"Goldfish" of project 705 leaves almost no one indifferent. Starting from an exceptionally beautiful and streamlined "exterior" and ending with outstanding technical characteristics and very bold design decisions. At the same time, assessments of this project are often given polarity. And sometimes the same specialists.
Below is an analysis of the appearance and history of Project 705. First of all, from the angle of real combat effectiveness, as well as, accordingly, assessing the feasibility and optimality of certain design solutions.
Taking into account the specifics of the topic, citation of large domestic specialists and links to their work on the 705 project, with the corresponding comments of the author, is widely used. Of course, this significantly increases the volume of the article and makes it difficult to read. But the topic requires it. It will be impossible to deal with the 705 phenomenon (and especially its lessons) in just a few words.
Separately, it is necessary to emphasize that until now "lessons 705" remain extremely relevant for our sub-division.
Engineering feat or mistake?
Here is an excerpt from an article in the Military Industrial Courier dated May 24, 2006 "A submarine looking into the future".
“We strongly disagree with the assessment of the Project 705 (705K) nuclear submarine given by I. D. Spassky …
Project 705 (705K) nuclear submarines have shown themselves to be battle-worthy ships and quite reliable in operation.
During the entire period of operation, the ships were in service in constant readiness for use for their intended purpose (at least 80%) …
They showed their high efficiency: each of them had from one to several contacts with foreign submarines in combat service.
Project 705 nuclear submarines were quite quiet for their time and, having high maneuverability characteristics, received certain advantages over foreign submarines. …
We, submariners, evaluate this ship as an outstanding achievement of the domestic submarine building, directed to the future. The minimum crew (only 35 people), without sailors, operated the nuclear submarine with practically the same combat capabilities as the nuclear submarines of projects 671, 671RT, 671RTM (the savings for the state still have to be calculated!).
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And here it is worth citing a significantly different opinion of one of the signatories of the article (head of the EMC of the 6th division of the nuclear submarine, Captain 1st Rank V. A. Dolgov):
“The maneuverability of the nuclear submarine of this project simply admired … The idea embodied in the nuclear submarine of project 705 (705K) provided for the creation of a submarine with a nuclear installation of small displacement (up to 1600 tons) with an integrated control system and a crew of 15-18 people. Therefore, "Malachite" one of the main tasks for itself set the all-round reduction of the submarine's displacement.
Everything that could win in weight and size was sacrificed to this. All this, both then (30 years ago), and now is issued for a breakthrough into the future, for the creation of ships ahead of their time.
In fact, the fleet received ships with a full range of design and organizational flaws, with the combat capabilities of nuclear submarines of only the 2nd generation. I will point out only the most, the most, with which the personnel had to deal with every day, during the entire service life of these submarines both at sea and in the base [only 11 points - M. K.] …
All these "features" of ALL pr. 705 appeared as a result of "the daily" battle to the death "of the chief designer and the entire team of the bureau for each kg of weight and dm³ of volume", as noted by B. V. Grigoriev in the article "Decisions that determined the appearance of the ALL project 705".
Hard? Undoubtedly.
Let me emphasize that this is the personal opinion of a very experienced professional with vast experience in operating nuclear submarines, including project 705. And the fact that it differs significantly from the view "signed by him in the collective letter above" is so - "the team did not press!"
And this despite the fact that the main problems of the 705 project were not at all mechanical (for all the severity and severity of the problems of the "mechanics").
Let us recall the "features" of the 705 project:
- high speed and very high maneuverability;
- nuclear power plant (NPP) with a liquid-cooled reactor (LMC);
- small displacement;
- a very high level of automation (with comprehensive automation of both technical and combat assets of nuclear submarines) and a small crew.
Initial intent: "it's so easy it can be automated"
The original design of 705 is most clearly described in the memoirs of L. A. Samarkin "There is no prophet in his Fatherland."
A. B. Petrov, "father of the 705 project", in agreement with V. N. Peregudov (at this time - only the Chief Designer of the 627A project) in 1955-1956. researched issues of submarine survivability. The result of these studies:
“The architecture of the nuclear submarine should only meet the conditions for diving, the design should be as simple as possible, all the main technical means for the movement should be in a single number - 1 gearbox, 1 turbine, 1 shaft.
Their redundancy is only in a straight line: diesel generator and / or battery, auxiliary propulsion unit, all redundancy elements without redundancy, etc.
The number of crews should be kept to a minimum.
No surface (and even more so underwater) unsinkability.
A. B. Petrov proposed a constructively simple single-hull nuclear submarine from three functional compartments - weapons, control and energy.
VN Peregudov was very interested in this project.
According to A. B. Petrov, he was immediately attracted by the idea of the possibility of automating control processes ("It's so easy it can be automated").
Of course, all this looked, to put it mildly, "revolutionary" (although the US Navy went exactly this way).
Therefore, not everyone agreed with these proposals.
So, M. G. Rusanov was a fierce opponent of single-hull submarines. And with his usual polemical fervor, he argued with A. B. Petrov and his associates. There were opponents of both single-shaft and single-reactor power plant schemes.
“At the beginning of 1958, according to the results of the studies by A. B. Petrov SPMBM "Malachite" a technical proposal was developed, which remained, however, without consideration by the Main Committee for Shipbuilding (SCS).
The reason for this was that at the end of 1958, the GKS held a competition for the 2nd generation nuclear submarine, which resulted in the project 671 multipurpose torpedo nuclear submarine for Malakhit.
It should be noted that this was the time when the satellite just flew, Belka and Strelka, everyone was waiting for a man's flight into space. Aviation, which had only recently taken the supersonic barrier, immediately reached Mach 2. Indeed, submarines capable of operating at depth for a long time have become a reality. It seemed that there were no impossible tasks. What is still technically impossible today will become a reality in 5–10 years (“And apple trees will bloom on Mars!”).
And this "flight of engineering thought" was not only for our developers. And in all developed countries of the world. The end of the 50s (and up to the beginning of the 90s) was an era of breakthrough engineering achievements, which were subsequently replaced by stagnation (“managers won over engineers”).
Separately, it is necessary to dwell on the problem of the speed of the new nuclear submarine.
B. V. Grigoriev (since 1960 he participated in the design of the nuclear submarine of project 705, from 1971 to 1974 he was deputy chief designer of project 705D):
"With timely detection of an enemy torpedo attack, the Project 705 nuclear submarine is capable of evading its torpedoes, having previously fired a salvo from its own tank destroyers."
And this applied not only to avoiding torpedoes.
