From time to time on the Internet and in periodicals, in articles dedicated to the next anniversary of the defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad, there are references to the sad fate of German prisoners of war. Their fate is often compared to the fate of millions of Red Army soldiers tortured to death in German camps. In this way, unscrupulous propagandists are trying to demonstrate the identity of the Soviet and Nazi regimes. Quite a lot has been written about the attitude of the Germans towards Soviet prisoners of war. As for the Soviet side, the USSR, which at one time did not sign the 1929 Geneva Convention "On the Maintenance of Prisoners of War" (the reasons for not signing it are known, but are not the subject of this article), announced that it would comply with it in the first the same days after the start of the Great Patriotic War.
At the initial stage of the war, there were no difficulties with the maintenance of prisoners of war for the simple reason that there were too few of them. From June 22 to December 31, 1941, 9147 people were taken prisoner by the Red Army, and by November 19, 1942, when the counter-offensive at Stalingrad began, another 10,635 enemy soldiers and officers had entered the rear prisoner-of-war camps. Such an insignificant number of prisoners of war made it possible to easily supply them according to the standards given in the following table.
The prisoners were necessary for the Soviet command not only as a labor force, not only as a source of information, but also as an object and subject of propaganda.
Rates of daily allowance for foreign prisoners of war and Soviet prisoners in the USSR in 1939-1946. (in grams)
Already in one of his first directives on June 24, 1941, the head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army, Army Commissar of the 1st Rank Mehlis demanded:
“… to systematically photograph prisoners, especially paratroopers in their clothes, as well as captured and destroyed by our troops German tanks, planes and other military trophies. The pictures are urgently and regularly sent to Moscow. Send also the most interesting interviews with prisoners and documents. All this will be used for propaganda purposes."
In the leaflets, which were addressed to the German and Finnish soldiers, they were guaranteed life and good treatment. However, Soviet propaganda did not have any noticeable influence on the enemy. One of the reasons for this failure was the repeated killing of German prisoners by the Red Army. There were relatively few such cases, but it would be a big mistake to keep silent about them or try to find an excuse for them, especially since the facts of the inhumane attitude of Soviet soldiers towards German prisoners were immediately widely "promoted" by Nazi propaganda. Subsequently, it was the fear of death at the hands of the "ruthless enemy" that caused the death of many Wehrmacht soldiers, who preferred death from hunger and typhus to Soviet captivity.
Despite the fact that from December 1941 to the end of April 1942 the Red Army was on an almost continuous offensive, it failed to capture a large number of prisoners of war. This is due to the fact that the Wehrmacht units either retreated in time, or quickly released their encircled units, not allowing the Soviet troops to destroy the "cauldrons". As a result, the first large encirclement that the Red Army managed to bring to an end was the encirclement of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad. On November 19, 1942, the Soviet counteroffensive began. A few days later, the encirclement was closed. The Red Army began the gradual elimination of the "cauldron", at the same time fighting off attempts to break through it from the outside.
By Christmas 1942, the attempts of the German command to break through the Soviet defenses and establish contact with the encircled ended in failure. The chance to break out of the "cauldron" was also missed. There was still an illusion that the inhabitants of the "cauldron" could be supplied by air, but the Stalingrad "cauldron" differed from the Demyansk and Kholmsk ones in size, distance from the front line, and most importantly, in the size of the encircled group. But the most important difference was that the Soviet command learned from its mistakes and took measures to combat the "air bridge". Even before the end of November, the Air Force and anti-aircraft artillery destroyed several dozen transport aircraft. By the end of the Stalingrad epic, the Germans had lost 488 "transports" and bombers, as well as about 1000 flight personnel. At the same time, even on the quietest days, the defenders did not receive the 600 tons of supplies due to them per day.
It is worth noting that problems with the supply of Paulus's group began long before the start of the Soviet operation "Uranus". In September 1942, the actual food ration that the soldiers of the 6th Army received was about 1,800 calories per day, while the demand, taking into account the loads, was 3,000–4,000. In October 1942, the command of the 6th Army informed the OKH that, since August, "living conditions throughout the entire range of the 6th Army are equally bad." The organization of additional food supplies due to the requisition of local sources was further impossible (in other words, everything that the soldiers of the valiant Wehrmacht plundered from the civilian population was eaten). For this reason, the command of the 6th Army requested an increase in the daily bread ration from 600 to 750 grams. The constantly growing physical and mental exhaustion of soldiers and officers was superimposed on the supply difficulties. By the time the Soviet counteroffensive began, these difficulties seemed terrifying, but the real horror began after November 19. Continuous battles with the advancing Red Army, a slow retreat to Stalingrad, fear of death, which seemed more and more inevitable, constant hypothermia and malnutrition, which gradually turned into hunger, quickly eroded morality and discipline.
Malnutrition was the biggest problem. Since November 26, the food ration in the "cauldron" has been reduced to 350 g of bread and 120 g of meat. On December 1, the grain delivery rate had to be reduced to 300 g. On December 8, the grain delivery rate was reduced to 200 g. At that time, the Germans received horsemeat welds for their skinny rations.
