Operation plan of the 1st Belorussian Front
The general concept of the operation of the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of Marshal G. K. Zhukov was to deliver a crushing blow to the Wehrmacht grouping covering Berlin from the east, to develop an offensive on the German capital, bypassing it from the north and south, followed by the storming of the city and the withdrawal of our troops to r. Elbe.
The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front occupied a 172 km wide section of the front, from Nipperwiese to Gross-Gastroze. The main strike grouping of the front deployed on the 44-kilometer stretch of Gustebise, Podelzig. The right flank of the front was deployed in the Nipperviese and Gustebize sectors. The left flank of the front deployed on the 82-kilometer stretch of Podelzig, Gross-Gastrose.
The main blow was delivered by the forces of 4 combined arms and two tank armies from the Kustrin area. The troops of the 3rd Shock Army under the command of Vasily Kuznetsov, the 5th Shock Army of Nikolai Berzarin and the 8th Guards Army of Vasily Chuikov, deployed in the center of the Küstrinsky bridgehead, had to break through the German defenses, ensure the entry of tank formations into the breakthrough and advance on the German the capital. On the sixth day of the operation, they were to be on the eastern shore of Lake Havel (Havel) in the Hennigsdorf-Gatow area. The 47th Army of Franz Perkhorovich received the task of bypassing Berlin from the northwest, advancing in the general direction of Nauen, Rathenov and on the 11th day of the operation to reach the Elbe. In addition, in the second echelon of the front in the main direction, the 3rd Army of Alexander Gorbatov was located.
The tank armies were in the second echelon of the strike group and had to develop an offensive bypassing Berlin from the north and south. The 1st Guards Tank Army under the command of Mikhail Katukov was supposed to advance not from the north together with the 2nd Guards Tank Army, as the Supreme Command Headquarters had previously planned, but from the south to take the southern part of Berlin. The offensive of Katukov's army was also supported by Ivan Yushchuk's 11th Panzer Corps. This change in the task of Katukov's army was proposed by Zhukov, and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin approved. The northern part of the bypass group was already very powerful, it included: the 61st Army of Pavel Belov, the 1st Army of the Polish Army S. G. Poplavsky, the 47th Army of Perkhorovich, the 2nd Guards Tank Army of Semyon Bogdanov, 9- 1st Tank Corps of Ivan Kirichenko and 7th Guards Cavalry Corps of Mikhail Konstantinov.
To ensure the offensive of the main strike group of the front in the center on the flanks, two auxiliary attacks were delivered from the north and south. In the north, Belov's 61st Army and the 1st Army of the Polish Poplavsky Army were advancing. They struck in the general direction of Liebenwalde, Wulkau and on the 11th day of the offensive were to reach the Elbe in the Wilsnack and Sandau areas.
In the south, the 69th Army of Vladimir Kolpakchi, 33rd Army of Vyacheslav Tsvetaev and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps delivered the second blow, providing the offensive of the main strike group. The Soviet armies advanced in the Podelzig, Briskov sector in the general direction of Fürstenwald, Potsdam and Brandenburg. The armies of Kolpakchi and Tsvetaev were to break through the German defenses in the Frankfurt direction and, advancing to the west, with access to the southern and southwestern parts of Berlin, cut off the main forces of the 9th German army from the capital.
In total, the 1st Belorussian Front had 9 combined arms and 2 tank armies, one air army (16th Air Army of Sergei Rudenko), two tank corps (9th Tank Corps of Ivan Kirichenko, 11th Tank Corps of Ivan Yushchuk), two guards cavalry corps (7th Guards Cavalry Corps of Mikhail Konstantinov, 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of Vladimir Kryukov). The 1st Belorussian Front was also supported by the 18th Air Army of Chief Marshal of Aviation Alexander Golovanov (long-range aviation) and the Dnieper military flotilla V. Grigoriev. The 1st Belorussian Front had at its disposal more than 3 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 18, 9 thousand guns and mortars.
The three brigades of the Dnieper flotilla were armed with 34 armored boats, 20 minesweepers, 20 air defense boats, 32 half-gliders and 8 gunboats. The boats were armed with 37-, 40-, 76- and 100-mm cannons, 8-M-8 launchers for firing 82 mm rockets and heavy machine guns. The flotilla was tasked with supporting the advancing troops, providing assistance in crossing water barriers, protecting water communications and crossings; destroy enemy mines placed on rivers; to carry out breakthroughs into the depths of the enemy defense, to disorganize the German rear, and to land troops. The 3rd brigade was supposed to capture the hydraulic structures in the Fürstenberg area, preventing their destruction.