The SABROC anti-submarine guided missile (PLUR) was preparing to enter service with the US Navy's submarines, and the high speed and exceptional acceleration data of the 705 made it possible to escape from the SABROC strike (taking into account the zone of destruction of its nuclear warhead of several kilometers).
At the turn of the 60s, a major war was perceived as definitely nuclear. Accordingly, the issues of the quick and accurate use of their nuclear weapons (and the evasion of the enemy's nuclear weapons) were extremely acute.
In the same period of time in the USSR, work began on the PLUR "Blizzard" and high-speed submarine missile (SPR) "Shkval".
At the same time "Shkval" for the 705 project very effectively complemented the "Blizzard", almost completely "closing" its dead zone. And taking into account the real detection ranges, it actually became the main weapon for the nuclear war of the 705 project (in its original concept).
Given the very high maneuverability and speed of the new submarine, significant restrictions on the launch conditions for missiles could actually be leveled out in battle.
One more essential point should be noted here.
Nuclear weapons are not a wunderwaffe. And it has serious limitations in terms of effectiveness. Given the limited engagement zone of tactical nuclear warheads (up to several kilometers), the issue of the precise use of such weapons (target designation) was very acute.
This task was supposed to be solved by a very developed sonar path of the new sonar complex (GAK) of project 705. At the same time, the installation of a large-size GAK antenna for the most effective passive search was unconditional.
L. A. Samarkin:
“The defining idea of the project in its original form, as already noted, was the constructive simplicity of the ship, nothing superfluous, except for the clearly expressed functionally necessary: weapons compartment, control compartment (“pilot's cabin”), energy compartment. It was the constructive simplicity that predetermined the small size of the crew and the possibility and reliability of centralized control …
It turned out to be something different, and in this “different” everyone made his own contribution.
Representatives of the Navy insisted on ensuring conditions for surface unsinkability, and for a 3-compartment short boat, this requirement gave it, if I may say so, a completely different look - a structurally complicated 6-compartment double-hull submarine.
Here it is necessary to note something that the participants in the creation of 705 clearly do not want to talk about. These are different (not coinciding) views of its "initiator" A. B. Petrov and appointed chief designer M. G. Rusanova. Moreover, the original plan of Petrov (and Peregudov)
"It's so easy it can be automated"
eventually turned into
"Make it as difficult as possible and automate at any cost".
This is the technique.
However, in terms of tactics, it should be noted preservation of the initial tactical idea of the project - a fast and "nimble" fighter with high-speed weapons (SPR and PLUR with nuclear warheads), capable of evading enemy weapons with speed and maneuver.
Implementation
The technical proposal for the 705 project was prepared in early 1960.
The first chief designer of the 705 project was appointed by V. N. Peregudov. A. B. Petrov was appointed head of the advanced design sector of the SPMBM "Malakhit".
On June 23, 1960, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR issued a decree No. 704-290 on the creation of a comprehensively automated nuclear submarine of project 705 with tactical and technical requirements: normal displacement of about 1,500 tons, full underwater speed of about 45 knots, immersion depth of at least 450 meters, crew - no more than 15 people, autonomy - 50 days. The decree allowed (if there were sufficient justifications) to deviate from the rules and regulations of military shipbuilding.
The chief designer of the project was M. G. Rusanov (I repeat, not in all agree with A. B. Petrov).
Taking into account the extremely stringent speed requirements, the use of titanium alloys seemed quite logical. B. V. Grigoriev wrote:
“The use of titanium alloy provided a reduction in displacement by 600 tons compared to a ship made of steel.
There was a price against titanium.
At that time, sheet titanium cost 14 rubles, titanium pipes - 30 rubles, profile rolled products - 23 rubles. for 1 kg.
A loaf of white bread then cost 20 kopecks.
The decline in prices for titanium, especially for pipes, occurred later."
The subject of fierce debate over 705 is the choice of its nuclear power plant, with a reactor with a liquid metal coolant.
The use of LMT was regarded by many as a mistake.
Samarkin L. A.:
“So why was construction stopped and the project was not developed further?
This happened due to the erroneous, premature choice of an unused PPU (steam generating unit) with liquid metal coolant (liquid metal coolant) in the 1st circuit and due to the reluctance of top management to admit this error and immediately correct it, to make a modification of the project with a water-cooled NPP (nuclear power plant), which, of course, was not easy to accomplish, and even more difficult to decide on it."
It should be noted that the first nuclear submarine with a nuclear power plant with liquid metal cores entered service as early as April 1, 1962 (nuclear submarine K-27 of project 645 - a modification of project 627A).
The K-27 was successfully operated by the Navy with several combat services (including in 1964 under the command of Captain 1st Rank I. I. Gulyaev, a record-breaking duration).
A severe NPP accident with the destruction of the reactor core and severe overexposure of the crew occurred with the K-27 only on May 24, 1968, when the construction of the 705 (K) series of the project was already in full swing.
Samarkin L. A.:
“It cannot be said that no one foresaw the tragic outcome at that time.
So, one of the leading specialists of SKB-143 in power engineering R. I. Simonov asked to withdraw his candidacy at the NTS for nomination for the prize for the PPU on the LMC for pr. 645, since he considered the use of these installations to be erroneous.
Chief Power Designer SKB-143 P. D. Degtyarev refused to sign technical project 705 for the same reason.
Head of OKBM (designer of PPU for project 705K) I. I. Afrikantov addressed a similar opinion to the Central Committee of the CPSU."
However, it is necessary to take into account the fact that with a pressurized water reactor (WWR) not only the speed requirements were not met, but the very idea was lost.
"Avoiding enemy weapons"
due to the limited capabilities of the VVR of that time for a rapid increase in power.
Thus, at the time of the start of development, there was no real alternative in the form of a pressurized water reactor corresponding to the requirements for the 705 project.
At the same time, the NPP itself on liquid metal cores, with all the operational problems on the 705 project, confirmed its characteristics.
The small number of the nuclear submarine crew was provided by complex automation. Starting from nuclear power plants and general ship mechanical systems and ending with means of detecting and processing information and a complex of weapons.
It is especially necessary to note the creation of the combat information and control system (BIUS) "Accord".
The solution of the most difficult task in a given time frame and with high efficiency was carried out by the SKB of the plant named after V. I. Kulakova (then Polyus Central Design Bureau) - a traditional developer of torpedo fire control devices. Taking into account the complexity of the new task, the IAT of the Academy of Sciences (later the Institute of Applied Mechanics of the Academy of Sciences named after Academician VA Trapeznikov) was involved in the work. At the same time, Academician V. A. Trapeznikov was appointed scientific supervisor for the entire complex automation of the Project 705 submarine (including the technical means of the nuclear submarine).
