On August 4, 1985, the Soviet nuclear submarine (nuclear submarine) K-278 under the command of Captain 1st Rank Yu. A. Zelensky (senior commander of the 1st submarine flotilla, Vice Admiral E. D. Chernov) made a record deep-sea dive on depth of 1027 meters, staying there for 51 minutes. Not a single combat submarine has since reached such a depth (the usual maximum depths of most nuclear-powered submarines are two times less, and non-nuclear submarines are three times less).
Upon ascent, at a working depth of 800 meters, an actual check of the operation of the torpedo-missile complex (TRK) was carried out by firing torpedo tubes (TA) with torpedo shells.
In addition to the crew and Chernov, the chief designer of the project, Yu. N. Kormilitsin, the first deputy chief designer, D. A. Romanov, the responsible delivery officer V. M. Chuvakin, and the commissioning engineer L. P. Leonov, were on board.
1. Why do you need a depth of a kilometer?
However, the question arises: what was the point for submarines in this record in a thousand meters of diving depth?
The traditional theses of "hide from detection" and "hide from weapons" have little to do with reality.
At great depths, the effectiveness of acoustic protection means sharply decreases, and, accordingly, the noise level of the submarine inevitably increases significantly.
V. N. Parkhomenko ("Complex application of acoustic protection means to reduce vibration and noise of ship equipment", St. Petersburg "Morintech" 2001):
The transition to block layouts of equipment further exacerbates the problem of non-support connections. The hydrostatic pressure increasing during submersion of the submarine causes an axial thrust force in the seawater circulation routes. At a certain depth, this force can exceed the weight of the block, and it "floats" over the support dampers, held essentially only by non-support links, which have become the main acoustic bridge between vibroactive equipment and noise-emitting parts of the housing.
Calculations show that a 600-ton block at immersion depths exceeding 300 m has an acoustic contact with the hull practically only through vibration isolating pipes. In this case, the acoustic efficiency of the nozzles determines the noise emission.
And further:
… Disadvantages of shock-absorbing structures and fastenings of modern ships … the above-noted low efficiency of means for reducing vibrational energy propagating through non-supporting links (pipelines, shafting, cable routes). Extended acoustic tests of modern ships have shown that in a number of pumping units, up to 60% or more of the vibrational power goes overboard through pipelines.
This is further exacerbated by the generally very favorable hydrology for the detection of submarines submerged to great depths. There are simply no “jump layers” at such depths (they can only be at relatively shallow depths), moreover, the submarine is located near the axis of the hydrostatic underwater sound channel (figure on the left).
At the same time, a submerged submarine with good search means, from a great depth, has, as a rule, a much larger illumination and detection zone (the figure on the right is the illumination zone using the example of a powerful modern lowered helicopter HAS (OGAS) FLESH).
Within the reach of weapons, a kilometer is only protection against small-sized torpedoes Mk46 and early modifications of heavy boat Mk48. However, the massive small-sized (32 cm) Mk50 and heavy (53 cm) Mk48 mod.5 torpedoes have a travel depth of more than a kilometer and fully ensure the defeat of a submarine target there. Here, however, it should be borne in mind that at the time of the entry into service of the K-278 Navy, at its maximum depth, no samples of US and NATO anti-submarine weapons could "reach", except for atomic depth charges (Mk50 and Mk48 mod.5 torpedoes entered service after the death of K-278 in 1989).
2. Background
With the advent of nuclear power plants (NPP), submarines have truly become "hidden" and not "diving" ships. In the conditions of tough confrontation of the Cold War, a race for technical superiority began, one of the important elements of which in the early 60s was considered the depth of immersion.
It should be noted that at that time the USSR was in the position of catching up, the United States was significantly ahead of it in the development of great depths.
Today, after all the deep-sea successes of our submarine (and especially the special underwater facilities of the GUGI - the Main Directorate for Deep-Sea Research), this looks somewhat surprising, however, it was the United States that first began to build deep-sea submarines.
The first was the experimental diesel-electric AGSS-555 Dolphin, laid down on November 9, 1962 and delivered to the fleet on August 17, 1968. In November 1968, she set a record for diving depth - up to 3,000 feet (915 m), and in April 1969, the deepest torpedo launch was performed from it (details of the US Navy were not disclosed, except that it was a remote-controlled experimental torpedo on electric base Mk45).
