The second half of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century are characterized by a large number of local wars and armed conflicts, in which air defense means were widely used. Moreover, the contribution of air defense units to the victory of any of the parties, as a rule, had not only tactical, but also strategic importance. In the context of reforming the Russian army, I would like to show, using the example of certain events of the recent past, what tragic consequences a unilateral or incorrect assessment of the role of air defense forces in modern warfare can lead to.
When it comes to the successful experience of the combat use of air defense forces, the example of the war in Vietnam is most often cited. Many books and articles have been written on this topic. In this regard, I would like to recall only a few figures characterizing the scale of hostilities at that time. During the period from August 5, 1964 to December 31, 1972, 4181 American aircraft (including unmanned aerial vehicles and helicopters) were shot down by Vietnamese air defense systems. Of these, anti-aircraft artillery destroyed 2,568 aircraft (60% of all US aviation losses). Fighter aircraft shot down 320 American aircraft (9%), but at the same time lost 76 combat vehicles. Anti-aircraft missile forces equipped with S-75 air defense systems shot down 1,293 aircraft (31%), of which 54 are B-52 strategic bombers. The consumption of missiles, including combat losses and malfunctions, amounted to 6806 pieces, or an average of 5 missiles per one destroyed target. Given the low cost of missiles (compared to an aircraft), this is a very good indicator. During the entire period of hostilities, US aviation was able to disable only 52 of the 95 S-75 anti-aircraft missile battalions.
Middle East conflicts are usually viewed as the antipode to the Vietnam War. Using their example, they are trying to show the ineffectiveness of Soviet air defense systems in the fight against modern aviation of a potential enemy. At the same time, out of ignorance or deliberately, the facts that led to the defeat of the Arab armies are hidden. In particular, until now almost nothing is said about the first hours before the start of the "six-day war" in 1967. And here there is something to think about! The time of the Israeli attack, June 5, 7.45 am, surprisingly "coincided" with the breakfast of the Egyptian pilots at the air bases and the departure of the Egyptian Defense Minister's special flight to the Sinai Peninsula. Shortly before the start of the war, the President of the country G. A. Nasser received information about the threat of a military coup. Ostensibly in order to prevent potential rebels from shooting down the board with the Egyptian generals, the air defense unit received an order to turn off all radar equipment. As a result, 183 Israeli planes from the Mediterranean Sea were able to cross the Egyptian border unnoticed and inflict a devastating bombing strike on military airfields. Already at 10.45 am, the Israeli aviation won complete air superiority. Loss of vigilance, temporary cessation of airspace control and outright betrayal among the country's top military leadership caused the defeat of the Egyptian army during the "Six Day War."
In the fall of 1973, Egypt and Syria decided to take military revenge. In violation of all-Arab solidarity, King Hussein of Jordan warned the Israeli leadership about the timing of the start of the military operation. However, the Egyptians, with the help of a double agent in their government, were able to misinform the Israeli military about the time of the outbreak of hostilities. On October 6 at 14:00, Egyptian soldiers on landing boats crossed the Suez Canal and captured 5 bridgeheads. With the help of water monitors, they washed the passages in the Bar-Leva line, which was a 160 km long sand wall with 32 concrete fortifications. After that, the Egyptians built pontoon bridges and rushed to the Sinai Peninsula. Having passed from 8 to 12 km, the Egyptian tanks stopped under the cover of the S-75, S-125 and Kvadrat air defense systems (export version of the Kub air defense system). The Israel Air Force tried to strike at Egyptian forces, but anti-aircraft missile battalions shot down 35 Israeli planes. Then the Israelis launched a tank counterattack, but, leaving 53 wrecked tanks on the battlefield, they retreated. A day later, they repeated the counteroffensive, but the losses in aviation and armored vehicles were catastrophic.
Having achieved the initial success, the Egyptians did not begin to develop the offensive, as they feared that their tanks would be out of the range of air defense systems and would be destroyed by enemy aircraft.
A week later, at the request of the Syrians, Egyptian tanks nevertheless moved forward, but 18 Israeli helicopters equipped with ATGMs destroyed most of them. Inspired by the success, Israeli special forces in Arab uniforms infiltrated to the other side of the canal and disabled part of the anti-aircraft missile systems. Another detachment of disguised special forces on the Soviet-made PT-76 and BTR-50P amphibious tanks captured in 1967 at the junction of two Egyptian divisions was able to cross Bolshoye Gorkoye Lake. After seizing the bridgehead, the sappers built a pontoon bridge. Pulling up armored vehicles, the Israeli tank groups marched south as far as Suez through the surviving Egyptian anti-aircraft missile battalions, at the same time destroying the crossings. As a result, the 3rd Egyptian Army found itself on the Sinai Peninsula without air defense cover and in complete encirclement. Now planes and helicopters of Israel, like targets at the range, could shoot Egyptian armored vehicles with impunity. This is how the third cemetery of Soviet tanks appeared (after the Kursk Bulge and the Zelovsky Heights near Berlin).
