The beginning of the war
The main reason that led to the fall of the Second Empire was the war with Prussia and the catastrophic defeat of the army of Napoleon III. The French government, given the strengthening of the opposition movement in the country, decided to solve the problem in the traditional way - channeling discontent with the help of war. In addition, Paris was solving strategic and economic problems. France fought for leadership in Europe, which was challenged by Prussia. The Prussians won victories over Denmark and Austria (1864, 1866) and resolutely moved towards the unification of Germany. The emergence of a new, strong united Germany was a strong blow to the ambitions of the regime of Napoleon III. A united Germany also threatened the interests of the French big bourgeoisie.
It is also worth considering that in Paris they were confident in the strength of their army and victory. The French leadership underestimated the enemy, an appropriate analysis of the latest military reforms in Prussia and the change in mood in German society, where this war was perceived as just, was not carried out. In Paris, they were confident of victory and even hoped to seize a number of lands on the Rhine, expanding their influence in Germany.
At the same time, internal conflict was one of the leading reasons for the government's desire to start a war. One of the advisers of Napoleon III Sylvester de Sassi regarding the motives that pushed the government of the Second Empire in July 1870 to enter the war with Prussia, wrote many years later: “I did not resist an external war, for it seemed to me the last resource and the only means of salvation for the empire … The most formidable signs of civil and social war appeared on all sides … The bourgeoisie became obsessed with some kind of unquenchable revolutionary liberalism, and the population of workers' cities - with socialism. It was then that the emperor ventured on a decisive stake - on the war against Prussia."
Thus, Paris decided to start a war with Prussia. The reason for the war was the conflict that arose between the two great powers over the candidacy of the Prussian Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern for the vacant royal throne in Spain. On July 6, three days after it became known in Paris that Prince Leopold agreed to accept the throne proposed to him, French Foreign Minister Gramont made a statement in the Legislative Corps, which sounded like an official challenge to Prussia. “We do not think,” said Gramont, “that respect for the rights of the neighboring people obliges us to endure that a foreign power, by placing one of its princes on the throne of Charles V…, could disrupt the existing balance of power in Europe to our detriment and jeopardize our interests and the honor of France … ". If such an "opportunity" came true, - continued Gramont, - then "strong with your support and the support of the nation, we will be able to fulfill our duty without hesitation and weakness." This was a direct threat of war if Berlin did not abandon its plans.
On the same day, July 6, the Minister of War of France Leboeuf made an official statement at a meeting of the Council of Ministers that the Second Empire was fully prepared for war. Napoleon III announced the diplomatic correspondence of 1869 between the governments of France, Austria and Italy, which created the false impression that the Second Empire, entering the war, could count on the support of Austria and Italy. In reality, France had no allies in the international arena.
The Austrian Empire, after the defeat in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, wanted revenge, but Vienna needed time to swing. The Prussian blitzkrieg prevented Vienna from taking a tougher stance against Berlin. And after the battle of Sedan in Austria, thoughts of a war against the entire North German Confederation led by Prussia were generally buried. In addition, the position of the Russian Empire was a deterrent for Austria-Hungary. Russia, after the Crimean War, when Austria took a hostile position, did not miss the opportunity to repay the former treacherous ally. There was a possibility that Russia would intervene in the war if Austria attacked Prussia.
Italy remembered that France did not bring the war of 1859 to a victorious end, when the troops of the Franco-Sardinian coalition crushed the Austrians. In addition, France still held Rome, its garrison was located in this city. The Italians wanted to unite their country, including Rome, but France did not allow this. Thus, the French prevented the completion of the unification of Italy. France was not going to withdraw its garrison from Rome, thus she lost a possible ally. Therefore, Bismarck's proposal to the Italian king to maintain neutrality in the war between Prussia and France was received favorably.
Russia, after the Eastern (Crimean) War, focused on Prussia. Petersburg did not interfere in the wars of 1864 and 1866, and Russia did not intervene in the Franco-Prussian war. In addition, Napoleon III did not seek friendship and alliance with Russia before the war. Only after the outbreak of hostilities, Adolphe Thiers was sent to St. Petersburg, who asked for Russia's intervention in the war with Prussia. But it was too late. Petersburg hoped that after the war Bismarck would thank Russia for its neutrality, which would lead to the abolition of the restrictive articles of the Paris Peace of 1856. Therefore, at the very beginning of the Franco-Prussian war, a Russian declaration of neutrality was issued.