From the memoirs of E. Ya. Metter "Accord" worked by "Lefties":
“It was a difficult task in terms of organizing the time diagram of the system's operation, taking into account the need to solve many programs in parallel at a speed of 100 thousand short op / sec …
We managed to organize parallel computations of tasks of different frequency and importance, which made it possible to squeeze the software into 32K plus 8K of constant memory”.
Taking into account the very serious bench testing (here it is worth noting that the SJSC "Ocean" of project 705 underwent not only bench testing, but also sea, with its placement on a special experimental submarine), a responsible attitude to business and a high level of developers, BIUS earned confidently and immediately …
Alas, there is something to compare with. BIUS "Omnibus" of the Moscow Scientific Research Institute "Agat" for the 3rd generation nuclear submarines took a very long and painful time (with a number of very acute conflicts between the Navy and the defense industry complex). And the same PLUR learned to shoot only in the early 80s.
Head order
Due to the high complexity and novelty of the Project 705 nuclear submarine, the head order was considered an experimental one. At the same time, for absolutely illogical reasons, its construction was "entrusted" to the Leningrad "Sudomekh" (future "Admiralty Shipyards"), which had previously built only diesel submarines. The first "automatic machine" of the Severodvinsk plant was considered as the "head" one (the first serial).
By decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR (1961), the experimental nuclear submarine was supposed to go on tests in 1965. And the real construction began only in 1964 with the planned delivery of the order in 1968.
By 1981, according to the draft shipbuilding plan for 1971-1980. it was planned to build 30 nuclear submarines, project 705. It turned out that, without waiting for the tests of the lead nuclear submarine, the OPK began construction of a series of nuclear submarines (and in 1971, two of them were 80% ready).
From the memoirs of the senior engineer of general ship systems (commander of the survivability division) Yu. D. Martyaskin:
Autumn 1964 … Obninsk … We studied first according to a three-compartment project according to some pre-sketch drawings.
An interesting moment. It turns out that in 1964 "Petrov's idea" of the most simple nuclear submarine was still alive.
“It was very interesting, smart and tense.
For example, during the life tests of automation systems at TsNII-45 at the stand, we suggested that we give all the night shifts to us.
We made it possible, especially for women, not to go to night shifts, and we ourselves got the opportunity to test ourselves in the most extreme emergency modes."
It is impossible not to quote Yu. D. Martyaskin and the (absent) political officer:
“Chief designer of the ship M. G. Rusanov removed the political officer from the staff list so that there was no bummer who annoyed the crew …
The zampolita was never brought in, for which all the crews prayed to Rusanov."
Further, it is quoted verbatim from the book of V. Tokarev "Two Admirals" (2017) (the author's style is preserved):
"In connection with the increased secrecy, what rumors were circulating - and that our installation makes candy from poop, and that our salary is immeasurable."
Doesn't it remind you of anything from today?
The commander-in-chief, under strong pressure from the Central Committee and the Government, tried to get it in 1968 instead of 1975-1980, a race began, an assault …
In connection with the chaos at Sudomeh … they organized their round-the-clock monitoring of the progress of work."
The construction of the main order for the K-64 was completed only in 1970 (that is, in the anniversary year, when the Leningrad plant could not “not deliver the order”). And in fact, the unfinished nuclear submarine was taken to Severodvinsk for delivery to the fleet.
Yu. D. Martyaskin:
"As soon as the ship was supposedly ready to go to sea, there and then an accident happened."
Due to massive malfunctions (including large turbine restrictions and only 30% of the reactor power) and imperfections, the K-64 passed only a reduced amount of tests.
From the book of the first commander of the nuclear submarine 705 of the project A. S. Pushkin's "Submarine Blue Whale":
“All control was carried out from 10 consoles, by combat alert by the entire crew, by combat readiness No. 2–7 of the operators.
For PPU is characterized by low power load at a speed of 20-24 knots - 28-35%, for STU - only 12-24%.
The number of propeller revolutions at 20-24 knots is 170-217 revolutions, while for other nuclear submarines it is not less than 220.
The pre-cavitation depth of immersion is 50–100 meters at a speed of 20–24 knots. The magnetic field at a distance of 0.7 of the hull width was only 2.5 oersteds."
A. I. Wax, chief designer of the Central Research Institute named after V. I. acad. A. N. Krylova in her work "Some strokes to the history of the creation of the project 705 submarine":
“Sea trials of the experimental boat began in 1971.
During the tests, it was possible to confirm, albeit indirectly (taking into account the data obtained during the operation of the NPP at a reduced power), the possibility of achieving the design full speed, measuring the noise, etc.
However, already in preparation for the tests and during their implementation, malfunctions began in the nuclear power plant, which ended in 1972 with a severe accident and the decommissioning of the nuclear submarine."
Yu. D. Martyaskin (a lengthy quote is worth citing almost in full):
“Finally, all tests were completed. The malfunctions were innumerable. The "skulls" gathered to decide "what to do next.
We came to the general conclusion that we need to stay in Severodvinsk for the winter, fix the malfunctions and move to Litsa closer to summer. With this decision, Admiral Yegorov went to Moscow to report to the Commander-in-Chief.
The commander-in-chief blew him very hard, ordered him to sign the acceptance certificate and sent us to the fleet. The Navy can't wait for such a ship.
Arriving back, Egorov gathered all the "skulls" and announced the decision of the Commander-in-Chief. The Skulls said that they only dreamed about it, and the decision was absolutely correct. We simply did not expect such cowardice and hypocrisy from these academicians.
Cheerful admirals arrived from Moscow. And, despite our squeals, they signed an acceptance certificate and drove away. And we were left alone with iron.
Two of the three power plant loops did not work. In one, alloy flowed out, in the other there was the main circulation pump …
Power is limited, at best a third could be given.
The turbine was enveloped in restrictions. 14 out of 54 cylinders of the VVD command group were leaking, the VVD pressure limitation was 150 kgf / cm² atm [instead of 400, - MK], two out of three compressors did not work.
Under the influence of the outboard pressure due to the leaky hydraulics, the bow rudders themselves moved back into the hull …
A bunch of faults in other parts …
The light hull was full of cracks, the main ballast tanks did not hold air, and the boat sat immersed in the wheelhouse.