A hungry person quickly loses the ability to think, falls into apathy and becomes indifferent to everything. The defense capability of the German troops was rapidly falling. On December 12 and 14, the command of the 79th Infantry Division reported to the headquarters of the 6th Army that, due to prolonged fighting and insufficient food supplies, the division was no longer able to hold its positions.
By Christmas, for several days, the soldiers of the front line were given an additional 100 g. It is known that at the same time some soldiers in the "cauldron" received no more than 100 g of bread. (For comparison: the same amount - at least in besieged Leningrad, received the children and dependents of Oranienbaum.) Even if this is not the case, such a "diet" for a sufficiently long time for thousands of adult men who experienced extreme physical and mental stress, meant only one thing - death. And she did not keep herself waiting. From November 26 to December 22, 56 deaths were recorded in the 6th Army, "in which nutritional deficiencies played a significant role."
By December 24, there were already 64 such cases. On December 20, a report was received from the IV Army Corps that "two soldiers died due to the loss of strength." It is worth noting that hunger kills adult men even before they become completely dystrophied. They generally endure hunger worse than women. The first victims of malnutrition in besieged Leningrad, for example, were able-bodied and working men, who received more rations than employees or dependents. On January 7, the registered mortality from hunger was already 120 people a day.
Paulus and his subordinates were well aware of the catastrophic situation their troops were in. On December 26, the chief of the rear of the encircled group, Major von Kunovski, in a telegraphic conversation with Colonel Fink, the head of the rear of the 6th Army, who was outside the ring, wrote:
“I ask by all means to make sure that tomorrow 200 tons will be delivered to us by planes… I have never sat so deep in shit in my life.”
However, no amount of pleading could correct the continuously deteriorating situation. In the period from January 1 to January 7, in the LI building, a daily ration of 281 g gross was given per person, while the norm was 800. But in this building the situation was relatively good. On average for the 6th Army, the distribution of bread was reduced to 50-100 g. The soldiers on the front line received 200 each. It's amazing, but with such a catastrophic shortage of food, some warehouses inside the "cauldron" literally burst with food and in this form fell into the hands of Red Army. This tragic curiosity is connected with the fact that by the end of December, due to an acute shortage of fuel, the freight transport completely stopped, and the riding horses died or were slaughtered for meat. The supply system inside the "cauldron" turned out to be completely disorganized, and often the soldiers died of hunger, not knowing that the saving food was literally a few kilometers away from them. However, in the 6th Army there were fewer and fewer people who could cover such a short distance on foot. In January 20, the commander of one of the companies, which was to make a 1.5-kilometer march, despite the fact that there was no shelling from the Soviet side, told his soldiers: "Whoever lags behind will have to be left lying in the snow, and he will freeze." On January 23, the same company took a four-kilometer march from 6 a.m. to dark.
Since January 24, the supply system in the "boiler" has completely collapsed. According to eyewitness accounts, in some areas of the environment, nutrition improved as there was no longer any record of food distribution. The containers dropped from the planes were stolen, and there was simply no energy to arrange the delivery of the rest. The command took the most draconian measures against the marauders. In the last weeks of the "cauldron" existence, the field gendarmerie shot dozens of soldiers and non-commissioned officers, but most of the encircled people, distraught with hunger, did not care. On the same days, in other areas of the "cauldron" soldiers received 38 grams of bread, and a can of Cola chocolate (several round palm-sized bars of tonic chocolate) was divided into 23 people.
From January 28, food was provided in an organized manner only to the soldiers on the front line. In the last days of the cauldron's existence, most of the sick and wounded, of whom there were already about 20,000 in December, in accordance with Paulus's order did not receive any food at all. Even taking into account the fact that a significant number of the wounded had managed to be taken out by planes, the headquarters of the 6th Army, which did not control the situation, believed that on January 26 there were 30-40 thousand of them. The walking wounded and sick roamed in droves in search of a shrinking cauldron to eat throughout the territory, infecting soldiers who were not yet sick.
According to unconfirmed reports, cases of cannibalism were observed in the 20th of January.
