Only a new aerospace defense system will be able to disrupt the enemy's ground-aerospace operation
Back in the 70s of the twentieth century in the USSR and the USA, missile and space defense systems (RKO) were created, designed to detect the fact of the launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as their interception in order to cover certain strategic areas. In the Soviet Union, there was a single air defense system of the country. Today, past achievements have largely been lost.
Without gaining superiority in air and space, a potential enemy will not dare to use ground forces. Therefore, the initial period of future wars will consist of a series of massive aerospace strikes against the most important centers of state, military, military-industrial significance, air defense forces, communication centers and means of communication, centers of combat and administrative control, as well as transport communications. Particular importance is attached to the destruction in the first strike of the forces and means of air defense (air defense) or aerospace defense (VKO).
Status QUO
With the division of the Air Defense Forces between the Air Force (VVS) and the Strategic Missile Forces (Strategic Missile Forces) and with subsequent reorganizations and landslides at the turn of the 21st century, our VKO practically ceased to exist. The RKO was not in the best position either. First she was transferred to the Strategic Missile Forces, then to the Space Forces. With each such transition, something was inevitably lost.
In December 2011, a new branch of the armed forces was created - the VKO Troops. However, as many military experts note, this in itself a positive step has not yet led to the implementation of the goal set in the aerospace defense concept - to organize combat operations of various groups of forces in a common system of armed struggle under a single leadership, according to a single concept and plan. The command of the Aerospace Defense Forces, due to insufficient rights, cannot solve such problems. The General Staff of the RF Armed Forces lacks elements of continuous monitoring of the evolving aerospace situation. The creation of a new structure of the Aerospace Defense Forces and their equipping with new weapons and military equipment are proceeding slowly and do not correspond to the scale of the possible threat to the country. The unified air defense system and the RF Armed Forces split into five independent parts - four air defense systems of military districts and the formations of the Aerospace Defense Forces.
The system formed at the same time, which includes the forces and means of air defense and missile defense of the services of the Armed Forces and combat arms, remained weakly structured. There are no necessary connections between its elements. At the strategic level, the next transformation did not restore a single leadership and a single responsibility for organizing and conducting an armed struggle against all forces and means of the enemy's aerospace attack over the entire territory of Russia. In this regard, the principle of concentrating the main efforts on threatening aerospace sectors cannot be carried out with the required speed.
Fighter aircraft. Countermeasures against SVKN are most effective in destroying carriers before the point of use of weapons. And this frontier with the development of military technologies is being pushed farther and farther. For the timely interception of strategic aviation, fighters with a large combat radius, the MiG-31, were created. This long-range fighter-interceptor with an anti-jamming onboard radar, in combination with modern computers and new missiles, is in fact a multi-channel weapon system. Formed from these aircraft, the advanced air echelons were supposed to intercept the aggressor over the water area of the Arctic Ocean and shoot down as many carriers as possible, regardless of their intended distribution among the targets of the strike. Today, the MiG-31 combat aviation complex has been virtually destroyed.
SPRN. The space echelon provides only limited control of missile-hazardous areas with significant temporary interruptions. The ground echelon carries out control with a significant gap in the continuous radar field in the northeast direction.
The missile defense system is combat-ready, but the service life of the fire weapons is constantly being extended and is already beyond the warranty period.
The construction of anti-aircraft missile defense is not echeloned, it has a focal, objective character. At the same time, peacetime anti-aircraft missile forces are capable of providing direct cover for no more than 59 percent of the facilities of the Armed Forces, economy and infrastructure from the list of facilities approved by the President of the Russian Federation to be protected from air strikes.
Problems
The unfavorable geostrategic and geographical position of the Russian Federation, which facilitates the use of the enemy's aerospace attack forces. It makes the aerospace invasion more preferable than the land one. On the other hand, these factors make it difficult for us to effectively solve the problems of air defense and aerospace defense. Under these conditions, the enemy will be able to deliver high-precision strikes coordinated in time and space against almost all targets on Russian territory. Therefore, the threats of an aerospace attack are the most significant in the overall system of Russia's military security.
There is no unified centralized control of forces and means of air defense or aerospace defense. Each next event, as a rule, did not increase the effectiveness of command and control of troops (forces) in repelling aggression from the aerospace sphere. At the operational and tactical levels, the control of air defense formations of the air force and air defense formations, fighter aircraft, military air defense and naval air defense forces remains practically autonomous. In such conditions, it is impossible to implement the complex use of various forces and assets of both air defense and aerospace defense, as well as the principles of concentrating the main efforts on the protection of the most important objects of the Russian Federation and on the cover of the main groupings of troops (forces) and objects of the Armed Forces.
