"Russian soldiers put up outstanding resistance, fighting to the last opportunity"
The fortified areas on the new border undoubtedly became the pinnacle in the development of Soviet fortifications in the 1930s and even 1941-1945. During the Great Patriotic War, there was no time or materials for the construction of such grandiose structures. The concrete caps of the Mozhaisk line of defense looked like a pale shadow of pre-war grandeur.
The structures of the fortified areas on the new border were built according to standard designs, which were a further development of the pillboxes of 1938. An important innovation in the design of caponiers and half-caponiers was the machine-gun point, which shot through the space in front of the main cannon and machine-gun installations. Another innovation was the reinforced defense of the entrance to the pillbox with an additional machine-gun mount in the protruding wing of the rear casemate (not found on all structures). This provided protection from the attack of the assault group on the structure from the rear.
The pillboxes on the new border were armed with installations with ball-armored embrasures of three types:
-artillery mount with 76, 2-mm casemate gun L-17;
-machine gun mounts DOT-4 with a 45-mm anti-tank gun and paired with it 7, 62-mm heavy machine gun DS-39;
-machine gun installations NPS-3 with 7, 62-mm machine gun maxim.
Ball structures were resistant to flamethrowers and provided better protection against bullets and shrapnel. Practice later confirmed this. NPS-3 and DOT-4 were mounted in frontal fire pillboxes and half-caponiers, and 76.2mm L-17 - in artillery half-caponiers (APC). To protect the approaches to the structure from the rear, a simplified (in comparison with installations for a heavy machine gun) PZ-39 was developed for a 7, 62-mm DT machine gun (Degtyarev tank).
German officers at the ball guns
installations of the Soviet pillbox. On the walls
traces of the battle are visible. Photo from the author's archive
It is widely believed that the Soviet URs in the directions of the main attacks of the Germans were the least combat-ready. It's a delusion. The weakest by the beginning of the war were the fortifications on the border of the Lithuanian SSR with Germany. Their construction actually began in the spring of 1941 - before that, only reconnaissance of the fortified areas had been carried out. The Soviet military leadership was aware of the delay in the start of construction, and in 1941 it was decided to catch up. Accordingly, out of 1 billion 181.4 million rubles allocated for fortification construction, 458.9 million were intended for PribOVO. However, in fact, by June 1941, they had mastered 126.8 million rubles. As a result, there were no combat-ready facilities in the Baltic on the morning of June 22, although several dozen structures were concreted. The path of the two tank groups was blocked only by unarmed boxes.
The fortified areas of ZAPOVO and KOVO were in a much better position. The Brest UR (BLUR) in Belarus, standing on the way of the 2nd TGr, had 49 combat-ready installations, the Vladimir-Volynsk UR in the direction of the main attack of the 1st TGr - 97 structures, the Strumilovsky UR - 84. Rava-Russian UR with 84 DOS, strictly speaking, it also blocked one of the planned offensive routes of the 1st TGr.
A feature of the pillboxes of the Kiev Special Military District was their equipping with armored caps, which were widely used in those years in France, Finland and Germany. The Soviet school of fortification did not favor armored caps. Help for the builders of URs in KOVO came from an unexpected direction: their source was the Polish Sarnensky fortified area and its warehouses. Armored caps improved observation from the structure, primarily towards the front, that is, the advancing enemy.
Antidotes and counterattacks
It would be a big mistake to believe that the Wehrmacht did not have the means to deal with permanent structures. Firstly, it had heavy and super-heavy artillery - from Czech 305-mm howitzers during the First World War to the latest German models, including the 600-mm Karl guns. The latter were late for the assault on the Maginot Line, but were ready to strike at the Soviet pillboxes. According to the offensive plan of the 45th Infantry Division on June 22, these guns were assigned to fire not at the Brest fortress, but at the newly built pillboxes of the BLUR next to it. Secondly, the German know-how was assault groups of infantry, capable of getting close to pillboxes with flamethrowers and explosive charges. Finally, the experience of the campaign in the West has shown high efficiency in the fight against long-term fortification … 88-mm anti-aircraft guns. During the storming of Fort Fermont (more precisely, the "ravine", the DOS complex) near Longyon on June 17, 1940, two 88-mm anti-aircraft guns supporting the 183rd infantry division from a distance of six kilometers fired 160 shells in four hours and punched a hole with a diameter of about a meter. construction. An examination of the fortifications after the fall of France showed that armored caps with an armor thickness of about 300 millimeters from the massive shelling of 88-mm cannons nevertheless split, which ultimately led to the loss of the entire structure's combat capability.
Pillbox near Rava-Russkaya, destroyed
presumably a 600 mm projectile
Karla. Photo from the author's archive
How did the pillboxes of the fortified areas on the new border show themselves? Oddly enough, the unfinished SDs in the Baltics were still able to give battle. So, the 504th regiment of the 291st infantry division lay in front of the pillboxes at Kretingen and advanced worse than others. One battle group of Manstein's 8th TD got stuck in front of unfinished pillboxes. In turn, the 109th regiment, attached to the 12th TD, stormed two not yet fully ready pillboxes, of which the northern one stubbornly defended. Most likely, the builders in the face of the Soviet 148th sapper battalion stood to death here. In the combat log of the 3rd TGr, following the results of June 22, the stubborn defense of individual concrete pillboxes was noted.