Another scourge of the army surrounded at Stalingrad was the cold. It cannot be said that the late autumn and winter of 1942-1943. in the Volga steppes were somehow especially extreme. So, on December 5, the air temperature was 0 degrees. On the night of December 10-11, it dropped to minus 9, and on December 15 again rose to zero. It got very cold in January. During the month, the temperature at night ranged from minus 14 to 23 degrees below zero. On January 25-26, when the agony of Paulus's army began, the thermometers dropped to minus 22. The average daily temperature in January ranged from zero to five degrees below zero. At the same time, a sharp and damp cold wind constantly blew through the Stalingrad steppe. Another feature of the Volga steppes, like any others, is the almost complete absence of trees in them. The only place from where it would theoretically be possible to deliver fuel (wood or coal) was Stalingrad. However, there was nothing to deliver it. As a result, another "silent killer" joined the famine. Under normal conditions, when a person can warm up and rest, when he eats normally, a long stay in the cold does not pose any danger to him. The situation in Stalingrad was different. Of course, the German command took into account the lessons of the winter of 1941/42. For the Wehrmacht, warm cotton sets, fur hats with earflaps and a lot of devices for heating dugouts were developed. Part of this wealth ended up in the 6th Army, but all the soldiers did not have enough warm clothes. However, as the inhabitants of the "cauldron" died out, it became easier and easier to get clothes, since the corpses no longer needed them. In fact, by the time of Paulus' surrender, the needs of those surrounded in warm clothes were satisfied, and many times over. However, in order to keep warm, a person needs fire, and it turned out to be too difficult to get it. Cold and dampness were doing their job. Frostbite and frostbite, exacerbation of chronic diseases, problems of the immune system, pneumonia, kidney disease, furunculosis, eczema - this is just a small list of diseases that persistent hypothermia brings to a person. It was especially hard for the wounded soldiers in the cold. Even a minor scratch could turn into gangrene. The horror was that the soldiers, even moderately wounded, were subject to immediate evacuation to the rear. The original concept of "Blitzkrieg Medicine" did not imply that the Wehrmacht would fall into cauldrons, from which it was impossible to take out the wounded, and excluded battalion and regimental first-aid posts from the evacuation system. On the front line, in the troops, there were only first aid equipment and almost no qualified surgeons. Thus, the wounded were doomed to die.
At the end of September, next to the soldiers of the 6th Army, or rather, right on them, the harbingers of another misfortune appeared: lice. The biological species head louse (Pediculus Humanus Capitis), body louse (Pediculus Humanus Corporis) can only parasitize on humans. Perhaps several carriers of lice arrived in Stalingrad with the army, perhaps the Wehrmacht soldiers were infected from local residents or in the terrible conditions of the city when they used other people's things. Lice multiply with terrifying speed. In a week, one individual can bring 50,000 larvae. Amazingly, the Germans, whose level of medicine significantly exceeded the Soviet one, could not defeat the lice. The fact is that they used chemical powders against parasites, while in the Red Army, which had the sad experience of the Civil War, the main means of fighting insects were steaming clothes, a haircut "to zero" and a bath. Of course, the lice "did not have mercy" on anyone, but they "favored" the German soldiers especially. Naturally, in the Stalingrad steppes it was difficult to equip a bathhouse and roast clothes. In addition, the apathy into which the German soldiers gradually fell does not contribute to the observance of basic rules of personal hygiene. That is why, since October, the 6th Army has sheathed. One day in late autumn, 1.5 kg (!) Of lice were removed from twelve prisoners of war in a military field hospital, which on average gave a figure of 130 g per person. Thus, with an average weight of adult lice - 0.1 mg, up to 130,000 individuals were removed from one wounded person! Single mortality from typhus and other infectious diseases was observed in the Paulus group even before the encirclement. In the last weeks of the existence of the "cauldron", patients flocked to Stalingrad, which gradually turned into a real typhoid focus. Even before the start of the counter-offensive at Stalingrad, the Soviet command from the testimony of prisoners of war and intelligence reports imagined in general what was happening in the army of Paulus, but no one could expect how bad things are there. Since November 19, the influx of prisoners has increased dramatically. It turned out that many of them are in a rather emaciated state, lousy and suffer from hypothermia. A few weeks later, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Lavrenty Beria, worried about the high mortality rate among the prisoners, ordered his subordinates to investigate its causes. Note that Lavrenty Pavlovich was hardly guided in his actions solely by the principles of humanism. First, the high mortality rate of prisoners of war could be used by enemy propaganda. Secondly, every deceased German or Romanian could not, because of his death, be subsequently used at work, and labor hands, even the hands of prisoners of war, were extremely necessary at that moment. Finally, thirdly, competitors and ill-wishers could doubt the organizational abilities of the General Commissioner of State Security.
On December 30, the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ivan Serov provided his patron with a memorandum, which said:
“In connection with the successful actions of the Red Army units on the South-West, Stalingrad and Don fronts, the dispatch of prisoners of war is proceeding with great difficulties, as a result of which there is a large mortality rate among prisoners of war.
The main causes of death are found to be:
1. Romanian and Italian prisoners of war from 6-7 to 10 days before surrender did not receive food due to the fact that all food supplied to the front went primarily to German units.
2. When captured, our units of prisoners of war are driven on foot 200-300 km to the railway, while their supply with rear units of the Red Army is not organized and often for 2-3 days on the way the prisoners of war are not fed at all.
3. Points of concentration of prisoners of war, as well as reception centers of the NKVD should be provided by the Headquarters of the Rear Services of the Red Army with food and uniforms for the route. In practice, this is not done, and in a number of cases, when loading trains, prisoners of war are given flour instead of bread, and there are no dishes.
4. Bodies of military communications of the Red Army supply carriages for sending prisoners of war, not equipped with bunks and stoves, and each carriage is loaded with 50-60 people.