The British also decided not to get involved in the war. According to London, it was time to restrict France, as the colonial interests of the British Empire and the Second Empire collided around the world. France made efforts to strengthen the fleet. In addition, Paris laid claim to Luxembourg and Belgium, which were under British auspices. England was the guarantor of Belgium's independence. Great Britain saw nothing wrong with strengthening Prussia to counterbalance France.
Prussia also pushed for war to complete the unification of Germany, which was being thwarted by France. Prussia wanted to capture the industrialized Alsace and Lorraine, as well as to take a leading position in Europe, for which it was necessary to defeat the Second Empire. Bismarck, already from the time of the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, was convinced of the inevitability of an armed clash with France. “I was firmly convinced,” he wrote later, referring to this period, “that on the way to our further national development, both intensive and extensive, on the other side of the Main, we would inevitably have to wage a war with France, and that in our internal and Under no circumstances should we lose sight of this opportunity in foreign policy. " In May 1867, Bismarck openly declared in the circle of his supporters about the impending war with France, which would begin when "when our new army corps are strengthened and when we have established stronger relations with various German states."
However, Bismarck did not want Prussia to look like an aggressor, which led to complications in relations with other countries and negatively affected public opinion in Germany itself. It was necessary for France to start the war itself. And he was able to pull this off. The conflict between France and Prussia over the candidacy of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern was used by Bismarck to provoke a further aggravation of Franco-Prussian relations and a declaration of war by France. For this Bismarck resorted to gross falsification of the text of the dispatch sent to him on July 13 from Ems by the Prussian king Wilhelm for forwarding to Paris. The dispatch contained the response of the Prussian king to the demand of the French government that he officially approve the decision expressed the day before by Prince Leopold's father to renounce the Spanish throne for his son. The French government demanded, in addition, that William give a guarantee that claims of this kind would not be repeated in the future. Wilhelm agreed to the first demand and refused to satisfy the second. The text of the reply dispatch of the Prussian king was deliberately altered by the Prussian chancellor in such a way that the dispatch as a result acquired an offensive tone for the French.
On July 13, the day the dispatch from Ems was received in Berlin, Bismarck, in a conversation with Field Marshal Moltke and the Prussian military, von Roon, openly expressed his dissatisfaction with the conciliatory tone of the dispatch. “We must fight…,” Bismarck said, “but success largely depends on the impressions that the origins of the war will give us and others; it is important that we are the ones attacked, and the Gallic arrogance and resentment will help us in this. By falsifying the original text of the so-called Ems dispatch, Bismarck achieved his intended goal. The defiant tone of the edited text of the dispatch played into the hands of the French leadership, which was also looking for a pretext for aggression. War was officially declared by France on July 19, 1870.
Calculation of the mitraillese Reffi
Plans of the French command. The state of the armed forces
Napoleon III planned to start the campaign with a rapid invasion of French troops into German territory until the completion of mobilization in Prussia and the connection of the troops of the North German Confederation with the troops of the South German states. This strategy was facilitated by the fact that the French personnel system allowed for a much faster concentration of troops than the Prussian Landwehr system. In an ideal scenario, a successful crossing by French troops across the Rhine disrupted the entire further course of mobilization in Prussia, and forced the Prussian command to throw all available forces to the Main, regardless of their degree of readiness. This allowed the French to beat the Prussian formations piece by piece as they arrived from different parts of the country.
In addition, the French command hoped to seize communications between north and south of Germany and isolate the North German Confederation, preventing the annexation of the states of southern Germany to Prussia and maintaining their neutrality. In the future, the South German states, taking into account their fears about the unification policy of Prussia, could support France. Also on the side of France, after the successful start of the war, Austria could also act. And after the transition of the strategic initiative to France, Italy could also take its side.
Thus, France was counting on a blitzkrieg. The rapid advance of the French army was to lead to the military and diplomatic success of the Second Empire. The French did not want to drag out the war, since the protracted war led to the destabilization of the internal political and economic situation of the empire
French infantrymen in uniforms during the Franco-Prussian war
Prussian infantry
The problem was that the Second Empire was not ready for a war with a serious enemy, and even on its own territory. The Second Empire could only afford colonial wars, with an obviously weaker enemy. True, in his throne speech at the opening of the legislative session of 1869, Napoleon III argued that the military power of France had reached the "necessary development", and its "military resources are now at a high level corresponding to its world mission." The Emperor assured that the French land and naval armed forces were "firmly constituted", that the number of troops under arms "was not inferior to their numbers under previous regimes.""At the same time," he said, "our weapons have been improved, our arsenals and warehouses are full, our reserves are trained, the Mobile Guard is being organized, our fleet has been transformed, our fortresses are in good condition." However, this official statement, like other similar statements by Napoleon III and the boastful articles of the French press, was only intended to hide from its own people and from the outside world the serious problems of the French armed forces.
