Ship armor in the XXI century. All aspects of the problem. Part 1

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Ship armor in the XXI century. All aspects of the problem. Part 1
Ship armor in the XXI century. All aspects of the problem. Part 1

Video: Ship armor in the XXI century. All aspects of the problem. Part 1

Video: Ship armor in the XXI century. All aspects of the problem. Part 1
Video: Napoleon's Great Blunder: Spain 1808 2024, April
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This article will focus on the armor of ships and anti-ship missiles. The topic is so hackneyed that it causes strong rejection, and the author would not have dared to disturb the public with his "fabrications", if not for the desire to share considerations that illuminate the problem from a new point of view. This article is an attempt to understand an interesting technical problem using amateur calculations and common sense available to the layman.

On the question of "classification"

For a complete understanding of the subsequent calculations, it is necessary to touch upon the common questions of the classification of weapons. This must be done, since this important issue is overlooked by many.

As you know, any weapon has its own purpose and, depending on this, is classified. From ICBMs, no one demands the ability to destroy detached tanks on the battlefield, and from ATGMs, no one demands to destroy cities on other continents.

Anti-ship missiles also have their own narrow purpose. RCCs are tactical (TN), operational-tactical (OTN) and operational (OH). In accordance with the basics of the art of war, the use of the former affects the outcome of the battle, the latter - the outcome of the operation. Operational-tactical anti-ship missiles occupy an intermediate place and are capable of influencing both the outcome of the battle and the outcome of the operation as a whole.

It is the purpose of the anti-ship missiles that determines their specific technical characteristics and, accordingly, combat capabilities. The most widespread anti-ship missiles in the world are Uranus, Harpoon, Exocet, P-15, RBS-15, C-802 and many many less famous missiles. OTN anti-ship missiles are less common, but still available to most developed maritime powers (Mosquito, Bramos, S-602). The PKR ON was created exclusively in the USSR and the USA (Tomahawk, Basalt, Granite, etc.). In accordance with the presented classification, RCCs are intended:

Anti-ship missiles TN for the destruction of warships of the classes: boat, corvette, frigate

OTN anti-ship missiles for the destruction of warships of the classes: frigate, destroyer, cruiser. Anti-ship missile system for the destruction of warships of the following classes: cruiser, aircraft carrier. Destruction of transports and non-main warships is not strictly regulated.

The issue of RCC classification is widely ignored. This is clearly seen in the many publications discussing the possible use of anti-ship missiles of the Harpoon or Exocet type on modern destroyers and cruisers. Although it is quite obvious that they are not intended for such purposes. The closest analogue of the Harpoon anti-ship missile system, the Russian Uranium, is designed to destroy ships with a displacement of up to 5,000 tons, as well as sea transports. Those. targets in the form of destroyers and cruisers are not included in this set at all.

Of course, this does not mean that the OTN anti-ship missile cannot be used to sink a missile boat, and the TN anti-ship missile cannot attack a cruiser. Of course it can. However, the developer did not envisage such an application, and that is why such a use of missiles is not optimal.

Connoisseurs of naval history will remember the Falklands War - they say, the Exocets were sunk by destroyers there. However, the displacement of the British destroyers of Project 42 does not exceed 5,300 tons, which almost corresponds to the class of anti-ship missiles TN, that is, Exocet. In this case, we are talking about the destroyers of that era. Today, ships of this class are confidently approaching the mark of 7-8 thousand tons of displacement and are already leaving the category of targets for anti-ship missiles TN.

The prevalence of RCC and the threat of their use

The anti-ship missiles of the TN are possessed by the fleets of almost all sea powers in the world. This determines their extremely high prevalence. The carriers of such anti-ship missiles are boats, corvettes, frigates, tactical aircraft and some destroyers. It would seem that protection against such massive weapons is the highest priority. After all, no one forbids the use of anti-ship missiles TN against destroyers and cruisers, although this is not their main task.

However, in practice, everything happens exactly the opposite. The recognized world leader in military shipbuilding, the United States, is removing near-zone air defense systems (20-mm Vulcan assault rifles) from their Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. This is done to save money. But do they save on the priority? All that a destroyer could rely on is naval air defense and electronic warfare equipment. Now there is no close air defense at all. To understand this absurd situation, it is necessary to look at the issue a little more broadly.