The AGSS-555 Dolphin was followed by the atomic NR-1, with a displacement of about 400 tons and a submersion depth of about 1000 meters, laid down in 1967 and handed over to the fleet in 1969.
The bathyscaphe "Trieste", which first reached the bottom of the Mariana Trench back in 1960, does not forget to build here.
Subsequently, however, the deep-sea theme in the US Navy was radically revised and practically “multiplied by zero” for two reasons: first, a significant redistribution of US military spending caused by the Vietnam war; the second and the main one is the revision of the priority of the tactical elements of submarines, as a result of which, on the basis specified in paragraph 1, a large immersion depth is no longer considered by the US Navy as a priority parameter.
A certain echo (and "inertia") of the US prospecting work on deep-water topics of the 60s was some published studies, for example, on deep-water (with an estimated immersion depth of 4500 m) rather large (3600 tons of displacement) submarine with "spherical" compartments of a strong hull (a kind of "American louse") in the Journal of Hydronautics in 1972.
In the USSR, in the early 60s, active development of great depths also began.
Of the obvious predecessors of the 685 project, the 1964 pre-draft design of a single-shaft deep-sea nuclear submarine with torpedo armament (10 torpedo tubes and 30 torpedoes), with a normal displacement of about 4000 tons, a speed of up to 30 knots and a maximum depth of up to 1000 m (data from OVT "Arms of the Fatherland" A. V. Karpenko).
The very concept of such a nuclear submarine and its hydroacoustic armament was very interesting: GAS "Yenisei" with a detection range of SSBNs of the "George Washington" type up to 16 km. It was assumed that in one voyage with full autonomy of 50-60 days, the nuclear submarine will be able to successfully attack the enemy up to five or six times. The high security of the nuclear submarine was provided primarily by a very large immersion depth. At the same time, TsNII-45 (now KGNTs) in its conclusion on this project noted that in those years (1964) it was considered expedient to design a deep-water nuclear submarine with a maximum immersion depth of 600-700 m, the immersion depth of 1000 m was overestimated and could cause large technical difficulties in its implementation.
3. Creation of the ship
Tactical and technical assignment (TTZ) for the development of an experimental boat with an increased immersion depth of project 685, code "Plavnik", was issued by TsKB-18 (now TsKB "Rubin") in 1966, with the completion of the technical project only in 1974.
Such a long design period was due not only to the high complexity of the task, but also to a significant revision of the requirements and appearance of the 3rd generation nuclear submarine (with the task of dramatically reducing noise and enhancing sonar weapons), and, accordingly, changing the composition of key equipment (in particular, a steam-generating unit (PPU) with a nuclear reactor OK-650 and a hydroacoustic complex SJSC "Skat-M"). In fact, Project 685 was the first 3rd generation nuclear submarine accepted for development.
"Fin" was created as an experienced, but full-fledged combat ship to perform tasks, including search, and long-term tracking and destruction of enemy submarines, to combat aircraft carrier formations, large surface ships.
The use of titanium alloy 48-T with a yield point of 72–75 kgf / mm2 made it possible to significantly reduce the mass of the hull (only 39% of the normal displacement, similar to that of other nuclear submarines).
4. Project evaluation
The first thing to note about the Fin is the exceptionally high quality of construction, both of the ship itself and of the components. The author of the article heard such assessments of the ship from many officers. It should be noted that the USSR defense industry complex produced quite high-quality ships (several "freaks" were literally piece failures), but against their background, the "Fin" stood out noticeably for the better.
This is especially important, both taking into account the factor and requirements of low noise and a significant objective lag of our mechanical engineering, as far as the possibility of producing equipment with low levels of vibroacoustic characteristics (IVC) is possible, and especially taking into account the deep-sea specificity of the ship, where all "usual" problems with IVC and noise are exacerbated multiple times (see item 1). And here the very good quality of the ship's construction in many respects made it possible to level the indicated traditional problems of the machine building of the USSR. The K-278 turned out to be a very low-noise nuclear submarine.
The armament for such an experienced deep-sea nuclear submarine of 6 TA and 20 torpedoes and rocket-torpedoes should be considered quite sufficient.
An interesting feature of the Fin was not group hydraulic torpedo tubes (as on the rest of the 3rd generation nuclear submarines, where the torpedo tubes of the corresponding side were “grouped” into common impulse tanks and a piston power plant of the firing system), but individual power plants for each submarine.
