77 years have passed since the time when the Japanese troops were defeated in the area of the Khalkhin-Gol River. However, interest in this armed conflict continues to persist among historians exploring the complex set of problems associated with the causes of World War II. The search continues for more accurate and substantiated answers to the questions: the conflict arose by chance or was organized deliberately, what are its causes, which side was the initiator and what goals did it pursue?
The point of view of Japanese military historians was set forth in The Official History of the Great East Asia War. It is based on the assertion that it was a border conflict, which the Soviet leadership used "to strike at the Japanese army, wanting to deprive it of hopes of victory in China and then focus all its attention on Europe." The authors state that the USSR knew very well that the Japanese government, immersed in hostilities in China, did everything possible to prevent new border conflicts. However, some Japanese researchers still consider this an armed clash, a deliberately organized act by anti-Soviet military personnel, especially the command of the ground forces and the Kwantung Army. To determine the causes of this conflict, it is necessary to briefly consider the events that preceded it.
In the early autumn of 1931, Japanese troops occupied part of Manchuria and approached the Soviet state border. At this time, the General Staff of the Japanese Army adopted the "Basic Provisions of the Plan of War against the USSR", providing for the advance of the troops of the Land of the Rising Sun to the east of the Great Khingan and the rapid defeat of the main forces of the Red Army. At the end of 1932, a plan of war against our country for 1933 was prepared, which assumed the consistent defeat of the Red Army formations, the elimination of Soviet Far Eastern air bases and the occupation of the Far Eastern railway section closest to the borders of Manchuria.
The Japanese military-political leadership took into account that by the mid-thirties the USSR was able to significantly strengthen its defense capacity in the Far East, therefore it decided to conclude an alliance with Germany. In a secret decision of the Japanese government on August 7, 1936, it was noted that in relation to Soviet Russia, the interests of Berlin and Tokyo as a whole coincide. German-Japanese cooperation should be directed towards ensuring the defense of Japan and "carrying out the struggle against the Reds." On November 25, 1936, Japanese Foreign Minister Arita, during a meeting of the Privy Council, which ratified the concluded "Anti-Comintern Pact", announced that from that moment the Russians should realize that they have to be face to face with Germany and Japan. The presence of allies in the West (Italy joined the pact in 1937) inspired the Japanese ruling circles to unwind the flywheel of military expansion in Asia, directed primarily against China and the USSR.
On July 7, 1937, an incident was triggered at the Lugouqiao Bridge near Beijing, which became the pretext for starting large-scale hostilities against China. The Western powers pursued a policy of actually conniving at the aggressor, hoping for a Soviet-Japanese clash. This was quite frankly stated on August 26, 1937 in a conversation with the American ambassador in Paris, Bullitt, by the French head of the French Foreign Ministry Delbos: “The Japanese offensive is primarily directed not against China, but against the USSR. The Japanese want to seize the railway from Tianjin to Beipin and Kalgan, with the aim of preparing an offensive on the Trans-Siberian railway in the Baikal region and against Inner and Outer Mongolia. " This foresight of the French minister was hardly an accident. The West knew about the anti-Russian orientation of the Japanese foreign policy in its strategic plans. However, in 1938, Japan, which was conducting an offensive in the northern and central parts of China, was not yet ready to launch a large-scale attack on the Trans-Siberian Railway in the Baikal region through Mongolia. It took time to prepare for such an operation, and therefore in the same year she provoked a military conflict near Lake Khasan, which ended her defeat. However, the Japanese leadership managed to show the Western powers the seriousness of their intentions to direct an attack to the north. And in the fall of 1938, the Japanese General Staff began developing a plan for the war against the USSR, which was codenamed "Plan of Operation No. 8". The plan was developed in two versions: "A" ("Ko") - the main blow was delivered against the Soviet troops in Primorye; "B" ("Otsu") - the attack was carried out in the direction that the Soviet Union had hardly expected - to the west through Mongolia.
The eastern direction has long attracted the attention of Japanese strategists. Minister of War Itagaki in 1936 indicated that it is enough to look at the map to see how important Outer Mongolia (MPR) occupies from the point of view of the influence of Japan and Manchuria, which is an extremely important area, since it covers the Siberian railway, which is the main route linking the Soviet Far East with the rest of the USSR. Therefore, if Outer Mongolia is annexed to Japan and Manchuria, then the security of the Russian Far East will be greatly undermined. If necessary, it will be possible to eliminate the influence of the Soviet Union in the Far East without a fight.