Battery of Soviet 152-mm howitzer-guns ML-20 near Berlin. 1st Belorussian Front
Preparation of the operation
In the main direction of the offensive, an artillery grouping was formed with a density of about 270 barrels per 1 km of the front (excluding 45-mm and 57-mm guns). To ensure the tactical surprise of the offensive, it was decided to carry out artillery preparation at night, 1, 5-2 hours before dawn. To illuminate the terrain and blind the enemy, 143 searchlight installations were concentrated, which were supposed to work with the start of the infantry attack.
30 minutes before the start of the artillery preparation, the night bomber aviation was supposed to strike at the headquarters of the enemy's communication centers. Simultaneously with artillery preparation, the attack and bomber aviation of the 16th Air Army delivered massive strikes against enemy strongpoints and firing positions to a depth of 15 km. After the introduction of mobile formations into battle, the main task of aviation was to suppress the anti-tank defense of the German troops. Most of the assault and fighter aircraft switched to direct support of combined arms and tank armies.
On April 14-15, our troops conducted reconnaissance in force in order to reveal the strengths and weaknesses of the German defense, its firing positions and force the enemy to pull up reserves to the forward edge. The main events took place in the zone of the 4 combined-arms armies of the main strike group of the front. In the center, the offensive was carried out by reinforced rifle battalions of the first echelon divisions, on the flanks - by reinforced companies. The advanced units were supported by strong artillery fire. In different directions, our troops managed to wedge into the enemy's battle formations by 2-5 km.
As a result, our troops overcame the strongest minefields and violated the integrity of the enemy's first line of defense, which facilitated the offensive of the main forces of the front. In addition, the German command was misled. From the experience of previous operations, the Germans thought that the main forces of the front would go over to the offensive after the reconnaissance battalions. However, neither on the 14th, nor on the 15th of April, our troops did not go into a general offensive. The German command made the erroneous conclusion that the offensive of the main forces of the 1st Belorussian Front was postponed for several days.
Soviet bombers heading for Berlin
Soviet soldiers cross the Oder river
Breakthrough enemy defenses
At 5 a.m. on April 16, 1945, artillery preparation began in complete darkness. On the front of the main strike grouping, artillery for 20 minutes suppressed enemy targets to a depth of 6-8 km and in some places up to 10 km. In such a short period, about 500 thousand shells and mines of all calibers were fired. The effectiveness of the artillery was great. In the first two trenches, from 30 to 70% of the personnel of the German units were incapacitated. When the Soviet infantry and tanks went on the attack in some directions, they advanced 1, 5-2 km without meeting enemy resistance. Soon, however, German troops, relying on a strong and well-prepared second line of defense, began to offer fierce resistance. Fierce fighting broke out along the entire front.
At the same time, bombers of the 16th Air Army attacked headquarters, communications centers, 3-4 trenches of the enemy's main defense zone. The 18th Air Force (heavy aviation) also took part in the attack. Within 40 minutes, 745 vehicles bombed the assigned targets. In just one day, despite the unfavorable meteorological situation, our pilots made 6550 sorties, including 877 at night. More than 1,500 tons of bombs were dropped on the enemy. German aircraft tried to resist. During the day, 140 air battles took place. Our falcons shot down 165 German cars.
The 606th Special Purpose Division, which was defending in the offensive zone of Perkhorovich's 47th Army, suffered heavy losses. German soldiers were caught by artillery barrage in the trenches and many died. However, the Germans put up stubborn resistance, our troops had to advance, repelling numerous counterattacks. By the end of the day, our troops advanced 4-6 km, capturing a number of important strongholds deep in the enemy's defenses. More than 300 prisoners were captured.