The armament consisted of USET-80 torpedoes (alas, those adopted by the Navy in a substantially "castrated" form from what was asked to develop by the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, about this in a subsequent article), anti-submarine missiles of the Waterfall complex (with nuclear and torpedo warheads). The torpedoes of the 2nd generation (SET-65 and SAET-60) indicated in some sources as part of the Fin's ammunition have nothing to do with reality, they are nothing more than the fantasies of individual authors.
With regard to the "early" USET-80 torpedoes, it should be noted that it is absolutely possible to fire them from a depth of 800 meters (which was not provided by the "late" USET-80 torpedoes, and not only because of the replacement of the "Waterfall" equipment with a structurally weaker "Ceramics", but and on replacing the silver-magnesium combat battery with a copper-magnesium one, with the corresponding problems of "cocking" on "cold water").
As noted above, the main search tool for nuclear submarines was SJSC "Skat-M" ("small modification" of the "large" SJSC "Skat-KS" for submarines of medium displacement and SSBNs of project 667BDRM). Its main difference from the "large" "Skat-KS" was the smaller main (nasal) antenna of the SAC (which was due to the corresponding dimensions of its carriers). Taking into account the fact that the "big" SJC did not get up on the "Plavnik", it was quite an acceptable and good constructive solution with one "but" … Unfortunately, the "small Skat" did not include a low-frequency flexible extended towed antenna (GPBA). For the specific application of the Fin, it would be very good and extremely useful: both for detecting targets, and for controlling the intrinsic noise (including recording their change when diving to different depths).
Speaking about the real detection ranges of low-noise targets by "Fin", we can cite the following appraisal user of the forum RPF "Valeric":
And the low noise of the Sharks is not a legend … The Shark, of course, does not reach Sea Wolfe or Ohio. It reaches Los Angeles, almost:)), if not for some discrete components. And according to the reduced noise level, there are no special questions for the Sharks.
Submarine pr. 685 before leaving for its last autonomous system on tasks found us on 7 cables. Barracuda (one of the first) detected us at 10. Although these numbers, of course, apply only to specific conditions.
Taking into account the fact that the processing of the Plavnik and Barracuda SJCs is close, the difference in the detection range was due to the different size of the main antennas of the SJC. And here I would like to emphasize once again - “Plavnik” really lacked GPBA. And here there are no complaints about the ship's designers - at the time of commissioning, there were simply no such GPBA (the variant with the "large" GPBA on the Skat-KS required a complex firing device and was not suitable for the Plavnik).
In general, it should be noted that the Plavnik nuclear submarine was undoubtedly a successful and quite effective nuclear submarine of the Navy (which was largely due to the very good quality of construction). As an experienced one, it fully justified the costs of its creation and provided both a study of the issues of practical application of great depths (both from the point of view of detection and issues of secrecy), and could be very effectively used, for example, as a nuclear submarine of a reconnaissance and shock curtain (for example, in the Norwegian Sea). I repeat, up to the moment of her death, the US and NATO navies did not have non-nuclear weapons capable of hitting her near its ultimate depth.
Here it is worth noting this, not at all "insignificant" moment of the fact that the groundwork for the 685 project, primarily for titanium, helped the Lazurit specialists a lot in creating the multipurpose nuclear submarines of the 945 Barracuda project. Veterans of Lazurit recalled that, seeing Lazurit as a competitor, Malachite, to put it mildly, "was not eager" to share its "titanium experience." In this situation, the Rubin Central Design Bureau ("we are doing one thing") helped with the materials of "Fin" (which went ahead of the "Barracuda").
5. In service
On January 18, 1984, the K-278 nuclear submarine was included in the 6th division of the 1st flotilla of the Northern Fleet, which also included submarines with titanium hulls: projects 705 and 945. On December 14, 1984, the K-278 arrived at the place of permanent basing, - Western Faces.
On June 29, 1985, the ship entered the first line in terms of combat training.
From November 30, 1986 to February 28, 1987, the K-278 completed the tasks of its first combat service (with the main crew of Captain 1st Rank Yu. A. Zelensky).
In August-October 1987 - the second military service (with the main crew).
On January 31, 1989, the boat received the name "Komsomolets".
On February 28, 1989, the K-278 "Komsomolets" entered the third combat service with the second (604th) crew under the command of Captain 1st Rank E. A. Vanin.