Despite the defeat of the ground forces of Egypt and Syria and the poor interaction of the air defense missile system with their aviation, in general, the air defense units of both Arab countries operated quite successfully. For 18 days of fighting, 250 aircraft were destroyed, which is 43% of the combat strength of the Israeli Air Force. The S-125 air defense system has proven itself well. On the Syrian-Israeli front, 43 aircraft were shot down with his help. In hostilities, the SA-75 "Desna" complexes were also confirmed to be highly effective, with the help of which 44% of all Israeli aircraft were destroyed. In total, the anti-aircraft missile forces of Egypt and Syria, equipped with the SA-75, S-125 and Kvadrat (Cube) air defense systems, accounted for 78% of all downed Israeli aircraft. The best results were shown by the Kvadrat anti-aircraft missile brigades (the Americans even asked the Israeli special forces to steal the missile of this complex for study).
In the late 70s of the XX century, at the height of the Cold War, Afghanistan was chosen as a springboard for delivering another blow to the Soviet Union. In the event of the victory of the pro-American regime in Kabul, the United States had a real opportunity, without resorting to the use of strategic nuclear forces, to target the main Soviet military and defense facilities in Central Asia and the Urals with the help of cruise missiles and medium-range missiles. Fearing such a development of events, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU went to direct armed intervention in the Afghan events. In fact, this led the Soviet Union to embark on an adventure similar to the American war in Vietnam. Using anti-communist rhetoric, CIA Director William Casey in May 1982 managed to find a common language with the Crown Prince and future King of Saudi Arabia, Fahd. As a result, the Saudis from enemies of the United States became their allies. During Operation Solidarity, for every dollar of the Saudis, the Americans gave the Mujahideen their dollar. With the funds raised, the CIA organized a massive purchase of Soviet weapons, primarily in Egypt, which by that time was already pro-American. At the same time, the US government-controlled Radio Liberty, Free Europe and Voice of America were carrying out a large-scale information cover operation. They taught radio listeners in various countries, including the USSR, that the Mujahideen were fighting with weapons bought from Soviet officers who were selling them in trucks. Until now, this well-staged myth is perceived by many people as a reliable fact. Under the guise of a legend, the CIA managed to arrange the delivery to Afghanistan of paired anti-aircraft guns, as well as portable anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS) "Stinger". As a result, the main advantage of the Soviet troops - combat helicopters and attack aircraft - was lost. There was a strategic turning point in the war and not in favor of the Soviet army. Large-scale deliveries of air defense systems and powerful disinformation around the world by the CIA, as well as a sharp deterioration in the economic situation within the USSR, ultimately forced the Soviet leadership to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan.
On May 28, 1987, a sports plane Cessna-172, piloted by Matthias Rust, lands at the walls of the Kremlin. The way this provocation was carried out speaks of its careful planning. First, the flight of the "air hooligan" was timed to coincide with the Day of the Border Troops of the KGB of the USSR. Secondly, pilot Matthias Rust was perfectly prepared for his mission. The aircraft was equipped with an additional fuel tank. Rust knew the route well, as well as how and where he should overcome the air defense system. In particular, Rust crossed the Soviet border on the international air route Helsinki - Moscow. Due to this, the Cessna-172 was classified as a "flight violator" and not as a state border violator. The main part of the route Rust's plane flew at an altitude of 600 m, in the right places dropping to 100 m, that is, below the border of the radar field. For the convenience of orientation and reduction of visibility, the flight took place over the Moscow-Leningrad railway. Only a professional could know that the contact wire for pantographs of electric locomotives creates a powerful "flare" and significantly complicates the observation of the intruder on the radar screens. Rust's use of secret methods of overcoming the Soviet air defense led to the fact that the intruder plane was removed from the notification at the Central Command Post. The landing of Cessna-172 on the Bolshoy Moskvoretsky Bridge and its subsequent taxiing to Vasilyevsky Spusk were filmed by foreign "tourists" who allegedly "accidentally" found themselves on Red Square. The investigation carried out by the USSR Prosecutor General's Office did not confirm that 19-year-old German citizen Matthias Rust was a spy. However, an analysis of subsequent events directly says that the special services of the West could have used the young pilot "in the dark." To do this, it was enough for an employee of Western intelligence, as if by chance, to get acquainted with Rust, inclined to adventures and to make him think about an unusual flight that would make the pilot famous all over the world. The same "random friend" could accidentally give Rust some professional advice on how best to overcome the Soviet air defense system in order to fly to Moscow. This, of course, is the recruitment version, but many facts indicate that it is close to reality. In any case, the task that the Western intelligence services set themselves was brilliantly accomplished. A large group of marshals and generals who actively opposed M. S. Gorbachev, E. A. Shevardnadze and A. N. Yakovlev, was dismissed in disgrace. Their places were taken by more obedient leaders of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Having suppressed the Soviet military opposition with the help of Rust (or rather, the Western special services), M. S. It was now easy for Gorbachev to sign the Treaty on the Elimination of Short and Medium-Range Missiles (SMRM), which he did in Washington on December 8, 1987.