In addition, a significant part of the prisoners of war do not have warm clothing, and the trophy property of the rear services of the fronts and armies is not allocated for these purposes, despite the instructions of Comrade Khrulev on these issues …
And, finally, in spite of the Regulations on Prisoners of War, approved by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, and the order of the Chief Military Administration of the Red Army, wounded and sick prisoners of war are not admitted to front-line hospitals and are sent to reception centers."
This memo gave rise to a rather harsh reaction at the very top of the Red Army command. Already on January 2, 1943, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 001 was issued. It was signed by the Deputy People's Commissar, Chief of the RKKA Quartermaster Service, Colonel-General of the Quartermaster Service A. B. Khrulev, but there is no doubt that this paper did not escape the attention of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief himself:
No. 0012 January 1943
The practice of organizing the direction and support of prisoners of war at the front and on the way to the rear camps establishes a number of serious shortcomings:
1. Prisoners of war are detained for a long time in the units of the Red Army. From the moment of capture until they arrive at the embarkation points, prisoners of war walk 200-300 kilometers and receive almost no food, as a result of which they arrive severely exhausted and sick.
2. A significant part of the prisoners of war, not having their own warm clothes, despite my instructions, are not provided with captured property.
3. Prisoners of war going from the place of capture to the points of embarkation are often guarded by small groups of fighters or not at all, as a result of which they disperse to settlements.
4. The concentration points for prisoners of war, as well as the reception centers of the NKVD, which, in accordance with the instructions of the Headquarters of the Rear Services of the Red Army and the Main Directorate of Food Supply of the Red Army, must be provided with food, material provisions and transport by the fronts, receive them in extremely limited quantities that do not satisfy the minimum needs. This does not allow the provision of prisoners of war according to the established norms of allowance.
5. VOSO fronts untimely and in insufficient numbers allocate rolling stock for sending prisoners of war to the rear camps; in addition, they provide wagons that are completely not equipped for human transportation: without bunks, stoves, toilet bowls, firewood and household equipment.
6. Contrary to the provision on prisoners of war, approved by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, and the order of the Glavvoensanupra, wounded and sick prisoners of war are not admitted to front-line hospitals and are sent to reception centers and camps of the NKVD with general stages.
For these reasons, a significant part of the prisoners of war is exhausted and dies even before being sent to the rear, as well as on the way.
In order to decisively eliminate shortcomings in the provision of prisoners of war and preserve them as a labor force, I order:
Front Commander:
1. Ensure the immediate dispatch of prisoners of war by military units to the concentration points. To speed up the dispatch, use all types of transport coming empty from the front.
2. To oblige the commanders of the units to feed the prisoners of war on the way before transferring them to the reception centers of the NKVD in accordance with the norms approved by the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 18747874s. Columns of prisoners of war should be provided with field kitchens from captured property and the necessary transport for transporting food.
3. In accordance with the regulations on prisoners of war, approved by the Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 17987800s of July 1, 1941, timely provide all types of medical assistance to the wounded and sick prisoners of war.
To categorically prohibit the sending in general order of the wounded, sick, frostbitten and severely exhausted prisoners of war and their transfer to the reception centers of the NKVD. These groups of prisoners of war should be hospitalized, followed by evacuation to the rear special hospitals, contenting them according to the standards established for sick prisoners of war.
4. Allocate a sufficient number of military guards to escort prisoners of war from the place of capture to the reception centers of the NKVD.
5. In order to avoid lengthy pedestrian crossings, bring the loading points of prisoners of war as close as possible to the places of their concentration.
6. Unit commanders, when sending prisoners of war, shall hand them over to the convoy according to an act indicating the number of escorted persons, the stock of food provided for the prisoners of war, and the property and transport attached to the convoy-echelon. The act of acceptance of prisoners of war must be presented upon delivery to reception centers.
To the chiefs of the convoys, according to the act, transfer all documents seized from prisoners of war for their delivery to the reception centers of the NKVD.
7. The daily foot crossing of prisoners of war shall be limited to 25-30 kilometers. Every 25-30 kilometers of the pedestrian crossing, arrange halts and overnight stays, arrange for the delivery of hot food, boiling water to prisoners of war and provide the possibility of heating.
8. Leave clothes, shoes, linen, bedding and dishes with prisoners of war. If prisoners of war do not have warm clothing, shoes and individual utensils, it is imperative to issue the missing items from the captured property, as well as from the belongings of killed and deceased enemy soldiers and officers.
9. Commander of fronts and military districts:
a) in accordance with the orders of the headquarters of the Main Directorate of Logistics of the Red Army No. 24/103892 dated 30.11.42 and the Main Directorate of Food Supply of the Red Army No. 3911 / sh dated 10.12.42, immediately check the provision of reception points of the NKVD and food distribution camps, to create the necessary supplies at points and in distribution camps for uninterrupted food for prisoners of war;
b) fully provide the reception centers and distribution camps of the NKVD with transport and household inventory. In the event of a massive influx of prisoners of war, immediately allocate additional necessary transport and equipment to the points and camps.