Kuznetsov's 3rd Shock Army was advancing successfully. The troops launched an offensive under the light of searchlights. The greatest success was achieved in the offensive zone of the right-flank 79th Rifle Corps of General SN Perevertkin. Our forces fought off several enemy counterattacks and captured important strongholds of Gross Barnim and Cline Barnim. In order to increase the pressure of the 79th corps in the zone of its offensive at 10 o'clock. introduced Kirichenko's 9th Panzer Corps. As a result, our infantry and tanks advanced 8 km and reached the enemy's intermediate defensive zone. On the left flank, General A. F. Kazankin's 12th Guards Rifle Corps advanced 6 km in a day. Especially stubborn battles were fought here for the Lechin stronghold. German troops repulsed a frontal attack of General V. I. Smirnov's 33rd division with heavy fire. Then the 33rd division and 52nd division of General ND Kozin bypassed Lechin from the north and south. So they took the strong point. Thus, on the day of the heavy battle, the troops of the 3rd Shock Army broke through the main line of enemy defense and with their right wing reached the intermediate zone. About 900 prisoners were captured.
By the light of searchlights, Berzarin's 5th Shock Army launched an offensive. The central 32nd Rifle Corps of General DS Zherebin achieved the greatest success. Our troops advanced 8 km and by the end of the day reached the right bank of the Alt Oder River, to the enemy's second line of defense in the Platkov-Guzov sector. On the right flank of the army, the 26th Guards Rifle Corps, overcoming fierce enemy resistance, advanced 6 km. The troops of the left-flank 9th Rifle Corps also advanced 6 km. At the same time, units of the 301st Infantry Division of Colonel V. S. Antonov took an important enemy stronghold - Verbig.
In the battle for the Verbig station, Lieutenant Grant Arsenovich Avakyan, a Komsomol organizer of the 1st battalion of the 1054th rifle regiment distinguished himself. Finding a detachment of the enemy, prepared for a counterattack, Avakyan, taking fighters with him, went to the house. Covertly sneaking up to the enemy, Avakyan threw three grenades through the window. The Germans, seized by panic, rushed out of the house and came under the concentrated fire of the submachine gunners. During this battle, Lieutenant Avakyan, together with his fighters, destroyed 56 German soldiers and captured 14 people, captured 2 armored personnel carriers. On April 24, Avakyan once again distinguished himself, while capturing and holding a bridgehead across the Spree River on the streets of Berlin. He was seriously wounded. For his courage and heroism, Lieutenant Avakyan was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Thus, by the end of the day, the troops of the 5th Shock Army, breaking the enemy's resistance, advanced 6-8 km. Our troops broke through all three positions of the main line of the German defense, and entered the offensive zone of the 32nd and 9th rifle corps to its second line of defense.
The troops of Chuikov's 8th Guards Army moved into the attack under the light of 51 searchlights. It should be noted that their light stunned the Germans and at the same time illuminated the road for our advancing troops. In addition, the powerful illumination of the searchlights disabled the German night vision systems. Almost simultaneously with the infantry, the forward brigades of the 1st Guards Tank Army of Katukov moved. The reconnaissance units of the forward brigades entered the battles in the ranks of the infantry. Having broken through the enemy's defenses and repelling several counterattacks by the 20th Motorized and 169th Infantry Divisions, our troops advanced 3-6 km. The enemy's main line of defense was broken. By 12 o'clock, Chuikov's guardsmen and the advanced units of the tank army reached the Seelow Heights, where the second powerful enemy line of defense passed. Fighting for the Seelow Heights began.
The beginning of the assault on the Seelow Heights. Zhukov's decision to bring tank armies into battle
The German command managed to withdraw part of the forces of the 20th motorized division to this defensive line, and also transferred the Muncheberg tank division from the reserve. The anti-tank defense of the Seelow direction was reinforced by a significant part of the artillery of the Berlin air defense zone. The second line of the German defense had a large number of wood-earth firing points, machine-gun pads, firing positions for artillery and anti-tank weapons, anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles. In front of the heights there was an anti-tank ditch, the steepness of the slopes reached 30-40 degrees and the tanks could not overcome them. The roads through which the armored vehicles could pass were mined and shot. The buildings were turned into strongholds.
The rifle corps of the 8th Guards Army did not reach the heights at the same time, therefore, the 15-minute fire raid envisaged by the offensive plan was carried out as they approached. As a result, there was no simultaneous and powerful artillery. The German fire system was not suppressed and our troops were met with heavy artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire. Repeated attempts by the guards infantry and advanced tank units to break into the enemy's defenses were unsuccessful. At the same time, the Germans themselves repeatedly launched counterattacks with forces from a battalion to an infantry regiment supported by 10-25 tanks and self-propelled guns, and strong artillery fire. The most fierce battles took place along the Seelow-Müncheberg highway, where the Germans installed about 200 anti-aircraft guns (up to half of the 88-mm anti-aircraft guns).