The world of maritime powers has long been divided into several large parts. On the one hand, these are the United States and NATO, as well as Japan. In the event of a major war, they will act as a united front, like a coalition. On the other hand, this is China. The third party is Russia. And finally, all the other maritime countries in the world. The last group is the most numerous, but the most technologically weak and poor. These countries do not have the strength and money to build or buy ships larger than a frigate, and their main weapon is TN anti-ship missiles. All this makes the most common type of anti-ship missile system, namely anti-ship missiles TN, and the most massive class of ships in the world - corvettes and frigates. In fact, these are fleets for wars with the fleets of the third world countries of equal strength. Such fleets are almost unable to withstand the "big" powers, and all they can count on is luck and chance.

Destroyers and cruisers, and with them the OTN anti-ship missiles and the ON anti-ship missiles, can only afford the first three groups. In fact, today only the United States, China and Japan are massively building destroyers. And the PKR ON and the PKR OTN are created only by Russia and the PRC. It turns out that some have large NKs, but no large missiles, while others have serious missiles, but no serious ships. The essence of this apparent imbalance will become clear later.

US problems

The United States is the main maritime power in the world. It is the United States that develops its naval power in the most complete way. However, they are for some reason less worried than others about the threat to their unarmored naval forces in the form of destroyers and cruisers. The United States could have created an armored destroyer for a long time, which is not afraid of the numerous anti-ship missile launchers of all countries of the world, and, possibly, the rest of the anti-ship missiles, but they do not. Why are they so careless about their extremely expensive ships and professional sailors? It can be assumed that the reason is ordinary human stupidity, but are we not too low opinion of the richest and most toothy country in the world?

The United States has carried out and is conducting many "punitive" operations against "undemocratic" regimes, in which it uses its navy in the most active way. However, until now, not a single Exocet (or other anti-ship missile system) has hit a US Navy ship in a combat situation. There were only a few accidents (the frigate "Stark", the negligence of the crew) or terrorist attacks (the destroyer "Cole", the negligence of the crew). Both of these and other cases are not typical or standard. But it was in a combat situation that nothing like this happened. Although the threat was, for example, in Libya or Iraq.

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Aircraft carrier strike group of the US Navy and allies. Does anyone see at least one target here for tactical missiles such as Harpoon or Exocet? But you can see many targets for larger anti-ship missiles, for example, for Mosquito, Brahmos, Granite, Basalt and aircraft X-22

The essence of punitive operations is actions against an obviously weak enemy. As mentioned above, most countries in the world cannot afford to create a strong fleet, saturated not even with aircraft carriers or destroyers, but with primitive corvettes. These countries are simply not able to form a single missile salvo from the forces they have with their anti-ship missile launchers. A volley of such force that could threaten not only the US AUG, but even a separate destroyer. Most boats or corvettes carry a typical load of 4-8 anti-ship missiles. This is enough for the Kenyan fleet to threaten the Somali fleet. But not enough to threaten even one US destroyer. Even a lone American destroyer, being on full alert, can easily disrupt an attack from 8-16 anti-ship missiles of any type that such fleets may have at their disposal. Some of the missiles will be shot down by the air defense missile system, some will be diverted to the side by means of electronic warfare, which cheap anti-ship missiles do not have protection against. And in the ideal case, the AUG aviation will not even allow the enemy to reach the range of a missile salvo.

All countries that can form a one-time salvo of anti-ship missiles that can really threaten the ships of the US fleet are either part of NATO, or it is the PRC and Russia. There are several other fairly strong maritime powers, but it is very difficult to imagine a conflict between them and the United States (India, Brazil, Argentina). All other countries do not have the strength to pose a serious threat to the US Navy.

As for a possible war with the Russian Federation or China, the Americans, apparently, do not even plan to seriously fight at sea. Nobody believes in the reality of such a war, because it will be the nuclear end of the world, in which an armored destroyer will turn out to be the most useless thing in the world.

But even if the conflict between NATO and the Russian Federation is non-nuclear, the attitude of the United States to the Russian Navy is about the same as the attitude of the Germans in 1941 to the Soviet Navy. The United States and NATO are clearly aware that they have absolute superiority on the high seas. Even at the peak of its power, the USSR could not equal the US and NATO in terms of the size of its fleet, and even more so today. But exactly the opposite, the Russian Federation dominates on its shores. Therefore, none of the American admirals (as well as the German admirals in 1941) will send the main forces of the fleet to the shores of Russia in their right mind.

And the meaning of the appearance of AUG somewhere near Murmansk or Vladivostok is profoundly useless: even by razing these cities to the ground, the United States will not achieve absolutely any strategic success. Russia can live without access to the seas for centuries. To inflict a really painful blow on her, you need to win on land, not at sea.