The French army was supposed to be ready for the march on July 20, 1870. But when Napoleon III arrived in Metz on July 29 to ferry troops across the border, the army was not ready for the offensive. Instead of the 250,000-strong army needed for the offensive, which should have been mobilized and concentrated on the border by that time, there were only 135-140 thousand people here: about 100 thousand in the vicinity of Metz and about 40 thousand at Strasbourg. It was planned to concentrate 50 thousand people in Chalon. a reserve army in order to further advance it to Metz, but they did not have time to collect it.
Thus, the French were unable to carry out a quick mobilization in order to bring the forces necessary for a successful invasion to the border in time. The time for an almost calm offensive almost to the Rhine, while the German troops were not yet concentrated, was lost.
The problem was that France was unable to change the outdated manning system of the French army. The perversity of such a system, which Prussia abandoned back in 1813, was that it did not provide for the advance manning, in peacetime, of combat-ready military units, which, in the same composition, could have been used during the war. The so-called French peacetime "army corps" (there were seven of them, which corresponded to the seven military districts, into which France was divided since 1858), were formed from heterogeneous military units located on the territory of the corresponding military districts. They ceased to exist with the transition of the country to martial law. Instead, they began to hastily form combat formations from units scattered throughout the country. As a result, it turned out that the connections were first disbanded and then re-created. Hence the confusion, confusion and waste of time. As General Montauban, who commanded the 4th corps before the start of the war with Prussia, the French command “at the moment of entering the war with the power, which had been ready for it for a long time, had to disband the troops that were part of the large formations, and re-create the existing army corps under the command of new commanders who were hardly known to the troops and in most cases did not know their troops themselves."
The French command was aware of the weakness of its military system. It was discovered during the military campaigns of the 1850s. Therefore, after the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, an attempt was made to reform the mobilization plan of the French army in case of war. However, the new mobilization plan prepared by Marshal Niel, which proceeded from the presence of permanent army formations suitable for both peacetime and wartime, and also assumed the creation of a mobile guard, was not implemented. This plan remained on paper.
The French are preparing to defend the estate, barricading the gates and punching holes for shooting in the wall with pickaxes.
Judging by the orders of the French command of July 7 and 11, 1870, at first there was a talk about three armies, it was proposed to create them according to Niel's mobilization plans. However, after July 11, the plan of the military campaign was radically changed: instead of three armies, they began to form one united Rhine army under the supreme command of Napoleon III. As a result, the previously prepared mobilization plan was destroyed and this led to the fact that the Rhine army, at the moment when it had to go on a decisive offensive, was unprepared, understaffed. Due to the absence of a significant part of the formations, the Rhine army remained inactive on the border. The strategic initiative was given to the enemy without a fight.
The formation of reserves was especially slow. Military depots were, as a rule, at a distance from the places of formation of combat units. To obtain weapons, uniforms and the necessary equipment, the reservist had to travel hundreds, and sometimes thousands of kilometers, before he arrived at his destination. Thus, General Vinois noted: “During the war of 1870, persons who were in the reserve regiments of the Zouaves located in the departments of northern France were forced to pass through the whole country in order to board a steamer in Marseilles and go to Colean, Oran, Philippeneville (in Algeria) to receive weapons and equipment, and then return to the unit located in the place from where they dropped out. They made 2 thousand km by rail in vain, two crossings, not less than two days each”. Marshal Canrobert painted a similar picture: "A soldier called up in Dunkirk was sent to equip himself in Perpignan or even Algeria, in order to then force him to join his military unit located in Strasbourg." All this deprived the French army of precious time and created a certain disorder.
Therefore, the French command was forced to begin concentrating the mobilized troops on the border before the mobilization of the army was fully completed. These two operations, which were carried out simultaneously, overlapped and mutually violated one another. This was facilitated by the disorderly operation of the railways, the preliminary plan for military transportation of which was also disrupted. A picture of disorder and confusion reigned on the railways of France in July-August 1870. It was well described by the historian A. Schücke: “Headquarters and administrative departments, artillery and engineering troops, infantry and cavalry, personnel and reserve units, were packed into trains to capacity. People, horses, material, provisions - all this was unloaded in great disarray and confusion at the main collection points. For a number of days, the Metz station presented a picture of chaos, which seemed impossible to understand. People did not dare to empty the cars; the arrived provisions were unloaded and loaded again into the same trains in order to be sent to another point. From the station, hay was transported to the city warehouses, while from the warehouses it was transported to the stations."