Somewhere around December 27, as part of a caravan, we went to Zapadnaya Litsa."
Remembers Admiral A. P. Mikhailovsky:
“The coming 1972 added new worries to us due to the fact that on the eve of the New Year holidays, the newest K-64 submarine arrived in Zapadnaya Litsa for permanent deployment, after being built and tested in the White Sea …
Many submariners and shipbuilders revered her as the ancestor of the "third generation" and told miracles about her.
Zapadnaya Litsa is not ready for the deployment of a nuclear submarine with LMT …
Providing a patrol ship as a steam producer to keep the alloy in a liquid state, as well as a floating dosimetry laboratory, was a dubious half-measure.
The head of the electromechanical service, Zarembovsky, was nervous, and I knew firsthand what the AEU on the LMC was, and the bitter experience of Leonov's crew on the K-27 increased the anxious feeling."
At the same time, the K-27 (the first one with liquid metal rolling stock) was not only a completely serviceable nuclear submarine, it was successfully operated by the fleet for a long time, including at the "limit" modes. In the case of the K-64, the industry submitted a "disabled" to the fleet …
Admiral A. P. Mikhailovsky:
“Pushkin’s installation was screwed up”!
The mechanics called a "goat" a kind of "thrombus" - a solidifying clot of liquid metal in the first loop of the reactor …
The disease did not appear immediately. First, the first alarming symptoms, then the growing crisis.
Desperate attempts by a council of experts from science and industry to save the situation by using extreme measures (up to the drain of the radioactive alloy) did not help.
There was a collapse. The remnants of the metal did not succumb to heating, neither external nor their own heat.
The reactor had to be shut down, and this is fatal.
The dead K-64 was towed to Severodvinsk. And we thought for a long time what to do next.
Unfortunately, the ideologist of LMC reactors, academician A. I. Leipunsky passed away."
And here is an excerpt from the book SPMBM "Malachite":
It turns out that
"The crew (fleet), as always, is to blame for everything."
And here it will be useful to recall the very dubious behavior of the management of SPMBM "Malakhit" after the tragedy at the nuclear submarine "Nerpa" (2008).
It would be doubly appropriate to mention the project 885 "Severodvinsk" agro-industrial complex, "handed over" to the fleet with huge imperfections, shortcomings and forgeries with tests. In fact, in a state of incapacity (because with the current level of anti-submarine weapons, a combat submarine cannot be considered "combat-ready" without effective means of protection).
Let me emphasize that these are not assumptions. Namely, the facts confirmed, among other things, by numerous decisions of arbitration courts. Read more about this in the article. AICR "Severodvinsk" was handed over to the Navy with deficiencies critical for combat effectiveness.
In addition, it will be triple useful to take into account the fact that now "Malakhit" and USC are stubbornly trying to "hand over" Project 885M to the Kazan fleet - without anti-torpedoes, with anti-torpedo countermeasures that are obviously outdated and absolutely ineffective against modern torpedoes, without the volley fire of remote-controlled torpedoes (and a number of other critical flaws).
The realities of completing the head order were well described by Rear Admiral A. S. Bogatyrev in the material "From the history of the technical crews of the nuclear submarine pr. 705 (705K)" with the following final conclusion:
“Even now it is not clear to me why the construction of the newest boat was entrusted in the first place not to the NSR, but to Sudomekh, which even had no experience in building nuclear-powered ships, let alone“automatic machines”.
Is this the result of a struggle between plant directors, leaders of the Leningrad and Arkhangelsk regions, or malicious intent?
And at whose command the K-64 became "the longest ship in the world" (the bow is in Leningrad, the stern is in Severodvinsk).
If the priority of construction was given to Severodvinsk, the series of nuclear submarines of pr. 705 would “go” from 1970, and not from 1977, as it happened, and there would be much more boats”.
At the turn
Chief Designer of the Central Research Institute. acad. A. N. Krylova A. I. Wax:
“At the end of the analysis of the causes of malfunctions and accidents at the NPP K-64, which were the subject of the proceedings of a number of commissions, the specialists of the TsNII im. acad. A. N. Krylov, his leadership and the Midsudprom, the question arose about the expediency of continuing the serial construction of the submarine of project 705 (705K), which had been launched by this time.
Based on the experience gained during the tests of the lead nuclear submarine, and taking into account a number of features of the project, as well as its obsolescence due to the delay in construction (the beginning of the design - the end of the 1950s, the real date for the delivery of the first serial submarine is the end of the 1970s.), TsNII im. acad. A. N. Krylova in 1973, in his report to the industry leadership, proposed to consider the issue of curtailing the serial production of nuclear submarines of project 705 (705K) and completion of one nuclear submarine as an experimental one (serial number 905).
The funds … were supposed to be used for the construction of an additional number of nuclear submarines, project 671 RT …
It was argued that (taking into account the lower cost of the nuclear submarine of project 671 RT and its relatively good characteristics), this could lead to an increase in the combat effectiveness of the grouping of torpedo nuclear submarines under construction."
It is worth making a comparison between the nuclear submarines 705 and 671RT of the project.
At a lower cost, the 671RT project had much more powerful armament (two 65-cm torpedo tubes (TA) and four 53 cm, instead of six 53 cm TA project 705), less noise and a greater range of target noise detection, while losing at maximum speed and overclocking characteristics. Obviously, when preparing proposals as a priority parameter, the TsNII im. Krylov considered low noise and more powerful weapons.
However, there was a certain slyness in these conclusions.
Firstly, the difference in dynamics between the 705 and 671RT was not so much quantitative as qualitative, allowing the 705 with a good probability to get away from the small-sized Mk46 torpedoes (the 671RT had much less chance of this).
Secondly, at least two orders of Project 705 were in very high readiness (over 80%). The navy and the defense industry have just "decommissioned" the newest and very expensive nuclear submarine (K-64). And it turns out that after her the Central Research Institute. Krylova suggested "just like that" to write off not only a large unfinished submarine, but also at least one practically finished nuclear submarine (leaving only the head Severodvinsk order).
Thirdly, slightly losing in the noise direction finding range, Project 705 Okean SJSC was fundamentally superior to Project 67RT Rubin SJSC in terms of the capabilities of active means (sonar and mine detection paths). And this was a very important factor for real combat conditions.
Fourthly, we slipped into a very competent American "information stuffing" that supposedly "low noise is everything in submarine warfare." At the same time, the US Navy itself did not think so at all, for example, practicing special tactics for fighting its submarines with our low-noise diesel submarines.