10. To the head of the VOSO of the Red Army:
a) ensure the supply of the required number of wagons for the immediate dispatch of prisoners of war to the camps; equip wagons with bunks, stoves, toilet bowls and uninterruptedly supply fuel along the route; to use for the evacuation of prisoners of war to the rear echelons released from the combat personnel;
b) ensure the rapid advancement of echelons along the way along with military transport;
c) to organize in the VOSO Directorate of the Red Army dispatch control over the advancement of echelons with prisoners of war;
d) establish norms for loading prisoners of war: in two-axle cars - 44-50 people, four-axle - 80-90 people. Echelons of prisoners of war to form no more than 1,500 people in each;
e) to ensure uninterrupted hot meals for prisoners of war and replenishment of the travel stock of food at all military food and nutrition points according to certificates issued by military units, reception centers and NKVD camps;
f) to organize a trouble-free supply of drinking water to prisoners of war, to provide each two-axle carriage with three and four-axle - five buckets.
11. To the chief of the Glavsanupra of the Red Army:
a) to ensure the hospitalization of the wounded, sick, frostbitten and severely exhausted prisoners of war in the medical institutions of the Red Army at the front and in the front line;
b) organize their immediate evacuation to the rear special hospitals;
c) to provide the necessary medical personnel with a supply of medicines for the medical and sanitary services of prisoners of war on the way. For these purposes also to use medical personnel from prisoners of war;
d) organize at the evacuation points a review and inspection of the passing trains with prisoners of war and the provision of medical assistance to the sick. Those who cannot follow due to health reasons are immediately removed from the echelons and hospitalized in the nearest hospitals with subsequent re-shipment to the rear special hospitals;
e) to carry out sanitary treatment of prisoners of war with disinfection of their personal belongings on the route of the echelons;
f) organize a complex of anti-epidemic measures among prisoners of war (before transferring them to the NKVD camps).
12. To prohibit the sending of prisoners of war in not equipped for human transportation and non-insulated wagons, without the necessary supplies of fuel, travel supplies of food and household equipment, as well as undressed or bare for the season.
Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Colonel-General of the Quartermaster Service A. Khrulev.
Looking ahead, it makes sense to clarify that throughout 1943 it was not possible to establish a normal evacuation of prisoners of war from the front. It must be assumed that such an important order was issued too late, and it would be foolish to expect that it could be properly executed in less than a month, when a stream of emaciated and sick prisoners of war fell upon the Red Army.
In the first days of January 1943, the commander of the Don Front, Colonel-General Rokossovsky, together with the representative of the Headquarters, Colonel-General of Artillery Voronov, recalled ancient times and two days before the start of the operation to eliminate the "cauldron", with the approval of Moscow, appealed to the commander of the German 6- 1st Army to Colonel-General Paulus with an ultimatum as follows.
“The 6th German Army, the formations of the 4th Panzer Army and the reinforcement units attached to them have been in complete encirclement since November 23rd, 1942. Units of the Red Army surrounded this group of German troops in a dense ring. All hopes for the salvation of your troops by the offensive of the German troops from the south and southwest did not come true. The German troops hurrying to help you are defeated by the Red Army, and the remnants of these troops are retreating to Rostov. German transport aircraft transporting you a hungry ration of food, ammunition and fuel, due to the successful, rapid advance
The Red Army is often forced to change airfields and fly to the location of the encircled troops from afar. In addition, the German transport aviation suffers huge losses in aircraft and crews from the Russian aviation. Her help to the encircled troops becomes unrealistic.
The position of your encircled troops is dire. They experience hunger, disease and cold. The harsh Russian winter is just beginning; severe frosts, cold winds and blizzards are still ahead, and your soldiers are not provided with winter uniforms and are in difficult unsanitary conditions.
You, as the Commander, and all the officers of the encircled troops understand perfectly well that you have no real opportunities to break through the encirclement ring. Your position is hopeless and further resistance makes no sense.
In the current desperate situation for you, in order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, we suggest that you accept the following terms of surrender:
1. All the German encircled troops, led by you and your headquarters, cease resistance.
2. To you in an organized manner to transfer to our disposal all personnel, weapons, all military equipment and military property in good condition.
We guarantee life and safety to all officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers who have ceased resistance, and after the end of the war, return to Germany or any country where prisoners of war wish.
We keep military uniforms, insignia and orders, personal belongings, valuables for the entire personnel of the surrendered troops, and edged weapons for the higher officers.
All surrendered officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers will immediately be provided with normal food. All the wounded, sick and frostbitten will receive medical assistance.
Your reply is expected at 15:00 Moscow time on January 9, 1943 in writing through your personally appointed representative, who must be followed in a car with a white flag on the road from KONNY to KOTLUBAN station.
Your representative will be greeted by trusted Russian commanders in area "B" 0.5 km southeast of junction 564 at 15:00 on January 9, 1943.
If you reject our proposal of surrender, we warn you that the troops of the Red Army and the Red Air Fleet will be forced to deal with the destruction of the encircled German troops, and you will be responsible for their destruction."
