On July 10, the Day of Military Glory of Russia is celebrated - the Day of the victory of the Russian army over the Swedes in the Battle of Poltava. The Battle of Poltava itself, the decisive battle of the Northern War, took place on June 27 (July 8) 1709. The significance of the battle was enormous. The Swedish army under the command of King Charles XII suffered a decisive defeat and was captured. The Swedish king himself barely managed to escape. The military power of the Swedish Empire on land was undermined. A radical change took place in the war. Russia launched a strategic offensive and occupied the Baltics. Thanks to this victory, Russia's international prestige has grown greatly. Saxony and Denmark again opposed Sweden in alliance with Russia.
Background
The just desire of the Russian state to regain the primordially Russian lands on the shores of the Gulf of Finland and at the mouth of the Neva and thereby gain access to the Baltic Sea, which Russia needed for military-strategic and economic reasons, resulted in a long and bloody Northern War with the Swedish Empire, which considered the Baltic your "lake". Russia was supported by Denmark, Saxony and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which were also dissatisfied with Sweden's hegemony in the Baltic.
The beginning of the war was a disaster for Russia and its allies. The young Swedish king and talented commander Karl XII with a lightning strike brought Denmark out of the war - the only power in the Northern Alliance (the anti-Swedish coalition of the Russian state, the Commonwealth, Saxony and Denmark), which had a navy. Then the Swedes defeated the Russian army near Narva. However, the Swedish king made a strategic mistake. He did not begin to complete the defeat of the Russian state, forcing it to peace, but became carried away by the war with the Polish king and the Saxon elector August II, chasing him through the territory of the Commonwealth. The Swedish king underestimated the Russian kingdom and the organizational skills, determination and will of Peter. He decided that his main enemy was the Saxon elector and the Polish king August II.
This allowed Tsar Peter to carry out "work on mistakes." The Russian tsar strengthened the cadre of the army, saturating it with national cadres (previously they relied on foreign military experts). They strengthened the army at a rapid pace, built a fleet, and developed industry. While the main forces of the Swedish army, led by the king, fought in Poland, the Russian army began to press the enemy in the Baltic, seized the mouth of the Neva River. In 1703, the fortified city of St. Petersburg was founded. In the same year, they created the Baltic Fleet and laid the base of the Russian fleet in the Baltic - Kronstadt. In 1704, Russian troops took Dorpat (Yuryev) and Narva.
As a result, when Karl turned his army against the Russians again, he met another army. An army that had already won victories more than once and was ready to measure its strength with a powerful enemy (the Swedish army before Poltava was considered one of the best, if not the best, in Europe). In the moral, organizational and technical state, the Russian army has qualitatively changed for the better. Russia was entrenched in the Baltic and was ready for new battles.
Russian campaign of Charles XII
Meanwhile, the Swedes were able to do away with Poland and Saxony. Karl imprisoned his protege Stanislaw Leszczynski in Poland. In 1706, the Swedes invaded Saxony, and the Polish king and Saxon Elector August II made a peace treaty with Sweden, withdrawing from the war. After that, Russia was left without allies. In the spring and summer of 1707, Charles XII was preparing his army, located in Saxony, for the Russian campaign. The Swedish king managed to make up for the losses and significantly strengthen his troops. At the same time, the Swedish king cherished a plan for a large-scale invasion of Russia with the participation of the troops of Turkey, the Crimean Khanate, the Polish puppet regime of Stanislav Leshchinsky and the Cossacks of the traitorous hetman Mazepa. He planned to take Russia into giant "pincers" and forever push Moscow away from the Baltic Sea. However, this plan failed. The Turks did not want to fight during this period, and Mazepa's betrayal did not lead to a large-scale deposition of the Cossacks and an uprising in the south. A handful of traitorous elders could not turn the people against Moscow.