Actually, everything that was happening was an obvious beginning crisis of our both military science and applied in the "naval" defense industry, which turned out to be unable to competently assess the new conditions of submarine warfare and work out well-founded proposals on effective combat models for our submarines and their technical implementation (including in the form of effective modernization of the project 705 nuclear submarines under construction).
Midsudprom did not support the Institute's proposals.
It was decided to continue the construction of six ships, project 705 (705K), which had been started at two factories, which was confirmed by the adopted resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which ordered the delivery of the last, 6th serial nuclear submarine in 1978 (in fact, the last boat (serial No. 107) was commissioned in 1981; it was under construction for almost 10 years, and in 1990 it was withdrawn from the fleet).
So the series 705 went to the Northern Fleet, 1st flotilla, in the future Admiral A. P. Mikhailovsky:
“I went to sea in K-123, taking with me only three officers of the flotilla headquarters: a navigator, a signalman and a mechanical engineer. More I could not take: there is nowhere to place.
Abbasov frankly admired his complex-automated miracle. I shared his admiration for everything related to the hydrodynamic qualities of the ship.
However, much was puzzling.
Why do I need these 40 knots, if by 20 the boat becomes deaf?
Why do I need this over-automation, if there is no opportunity to switch to manual control of many systems and mechanisms, when a blown fuse can bring the boat out of control?
Who and why needed to rename the navigator, calling him "assistant commander for navigation", miner - "assistant commander in arms", helmsman - "engineer for ship motion control"?
All this is necessary break.
The names of systems and devices, positions, ship schedules, command words when controlling a boat - urgently bring it into line with diving experience, diving traditions and ship charter.
It is necessary to shoot down the "comprehensively automated arrogance" not only from Abbasov's crew, but also from all subsequent ones. After all, by the end of the year, I will have six such boats in my flotilla.
Reinforced 705
Already the initial design studies for 705 included not only a multipurpose (main) option, but also a shock one - both with anti-ship missiles and ballistic missiles of the D-5 complex (while, in accordance with the views of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy S. G. Gorshkov, 8- missile version with the ability to launch all ballistic missiles in one salvo).
One of the shock versions of the pre-sketch project 705.
From the book on the history of SPMBM "Malachite":
“Analyzing in 1968 the experience of creating the nuclear submarine of Project 705, the probable tactics of its use, the SPMBM formulated an opinion on the timeliness of working out issues related to the modification of this project.
The main focus of the modification was seen in increasing the combat effectiveness of the ship by increasing the number and range of weapons.
At the same time, it was taken into account that an increase in the range of action of torpedoes and rocket torpedoes is possible only with an increase in their caliber and length."
We emphasize this conclusion of the SPMBM and return to it in the final evaluation of the project.
Taking into account the development of the direct competitor of Project 705 - the nuclear submarine of Project 671 with the strengthening of its armament with the 65-cm TA, the development of Project 705 with "enhanced" armament (Project 705D) began.
B. V. Grigoriev:
“The nuclear submarine of Project 705D was considered as a natural continuation of Project 705 and was developed on the basis of the basic principles adopted during its creation.
The project was supposed to increase the amount of 533 mm ammunition from 18 to 30 units, re-equip the submarine with four missiles of increased caliber.
The Sverdlovsk design bureau "Novator" performed a special development of the rocket for the nuclear submarine of project 705D, which confirmed the possibility of storing it without access and maintenance for 6 months in unsealed outboard launchers of the cabin fencing and launching under its own rocket engines."
Note
The "self-exit" start made it possible not only to abandon special power plants for firing, but also to increase the maximum launch depth. The proposed solution made it possible to have 10 units ready for a salvo at the same time. ammunition of various types.
That is, in theory - "everything is fine, wonderful marquise", but the possibility of practical implementation in the form of normal operation in the fleet of "wonderful designs" of "Malachite", to put it mildly, raises serious concerns.
At the same time, on the 705D project (in fact, "the same age" as the new 3rd generation nuclear submarines), the noise level continued to remain extremely high.
B. V. Grigoriev:
"The acoustic characteristics of the ship have been significantly improved (by 1.5 times)."
Sorry, but "one and a half times" is not "essential" for acoustics (in quotes), but almost nothing. And given the extremely high noise level of the 705 project, it is quite logical that the Navy refused the "gift" of the 705D project.
Speaking about the 705D project, it should be noted that it was supposed to be in two versions of the nuclear power plant: with liquid metal core and the new pressurized water reactor OK-650 (without exaggeration, a genius, both in design and in characteristics, a product of our atomic complex).
B. V. Grigoriev:
"The main fuel and energy elements depended little on the type of PPU, since … the parameters of the OK 650B-3M reactor in terms of mass, dimensions and maneuverability approached the parameters of the BM-40A."
In the future, the OK-650 reactor will become standard (with minor modifications) for all our 3rd generation nuclear submarines.
The real combat effectiveness of the project 705
Memoirs of the commander of the K-493 pr. 705K captain of the 1st rank B. G. Kolyada:
“Anyone who commanded the nuclear submarine of project 705 (705K) will say a lot of admiring words about its maneuverability, its ability to gain speed almost instantly (in a matter of minutes from 6 to 42 knots).
The boat is very beautiful externally - limousine-type wheelhouse fencing, streamlined hull.
The nuclear submarine of project 705 (705K) sailed to the Arctic, the crews practiced ice navigation, including icing.
In my last BS, while sailing in the Arctic Ocean, part of the trip took place under the ice, part - at the edge of the ice. And I very much remember the ease of icing, as well as surfacing in a hole - high maneuverability greatly simplified the solution of these tasks.
The latter is worth paying special attention to.
US and British Navy submarines routinely operate with much less restrictions than the Navy submarines. In this connection, the opinion about the "safety" of most of the Northern Sea Route from enemy submarines raises serious doubts.
The submarines of the so-called "partners" can not just go there, but with the solution of combat missions. Including where our large nuclear submarines either have very large restrictions, or in general are practically incapable of combat
Accordingly, the issue of a "small nuclear submarine" for the Russian Navy is at least worthy of attention (for example, the version with a nuclear power plant of project 677).
“Of course, on the new ships the GAK were better - for example, on the boats of Project 671 RTM, the detection range was higher, nevertheless, in training fights they did not always win, their torpedo attacks were not always successful.
The speed of our boat allowed us to get away from the torpedo, as a result of which, in fact, guidance was not made.