In Belarus, the 256th division of the XX AK collided with the stubbornly defended pillboxes of the Grodno UR. The division's railway department noted: "In the Krasne area, the regiment is involved in serious battles for pillboxes, and in the Lipsk area it faces strong resistance." Nearby, near Augustov, the resistance of the pillboxes partially disrupted the bypass maneuver of the 162nd Infantry Division - the breakthrough took place in another sector only in the evening of June 22. The commander of the 28th Infantry Division of the VIII Corps, in a report on the battles in the Sopotskin area, wrote: "In the fortified area from Sopotskino and to the north … we are talking primarily about the enemy, who firmly decided to hold on at any cost and did it."
The most serious battle was given to the Germans by the URs KOVO in Ukraine. Chronologically, the first to enter the battle was the Strumilovsky UR. From the hills on the western bank of the Bug River, it was not visible across the border and became an unpleasant surprise. The report of the German engineer battalion that stormed the pillbox near Sokal said: “Due to the location of the fortifications, which unexpectedly turned out to be extremely skillful, there was the possibility of effective mutual fire support of the pillboxes, which could significantly complicate the attack. The shelling of the pillbox and embrasures with assault guns turned out to be practically ineffective due to the good quality of concrete and the low location of embrasures with powerful spherical masks. A typical description of the attack was as follows: “Despite the artillery fire, several soldiers with flamethrowers and explosives managed to get close to the embrasure. However, due to the high quality of Russian materials, the explosions were ineffective. "The actions of the garrisons of the structures were also highly appreciated by the enemy: "The Russian soldiers put up outstanding resistance, surrendering only if they were wounded, and fighting to the last opportunity."
Defense floors
The most unpleasant surprise for GA "Yug" was the persistent defense of the strong points of the Vladimir-Volynsky UR (VVUR). The construction of fortifications here, in spite of the words of the famous song “We don’t want a single inch of someone else's land, but we won’t give up our own piece,” became the motto, was carried out taking into account military expediency. The protrusion of the border towards German-occupied Poland, formed by the bend of the Bug channel in the Ludin area, was not equipped for a long-term defense. The positions of the VVUR support points were at the base of the ledge.
Pillbox of Rava-Russian UR with a torn out explosion
armored hood. Photo from the author's archive
The 44th Infantry Division, crossing the Bug, plunged deep into Soviet territory, and collided with the Yanov defense center of the Vladimir-Volynsky UR at about 9.00. By evening, the situation had not changed dramatically. The ZhBD of the 1st TGr records that "the 44th Infantry Division is still fighting for pillboxes on both sides of Yanov." The Germans managed to break through the UR only in the first half of the day on June 23. This led to a delay in the introduction of the 14th TD of the 1st TGr into battle and even the adjustment of the order of the German forces in this direction, the unplanned introduction of the 13th TD as part of the III AK. Field studies of the current state of DOS show traces of a stubborn struggle, its shelling, including 88-mm anti-aircraft guns.
In the appendix to the 6th Army's ZhBD, describing the experience of fighting the Soviet fortifications, it was stated: “The pillboxes, which were already considered destroyed, after a while suddenly revived in our rear. The reason is in their three-story structure. Not knowing about it, our troops believed after the seizure of the upper floor that they had destroyed the pillbox. In fact, the garrisons retreated in time to the lower floors and there they expected the attackers to leave. Three floors is still an exaggeration, but two floors were typical for pillboxes on the new border of the 1940-1941 construction. This extended the resistance of the Sokalsky and Vladimir-Volynsky URs for several days.
The most stubborn resistance to the invasion was provided by the pillboxes of the Rava-Russian UR. In the offensive zone of the German 262nd Infantry Division, the RRUR defense unit intercepted a section of open terrain between the highway to Rava-Russkaya and the wooded-swampy area to the west of it. Here the Germans were first stopped and then driven back by a counterattack of General Mikushev's 41st Rifle Division. The 24th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht lay down in front of Lyubycha Krulevskaya, she did not manage to capture the fortified heights at Deba. It was here that the unfinished pillbox "Komsomolets" was located, which became the legend of the RRUR. The fighting continued for several days. German plans to launch an offensive along the highway to Rava-Russkaya motorized corps on the first or second day of the war were not destined to come true.
The right neighbor of the 24th Infantry Division, the 295th Infantry Division, was supported by 600-mm Karl mortars. They were used to destroy pillboxes in the Great Dzyal area. However, on June 22, no success was achieved. The 295th Infantry Division began the assault on the RRUR strongpoint, but did not complete it. The report that the Great Dzyal was taken by the 517th regiment is dated June 23rd. On the same day, the IV Corps reported that the Karls were no longer needed and were out of order due to technical problems. According to the known data on the shooting at the Brest Fortress, it can be assumed that shells were stuck in the barrels of the "miracle weapons". The details of the Karlov's actions near Rava-Russkaya are unknown, but the photographs from the fortified area show pillboxes with very serious damage. These can be explosions of both large explosive charges and 600-mm shells.
Several factors acted against the Soviet pillboxes. First, a lot depended on the distance of the UR positions from the border. If the garrisons raised by alarm managed to occupy the structures, they fought. Those closer to the border could be captured without a fight. Secondly, observation periscopes became the Achilles' heel of the pillboxes. Their warheads were blown up by assault groups, fuel was poured into the pillboxes or explosive charges were lowered. The lack of sprinkling of unfinished structures allowed the Germans to use flamethrowers through the pipes of telephone inputs. Finally, the garrisons of the URs most often fought alone, without field filling, which simplified the task of assault groups and roundabout maneuvers of the German infantry.
In general, it should be recognized that the potential for fortifications on the new border has not been fully utilized. However, they became a tangible obstacle and inflicted the first serious losses on the enemy.