"A SEVERE MOUNTAIN EXPECTS THAT COUNTRY, WHICH WILL PROVE UNCAPABLE TO REFLECT AIR SHOCK." G. K. ZHUKOV
Another goal was achieved with the help of "Rust's flight". The NATO countries actually proved that the air defense system of the Soviet Union, which met all the best criteria of the Great Patriotic War and the post-war period, was morally obsolete by the mid-1980s. Thus, the Su-15 and MiG-23 interceptor fighters did not "see" the low-altitude, small-sized and low-speed target Cessna-172 on their sights against the background of the earth. They also did not have the technical ability to reduce their flight speed to the minimum value that Rust's sports plane had. Twice MiGs flew over the intruder aircraft, but they could not find it on the screens of their radar sights and intercept it because of the large difference in speed. Only Senior Lieutenant Anatoly Puchnin was able to visually (and not on the screen of the airborne radar) notice a foreign aircraft and was ready to destroy it. But the order to open fire was never received. The scandalous flight of M. Rust showed that American cruise missiles, which in many respects had characteristics similar to the Cessna-172, would be able to reach the Moscow Kremlin. The question arose about the urgent rearmament of the Air Defense Forces. Anti-aircraft missile units are being rapidly equipped with S-300 air defense systems. At the same time, air defense aviation was actively replenished with Su-27 and MiG-31 interceptor fighters. The military equipment supplied to the troops could effectively fight not only with 4th generation aircraft, but also with the main types of cruise missiles. However, such costly rearmament programs were no longer within the power of the terminally ill Soviet economy.
The conclusion from the flight of M. Rust was made by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU astonishing. The Air Defense Forces, as a branch of the Armed Forces of the USSR, were deprived of independence and virtually eliminated, which is still one of the best "gifts" for all external enemies of Russia. For more than six months, the main occupation of the air defense servicemen was not combat training, but the cleaning of the forest adjacent to the territory of the military units from old trees and bushes.
Many years of ignoring the requirements of the times and incompetence were the main diseases of many political and military leaders of the Soviet Union. In particular, the experience of military operations in the Middle East accumulated by the beginning of the 80s of the twentieth century showed that transported anti-aircraft missile systems and radar stations, due to their low mobility, very often became easy prey for the enemy. In particular, as early as June 7-11, 1982, the most powerful stationary Syrian air defense group "Feda", located in the Bekaa Valley (Lebanon), during the Israeli operation "Artsav-19" was destroyed by a sudden strike of ground-to-ground missiles, as well as long-range and rocket artillery fire, using ball and cluster munitions with infrared and laser guidance. To detect Syrian missiles, Israeli aviation used decoys simulators and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with cameras on board. As a rule, the aircraft did not enter the zone of destruction of the air defense missile system, but delivered long-range strikes with the help of high-precision guided or homing missiles (soon the Soviet defense industry learned to intercept the control of missiles with a television guidance system and UAVs from the Israelis, having managed to plant one from drones).
The Israelis acted no less successfully against the Syrian aviation. At the end of hostilities, the Americans even nicknamed their F-16 "MiG Killer". The operation carried out by Israel against the air defense and air force of Syria was a revenge for the actual defeat in October 1973, when the Syrian air defense systems inflicted a serious defeat on the enemy.
Both Israel and the United States are still proud of their victory in the Bekaa Valley. But both countries are silent about how they actually got it. And the reason for the success of the actions of the Israeli aviation lies not in the weakness of the Soviet air defense systems, but in the successful special operation of the CIA. For 7 years, American intelligence received top secret information from the traitor Adolf Tolkachev. He held the position of lead designer at one of the Moscow research institutes and was associated with the development of radar sights for MiGs, guidance systems for anti-aircraft missiles, air-to-air missiles, as well as the latest identification system. According to Americans, the traitor saved about $ 10 billion for the United States, while his services cost the CIA $ 2.5 million., which was in service with the Syrian air defense and air force units, the Israeli army was able to easily neutralize the Feda grouping. As a result, the Syrian MiGs turned from combat fighters into targets, and anti-aircraft missiles from guided missiles became unguided. Only in 1985, Adolf Tolkachev, thanks to information received from the Soviet agent in the CIA Edward Lee Howard (according to other sources, from Aldrich Ames), was arrested and, despite the personal request of US President R. Reagan to M. S. Gorbachev about pardoning the traitor, shot.