In order to ensure preparations for the invasion of our country through Mongolia, on the territory of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, the Japanese began the construction of railways and highways, as well as airfields, in particular, a railway line from Solun to Gunchzhur through the Great Khingan was urgently laid, after which the paths went parallel Mongol-Manchu border.
In April 1939, the Japanese General Staff assessed the European military-political situation and noted that events were rapidly brewing there. Therefore, on April 1, it was decided to speed up preparations for war. The command of the Kwantung Army has stepped up the preparation of Option "B" of the "Operation Plan No. 8" with the aim of its implementation next summer. It believed that in the event of hostilities at a distance of 800 km from the nearest railway junction, the Red Army would not be able to organize the delivery of the necessary reinforcements, weapons, and other material support for the troops. At the same time, units of the Kwantung Army, located no further than 200 km from the railroad, will be able to create supply bases in advance. The command of the Kwantung Army reported to the General Staff that the USSR would need to spend ten times more efforts than the Japanese to support military operations in the Khalkhin Gol region.
On May 9, 1939, the chief of staff of the Japanese army, Prince Kanyin, presented the emperor with a report, where he confirmed the desire of the ground forces to give the Triple Alliance an anti-Soviet orientation first of all. The armed conflict on the Khalkhin-Gol River was supposed to test the degree of combat readiness and combat effectiveness of the Soviet troops and test the strength of the Kwantung Army, which received a corresponding increase after the defeat at Lake Khasan. The Japanese command knew that in Germany, England and France there was an opinion about the reduction of the combat readiness of the Red Army after the purge of its top command personnel. In the area of the planned operation, the Japanese concentrated the 23rd Infantry Division, whose command personnel were considered experts in the Soviet Union and the Red Army, and its commander, Lieutenant General Komatsubara, was at one time a military attaché in the USSR.
In April, from the headquarters of the Kwantung Army, an instruction was sent out on the actions of Japanese units in the border zone, where it was prescribed that in cases of crossing the border, violators should be immediately eliminated. To achieve these goals, even temporary penetration into the territory of the Soviet Union is allowed. In addition, the need was indicated for the commander of the defense units to determine the location of the border in those areas where it was not clearly defined and to indicate it to the units of the first line.
The Mongol-Manchu state border in this area passed about 20 km east of the river. Khalkhin-Gol, but the commander of the Kwantung Army determined it strictly along the river bank. On May 12, the commander of the 23rd Infantry Division conducted a reconnaissance, after which he ordered the Japanese units to push back the Mongol cavalry detachment that had crossed Khalkhin Gol, and on May 13 he brought an infantry regiment into battle with the support of aviation. On May 28, the 23rd Infantry Division, after a preliminary bombardment, went on the offensive. On May 30, the General Staff of the Army gave the Kwantung Army the 1st air formation, consisting of 180 aircraft, and, in addition, inquired about the army's needs for people and military materials. The troops of the Kwantung Army began direct preparation for a military conflict.
Thus, the aggression against our country and the Mongolian People's Republic was prepared ahead of time. From 1936 to 1938, the Japanese side violated the state border of the USSR more than 230 times, 35 of which were major military clashes. Since January 1939, the state border of the Mongolian People's Republic has also become the object of constant attacks, but hostilities with the participation of regular troops of the imperial army began here in mid-May. The balance of forces by this time was in favor of the enemy: against 12,500 soldiers, 186 tanks, 265 armored vehicles and 82 combat aircraft of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, Japan concentrated 33,000 soldiers, 135 tanks, 226 aircraft. However, it did not achieve the planned success: stubborn battles continued until the end of May, and Japanese troops were withdrawn beyond the state border line.
The beginning of hostilities was not entirely successful for the defenders. The Japanese attack on the eastern section of the state border was unexpected for our command, since it was believed that Japanese troops would begin active operations in the western part of the border, where the Soviet command concentrated our troops.