Charles was not embarrassed (he dreamed of the glory of Alexander the Great) and he began the campaign with the available forces. The Swedish army began the campaign in September 1707. In November, the Swedes crossed the Vistula, Menshikov retreated from Warsaw to the Narew River. Then the Swedish army made a difficult transition along the actual off-road through the Masurian swamps and in February 1708 reached Grodno, the Russian troops retreated to Minsk. Exhausted by the heavy off-road march, the Swedish army was forced to stop at "winter quarters." In June 1708, the Swedish army continued its march along the Smolensk-Moscow line. At the end of June, the Swedes crossed the Berezina south of Borisov. At the same time, Levengaupt's corps with a huge train went south from Riga. In July, the Swedish army defeated the Russian troops at Golovchin. The Russian army retreated beyond the Dnieper, Charles XII occupied Mogilev and captured the crossings across the Dnieper.
Further advancement of the Swedish army slowed sharply. Tsar Peter applied the old tactics of the Scythians - the "scorched earth" tactic. Swedish troops had to move through the devastated terrain, experiencing an acute shortage of food and fodder. On September 11-13, 1708, a military council of the Swedish king with his generals took place in the small Smolensk village of Starishi. The question of the further actions of the army was being decided: to continue moving to Smolensk and Moscow or to go south, to Little Russia, where Mazepa promised comprehensive support. The movement of the Swedish army through the devastated area was threatened with starvation. Winter was approaching, the Swedish army was in need of rest and provisions. And without heavy artillery and supplies, which General Levengaupt was supposed to bring, it was almost impossible to take Smolensk. As a result, they decided to go south, especially since Hetman Mazepa promised winter apartments, food and assistance for 50 thousand people. Little Russian troops.
The defeat of Levengaupt's corps on September 28 (October 9) 1708 in the battle near the village of Lesnoy finally buried the plans of the Swedish command to march on Moscow during the 1708 campaign. It was a serious victory, it was not in vain that Tsar Pyotr Alekseevich called her “the mother of the Poltava battle”. The Swedes lost hope for strong reinforcements - about 9 thousand Swedes were killed, wounded and captured. General Levengaupt was able to bring only about 6 thousand demoralized soldiers to King Charles. The Russians captured an artillery park, a huge wagon train with a three-month supply of food and ammunition. Karl had no choice but to turn south.
Portrait of Peter I. Painter Paul Delaroche
Swedish king Karl XII
Confrontation in South Russia
And in the south, everything turned out to be not as good as in the words of the traitor Mazepa. From the thousands of Cossacks, Mazepa managed to bring only a few thousand people, and these Cossacks did not want to fight for the Swedes and fled at the first opportunity. Menshikov outstripped the vanguard of Charles XII, took Baturin and burned the reserves there. The Swedes got only the ashes. Karl had to move further south, embarrassing the population with looting. In November, the Swedes entered Romny, where they stayed for the winter.
In winter, the situation has not improved. Swedish troops were stationed in the area of Gadyach, Romen, Priluk, Lukhovits and Luben. Russian troops were stationed east of this area, closing the approaches to Belgorod and Kursk. The strongholds of our troops were Sumy, Lebedin and Akhtyrka. The scattered nature of the Swedish army was associated with the inability to locate the army in one or two cities and the need for constant requisition of food and fodder from the local population. The Swedes lost people in constant small skirmishes. The Swedish troops were "bothered" not only by the "parties" directed by Russian generals, but also by the peasants and townspeople dissatisfied with the activities of the invaders. For example, in mid-November, three cavalry and one infantry regiments of the enemy approached the small town of Smely in the hope of winter quarters. Menshikov, learning about this, brought dragoon regiments to the aid of the townspeople. Russian dragoons, together with the bourgeoisie, defeated the Swedes: about 900 people were killed and captured. The entire convoy became a trophy of the Russian troops. When the Swedish king Karl with the main forces arrived at the Bold, his population, deciding that the resistance was hopeless, left the town. Charles XII, on the advice of Mazepa, burned the rebellious city. In December, the Swedes captured the weakly fortified city of Terny, massacred over a thousand inhabitants and burned down the settlement. Large losses - about 3 thousand people, the Swedes suffered during the assault on the Veprik fortress.