Some conceptual provisions require clarification. In particular, the main control objects have varying degrees of automation. Strategic aerospace defense systems (early warning systems, SKKP, PKO) operate in a single combat control loop in accordance with the implemented combat algorithms. The missile defense and missile defense systems are controlled fully automatically. And the control of the SKKP, PKO, air defense is partially automated, depending on the tasks being solved. While maintaining the continuity of the main aerospace defense systems, it is necessary to combine the heterogeneous control subsystems into a single ACS of the aerospace defense, which requires a special design and development work. Its result should be clear scientifically substantiated conclusions on organizational and technical measures for combining heterogeneous control subsystems into a single ACS of aerospace defense while maintaining the continuity of the main aerospace defense systems.
The created Aerospace Defense Forces organizationally united part of the air defense forces and assets, the missile defense forces and assets, and had to work out ways of their joint control and use. However, this has not happened yet. The main reasons, in the opinion of experts, are the absence of a strategic command (control body), which has not only duties, but also the right to organize combat operations of various (heterogeneous) groupings of troops (forces); the departure of specialists from the military command and control bodies of the RF Armed Forces who have an idea of what the aerospace defense system is; the struggle for the right to control the forces and means of aerospace defense, even those structures that did not imagine all the diversity and complexity of the content of hostilities in the aerospace sphere ("they wanted the best, but it turned out, as always"), while the existing problems worsened and appeared new; the lack of persons responsible for organizing research in the field of creating an aerospace defense system and capable of working out ways to solve the problems of a control system that unites private subsystems into a single whole; in the General Staff there are no elements of continuous monitoring of the evolving aerospace situation and operational control of forces and means of aerospace defense; the created command of the Aerospace Defense Forces also cannot solve these tasks due to its status of a branch of the armed forces.
There is no replacement for the destroyed MiG-31 complex. First, the release of the engine to it was stopped, and then the manufacture of the aircraft itself. In the future, all attempts to resume its production ran into some kind of insurmountable wall. But this is an all-weather, high-altitude, heavy interceptor fighter that has no analogues in the world, in which huge funds were invested during the Soviet era. Its modifications - the MiG-31M (combat load of almost 16 tons) and the MiG-31D (which worked in space - a rocket weighing about five tons was attached, inside which there were four rockets for destroying satellites or launching a satellite weighing up to 200 kilograms into orbit) are really unique … He could become the main striking force of the VKO, capable of gaining air supremacy. The assurances of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the Air Force that multifunctional fighters - the serial Su-35 and the PAK FA being developed will be able to fully replace the MiG-31 when intercepting modern aircraft of a potential enemy, raise reasonable doubts. These aircraft are unable to compete with it in terms of key altitude and speed characteristics - climb rate, supersonic cruising speed, altitude ceiling, and carrying capacity.
At present, in Russia, there is actually a departmental air defense system and an autonomous missile defense system. In the first, the air defense forces and means are divided according to the types of the Armed Forces and the branches of the Air Force and carry out their special tasks. In each type of the Armed Forces or combat arms, the air defense of its specific objects is organized: the commands of the Aerospace Defense Forces and the Air Force and Air Defense formations organize, within the boundaries of their responsibility, the defense of the country's facilities (supreme bodies of state and military control, strategic nuclear forces, energy, infrastructure, military industry, environmentally potentially dangerous and other objects), the command of the military air defense organizes, within the framework of combined-arms operations, the defense of the ground forces, the command of the fleets - the forces of the fleet. In this regard, control of the airspace of the Russian Federation at low altitudes is carried out only on 33 percent of the country's territory, at high altitudes - on 51 percent of the territory. The length of the radar-controlled sections of the Russian state border is: at low altitudes - 23 percent, at medium and high altitudes - 59. As a result, in the event of a war, the United States can destroy 80–90 percent of Russian strategic nuclear forces in the first hours of confrontation.
Actual tasks
To include fighter aircraft in a single combat command and control system of the Aerospace Defense Forces. In the military districts, it is not part of the VKO brigades, but as part of the air bases. The aggressor always has the initiative in choosing the timing and direction of blows. It will overcome the air defense system where it is profitable for it, in particular in the areas most weakly covered by anti-aircraft missile systems, and in narrow sectors of the front. Therefore, only the anti-aircraft missile system that is in the breakthrough zone will take part in repelling the raids. In such a situation, only fighter aircraft can perform a quick maneuver, concentrating their forces on the threatened direction, and thereby block the errors in predicting possible enemy actions.