Often, echelons with troops were delayed en route due to the lack of accurate information about their destination. For the troops, in a number of cases, the points of concentration of troops were changed several times. For example, the 3rd Corps, which was to be formed at Metz, received an unexpected order on 24 July to head for Bulei; 5th Corps had to move to Sarrgömin instead of Scourge; imperial guard instead of Nancy - in Metz. A significant part of the reservists got into their military units with a great delay, already on the battlefield or even got stuck somewhere along the way, never reaching their destination. The reservists who were late and then lost their part formed a large mass of people who wandered along the roads, huddled where they had to and lived on alms. Some began to loot. In such confusion, not only the soldiers lost their units, but the generals, unit commanders could not find their troops.
Even those troops that managed to be concentrated on the border did not have full combat capability, since they were not provided with the necessary equipment, ammunition and food. The French government, which for several years considered a war with Prussia inevitable, nevertheless frivolously did not pay due attention to such an important issue as the supply of the army. From the testimony of the Quartermaster General of the French Army Blondeau it is known that even just before the start of the Franco-Prussian war, when the plan of the 1870 campaign was discussed in the state military council, the question of supplying the army "did not occur to anyone." As a result, the question of supplying the army arose only when the war began.
Therefore, from the first days of the war, numerous complaints about the lack of food supplies to the military units were rained down against the War Ministry. For example, the commander of the 5th corps, General Fayi, literally cried out for help: “I am in Beach with 17 infantry battalions. No funds, a complete lack of money in city and corps cash desks. Send hard coin to support the troops. Paper money does not circulate. " The commander of the division in Strasbourg, General Ducros, telegraphed the Minister of War on July 19: “The food situation is alarming … No measures have been taken to ensure the delivery of meat. I ask you to give me the authority to take measures dictated by the circumstances, or I am not responsible for anything … ". “In Metz,” the local quartermaster reported on July 20, “there is no sugar, no coffee, no rice, no alcoholic beverages, there is not enough bacon and rusks. Send at least one million daily rations to Thionville urgently. " On July 21, Marshal Bazin telegraphed to Paris: "All commanders insistently demand vehicles, camp supplies, which I am unable to supply them." The telegrams reported a shortage of ambulance carts, carriages, kettles, camp flasks, blankets, tents, medicines, stretchers, orderlies, etc. Troops arrived at the places of concentration without ammunition and camping equipment. And in the field there were no supplies, or they were extremely scarce.
Engels, who was not only a famous Russophobe, but also a major expert in the field of military affairs, noted: “Perhaps we can say that the army of the Second Empire was defeated so far only from the Second Empire itself. With a regime in which its supporters are generously paid by all means of the long-established system of bribery, it could not be expected that this system will not affect the commissariat in the army. A real war … was prepared a long time ago; but the procurement of supplies, especially equipment, seems to have received the least attention; and just now, at the most critical period of the campaign, the disorder that prevailed in this particular area caused a delay in action for almost a week. This small delay created a huge advantage for the Germans."
Thus, the French army was not ready for a decisive and rapid attack on enemy territory, and missed a favorable moment for an attack due to the disorder in its rear. The plan for an offensive campaign collapsed due to the fact that the French themselves were not ready for war. The initiative passed to the Prussian army, the French troops had to defend themselves. And in a protracted war, the advantage was on the side of the North German Confederation, led by Prussia. German troops completed mobilization and could go on the offensive.
France lost its main advantage: superiority in the mobilization phase. The wartime Prussian army was superior to the French. At the time of the declaration of war, the French active army numbered about 640 thousand people on paper. However, it was necessary to deduct the troops that were stationed in Algeria, Rome, the garrisons of the fortresses, the gendarmerie, the imperial guard, and the personnel of the military administrative departments. As a result, the French command could count on about 300 thousand soldiers at the beginning of the war. It is understood that in the future the size of the army increased, but only these troops could meet the first enemy strike. The Germans, on the other hand, concentrated about 500 thousand people on the border in early August. Together with the garrisons and spare military units in the German army, according to the data of its commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Moltke, there were about 1 million people. As a result, the North German Confederation, led by Prussia, received a numerical advantage at the initial, decisive stage of the war.