6. Death
On April 7, 1989, the submarine was sailing at a depth of 380 meters at a speed of 8 knots. It should be noted that the depth of 380 meters, as a long-term one, is absolutely uncharacteristic for most nuclear submarines and for many of them it is close to the limit. The advantages and disadvantages of such a depth - clause 1 of this article.
At about 11 o'clock, a powerful intense fire broke out in the 7th compartment. The nuclear submarine, having lost its speed, surfaced in an emergency. However, due to a number of gross mistakes in the struggle for survivability (BZZH), a few hours later it sank.
According to objective data, the real cause of the fire and its extremely high intensity was a significant excess of the oxygen content in the atmosphere of the stern compartments due to the uncontrolled (due to a long-term malfunction of the automatic gas analyzer) oxygen distribution in the stern.
For the maintenance of the "so-called BZZh" 4 open sources are recommended, with their brief description.
First source. "Chronicle of the death of the nuclear submarine" Komsomolets ". The version of the senior teacher of the cycle of Management, navigation safety and BZZh PLA of the 8th training center of the Navy, captain 1st rank N. N. Kuryanchik. It should be noted that it was written without full support for documents, largely on the basis of indirect data. However, the author's extensive personal experience made it possible not only to qualitatively analyze the available data, but also to see (“presumably,” but accurately) a number of key points in the negative development of an emergency.
Second origin. The book of the deputy chief designer of the project DA Romanov "The tragedy of the submarine" Komsomolets "". Written very harshly, but fair. The author also acquired the first edition of this book in the 1st year of the Higher School of Medical Sciences; it made a very strong impression on all interested classmates. Therefore, at the very first lecture on the discipline "Theory, structure and survivability of the ship" the teacher (captain of the 1st rank with extensive experience in the ship's crew) was asked a question about it. I will quote his answer verbatim:
This is a slap in the face for the officer corps, but absolutely deserved.
My son serves in the north on the BDRM, and I bought this book and sent him with instructions to re-read it before each "autonomous".
Third source. A little-known, but very useful and very worthy of reprint book by V. Yu. Legoshin "Struggle for survivability on submarines" (editions of the Frunze VVMU 1998) with a very tough analysis of a number of accidents and disasters of submarines of the Navy. It is worth noting that at the time of publication by the Deputy Head of the VVMU named after V. I. Frunze was the captain of the 1st rank B. G. Kolyada - the senior on board the "Komsomolets" in the fatal campaign and a man extremely tough and strict. Knowing that (in a number of cases with extremely harsh estimates) was written in the draft of the book by V. Yu. Legoshin (senior teacher of the Department of Theory, Arrangements and Survivability of the Ship), we, the cadets, then froze in anticipation of whether she would leave the printing house and in any form? The book came out without any "editorial revision", in an initially rigid form.
Fourth source. Book of Vice Admiral E. D. Chernov "Secrets of Underwater Disasters". Despite the fact that the author does not agree with a number of its provisions, it was written by an experienced Professional with a capital letter, whose opinions and assessments deserve the most careful study. I repeat, even if I disagree with him on a number of issues. His opinion was given in the article "Where is Admiral Evmenov" running to? ".
Returning to Chernov's book. The question is that it is not enough to allocate "regular time" for working out tasks. If an "experienced" foreman of the hold command opens the outboard opening with his own hands, actually sinks the boat (as was the case on the Komsomolets), this speaks not so much of the "lack of time for preparation" as of the systemic problems of the Navy in training for damage control (BZZh).
As for the "systemic problems" in the preparation of our submarine BZZ, this issue will be discussed in detail in a separate article. It is worth emphasizing here that the problem is much more complex and deeper than the one often attributed to the Komsomolets disaster: “there was a strong main crew and a weak second one”.
Firstly, a number of officials in the second crew were from the first (including key ones for the BZZh).
Secondly, there were "questions" about the first (main) crew. The episode with the loss of a pop-up rescue chamber (VSK) during tests in the White Sea was on the verge of a nuclear submarine disaster (death). Details (" What"" Separated the sea "from the central post of the nuclear submarine and how it actually happened) this" tried to quickly forget ", but in vain. This example is extremely tough, literally "under the breath", of the fact that there are no "trifles" in the underwater business. And if somewhere "began to drip", then it is necessary to clearly and according to the governing documents declare "emergency alarm" and understand (and not take "some independent actions" without a report).