Both armies suffered losses not only during skirmishes and assaults, but also from an unusually harsh winter. In 1708, a severe frost swept across Europe and caused tremendous damage to gardens and crops. As a rule, mild, winter in Little Russia stood out to be extremely cold. Many soldiers froze or frostbitten face, hands and feet. At the same time, the Swedes suffered more serious losses. The ammunition of Swedish soldiers, badly worn out after leaving Saxony, did not save them from the cold. Contemporaries from the Swedish camp left a lot of evidence of this disaster. S. Leshchinsky's representative at the headquarters of Karl XII, Poniatovsky, wrote: “Before coming to Gadyach, the Swedes lost three thousand soldiers, dead frozen; besides, all the attendants with the carts and many horses."
The Swedish army was cut off from the military-industrial base, the fleet and began to experience a shortage of cannonballs, lead and gunpowder. It was impossible to replenish the artillery park. Russian troops systematically pressed the enemy, threatening to cut off the Swedes from the Dnieper. Karl could neither impose a general battle on Peter, in which he hoped to crush the Russians and open the way for an attack on Moscow.
Thus, during the winter of 1708 - 1709. Russian troops, avoiding a general engagement, continued to exhaust the forces of the Swedish army in local battles. In the spring of 1709, Charles XII decided to renew the offensive against Moscow through Kharkov and Belgorod. But before that, he decided to take the Poltava fortress. The Swedish army approached it with a force of 35 thousand people with 32 guns, not counting a small number of Mazepa and Cossacks. Poltava stood on the high bank of the Vorskla River. The city was protected by a rampart with a palisade. The garrison, commanded by Colonel Alexey Kelin, consisted of 6, 5-7 thousand soldiers, Cossacks and militias. The fortress had 28 guns.
The Swedes, lacking artillery and ammunition for the siege, tried to take the fortress by storm. From the first days of the siege, they began to storm Poltava over and over again. Its defenders repelled 12 enemy attacks in April alone, often making daring and successful attacks themselves. The Russian army was able to support the garrison of Poltava with people and gunpowder. As a result, the heroic defense of Poltava gave the Russians a gain in time.
Thus, the strategic situation for the Swedish army continued to deteriorate. They could not take Poltava, despite a long siege and heavy losses. In May 1709, the Lithuanian hetman Jan Sapega (a supporter of Stanislav Leshchinsky) was defeated, which dispelled the Swedes' hopes for help from the Commonwealth. Menshikov was able to transfer reinforcements to Poltava, the Swedish army was in fact surrounded. Karl's only hope was a decisive battle. He believed in the invincibility of his army and victory over the "Russian barbarians", despite their superiority in the number of people and weapons.
The situation before the battle
Peter decided that the time had come for a general battle. On June 13 (24), our troops planned to break through the blockade of Poltava. The day before, the tsar sent the commandant of the fortress Kelin an order that the defenders of the fortress, simultaneously with the blow, which were inflicted by the main forces of the Russian army, made a sortie. However, the plan of attack was disrupted by the weather: a heavy downpour raised the water level in Vorskla so much that the operation was canceled.
But the operation, thwarted by bad weather, was compensated for by a successful attack in Stary Senjary. The captured Russian Colonel Yurlov was able to secretly inform the command that in Starye Senzhary, where Russian prisoners were kept, "the enemy is not very popular." On June 14 (25), the dragoons of Lieutenant General Genskin were sent there. Russian dragoons took the city by storm and freed 1,300 prisoners, killing 700 enemy soldiers and officers. Among the Russian trophies was the Swedish treasury - 200 thousand thalers. The relatively insignificant losses of the Russian troops - 230 killed and wounded, were an indicator of the decline in the combat skill and spirit of the Swedish troops.