A negative impact, along with a poor knowledge of local conditions, had a lack of combat experience, especially in the management of units. The actions of the Soviet aviation also turned out to be extremely unsuccessful. Firstly, due to the fact that the aircraft were of outdated types. Secondly, the airfields were not fully equipped. In addition, there was no communication between the air units. Finally, the personnel lacked experience. This all led to significant losses: 15 fighters and 11 pilots, while the Japanese had only one aircraft shot down.
Measures were urgently taken to increase the combat capability of the Air Force units. Groups of aces were sent to the place of hostilities under the command of corps commander Ya. V. Smushkevich, increased the fleet of combat vehicles, radically improved the planning of military operations and their support. Vigorous measures were also taken to increase the combat effectiveness of units of the 57th Special Rifle Corps. At the end of May 1939, a group of commanders arrived at Khalkhin-Gol, led by corps commander G. K. Zhukov, who took command of Soviet troops in Mongolia on June 12.
The first half of June was relatively calm. Taking into account the experience of the May battles, both sides brought up fresh forces to the area of operations. In particular, the Soviet group was strengthened, in addition to other formations, and two motorized armored brigades (7th and 8th). By the end of June, the Japanese concentrated in the Khalkhin Gol area the entire 23rd Infantry Division, 2 Infantry Regiments of the 7th Division, 2 Armored Regiments, 3 Cavalry Regiments of the Khingan Division, about 200 aircraft, artillery and other units.
In early July, the Japanese launched an offensive again, wishing to encircle and destroy our troops, which were located on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin-Gol River. The main battles took place near Mount Bain-Tsagan and lasted for three days. In this sector, nearly 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 300 artillery pieces and hundreds of combat aircraft met in battles on both sides. Initially, success was with the Japanese troops. Having crossed the river, they pushed the Soviet formations, and reached the northern slopes of the Bain Tsagan, and continued to build on their success along the western bank of the river, trying to get our troops behind the lines. However, the Soviet command, having thrown into battle the 11th tank brigade and the 24th motorized rifle regiment, managed to turn the tide of hostilities, forcing the Japanese to begin a retreat on the morning of 5 July. The enemy lost up to 10 thousand soldiers and officers, practically all tanks, most of the artillery and 46 aircraft.
On July 7, the Japanese made an attempt to take revenge, but they did not succeed, moreover, in 5 days of fighting they lost more than 5,000 people. Japanese troops were forced to continue their withdrawal.
In the historical literature, these battles were called the Bzin-Tsagan massacre. But for us, these battles were not easy. The losses of the 11th Tank Brigade alone amounted to about a hundred combat vehicles and over 200 people. Soon the fighting resumed and continued throughout July, but did not lead to any serious changes in the situation. On July 25, the command of the Kwantung Army issued an order to end the offensive, put in order the troops and materiel and consolidate at the line where the units are currently located. The battles, which went on from June to July, became a turning point in the struggle of Soviet aviation for air supremacy. By the end of June, she had destroyed about 60 enemy aircraft. If in May there were only 32 sorties, in which a total of 491 aircraft participated, then from June 1 to July 1 there are already 74 sorties (1219 aircraft). And in early July, the number of downed aircraft increased by another 40. Having thus lost about 100 combat vehicles, the Japanese command from mid-July was forced to temporarily abandon active operations in the air.
Having failed to achieve the goals set during the fighting from May to July, the Japanese command intended to solve them with the "general offensive" planned for the end of the summer, for which it was carefully and comprehensively preparing. From fresh formations that were urgently transferred to the area of hostilities, by August 10, they formed the 6th Army, numbering 55,000 people, more than 500 guns, 182 tanks, at least 1,300 machine guns and more than 300 aircraft.
The Soviet command, in turn, also prepared countermeasures. Two rifle divisions, a tank brigade, artillery, and support units were transferred from the Soviet internal military districts to the place of hostilities. By mid-August, the 1st Army Group included (including three cavalry divisions of the Mongolian People's Republic) up to 57 thousand people, 2255 machine guns, 498 tanks and 385 armored vehicles, 542 guns and mortars, more than 500 aircraft. The Soviet-Mongolian troops were given the task of encircling and then destroying the troops of the aggressor who had invaded the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic, and restoring the Mongolian state border.