Explanation: according to the mention that “the foreman of the hold command opens the outboard opening with his own hands”, we are talking about this episode (quote from the book by D. A. Romanov):
Michman V. S. Kadantsev (explanatory note): “The mechanic gave me the order to close the bulkhead door between the 4th and 5th compartments, close the 1st lock on the exhaust ventilation of the aft block … I closed the bulkhead and began to close the 1st lock of the exhaust ventilation, but close I could not complete it, as water began to flow into the ventilation shaft”.
One more confirmation that there is no fire in the emergency compartments and that the solid hull is cooling down. Fulfilling an illiterate order to close the 1st exhaust ventilation constipation, Midshipman Kadantsev simultaneously opened the exhaust ventilation shaft flooding valve, that is, he unwittingly contributed to the faster flooding of the submarine. Another evidence of poor knowledge of the material part of the personnel.
Note.
7. Lessons and backlog of the project 685
The technical revolution of the search engine for submarines that took place de facto over the past fifteen years (see article "There is no more secrecy: submarines of the usual kind are doomed") makes us take a fresh look at the experience of creating nuclear submarines of project 685. Including in relation to the creation of promising nuclear submarines of the 5th generation (what was presented to the President of the Russian Federation a year and a half ago in Sevastopol at the exhibition of naval weapons under the guise of a supposedly "promising" project "Husky ", Obviously, in no way corresponds not only to the 5th, but also to the 4th generation of the nuclear submarine).
The key issue here is the complex use of non-acoustic and acoustic search means by the enemy. Departure to greater depths from "non-acoustics" leads to a sharp increase in the visibility of our nuclear submarine in the acoustic field. However, an increase in diving depths (when solving issues of low noise) in the future will be one of the key ways to avoid detection by non-acoustic aviation and especially space means.
That is, it is necessary to sharply increase the usual submarine immersion depths (the author refrains from giving specific estimates, taking into account the open nature of the article). Yes, a kilometer is probably not needed here (or is it “not needed yet”?), However, the values of the calculated, maximum depth and “depth of long-term presence” are interconnected.
Here it is necessary to say separately about the so-called "working depth", that is, the depth where formally the submarine can be "indefinitely". But what time is it?
In one of the issues of the newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda" in the mid-90s, there was a very interesting article about the Central Research Institute "Prometheus", including their work on nuclear submarine hulls. And there were such words that (cited from memory), when they nevertheless began to count and figure out how many submarines could actually be at working depth, it turned out that this resource was not only very finite, but for many submarines of the USSR Navy it turned out to be completely chosen.
In other words, heavy loads of huge hydrostatic pressure strongly load both the housing itself and such acoustic protection means as various shock-absorbed pipes (once again to paragraph 1 of the article - they are extremely important in terms of low noise). What will happen if, for example, the shock-absorbing cords of the bottom flapping section of the main condenser breaks at a depth of, say, 500 meters (that is, 50 kgf presses for every square centimeter)? The dimensions of these cords (highlighted in red) can be estimated from the above and enlarged layout of the steam turbine unit of the project 685 nuclear submarine.
And the answer to this question, even in spite of the presence of the first and second set of slamming of this circus route, will be, as they say, “on the verge of“Thresher”(US Navy submarine, which died on a deep dive in 1963).
In addition to technical issues, the issues of long-term stay at great depths entail serious organizational problems. The required service life of a strong case for “long-term depths” can be set with an increased design depth (and, probably, using titanium alloys, which have not only better specific characteristics, but also fatigue characteristics in front of special steels). But the issue of “deep-water resource” is much more acute for outboard pipes and cords. Replacement of the largest of them (such as the circulating lines of the main condenser) is possible on a regular basis only during mid-life repairs (with the removal of the steam turbine unit from the casing).
Let me remind you that until now, not a single third-generation nuclear submarine has undergone an average repair (the first one, Project 971 Leopard, was recently withdrawn from the shop, work on it has not yet been completed), having a significant part of large outboard branch pipes for a long time. expired terms of operation. Obviously, for such nuclear submarines, a relatively safe stay at sea can be ensured only at relatively small actual depths of submarine submersion.
Accordingly, the future grouping of submarines of the Navy must be reliably and fully supported in technical (including constructive) and organizational terms by ship repair. What we had with the VTG ("nonhost" term - "restoration of technical readiness") of the 3rd generation nuclear submarines (instead of their full-fledged repair) is further unacceptable.
That is, the problems of creating deep-sea (and, moreover, low-noise nuclear submarines) are extremely difficult, and here the groundwork of the Plavnik has become extremely valuable today.
