Since the recent Operation Cloud Pillar never made it to the ground phase, all combat throughout the week followed the same pattern. Israeli military aircraft attacked targets in Gaza, and drones carried out reconnaissance and monitoring of the results of the attacks. The anti-Israel coalition, consisting of Hamas organizations, the People's Liberation Committees, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, responded to the air strikes with only formidable statements and constant shelling of Israeli territory. The overwhelming majority of attacks from Gaza were conducted using various types of unguided rockets. Because of this, Israel had to use its own missile defense systems. Due to some peculiarities of missile attacks, the overwhelming majority of combat work had to be done by the calculations of the Iron Dome missile defense systems.
A detailed consideration of the use of the "Iron Dome" should start with the official figures. During the week of Operation Pillar Cloud, at least 875 rockets launched from the Gaza Strip fell in uninhabited areas or agricultural areas, causing little harm, according to Israeli military reports. 58 missiles were able to break through to their intended targets and fell in Israeli cities. Another 421 missiles were destroyed by missile defense systems. Thus, no more than 14% of the total number of missiles that could have hit the target were able to reach various Israeli targets. As for the 875 ammunition that flew past any buildings, the Israeli missile defense system allowed them to calmly fall away from potential targets.
The main Israeli missile defense system Iron Dome (Kipat Barzel), which became the main character of the reports on the progress of operations, has a number of interesting features. The fall of enemy missiles in uninhabited areas is a direct consequence of one of them. The missile defense complex is equipped with an EL / M-2084 radar developed by Elta Systems, which is designed to detect and track targets. In fact, this radar can track any type of missile available in the region, however, only those targets that can be hit by the available anti-missiles are taken for escort. If the enemy's missile has a speed too high for the Iron Dome, then information about it is transmitted to other missile defense batteries that can cope with it. In addition, the EL / M-2084 radar automatically calculates the trajectory of the enemy missile and predicts the place of its fall. In the memory of the ballistic computer there is a map of the area, with which the data on the point of missile fall is checked. If this point falls on any settlement, a command is issued to launch an anti-missile. If the enemy's ammunition flies into a deserted area, then the electronics only accompanies it in case of any changes in the trajectory. Based on this method of operation of the Iron Dome radar, it is not difficult to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of missile strikes from Gaza. A small count shows that about two-thirds of the launched Qassams, Grads and Fajrs were unable to even come close to their targets. The more "lucky" missiles, in turn, were attacked and, for the most part, shot down. Only four percent of the total number of rockets fired reached their targets.
As a result of Arab rocket attacks in Israel, six people were killed and 239 were injured of varying degrees of severity. For comparison, we can recall the numerical aspects of the Second Lebanese War in 2006, one of the results of which at one time was the creation of several missile defense systems. Then, in two months of hostilities, Arab armed formations fired over four thousand missiles at Israel. Slightly more than a thousand of them fell on the territory of settlements. Israeli civilian casualties totaled 44 dead and over 4,000 wounded. In addition, in 2006, the rockets caused material damage in the amount of at least one and a half billion US dollars. As you can see, the effectiveness of the new missile defense system has now been confirmed in practice: not 25-26% flew to the target, but only 4 percent of the total number of missiles fired. At the same time, it is worth noting an increase in the effectiveness of firing unguided rockets: in 2006, fighters of Arab paramilitary organizations sent three-quarters of the rockets “into milk”, and six years later - 60%. There is a slight increase in shooting accuracy. In light of this fact, the presence of anti-missile systems becomes an even more pressing issue.
Another interesting aspect of the Iron Dome system is the economic component of its operation. According to reports, one launch of an interceptor missile costs the Israeli military 35-40 thousand dollars. Multiplying this figure by the number of missiles flying to populated areas, we get an amount of several million. As for the damage prevented by anti-missile missiles, it remains only to guess and make approximate calculations. Or take into account the logic of the Israeli military, with which they adopted the new missile defense systems. One way or another, with a high degree of probability it can be argued that there are quite large savings on compensation for victims alone, not to mention the cost of restoring destroyed buildings.
Talking about the cost-effectiveness of the Iron Dome often brings up the cost of Arab missiles. It is quite obvious that any missile used by the Arabs, be it Qassam or Fajr, costs an order of magnitude, or even two, cheaper than just one interceptor missile. In addition, the relatively small number of anti-missile systems (only five batteries) does not allow intercepting a large number of missiles at the same time. Thus, the anti-Israeli forces are quite capable of arranging a massive shelling using, for example, MLRS combat vehicles, as a result of which a considerable part of unguided rockets will be able to reach their targets. The Israeli command understands these risks and therefore has long been closely monitoring the movements of suspicious vehicles. As far as is known, during Operation Cloud Pillar, the Israeli Air Force destroyed several vehicles that were carrying unguided missile launchers or that had entered positions for fire. If Hamas or any other similar organization uses serious combat vehicles, the result will be exactly the same. In view of the deteriorating situation on the borders with Gaza and Palestine, Israel several months ago increased its patrolling of dangerous areas with the help of unmanned aerial vehicles. Thus, the MLRS vehicle, having a characteristic appearance, will most likely be destroyed, at the latest, after entering the firing position. In addition, the use of such a technique may have an international reaction that is unpleasant for Arabs. Therefore, it remains to use only homemade launchers.
Israel currently has five Iron Dome batteries. The same number may be put on duty over the next few years. Until recently, the construction and purchase of new complexes has been the subject of controversy. However, the past operation "Pillar of the cloud" clearly demonstrated the effectiveness of this system. So, most likely, the Israeli leadership will find funds to buy a few more batteries. As practice has shown, the complexes, their maintenance and combat use will cost the state treasury much less than the restoration of civilian objects and the payment of compensation to the victims.