On June 16 (27), 1709, the Russian military council confirmed the need for a general battle. On the same day, the Swedish monarch was wounded in the leg. According to the version set forth in the History of the War of the Sweys, Karl and his entourage were checking the posts and accidentally ran into a group of Cossacks. The king personally killed one of the Cossacks, but during the fight a bullet hit him in the leg. According to the testimony of contemporaries of the battle, when the king heard that several enemies crossed the river, he, taking with him several drabants (bodyguards), attacked and overthrew them. On his return, he was wounded by a shot from a gun. This event showed the courage of the Swedish king and his irresponsibility. Charles XII led his army to distant lands from his native Sweden and found himself in Little Russia on the brink of disaster, which, it would seem, should have been thinking about how to get away and save the soldiers, and not risk his life in petty skirmishes. Karl cannot be denied personal courage, he was a brave man, but he lacked wisdom.
Meanwhile, the moment of the decisive battle was approaching. Even before Charles was wounded, on June 15 (26), part of the Russian army crossed the Vorskla, which had previously divided the two armies. When Renschild reported this to the king, he conveyed that the field marshal could act at his own discretion. From the time of the Battle of Forest Karl, attacks of indifference were overcome, it was such a moment. In fact, the Swedes offered almost no resistance to the crossing Russian troops, although the water line was convenient for counterattack and defense. On June 19-20 (June 30 - July 1), Tsar Peter Alekseevich crossed the river along with the main forces.
King Karl XII of Sweden, who had always followed offensive tactics, showed no interest in engineering preparation for the future battlefield. Karl believed that the Russian army would be passive, and would mainly defend itself, which would allow him to break through the enemy's defenses with a decisive attack and defeat him. Karl's main concern was to secure the rear, that is, to deprive the Poltava garrison of the opportunity to make a sortie at the moment when the Swedish army was carried away by the battle with Peter's army. To do this, Karl had to take the fortress before the start of the general battle. On June 21 (July 2), the Swedish command organized another assault on Poltava. The Swedes again prepared the tunnels, laid barrels of gunpowder, but, as before, there was no explosion - the besieged explosives were safely seized. On the night of June 22 (July 3), the Swedes went on an assault, which almost ended in victory: "… in many places the enemy climbed the rampart, but the commandant showed untold courage, for he himself was present in all the right places and circled." At the critical moment, residents of the city also helped: “The residents of Poltava were all on the rampart; the wives, although they were not in the fire on the rampart, only brought stones and so on. " The assault failed this time too. The Swedes suffered heavy losses and did not receive guarantees of the security of the rear.
Meanwhile, Russian troops built a fortified camp at the place of the crossing - the village of Petrovka, located 8 versts north of Poltava. Having examined the area, the Russian tsar ordered to move the army closer to the enemy's location. Peter decided that the open terrain near Petrovka provides the enemy with a great advantage, since earlier the Swedish army was distinguished by high maneuverability and the ability to rebuild during the battle. Based on the experience of the battles at Lesnaya, it was obvious that the Swedes were losing this advantage in conditions when it was necessary to fight in the conditions of rugged wooded areas that limited maneuver.
Such a locality was in the area of the village of Yakovtsy. Here, five kilometers from the enemy, the Russians began building a new fortified camp on June 25 (July 6). It was reinforced by six redoubts built in front of the camp, which blocked the way for the Swedes to the main forces of the Russian army. Redoubts were located one from another at a distance of a rifle shot. After examining the fortifications, Tsar Peter on June 26 (July 7) ordered the construction of four additional redoubts, located perpendicular to the first six. The arrangement of additional redoubts was an innovation in the engineering equipment of the battlefield. Not having overcome the redoubts, it was extremely dangerous to engage in battle with opponents, it was necessary to take them. At the same time, the Swedes, storming the redoubts, each of which had a garrison from a company of soldiers, had to suffer serious losses from rifle and artillery fire. In addition, the offensive through the redoubts upset the battle formations of the attackers, worsening their position in a collision with the main forces of the Russian army.