Paulus rejected the ultimatum (according to Rokossovsky's recollections, Soviet envoys were fired upon from the German side), and on January 10, 1943, on the approaches to Stalingrad, hell broke out …
“On January 10, at 8:5 am, the Russians begin shelling even stronger than on November 19: for 55 minutes,“Stalin's organs”howl, heavy guns are thundering - volley after volley without interruption. Hurricane fire plows the whole earth. The last assault on the boiler began.
Then the gunfire fades away, white-painted tanks approach, followed by submachine gunners in camouflage coats. We leave Marinovka, then Dmitrievka. All living things scurry into the Rossoshka valley. We dig in at Dubinin, and two days later we find ourselves in the area of the Nursery station in Tolovaya Balka. The boiler gradually shrinks from west to east: on the 15th to Rossoshka, on the 18th to the Voroponovo - Nursery - Khutor Gonchara line, on the 22nd to Verkhne-Elshashsh - Gumrak. Then we rent Gumrak. The last opportunity to take out the wounded by airplanes and receive ammunition and food is disappearing.
(…) On January 16, our division ceases to exist (…).
(…) Decay is increasing. Other officers, such as the chief of the operational department of the headquarters of our division, Major Vilutski, flee by plane. After the loss of the Nursery, the planes land in Gumrak, which the Russians are constantly firing at. Some officers, after the disbandment of their units, secretly flee to Stalingrad. More and more officers want to single-handedly break through to the retreating German front. There are such people in my battle group (…)”.
Soon Steidle himself joined this dull stream. At that time, street fighting was still going on in Stalingrad, the city was literally packed with soldiers and officers who did not know what to do now. Someone cherished the hope of getting out of the cauldron on their own, someone wanted to understand what was happening and receive clear orders, and someone simply hoped to find food and shelter in the city. Neither one nor the other, nor the third have achieved their goals. Stalingrad in the second half of January turned into an island of despair, shelled from all sides.
“An innumerable number of soldiers are moving along the street in front of the barred windows. For many days they have been moving from one trench to another, rummaging in abandoned cars. Many of them came from fortified cellars on the outskirts of Stalingrad; they were driven out of there by Soviet assault groups; here they are looking for a place to hide. An officer appears here and there. In this commotion, he is trying to gather combat-ready soldiers. However, many of them choose to join a unit as stragglers. Soviet troops attack and move non-stop from one block, garden, factory area to another, seizing position after position. (…) Many are extremely tired to end this on their own and leave this crumbling front. Such people continue to fight, because next to them there are others who intend to defend their lives to the last patron, those who still see the real enemy in the Soviet soldier or who are afraid of retribution.
Around us - the ruins and smoking ruins of a huge city, and behind them flows the Volga. We are being fired on from all sides. Where a tank appears, the Soviet infantry is also visible there, following directly behind the T-34. Shots and the terrible music of the "Stalinist organs" are clearly audible, which at short intervals conduct barrage fire. It has long been known that there is no defense against them. The apathy is so great that it no longer bothers you. It is more important to pull out something edible from the pockets or rusks of the killed and wounded. If someone finds canned meat, he slowly eats it, and scrubbs the box with swollen fingers, as if it depends on these last leftovers whether he survives or not. And here's another ghastly sight: three or four soldiers crouched around a dead horse, ripping off pieces of meat and eating it raw.
This is the situation "at the front", at the forefront. The generals know it as well as we do. They are being "informed" about all this, and they are considering new defensive measures."
Finally, from January 30 to February 2, the remnants of the German troops defending in the cauldron laid down their arms. To the surprise of the Soviet military (who estimated the encircled grouping at about 86 thousand people), only 91,545 Germans were captured from January 10 to February 22, 1943 (including 24 generals and about 2,500 officers), and there were also tens of thousands dead. The condition of the prisoners was terrible. More than 500 people were unconscious, 70 percent had dystrophy, almost all suffered from vitamin deficiency and were in a state of extreme physical and mental exhaustion. Pneumonia, tuberculosis, heart disease and kidney disease were widespread. Almost 60 percent of the prisoners had 2nd and 3rd degree frostbite with complications in the form of gangrene and general blood poisoning. Finally, about 10 percent were so hopeless that there was no way to save them. Among other things, the prisoners entered the troops unevenly, throughout January, and the order to create a large front-line camp was given on the 26th of this month. Although the camp, or rather several distribution camps, united into administration No. 108, with its center in the village of Beketovka, began to function already in early February, it was certainly not possible to properly equip it.
But first, the prisoners had to be taken out of Stalingrad and somehow delivered to the camps, which were located approximately at a distance from the city, not exceeding the daily march of a military unit consisting of healthy people. Nowadays, Beketovka has already entered the city limits of Volgograd. On a summer day, the walk from the city center to this area takes about five hours. In winter, it will take more time, but for a healthy person, this "journey" will not be too difficult. The Germans, exhausted to the limit, are a different matter. Nevertheless, they had to be urgently withdrawn from Stalingrad. The city was almost completely destroyed. There were no premises suitable for accommodating a huge number of people, the water supply system did not function. Typhus and other infectious diseases continued to spread among the prisoners. Leaving them in Stalingrad meant condemning them to death. Long marches to the camps did not bode well either, but at least left chances of salvation. At any moment, the city could turn into an epidemic focus, and fatal diseases spread to the Red Army, who also gathered in Stalingrad in a huge number. Already on February 3-4, the Germans capable of moving, who were still waiting to be shot, were lined up in columns and began to be taken out of the city.