In addition, the location of the French troops, which would have been successful in the event of an offensive war, was not suitable for defense. French troops were spread out along the Franco-German border, isolated in fortresses. After the forced abandonment of the offensive, the French command did nothing to reduce the length of the front and create mobile field groups that could fend off enemy strikes. Meanwhile, the Germans grouped their forces in an army concentrated between the Moselle and the Rhine. Thus, the German troops also received a local advantage, concentrating the troops on the main direction.
The French army was significantly inferior to the Prussian one in terms of its fighting qualities. The general atmosphere of degradation, corruption, which was characteristic of the Second Empire, swept over the army. This affected the morale and combat training of the troops. General Tuma, one of the most prominent military specialists in France, noted: “The acquisition of knowledge was not held in high esteem, but cafes were held in high esteem; the officers who stayed at home to work were taken under suspicion as people who were alien to their comrades. To succeed, it was necessary above all to have a dandy appearance, good manners and proper posture. In addition to these properties, it was necessary: in the infantry, standing in front of the command, hold, as it should be, hands at the seams and look 15 steps forward; in the cavalry - to memorize the theory and be able to ride a well-trained horse across the courtyard of the barracks; in artillery - to have a deep contempt for technical pursuits … Finally, in all types of weapons - to have recommendations. A truly new scourge has befallen the army and the country: recommendations …”.
It is clear that the French army had excellently trained officers, people conscientiously related to their duties, commanders with combat experience. However, they did not define the system. The high command could not cope with their tasks. Napoleon III possessed neither the military talents nor the personal qualities necessary for the skillful and firm leadership of the troops. In addition, by 1870, his health condition had deteriorated significantly, which adversely affected his clarity of mind, decision-making and operational coordination of government actions. He was treated (urinary tract problems) with opiates, which left the emperor lethargic, sleepy and unresponsive. As a result, the physical and mental crisis of Napoleon III coincided with the crisis of the Second Empire.
The French General Staff at that time was a bureaucratic institution that had no influence in the army and could not rectify the situation. In the years preceding the Franco-Prussian war, the French General Staff was almost completely removed from participation in the military measures of the government, which were conceived mainly in the bowels of the War Ministry. As a result, when the war began, the General Staff officers were not ready to fulfill their main task. The generals of the French army were cut off from their troops, they often did not know them. Command posts in the army were distributed to persons who were close to the throne, and not distinguished by military successes. So, when the war with Prussia began, seven out of eight corps of the Rhine army were commanded by generals who belonged to the closest circle of the emperor. As a result, the organizational skills, the level of military-theoretical training of the command staff of the French army lagged significantly behind the military knowledge and organizational skills of the Prussian generals.
In terms of armament, the French army was practically not inferior to the Prussian. The French army adopted a new Chasspeau rifle of the 1866 model, which was several times superior in many characteristics to the Prussian Dreise needle rifle of the 1849 model. Chasspo rifles could conduct aimed fire at distances of up to a kilometer, and Dreise's Prussian needle guns fired only 500-600 meters and misfired much more often. True, the French army, due to the poor organization of the quartermaster service, the extreme disorder in the army's supply system, did not have time to completely re-equip with these rifles, they accounted for only 20-30% of the total armament of the French army. Therefore, a significant part of the French soldiers were armed with rifles of outdated systems. In addition, the soldiers, especially from the reserve units, did not know how to handle the guns of the new system: the low level of military training of the rank and file of the French army made itself felt. In addition, the French were inferior in artillery. The bronze gun of the La Gitta system, which was in service with the French, was significantly inferior to the German Krupp steel cannons. The La Gitta cannon fired at a distance of only 2, 8 km, while the Krupp guns fired at a distance of up to 3.5 km, and also, unlike them, were loaded from the muzzle side. But the French had 25-barreled mitraleses (buckshot) - the predecessor of machine guns. Mitralese Reffi, extremely effective in defense, beat one and a half kilometers, throwing bursts of up to 250 bullets per minute. The Germans did not have such weapons. However, there were few of them (less than 200 pieces), and mobilization problems led to the fact that they could not collect the calculations. Many of the calculations were insufficiently trained in handling mitrailleuses, and sometimes they had no combat training at all, and they also had no idea about sighting or rangefinder characteristics. Many commanders did not even know about the existence of these weapons.
French rifle Chasspeau model 1866
Prussian Dreise needle rifle, adopted in 1849
Mitraleza Reffi