The operation was being prepared in extremely difficult conditions. Due to the considerable remoteness of the combat zone from the railway, it was necessary to transport personnel, military equipment, ammunition, and food by vehicles. In a month, over a distance of about 750 km, in off-road conditions, by the heroic efforts of the Soviet people, about 50,000 tons of various cargo and about 18,000 people were transferred. Summing up the results of the operation at one of the analyzes, the brigade commander Bogdanov said: “… I must emphasize here that … our rear, our soldiers are drivers, our soldiers of stage companies … all these people showed no less heroism than all of us on this front. Not less. Imagine the situation: for 4 months, car drivers make flights for 6 days from the front to Solovyevsk and from Solovyevsk to the front. 740 kilometers, and so continuously every day without sleep … This is the greatest heroism in the rear …"
Such intense work on the transportation of material resources over a long distance and in difficult climatic conditions made it difficult for regular maintenance, led to frequent breakdowns of vehicles. By September 1939, for example, a quarter of the vehicle fleet was out of order. The repair and restoration service was faced with the task of putting the damaged equipment into operation as soon as possible, and carrying out the required repairs in the field. And MTO workers successfully coped with this task.
Preparations for the offensive took place in conditions of increased secrecy, active and effective measures were taken to misinform the enemy. For example, the troops were sent a "Memo to a soldier in defense", written personally by G. K. Zhukov, false reports were transmitted about the progress of the construction of defensive structures, all regroupings were carried out only at night and in parts. The noise of redeployed tanks was drowned out by the hum of night bombers and small arms fire. To give the enemy the impression that the central sector of the front was fortified by Soviet-Mongolian troops, radio stations operated only in the center. The army sound detachment made imitation of driving stakes and noise of tanks, etc.
The Japanese command planned to start the "general offensive" on 24 August. But at dawn on August 20, the Soviet-Mongol troops suddenly launched a powerful offensive for the enemy. It began with a powerful bombing strike, in which more than 300 aircraft were involved. After him, artillery preparation was carried out and tank, and then infantry and cavalry units entered the battle. It is worth noting that the Japanese quickly recovered from the surprise and began stubborn resistance, sometimes even going into counterattacks. The battles were fierce and bloody. From the 20th to the 23rd of August, our troops broke through the Japanese defenses and surrounded the enemy. Attempts by the Japanese to break through the encirclement with strikes from outside were unsuccessful. Having suffered significant losses, the unblocking connections were forced to retreat. On August 27, the encircled troops were dismembered and partially destroyed, and on August 31 the enemy on the territory of Mongolia was completely destroyed.
Despite this, the Japanese continued to fight, and only on September 16, their government admitted defeat. During the fighting, the enemy lost about 61,000 people killed, wounded and captured, almost 660 aircraft, a large number of various military equipment and equipment. The total losses of the Soviet-Mongolian troops amounted to over 18,000 people.
The victory won 77 years ago in the region of the Khalkhin-Gol River became possible not only thanks to the competent leadership of the troops by the command, modern military equipment at that time, but also to mass heroism. In furious air battles over Khalkhin-Gol, Soviet pilots V. F. Skobarikhin, A. F. Moshin, V. P. Kustov, having used up the ammunition, made air rams and destroyed the enemy. The Commander of the Air Force of the 1st Army Group, Colonel Kutsevalov, noted: “During the period of hostilities, we did not have a single case when someone chickened out in battle and left the battle … We have a number of heroic deeds that we performed before your very eyes, when the pilots did not have enough bombs, cartridges, they simply rammed enemy planes, and if they themselves died, the enemy still fell …"
The feats of Soviet soldiers on Mongolian soil are not counted in tens or even hundreds. The total number of those awarded with military orders and medals exceeds 17,000 people. Of these, three: S. I. Gritsevets, G. P. Kravchenko and Ya. V. Smushkevich - for the second time they were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 70 soldiers became Heroes of the Soviet Union, 536 soldiers of the Order of Lenin, 3224 of the Red Banner, 1102 of the Red Star, medals "For Courage" and "For Military Merit" were awarded almost 12 thousand. human. All this served as a sobering lesson for the Japanese leadership, which never dared to attack the Mongolian People's Republic or the USSR during the entire Second World War.