To restore the operation of the MiG-31. These combat aviation complexes, together with tanker aircraft and radar remote observation complexes, would make it possible to solve the aerospace defense mission in the northern and eastern strategic aerospace directions without creating a ground defense infrastructure and aerospace forces; to form the front line of the air defense-missile defense system in threatened directions up to the launch line of air and sea-based cruise missiles, that is, 3–3, 5 thousand kilometers from the state border; cover long-range and naval missile-carrying aircraft from enemy fighters in remote areas and cover their naval groupings (including submarines) from air strikes when deployed in distant ocean and sea zones.
Create an operational-strategic grouping of forces (OSGV) of VKO, in which:
1. The commander of the OSGV VKO reports directly to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
2. All actions on the use and application of the OSGV VKO are coordinated with the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, if necessary, the troops involved are supplemented with other forces and means of the Ministry of Defense.
3. The created subsystem for obtaining reconnaissance and other information about the enemy makes it possible to use all state structures engaged in reconnaissance, to have data on the aerospace enemy, his movements and concentrations in the directions threatened by our country. The commander of the OSGV VKO himself becomes a member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation.
4. By the collection and processing subsystem, the received reconnaissance and other information about the aerospace enemy is analyzed, evaluated and issued to the OSGV commander in the form of recommendations and decisions on the use of forces.
5. The headquarters and units of the OSGV VKO located in the locations of the headquarters of the commands of the military districts and their troops constantly coordinate their actions with each other, conduct joint exercises, are on alert, that is, they interact with other forces and assets of the Armed Forces on air defense-missile defense issues. PKO.
6. Upon receipt of data on the preparation and concentration of forces and means of an aerospace attack of the enemy in threatening directions, according to the decision of the commander of the OSGV VKO, subunits are transferred from military districts, and in agreement with the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces - and additional forces and means of the Ministry of Defense in the direction of concentration of the SVKN the enemy to repel an attack, and, if necessary, deliver a preemptive strike. The promptness and surprise of the actions of the OSGV VKO are becoming the main factors of the advantage of our measures over the actions of the enemy - the concentration of aircraft carriers and submarines, the movement of aviation to our borders.
7. The Military Academy of the East Kazakhstan region named after Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov (Tver), which included the functions of the 2nd Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense, becomes the leading research organization for the study of military-theoretical, military-technical, military-economic problems and a forge personnel for OSGV VKO.
8. The Office of the Order of Military Equipment, together with the military-industrial complex, ensures the supply of the latest weapons and military equipment for the OSGV VKO, conducts tests and is included in the combat strength.
9. The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are engaged in their functions and tasks formulated in the Military Doctrine, without being distracted by the constant reform of the Armed Forces, leading them to a deplorable state and a significant lag of Russia in the combat and numerical strength of forces equipped with conventional weapons from the armies of the main foreign states and military blocs.
Taking into account the foregoing, it is much easier to prepare a law on the creation of a new aerospace defense system and a presidential decree on the introduction of the OSGV as an independent structure within the RF Armed Forces. Today, there are not enough military forces and the necessary state resources to create continuous zones of radar reconnaissance, weapons of destruction and suppression throughout the country. Therefore, it is impossible to cover all strategic objects with the aerospace defense system from the attacks of the SVKN. This task must be left to the Armed Forces. The purpose of the OSGV VKO as the main element in the structure of the strategic defense forces (SOS) is to ensure the stability of the strategic strike forces (SUS), represented primarily by the nuclear triad of land, sea and air bases. To achieve this goal, the OSGV VKO must solve the following main tasks: conducting reconnaissance of the aerospace situation, opening the beginning of an air, missile and space attack, notifying the state and military authorities of the Russian Federation about it, repelling an aerospace attack.
The aerospace defense system must be created on a territorial basis, but with centralized control of its forces on a national scale, and not individual objects with the possibility of operational transfer of troops to any point in our country or beyond. The created system should be in the highest degrees of combat readiness (ISBG) already in peacetime, in order to be constantly capable of repelling sudden strikes of an aerospace enemy (without any restructuring of both the aerospace defense system itself and its control system. That is why the OSGV VKO needs to be formed mainly by troops of constant combat readiness.
The criterion value of the indicator of damage inflicted on an aerospace enemy is not a threshold, but the maximum possible number (or share) of destroyed aircrafts. It is by this criterion that one should compare the possible methods of warfare and choose the best one. The above approach to the creation of an aerospace defense system revises the very concept of protecting the state from aerospace aggression. Now there is no need to smear the aerospace defense system over all potentially possible objects of high economic, political, and military significance. And there is no need to create aerospace defense throughout the country. And it’s impossible. In the initial phase of the armed struggle, no matter how unusual it sounds, all other troops and forces, all other actions carried out on the ground, at sea, from the air, will provide in relation to the forces and measures that make up the main content of the first and main stage of modern large-scale war. The forces and means of the OSGV VKO, having fulfilled their main task, will thus do the most important thing - they will create a turning point in the war.