What will the US Navy be busy with in a non-nuclear conflict with Russia or China? The answer is simple: he will guard transoceanic convoys. Protect from attempts by the fleets of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China to get out of the coastal zone and cause at least some damage to the United States on the high seas. Having no support in the world ocean in the form of allies and a system of bases, the fleets of the PRC and the Russian Federation will be forced to use long-range aircraft and submarines for this. Both those and others are not carriers of anti-ship missiles TN - this is already the operational level. And as will be shown below, the creation of armor from anti-ship missiles OTN and ON for a destroyer seems to be a very useless undertaking.

Problems of Russia and China

The Russian Navy has lost the ability to build destroyers and is not yet trying to resume it. But the OTN anti-ship missiles are created, for example, in the form of coastal missile systems. The Russian Federation also has aviation capable of carrying anti-ship missiles TN and OTN.

A mirror image of what the US Navy has. The Americans have large NKs, but they do not have the RCC ON and OTN. The Russian Federation has almost no large NKs, but it has the RCC ON and OTN. And this is perfectly logical. The US Navy's anti-ship missiles and OTN are not needed due to the lack of targets for them - neither the Russian Federation nor the PRC have a developed AUG system, and they have very few destroyer-cruiser-class ships. Even in Soviet times, the threat from surface ships of the USSR Navy was not perceived in the United States so seriously that they began to create anti-ship missiles OTN and ON. On the other hand, the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China have as potential targets for attack almost 90 American CD and EM, up to 10 aircraft carriers, more than 15 UDC and DKVD (and this does not include Japan and other NATO countries). To defeat all these targets, it is the OTN anti-ship missile or the ON anti-ship missile system that is needed. Only a great dreamer can seriously count on drowning an aircraft carrier with the help of Uranus or Exocets. That is why the traditions of "large" missiles - Basalts and Granites - are so strong in our Navy.

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This is roughly what an average surface ship of the Soviet and Russian Navy looks like. This is (along with RTOs and TFRs) the typical goal of NATO anti-ship missiles. That is why in the west there is no anti-ship missile larger than Spear and Exoset - there is simply no need for them. NATO headquarters do not believe in the possibility of a general battle against a squadron of a pair of cruisers and three or four destroyers: the Russians are not suicides

Russia is quite logically developing both classes of anti-ship missiles. To combat destroyers and cruisers, the Bramos anti-ship missiles are designed, i.e. RCC OTN, and Zircon is planned as RCC ON. And since the main goal of the Russian Federation is still the defense of the coast and domination in the closed seas (the Black and Baltic Seas), the emergence of coastal launchers of anti-ship missiles of this type is logical. It is in our conditions that such a decision can be considered justified. For example, being in Crimea, such a complex controls 2/3 of the Black Sea area, and being disguised, it is practically not detected on the ground (unlike a ship, which, even with the full use of stealth technologies, still remains a radio-contrast object).

Ship armor in the XXI century. All aspects of the problem. Part 1
Ship armor in the XXI century. All aspects of the problem. Part 1

And this is how the main striking force of the fleet in the near sea zone looks like - 3K55 "Bastion" (in the far zone - submarines). For example, the Black Sea Fleet can fire a salvo of 24 missiles at a range of 300 km, which exceeds the strike capabilities of all ships of the same Black Sea Fleet combined.

In terms of the number of a possible missile salvo in the coastal zone, Russia may well reach a serious level without the cost of building a large fleet. If we add to this long-range aviation, capable of using anti-ship missiles against ships, tactical aviation and diesel-electric submarines, the picture will be complete. Climbing to the shores of the Russian Federation in this situation becomes too risky, and the US Navy simply does not dare to undertake such an adventure (with the exception of submarines and aviation). Moreover, as mentioned above, Russia does not have important economic or strategic goals on the coast. For the United States, it is much more important not to lose control of the ocean, where trade arteries are laid, than the dubious prospects of the bombing and shelling of Murmansk (for our population, which survived the 90s, no devastation and bombardment will shock).

At the same time, the construction of EM and KR is almost unnecessary for Russia. To build EM and KR, you need to clearly understand what these expensive and complex ships are required for. In the United States, they are primarily engaged in the protection of the AUG, amphibious forces and large oceanic convoys. The Russian Federation does not have any of this, and it is not even planned. Accordingly, there are no target tasks for EM and KR.

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