Some modern researchers compare the withdrawal of prisoners of war from Stalingrad with the "death marches" in Southeast Asia, during which thousands of American and British prisoners of war were killed at the hands of the Japanese. Are there grounds for such comparisons? More likely no than yes. First, the atrocities of the Japanese are supported by concrete and abundant evidence. Secondly, the Americans and the British were captured healthy or relatively healthy (as, by the way, the Red Army soldiers were taken prisoner by the Germans). In the case of Stalingrad, the convoys had to deal with people, a significant part of whom were actually dying. There is anonymous evidence that some of the utterly exhausted prisoners who could no longer move were shot by guards. At the same time, the military doctor Otto Rühle, in his book "Healing in Elabuga", says that all the fallen German soldiers were transferred to a sled and taken to the camp. And here is how Colonel Steidle describes his journey to the camp:
“A group of officers, replenished by several soldiers and non-commissioned officers, was formed in a column of eight people (in eight rows). A march was coming, which demanded from us the exertion of all our forces. We took each other's arms. We tried to restrain the pace of the march. But for those who walked at the end of the column, he was still too fast. The calls and requests to go slower did not stop, and this was all the more understandable since we took with us many with sore legs, and they could hardly move along the well-worn, glistening as a mirror, icy road. What have I not seen as a soldier on these marches! Endless rows of houses, and in front of them - even in small huts - lovingly groomed gardens and kindergartens, and behind them are playing children, for whom everything that happens has either become commonplace or remains incomprehensible. And then endless fields stretched all the time, interspersed with forest belts and steep or gentle hills. The outlines of industrial plants were visible in the distance. For hours we marched or drove along railways and canals. All methods of crossing were tested, including the use of a mountain road at dizzying heights. And then again marches past the smoking ruins, into which the settlements that have existed for centuries have been turned. (…) Snow-covered fields stretched on both sides of our path. At least, so it seemed to us on that January morning, when the frosty air mixed with the descending fog, and the earth seemed to be lost in infinity. Only from time to time could one see the crowded prisoners of war who, like us, made this march, a march of guilt and shame! (…) After about two hours we reached a large group of buildings at the entrance to Beketovka."
At the same time, Steidle emphasizes the correct behavior of the convoy and the fact that the soldiers drove away civilians who were trying to approach the convoy with shots into the air.
Prisoners of war in Stalingrad continued to arrive until February 22, 1943. On that day, there were 91,545 enemy servicemen in the city and its environs, some of whom were already dead. In the very first days, great problems arose with the placement of prisoners. In particular, the Beketov camp was not equipped with sufficient space. Let's turn to Steidle's memories again:
“We were placed there in all rooms from the basement to the attic, mostly in groups of eight, ten or fifteen people. Who at first did not seize a place for himself, he had to stand or sit on the landings of the stairs as necessary. But this building had windows, a roof, water and a temporarily equipped kitchen. There were latrines in front of the main building. In the next building there was a sanitary unit with Soviet doctors and nurses. We were allowed to walk around the large courtyard at any time of the day, to meet and talk to each other.
To avoid typhus, cholera, plague, and everything else that could arise with such a crowd, a large campaign for preventive vaccinations was organized. However, for many, this event was belated. Epidemics and serious illnesses were common even in Stalingrad. Those who fell ill would die alone or among their comrades, wherever they had to: in an overcrowded basement hastily equipped for an infirmary, in some corner, in a snowy trench. Nobody asked why the other died. The overcoat, scarf, jacket of the dead did not disappear - the living needed it. It was through them that very many became infected. And here, in Beketovka, something appeared that we considered completely impossible, but which made extremely clear the criminal nature of Hitler's actions, and our own guilt for not fulfilling a long-overdue decision: a physical, mental and spiritual collapse of an unprecedented scale. Many who managed to get out of the stalingrad hell could not stand it and died from typhus, dysentery, or complete exhaustion of physical and mental strength. Anyone who was still alive a few minutes ago could suddenly collapse to the floor and in a quarter of an hour be among the dead. Any step could be fatal for many. A step into the courtyard, from which you will never return, a step for water that you will no longer drink, a step with a loaf of bread under your arm, which you will no longer eat … Suddenly, the heart stopped beating.
Soviet women, doctors and nurses, often sacrificing themselves and not knowing rest, fought against mortality. They saved many and helped everyone. And yet, more than one week passed before it was possible to stop the epidemics."