Forces of the parties
At the disposal of Tsar Peter in the fortified camp in front of Poltava there were 42 thousand regular and 5 thousand irregular troops (according to other sources, about 60 thousand people). The army consisted of 58 infantry battalions (infantry) and 72 cavalry squadrons (dragoons). In addition, another 40 thousand people were in the reserve on the Psel River. The artillery park consisted of 102 guns.
In the Swedish army, based on the number of casualties killed and captured near Poltava and Perevolnaya, as well as those who fled with King Charles, there were a total of about 48 thousand people. Moreover, the number of the most combat-ready forces that participated in the Battle of Poltava was much smaller. From 48 thousand it is necessary to subtract about 3 thousand Cossacks-Mazepa and about 8 thousand Cossacks led by K. Gordienko, who went over to the side of Mazepa and Karl in March 1709, as well as about 1300 Swedes, who continued to blockade the Poltava fortress. In addition, the Swedish king, apparently not sure of victory and trying to cover dangerous directions, deployed several detachments along the Vorskla River to its confluence with the Dnieper at Perevolochna, retaining the possibility of retreat. Also, from the number of the participants in the battle, it is worth subtracting those who were not involved in the combat service: 3400 "servants" were taken prisoner only at Perevolochnaya. As a result, Karl could exhibit about 25-28 thousand people and 39 guns. In the battle itself, not all forces participated on both sides. The Swedish army was distinguished by high professionalism, discipline and won many convincing victories in the lands of Denmark, Saxony and Poland. However, the latest setbacks have greatly affected her morale.
Denis Martin. "Battle of Poltava"
Battle
June 27 (July 8) at two o'clock in the morning, the Swedish army under the command of Field Marshal K. G. Renschild (the king was carried by his bodyguards - drabants on a stretcher) with four columns of infantry and six columns of cavalry secretly moved towards the enemy's position. Charles XII called upon the soldiers to fight bravely with the Russians and invited them, after the victory, to a feast in the tents of the Moscow Tsar.
The Swedish army moved towards the redoubts and stopped at night 600 meters from the front fortifications. From there the knocking of axes was heard: this was hastily completed by 2 advanced redoubts. The Swedes deployed in 2 battle lines in advance: the 1st consisted of the infantry, the 2nd - of the cavalry. The Russian horse patrol detected the approach of the enemy. Fire was opened from the redoubts. Field Marshal Renschild ordered the attack to be launched at five o'clock in the morning. The Swedes were able to take two of them on the move, which they did not have time to complete. The garrisons of the other two offered stubborn resistance. This was an unpleasant surprise for the Swedes: they knew only about the line of six transverse redoubts. They did not have time to start their assault. The enemy was attacked by the Russian dragoon regiments of Generals Menshikov and K.-E. Rennes. The Swedish cavalry went ahead of the infantry, a battle ensued.
The Russian dragoons threw back the royal squadrons and, by order of Peter I, retreated beyond the line of longitudinal redoubts. When the Swedes renewed their attack, they were met with strong rifle and cannon fire from the field fortifications. The right flank of the Swedish army, caught in the crossfire and suffering heavy losses, retreated in disarray to the forest near the village of Malye Budischi. The Swedish right-flank columns of generals K. G. Ross and V. A. Schlippenbach was defeated by the dragoons of General Menshikov.
At about 6 o'clock, Peter I built the Russian army in front of the camp in 2 battle lines. The peculiarity of the formation was that each regiment had its own, and not someone else's, battalion in the second line. Thus, the depth of the battle formation was created and the support of the first battle line was reliably provided. The center was commanded by General Prince A. I. Repnin. The tsar entrusted the general command of the troops to Field Marshal B. P. Sheremetev, who was tested in the war. The Swedish army, which had forced its way through the redoubt line to lengthen its battle formation, formed a single battle line with a weak reserve behind. The cavalry stood on the flanks in two lines.