Hearing a torpedo shot, you bring it to the aft sector and give full speed - 40 knots, and the torpedo does not catch up with the boat.
And here we come to what really became a "knockout" for the 705 project.
Yes, it confidently "runs away" from the 40-nodal SET-65 torpedo (and even more so from the old American Mk37 torpedoes).
However, in 1971 (that is, simultaneously with the delivery of the lead nuclear submarine of Project 705 to the fleet), the US Navy adopted the Mk48 torpedo, which had a maximum speed of 55 knots and with a cruising time of more than 12 minutes (for the first modifications). Thus, the "theoretical" (without taking into account the time for the turn, acceleration and error on the attacking torpedo) catching speed for the 705 project is about 14 knots (or 7 m / s), or a little more than 2 cab. per minute.
12 minutes of full speed for the Mk48 means that it will catch up with the 705 at maximum speed, even when launched into the "stern", when firing from a distance of up to 25 cab. (at the same time, for the 705, they usually called "about 10 cab."
In other words, in the overwhelming majority of tactical situations, the US Navy submarines (even of old types) had a decisive superiority over the Project 705 nuclear submarine due to the presence of Mk48 torpedoes with high performance characteristics.
These harsh realities have been “retouched” in every possible way.
For example, Rear Admiral A. S. Bogatyrev, in the past - the commander of the nuclear submarines of projects 705 and 705K considered:
Let's say - the worst case - we are being secretly tracked by the enemy's submarine, that is, we do not know that we are "on the hook." …
Well, what if a torpedo "ran" from the "stern" towards us, and the acoustics, real professionals, found it?
The commander counterattacks the enemy within a few seconds, and in the same seconds the boat reaches its maximum speed, even with a 180 ° turn, and leaves.
The torpedo cannot catch up with her!"
Alas, the Mk48 can catch up (when launched for torpedoes of the first modifications from a distance of less than 25 cab). And here a completely different tactic was needed than "putting a bucket on your head" (a slang expression for the most complete move of the submarine).
Captain 1st Rank G. D. Baranov, in the past - the commander of the K-432 project 705K:
“The insufficient capabilities of the SAC, which are mainly determined by the high level of its own interference, did not make it possible to achieve a decisive separation from the nuclear submarine in solving anti-submarine problems …
This did not allow to recognize the nuclear submarine of project 705 (and 705K) as domestic submarines of the third generation.
It was said directly and honestly.
Yes, 705 had tracking of foreign submarines (IPL). For example, K-463 has more than 20 hours of tracking SSBNs (stopped by order). But the tracking is not hidden, with the active use of sonar means (sonar tract in various modes and mine detection tract), at short distances and literally “on the nerves”. With a high probability, the opinion expressed in our literature that “to stop tracking” the K-463 was a request “through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs” is most likely true. For such "dog fights" under water were too dangerous.
The problem is that for the enemy such "behavior" of our nuclear submarine was a problem only in peacetime. In the military (or threatened) - it would have been just a shot from the Mk48 (with fatal consequences for the 705).
With all this, the words of G. D. Baranov on the capabilities of the 705 project against surface ships:
“After a year or two of the operation of the nuclear submarine, it became clear that the new ships have unusual and in many ways brilliant capabilities of the power plant, which, if used correctly, successfully and without much effort, evade anti-submarine forces of a potential enemy and any torpedoes that were in service at that time. US and NATO submarines, as well as, unlike nuclear submarines of other projects, to monitor detachments of warships (OBK), aircraft carrier strike formations and groups (AUS and AUG) of a potential enemy …
It should also be recalled that an ineffective torpedo weapon designed only for self-defense against NK (SAET-60A torpedoes) forced us to approach them at extremely short distances to increase the probability of hitting surface targets, which sharply reduced our chances of successfully completing torpedo attacks due to the need to overcome a deeply echeloned ASW”.
Alas, the main drawback of the SAET-60A was not in small salvo ranges, but in the extremely low noise immunity of its homing system (HSS), in fact the direct "successor" of the German TV during the Second World War (the effectiveness of which turned out to be extremely low due to the massive use of towed traps by the allies) …
In fact, a project 705 nuclear submarine with a towed trap "Nixie" would have to shoot SAET-60A like straight-forward torpedoes in a real battle (for its reliable defeat). Such is the "nuclear submarine of the XXI century" (according to a number of experts).
At the same time, a large number of US Navy and NATO ships had the ASROC anti-submarine missile system, which made it possible to repeatedly "beat with a club" at our nuclear submarine even before it entered the volley position.
The high speed of the 705 project was close to that for the Mk46 torpedoes of ASROC missiles and aviation, which (taking into account the low energy reserve of a 32 cm torpedo) sharply reduced the likelihood of hitting an actively maneuvering nuclear submarine of Project 705. However, the ASROC launcher (the most common) had 8 missiles, plus another 16 to reload in the cellar.
Taking into account the factor of low efficiency of Mk46 torpedoes against actively maneuvering nuclear submarines of Project 705, the experience of its use for "opening" and additional reconnaissance of orders of US Navy and NATO ship formations while ensuring the effective use of strike weapons (ASM) by the fleet, should be considered, of course, positive.
From the memoirs of the former First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (1988-1992), Fleet Admiral I. M. Captain:
"To support the actions of the tactical group, it was necessary to form a reconnaissance and shock curtain in the composition of three nuclear submarines of the project 705 or 671 RTM."
Yes, for our Premier League it was “Russian roulette”.
But if, figuratively speaking, for the nuclear submarine of Project 671RTM there were “almost all the cartridges” in the “drum of this revolver”, then for the 705 there were only “one or two”. In other words, to reliably defeat the Project 705 nuclear submarine, it was necessary to consistently execute a large number of attacks from the Mk46. And here the 705 project had chances to "split the order" and give high-quality target designation to the strike forces of the fleet.
Evaluation of the enemy
Undoubtedly, the new nuclear submarines aroused extreme interest in the US Navy (also because they themselves were developing a program to build high-speed Los Angeles).
Vladimir Shcherbakov in the article "How the Pentagon hunted for the secrets of the Project 705 nuclear submarine" wrote:
"American intelligence was able, on the basis of information obtained by various methods, even at the stage of building the first ships of Project 705, to reveal the main features of the newest Soviet submarine."
With the beginning of the operation of the Project 705 nuclear submarine at sea, the enemy began a targeted collection of data on a new project of the USSR Navy, including specifically letting itself be detected.