Stalingrad prisoners were sent not only to the outskirts of the destroyed city. In general, it was supposed to leave the wounded, the sick and another 20,000 people on the spot, who were supposed to be engaged in the restoration of Stalingrad. Others were to be assigned to camps located in other parts of the country. So, the surviving officers and generals were placed in Krasnogorsk, Elabuga, Suzdal and Ivanovo region near Moscow. It so happened that it was those who were taken out of the Stalingrad region that made up a significant part of the survivors. Most of the prisoners faced a sad fate. First, the wounded died. At the time of capture, at least 40,000 people needed immediate hospitalization. However, Camp 108 was not initially equipped with hospitals. They began their work only on February 15th. By February 21, 8696 prisoners of war had already received medical assistance, of which 2,775 were frostbite, and 1969 needed surgical operations due to injuries or illnesses. Despite this, people continued to die.
The general death rate among prisoners of war seriously worried the leadership of the USSR. In March, a joint commission of the People's Commissariat for Health, NGOs, the NKVD and the Executive Committee of the Union of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies was formed, which was to examine the camps of the Administration of Camp 108 and determine the causes of such a high mortality rate. At the end of the month, the commission examined the camp in Khrenovoe. The survey report said:
“According to the acts of physical condition of the prisoners of war who arrived at the camp, they are characterized by the following data: a) healthy - 29 percent, b) sick and malnourished - 71 percent. The physical condition was determined by their appearance; the prisoners of war who could move independently belonged to the healthy group."
Another commission, which examined the Velsk prisoner of war camp a few days later, wrote in its statement:
“The prisoners of war are shown to be extremely lousy, their condition is very emaciated. 57 percent
mortality falls on dystrophy, 33 percent. - for typhus and 10 percent. - for other diseases … Typhus, lice, vitamin deficiency were noted among German prisoners of war while they were surrounded in the Stalingrad region."
In the general conclusions of the commission, it was said that many prisoners of war arrived in the camps with diseases that were irreversible. Be that as it may, by May 10, 1943, 35,099 of the first inhabitants of the Beketov camps were hospitalized, 28,098 people were sent to other camps, and another 27,078 people died. Judging by the fact that after the war, no more than 6,000 people who were captured at Stalingrad returned to Germany, among whom there were many officers, whose stay in captivity took place in relatively comfortable conditions, it can be assumed that most of the "Stalingradians" captured by the Red Army did not survive 1943 From the mistakes made in the winter of 1943, when the Soviet side had to accept a large group of prisoners of war, conclusions were drawn. Already in mid-May, all the heads of the camps were sent a Directive of the NKVD of the USSR on the need to take measures to improve the sanitary and living conditions of prisoners of war.
“Moscow May 15, 1943
Sov. secretly
To the head of the NKVD _ t.
Copy: To the chief of the _ POW camp
T. _
Considering that the bulk of the prisoners of war captured in the winter of 1942/43 were extremely exhausted, sick, wounded and frostbitten by the time of capture, and therefore the work to restore the physical condition of prisoners of war and the elimination of cases of morbidity and mortality of prisoners of war until recently gave the proper results, the NKVD of the USSR, in addition to the previously given directives, suggests:
1. To take the necessary measures to improve the living conditions of prisoners of war. Bring living quarters and camp grounds to an exemplary sanitary condition. Ensure sufficient throughput of baths, disinfection chambers and laundries, completely eliminate lice among prisoners of war.
2. To improve the treatment of each individual prisoner of war.
3. To organize differentiated nutritional therapy for the malnourished and sick.
4. To pass the entire contingent of prisoners of war through the medical commission and release the weakened from work with enrollment in the health teams, giving them 750 grams of bread a day and a 25% increase in food until they are fully restored to working capacity. For prisoners of war with limited working capacity, establish a 25-50% reduction in the production rate with the issuance of a full food rate to them.
Medical examination of prisoners of war shall be carried out at least once a month.
5. To take measures to ensure the full and timely supply of POW camps with all kinds of food, in particular vegetables, vitamin products and food for the diet.
6. Provide the camp with underwear and bedding as needed. To ensure the implementation of these measures to prevent mortality and establish medical and sanitary services for prisoners of war, the head of the UNKVD, t._, personally go to the site and take measures to provide assistance to the camp.
On the state of the prisoner of war camp and the implementation of this directive, the head of the UNKVD, t._, should regularly report to the NKVD of the USSR through the head of the Prisoner of War Department, Major General Petrov.
Deputy Commissar Comrade Kruglov to systematically check the implementation of this directive.
People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissioner for State Security L. Beria.
In the future, excesses similar to Stalingrad did not occur in Soviet prisoner-of-war camps. In total, over the period from 1941 to 1949, more than 580 thousand prisoners of war of various nationalities died or died in the USSR from various reasons - 15 percent of the total number of those taken prisoner. For comparison, the loss of Soviet prisoners of war was 57 percent. If we talk about the main cause of death of the Stalingrad prisoners, then it is obvious - this is Paulus's refusal to sign the surrender on January 8. There is no doubt that in this case, too, many German soldiers did not survive, but most would have been able to escape. Actually, if a significant part of the captured German generals and officers did not see the indifference with which their own command treats their fate, and then did not feel the dedication with which ordinary Soviet people, their enemies, fought for their health, it is unlikely that they would become to participate in the creation of the Free Germany committee.