At the same time, serious tactical errors in the organization of the Syrian air defense group cannot be disregarded. The extensive practice of waging local wars, accumulated by that time, repeatedly confirmed that most of the enemy's aircraft were most often destroyed due to the unexpected maneuver of anti-aircraft missile divisions and their competent actions from ambushes (the tactics of nomadic divisions, and, according to the experience of the war in Yugoslavia, of nomadic batteries). However, the stereotypes of the combat experience of the Great Patriotic War in the 1980s still dominated the minds of many Soviet military leaders. Very often they imposed their views on the numerous allies of the USSR. An example is the role of a number of former high-ranking Soviet generals in the organization of Iraqi air defense. Everyone knows very well what results their outdated knowledge led to (the United States then, in fact, repeated Operation Artsav-19).
The story of the defeat of the Feda group is very instructive for our time. It is no secret that the basis of the Russian air defense missile systems is the S-300 complex (and in the near future, the S-400). The transition to one universal system reduces production and training costs, simplifies maintenance, but also poses a serious threat. Where is the guarantee that there will not be a new Tolkachev who will not transfer the technology to the Americans to "blind" or remotely turn off (there are already such developments) these famous Russian anti-aircraft missile systems, turning our air defense units from a formidable weapon into easy prey for enemy aircraft?
As the "five-day war" with Georgia showed, Russia has more serious enemies in addition to international terrorism. Washington's open support for an insolent attack by Georgian troops on Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia, as well as the active participation of the US military in arming, training and providing information support for the Georgian army's military operations confirm that this was in fact a US war against Russia. Only it was carried out by the hands of Georgian soldiers. The goal of Washington's next military adventure is exactly the same as in Iraq - American control over the world's hydrocarbon reserves. If the Georgian blitzkrieg succeeded, the United States would have the opportunity to maximize its sphere of influence over the gas and oil-rich countries of the Caspian region. This means that the military victory of the American puppet M. Saakashvili would allow the construction of the Nabucco gas pipeline (through which gas from Central Asia, bypassing Russia, should go to Europe). However, it did not work out … Moreover, the Western press reported that during the "five-day war" the already operating Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was damaged by Russian aircraft. The complete failure of the American oil and gas adventure caused outright hysteria in the West, which suddenly declared Moscow an aggressor and began to whitewash Georgia in every possible way. The question of where the oil and gas pipe runs, who turns and opens the valve, is still topical (this was confirmed by the New Year's gas blackmail, organized by Kiev with the tacit consent of Washington in order to undermine the European economy and discredit Gazprom).
Continuing the topic, I would like to touch upon the actions of the Russian Air Force during the operation to force Georgia to peace. It must be said that only thanks to the courage and heroism of the Russian military pilots it was possible to stop the Georgian convoy that broke through in the direction of the Roki tunnel. Pilots of attack aircraft, like Alexander Matrosov in the Great Patriotic War, rushed at the enemy as at the embrasure of a pillbox and were able to restrain his advance until the approach of units of the 58th Army. But many questions arise about the work of the headquarters. On the first day, the aviation acted as if it were Chechnya, not Georgia. We have to admit that the Georgian-Ukrainian air defense has shown its combat effectiveness. At the same time, the Russian Air Force failed to timely suppress the enemy's radar and neutralize the work of the Ukrainian-made Kolchuga-M passive radio-technical reconnaissance stations (RTR). SAM "Buk-M1" with Ukrainian calculations were included in the radiation only for launching missiles, which did not allow to detect their location. Shooting at targets was carried out mainly in pursuit. As a result, the anti-missile maneuver performed by our pilots turned out to be ineffective. Considering the number of lost Russian aircraft, it must be admitted that the Kolchuga RTR and Buk air defense missile systems, developed back in Soviet times, have once again confirmed their high combat capabilities.
The results of the operation to force Georgia to peace force us to take a fresh look at the decision of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation to reduce 50 thousand officer posts in the Air Force. It is well known that the training of one military pilot, and an officer of the Air Defense Forces and RTVs, costs the budget a very substantial sum. And such a radical decision to actually write off the already made investments in human capital, even from an economic point of view, cannot seem reasonable. "Money down the drain" - otherwise, such actions of some high-ranking officials cannot be called. The famous Russian statesman Emperor Alexander III said: “… Russia has no friends. They are afraid of our enormity … Russia has only two loyal allies. This is her army and her navy. " Having made a small retrospective look into the recent past, it seems to me that we should not forget about this.
