a very good solution, but for artillery combat with an enemy cruiser, it was useless, since these directors were created to control anti-aircraft fire 127- mm artillery and could not effectively work on surface targets at long ranges.
There was no universal artillery as such, and the role of anti-aircraft guns was played by 76-mm / 50 two-gun (and single-gun on the lead ship of the series), despite the fact that the total number of barrels reached 24. They were inferior to the 40-mm Bofors in rate of fire (45-50 rds / min versus 120-160 rds / min), but the Americans managed to install radio fuses on their shells. Thus, enemy aircraft could be hit by shrapnel from a close explosion, while from the "Bofors" the aircraft could only be shot down by a direct hit. The real combat effectiveness of such a solution is unknown, but in general the 76-mm artillery system had a long range and ceiling, and was obviously much better than the usual "bofors". Fire control of 76-mm artillery was carried out by four directors Mk.56 and nine directors Mk.51.
On the one hand, the number of directors of anti-aircraft fire control is impressive, and significantly exceeds that of Soviet cruisers (which had 2 SPN and 4 radio range finders, one for each universal-caliber turret), but on the other, in order to correctly compare the capabilities of American and Soviet missile launchers, you need to know their capabilities in detail. It is known, for example, that the best results were achieved if one director of the United States controlled the fire of 1-2 127-mm installations, no more, but what about the domestic SPN? Unfortunately, the author does not have such data, which is very important. In this case, the score of the quality of the MSA "over the heads" will not be correct.
Perhaps we can say that the Americans tried to create a rather highly specialized cruiser, "sharpened" primarily for the air defense of formations, and capable (in theory) of effectively repelling the attacks of enemy destroyers. However, the standard displacement of the ship reached 14,700 tons (which is almost 30% more than the cruiser of the "Chapaev" class) and came close to the heavy "Des Moines" (17,255 tons), despite the fact that the latter had comparable (and in fact - as if not the best) air defense (12 * 127-mm and 24 76-mm barrels of 76-mm anti-aircraft guns), but at the same time they carried nine powerful and rapid-fire 203-mm guns, as well as more solid armor protection at the same travel speed. Accordingly, the air defense capabilities significantly exceeded those of the "Chapaev", but at the same time, in the artillery duel, the ships of the "Worcester" type still remained vulnerable to Soviet cruisers.
In general, the following can be said about the modernized project 68K. The pre-war project 68 turned out to be very good and had good reserves for modernization, but the need to install advanced radar and anti-aircraft weapons based on the results of military experience led to the complete exhaustion of the modernization potential of the Chapaev-class cruisers. Of course, the air defense capabilities of cruisers increased by almost an order of magnitude in comparison with the initial project, but still did not reach the wishes of the sailors (12 * 100-mm and 40 * 37-mm barrels). The cruisers of the 68K project turned out to be quite modern ships at the time of their entry into service, but nevertheless they had a number of disadvantages that, alas, could no longer be eliminated due to the limited size of the ships of this project. The cruisers of the 68K project were put into operation in a very timely manner - the Soviet post-war fleet desperately needed ships, and at first the Chapaevs' capabilities met the fleet's tasks, but there was no point in resuming the further laying of ships of this type - the fleet needed a more modern cruiser.
But that's a completely different story …