Captain 1st Rank G. D. Baranov:
“The crews“brought”the first contacts with foreign submarines, but their unbiased analysis suggested that the enemy, intensely interested in the TTE of the new nuclear submarines, was specially approaching them at a“sword thrust”distance to take hydroacoustic portraits of our ships.
Moreover, in order to analyze the real combat capabilities of the enemy, they even carried out simulated torpedo attacks (with the actual firing of torpedoes or simulators with torpedo noises). The issues of such actions were discussed in more detail in the article “At the forefront of the underwater confrontation. "Cold War" submarine ".
By Dmitry Amelin and Alexander Ozhigin in the magazine "Soldier of Fortune" No. 3 for 1996:
“With the same commander, our crew, performing a long march, in the area of Medvezhye Island was attacked by an unknown enemy. I stood as a hydro-acoustist on watch …
Suddenly, a mark from the target appeared on the screen of the sonar complex …
The sound from the target began to grow sharply, and I had no doubts that it was a torpedo. The bearing to the target did not change, and this clearly meant that it was approaching us …
Reported: "Torpedo on the right 15".
The commander immediately gave the command: "Raise the power of the power plant to one hundred percent."
The inclusion of the sound of the torpedo on the speakerphone instantly sobered everyone …
The commands poured in: "To the left on board, the most complete turbine."
Then we ran away, we could develop crazy speed.
What was there, who attacked, what, there was no time to figure it out."
In view of the above, the public assessment of American authors Norman Polmer and K. Gee Moore (in the book "The Cold War of Submarines") is as follows:
“Project Alfa is the most outstanding submarine of the 20th century.
The emergence of the Alfa project caused a shock in the naval circles of the West.
We have upgraded our Mk48 torpedoes with the aim of increasing the speed and depth of immersion to values exceeding those achieved on these exceptional submarines."
Agree, it smacks of open slyness and an obvious desire not even to "shake" the American taxpayer on new expenses for the US Navy, but rather to "hit the hands" of lobbyists of any "exterminating mafias" of the US Air Force in order to "master the budget pie" (that is, "The USSR Navy Is the enemy, and the enemy is its own air force (USA) ").
conclusions
Rear Admiral L. B. Nikitin in his work "Lessons on the operation of nuclear submarines of pr. 705, 705K" noted:
“Thus, by the end of the 1970s. instead of "very, very" the Navy received an "underwater fighter" with very mediocre TTE for its time.
The cost of material, moral and other types of costs associated with the creation of a truly unique ship, did not pay off, hopes were not justified.
What is worse in the world?
And, as we can see, this is by no means connected with the choice of the type of reactor installation, as some authors try to present, who, by the way, had no direct relation to the operation of the nuclear submarines of pr. 705 and 705K in the fleet.
The position of these authors is not accidental and understandable.
The fact is that at the stage of development of the TTZ and the design of these ships, the authors of the project, the Ministry of Justice Industry and the Navy did not see, did not guess the trends and prospects for the development of submarine shipbuilding for the next 10-15 years, as a result of which it was not possible to create a submarine with optimal TFC in all respects and with a noise level that meets the requirements of combating submarines of a potential "enemy", the noise levels of which were known by that time, albeit approximately."
This opinion is widespread.
But it is not entirely true.
The fact is that all nuclear submarines become obsolete over time, they are beginning to yield more and more to new-built nuclear submarines in terms of low noise. And here the key issue is effective modernization and the development of a model for its application, which ensures the longest possible maintenance of the combat effectiveness of nuclear submarines. The USSR Navy did not cope with this (further this issue will be analyzed in detail using the example of the development in the Navy of Project 671 in comparison with the Sturgeon project of the US Navy).
Speaking of LMC reactors, one cannot but highlight the words of Rear Admiral Nikitin:
"The recent R&D projects have shown the possibility of painless use in the standard version of the frozen state of the coolant, which, with the right approach, opens up ample opportunities for the use of shipborne reactor plants with liquid metal fuel, practically negating the drawback that caused so much trouble to the Navy during the operation of the nuclear submarines of pr. 705 and 705K" …
Captain 1st rank (ret.) S. V. Topchiev in the article "Opinion: Why the nuclear submarines of Project 705 were not needed by the Navy" summarizes:
The year 1981 can be considered the apotheosis, when the mass awarding of the participants in the epic took place.
A little more than a hundred awards "fell" on the compound that bore the brunt of the project development.
Then a smooth sunset began.
In the early 1990s, all boats, with the exception of the K-123, were decommissioned."
In the "dying" of the 705s, not even their shortcomings played a very large role, but the elementary exhaustion of spare parts, both for AEU (for example, bearings of turbine generators and electric machines), and for GAK and BIUS.
For example, in the second half of the 80s, on almost all nuclear submarines 705 of the project, the active paths of the SAC (that is, what was just the strong and especially valuable) were faulty.
It turned out even more "fun" with the weapon.
Due to the unique data entry system for the nuclear submarine 705 of the project, special modifications of the SAET-60A and SET-65A torpedoes were produced. By the beginning of the 90s, all of them had already come out according to the assigned terms of service. As a result, when, in the early 90s, the Navy received from a long medium repair (after the reactor accident in 1982) the last running submarine of Project 705 - K-123, the only thing that it had in its ammunition was mines (since they did not data entry required). There was not a single torpedo for this nuclear submarine.
To date, all the nuclear submarines of Project 705 (K) have already been dismantled, which should be considered a big mistake.
Our fleet is sorely lacking an experimental submarine. And when replacing the nuclear power plant with a diesel-electric version (using serial components), we could get a very effective experimental submarine (development of new weapons, detection equipment, etc.).
Returning to the "features" of the 705 project.
First. High speed and very high maneuverability.
For the 705, this was "the basis of the concept", including models of combat use. And at the time of making decisions, it made sense.
The irony is that starting from the 3rd generation, our nuclear submarines began to lose their advantage in speed and acceleration characteristics over the new submarines of the US Navy. 38 knots, indicated in some reference books, for the "high-speed" modification of the Los Angeles submarine, this is not a "mistake" and not a "fantasy", but a fact. The overclocking characteristics of the American submarine are even more impressive. The author had the opportunity to personally verify this on the basis of the data of the SET-65 torpedo guidance to the submarine.
The reaction of "military science" to these data is interesting (literally):
"Well, you can't draw general conclusions from one example."
Yes, there are few examples (not one). However, even here our “military science” habitually “played its favorite game -“I'm in the house”.
Moreover, according to a number of indirect data, there is reason to believe that the speed of the newest Virginia-class submarines is significantly higher than the usually indicated values.