At 9 o'clock in the morning the first line of the Russians moved forward. The Swedes also went on the attack. After a short mutual rifle fire (from a distance of about 50 meters), the Swedes, not paying attention to the rifle and cannon fire, rushed into a bayonet attack. They strove to get closer to the enemy as soon as possible and avoid destructive artillery fire. Karl was sure that his soldiers in hand-to-hand combat would overturn any enemy. The right wing of the Swedish army, with which Karl XII was located, pushed the battalion of the Novgorod infantry regiment, which was attacked by 2 Swedish ones. There was a threat of a breakthrough in the Russian position almost at its very center. Tsar Peter I personally led the second battalion of Novgorodians in the second line in a counterattack, which overturned the Swedes who had broken through with a swift blow, and closed the gap that had formed in the first line.
In the course of fierce hand-to-hand combat, the Swedish frontal attack drowned out, and the Russians began to press the enemy. The line of Russian infantry began to cover the flanks of the battalions of the royal infantry. The Swedes panicked, and many of the soldiers ran, fearing the encirclement. The Swedish cavalry rushed off to the Budishchinsky forest without resistance; the infantrymen also rushed there after her. And only in the center, General Levengaupt, next to whom the king was, tried to cover the retreat to the camp. The Russian infantry pursued the retreating Swedes to the Budishchensky forest and at 11 o'clock lined up in front of the last woodland that hid the fleeing enemy. The Swedish army was completely defeated and, in a disorganized composition, fled, led by the king and hetman Mazepa, from Poltava to the crossings across the Dnieper.
Russian losses amounted to 1,345 killed and 3,290 wounded. The losses of the Swedes - 9333 killed and 2874 prisoners. Among the prisoners were Field Marshal Renschild, Chancellor K. Pieper and part of the generals. Russian trophies were 4 cannons and 137 banners, the enemy's camp and wagon train.
The remnants of the fleeing Swedish army on June 29 (July 10) reached Perevolochna. The demoralized and exhausted Swedes began in vain to seek funds to cross the river. They dismantled the wooden church and built a raft, but it was carried away by the river current. Toward night, several ferry boats were found, to which wheels from carriages and carts were added: they made improvised rafts. But only King Karl XII and Hetman Mazepa managed to cross to the western bank of the Dnieper with about a thousand people close to him and personal guards.
Then Russian troops approached Perevolochnya: a guards brigade led by General Prince Mikhail Golitsyn, 6 dragoon regiments of General R. Kh. Bour and 3 cavalry and 3 foot regiments led by Menshikov. He accepted at 14 o'clock in the afternoon on June 30 (July 11) the surrender of the Swedish army thrown by the king, which did not even think about resistance. 142 banners and standards were captured. In total, 18,746 Swedes were taken prisoner, almost all the generals, all their artillery, and the remaining property. King Karl XII fled with his retinue into the possession of Turkey.
Alexey Kivshenko. "The surrender of the Swedish army"
Outcomes
The elimination of the most efficient core of the Swedish army had strategic consequences. The strategic initiative in the war completely passed to the Russian army. The Swedish army was now defending itself, relying on fortresses, and the Russians were advancing. Russia got the opportunity to win up at the Baltic theater. Former allies of Russia in the Northern Alliance again opposed Sweden. At a meeting with the Saxon Elector Augustus II in Torun, the military alliance of Saxony and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth with Russia was again concluded. The Danish king also opposed Sweden again.
In Europe, the art of the Russian army in the battle of Poltava was highly appreciated. Russian military art was recognized as advanced and innovative. The famous Austrian commander Moritz of Saxony wrote: "In this way, thanks to skillful measures, you can make happiness lean in your direction." The major French military theorist of the first half of the 18th century, Roconcourt, advised studying the military leadership of Tsar Peter I. About the Battle of Poltava, he wrote the following: “Such a decisive victory over the best disciplined European troops was not a well-known omen of what the Russians would do over time … Indeed, it should be noted this battle a new tactical and fortification combination, which would be a real progress for both. By this very method, which had not been used until then, although equally convenient for offensive and defensive purposes, the entire army of the adventurer Charles XII was to be destroyed."
Personal standard of Charles XII, captured during the Battle of Poltava