Marshal Zhukov, taking into account the complexity of the upcoming battle, decided to move mobile units closer to the first echelon. By 12 o'clock. On April 16, the tank armies were already completely at the Küstrin bridgehead, ready to engage in battle. Assessing the situation in the first half of the day, the front commander came to the conclusion that, despite the powerful artillery and air preparation, the enemy's defense in the second zone was not suppressed and the offensive of the four combined-arms armies slowed down. The armies clearly did not have time to complete the task of the day. At 16 o'clock. 30 minutes. Zhukov gave the order to bring the guards tank armies into battle, although according to the original plan it was planned to bring them into battle after breaking through the enemy's second line of defense. The mobile formations, in cooperation with the infantry, were supposed to break through the enemy's second line of defense. The 1st Guards Tank Army was deployed in the 8th Guards Army's offensive zone. Bogdanov's 2nd Guards Tank Army, with its 9th and 12th Guards Tank Corps, began to move with the aim of advancing in the general direction of Neuhardenberg and Bernau. However, leaving at 19 o'clock. on the line of the advanced units of the 3rd and 5th shock armies, the tank army could not go further.
Battery of Soviet 122mm M-30 howitzers firing at Berlin
Combat operations in auxiliary directions
On April 16, the 61st Army regrouped its forces in a new direction and prepared for an offensive the next day. The troops of the 1st Polish Army went over to the offensive in three divisions. The Poles crossed the Oder and advanced 5 km. As a result, by the end of the day, Polish troops broke through the enemy's first line of defense. In the evening, the Oder began to cross the troops of the second echelon of the Polish army.
Left-flank strike group - 69th and 33rd armies went on the offensive at different times. Kolpakchi's 69th Army launched an offensive in the early morning by searchlights. Our troops advanced 2-4 km, breaking fierce resistance and repelling fierce enemy counterattacks. Our troops were able to break through the Lebus-Schönflies highway. By the end of the day, the army had broken through the main line of defense and reached the Podelzig, Schönfis, Wüste-Kunersdorf line. In the area of the Shenfis station, our troops reached the second zone of enemy defense.
Tsvetaev's 33rd Army began its offensive somewhat later. Our troops in the conditions of wooded and swampy terrain advanced 4-6 km, breaking through two positions of the enemy's main line of defense. On the right flank, the 38th Rifle Corps reached the defensive line of the Frankfurt fortress by the end of the day.
Thus, on the first day of the offensive, with the powerful support of artillery and aviation, our troops broke through only the main enemy zone, advancing 3-8 kilometers in different directions. It was not possible to fully complete the task on the first day - to break through the second line of enemy defense, which passed along the Seelow Heights. The underestimation of the enemy's defense played a role. The powerful enemy defenses and the remaining unsuppressed fire system required a regrouping of artillery and new artillery and air training.
Zhukov, in order to accelerate the offensive, brought into battle both main mobile formations - the tank armies of Katukov and Bogdanov. However, they began to take positions in the evening and were unable to change the situation. The Soviet command in the evening of April 16 ordered to continue the offensive at night and in the morning of April 17 to break through the second line of defense of the German army. For this, it was decided to conduct a second 30-40-minute artillery preparation, concentrating up to 250-270 artillery barrels per 1 kilometer of the front. In addition, the army commanders were ordered not to get involved in protracted battles for enemy strongholds, to bypass them, transferring the tasks of eliminating the encircled German garrisons to the last units of the second and third echelons of the armies. Guards tank armies were instructed to organize interaction with the infantry.
The German command hastily took measures to strengthen the defense of the Berlin direction from the east. From 18 to 25 April, from the 3rd and 4th tank armies and the remnants of the East Prussia army, 2 command and control corps and 9 divisions were transferred to the 9th army. So on April 18-19, the 11th SS Nordland Motorized Rifle Division and the Netherlands 23rd SS Motorized Rifle Division arrived from the 3rd Panzer Army; On April 19, the administration of the 56th Panzer Corps and the 214th Infantry Division arrived from the 4th Panzer Army. Then the administration of the 5th Army Corps and other units arrived. The Germans tried with all their might to stop the advance of the 1st Belorussian Front.
Soviet artillery preparation in the area of Seelow Heights