Second. AEU with LMC.
Despite all the problems with operation, the implementation of the concept of the 705th without liquid metal rolling in the 60s. was impossible. And it paid off (I repeat, regardless of the problems with use).
Third. Small displacement.
In itself, the small displacement of the nuclear submarine was not new. For example, a significant number of foreign nuclear submarines had a displacement less than Project 705 nuclear submarines, starting with the Skate and Talliby (US Navy) and ending with the modern Rubies of the French Navy. For the 705, displacement was important for speed. However, with this "too clever" and very much, completely forgetting during the development of the creation of reserves for modernization. To a large extent, it was this that had fatal consequences for the 705 project (for which it was quite possible to lose the speed knot).
Fourth. The very high level of automation and the small crew did not justify themselves.
However, on the basis of the 705 project on integrated automation, 3rd generation nuclear submarines were created, where the level of automation and redundancy were optimally linked to the number of crew (and significantly less than on foreign submarines).
And here we are, of course, and really ahead of other countries.
And finally, the last and most important thing is the weapon
The main conclusion and unlearned lesson of the 705 project will be the phrase of Admiral Popov:
"Ships are built for cannons."
Alas, it was an almost complete failure in arms that became a disaster for the 705 project.
Nuclear use?
However, in this case, bases are among the priority targets of the strike. Accordingly, you will have to fight with those that are already loaded. PLUR 81R and "Shkval" were stored in torpedo tubes (TA). And given that the torpedoes on the 705 were non-universal, that is, in the TA it was necessary to hold a two-torpedo salvo SET-65A (against submarines) and a two-torpedo salvo SAET-60A (against ships), under the PLUR and Shkval there were only two TA (in other words, only 2 weapons in ammunition).
With the adoption of the PLUR "Waterfall" (which had, among other things, a non-nuclear version with a torpedo), the modernization of the Project 705 nuclear submarine for them turned out to be impossible. There were not even scanty reserves in terms of displacement and power supply. The team of BIUS developers was dispersed.
According to the initial plans of the Project 705 nuclear submarine, they were to receive high-speed anti-ship peroxide torpedoes 53-65MA with wake guidance and a special modification of the "promising" universal torpedo of the Navy - UST.
With a high probability, the 53-65MA for the 705th was "hacked to death" personally by Admiral Yegorov, who was very critical of peroxide torpedoes. And it was the right decision. The small crew of the nuclear submarine did not provide constant monitoring of the torpedoes "visually and tactilely" by the torpedo operator on duty. And the stake on automation (the SADCO system - automatic remote control of the oxidizer), developed for the 705 project, was a frank "game with matches".
A variant of the UST torpedo (which became UST-A USET-80) for the 705 project "died without being born." As a result, the "machine guns" were left with the second generation SET-65A (anti-submarine) and SAET-60A (anti-ship) torpedoes. Both of these torpedoes can be seen live in the museum of the Gidropribor concern.
SET-65A had an old (the very first version of SET-65) active-passive homing system (SSN) Podrazhanskiy ("eared equipment") with a real response radius and a search area of less than 800 meters and a speed of 40 knots per 15 km.
Comparing it with the Mk48 (with its 55 knots and 18.5 km range at high-speed mode, a CCH radius of more than 2.5 km and telecontrol) is simply devastating.
But the situation with the SEAT-60A anti-ship torpedoes was even sadder, due to the extremely low noise immunity of their CLS (and the massive proliferation of towed traps on NATO ships).
The tragedy of the 705 project is that, which was conceived as an "almost space breakthrough" in the 21st century, the "gold" in cost "atomic fish" was armed with practically a "rezinostrel", with which there was practically no chance against even the old US Navy submarines with the Mk48 torpedo.
By creating the Mk48 torpedo, the US Navy "knocked out" the Project 705 concept. Of course, the costs of these programs were disproportionate. Competently spending limited funds, the enemy effectively neutralized our colossal investment of resources on a series of Project 705 nuclear submarines.
Everything turned out even tougher today with the "newest" project 885 "Ash" of the same "Malachite".
The scam with the creation of a "promising" complex of counteraction for the nuclear submarine of the Navy "Module-D", of course, requires a public opening.
Earlier, given the closed nature of the topic, there were great restrictions on what you can write in the media. Now, after the publication of a number of articles (for the "especially vigilant" - freely available and with the permission of the "first departments" for publication), this scam needs to be described in detail and in detail.
If a new torpedo was required to reliably counter the 705 project of the US Navy, then in order to neutralize the protection concept of our "newest" 885 US Navy project, it was enough to replace the cassettes and hardware models in the previously released torpedoes (Mk48 mod.6 and Mk48 mod.7).
At the same time, "Malachite" is the head organization of the Russian Federation for weapons and self-defense systems for submarines.
Fleet?
And the admirals "are in anticipation" of well-fed positions in the defense industry. So the fleet “cheerfully accepts” both Boreas with ancient USETs, and defenseless (with obviously ineffective countermeasures and without anti-torpedoes) “Prince Vladimir”, “Severodvinsk”, new diesel submarines.
There will be no war? Maybe it won't.
Was it possible to do something effective with the nuclear submarine 705 of the project?
Undoubtedly.
And the main thing here is an effective application model and its technical implementation. Since our 705 had no chances to compete with the latest US Navy submarines in low noise (plus effective torpedoes from the enemy), the solution was to use active search means. Fortunately, the Ocean State Joint Stock Company had the potential for this. And modernization in this direction was quite possible.
Moreover, the modernization of the SJSC (new element base) made it possible to provide such necessary reserves of weights, volumes and energy consumption.
The main weapon should have become PLUR. That is, it turns out a kind of "large underwater anti-submarine ship." Moreover, this "underwater BOD" would significantly exceed the same BOD of Project 1155 in speed (including search), the ability to work in stormy conditions, as well as the potential for the most efficient use of hydrological conditions.
A division of such nuclear submarines could become a "broom" for submarines and submarines of the NATO Navy in the Barents Sea, reliably ensuring the deployment of our forces (including NSNF).
It would be extremely effective to use such a nuclear submarine - an "underwater BOD" for the anti-submarine defense of a ship formation.
"Long arm" PLUR (in combination with effective means of active search) made it possible to shoot US Navy submarines from a safe distance from torpedoes Mk48. And the American submariners knew this very well, respected and feared the "Waterfalls".
So there were opportunities.
But no one even tried to work out and implement them.
And today again with our current problems the situation is exactly the same.
