As you know, the plans for the construction of the Russian Navy, approved by the state armaments program for 2011-2020, have failed miserably in literally all classes of ships. Except perhaps the "mosquito" fleet. But the point is that the latter within the framework of the GPV 2011-2020. they were not going to build at all: it was supposed to put into operation only a few artillery "Buyans" and missile "Buyanov-M" - very small missile ships "river-sea". The emphasis was on completely different classes: corvettes and frigates, multipurpose nuclear and diesel submarines of the latest projects.
Alas, it soon became clear that the program turned out to be overly optimistic, literally everything was overestimated. The design bureaus were unable or extremely delayed in bringing to mind the latest and most sophisticated technology: let us recall the diesel-electric submarines of the Lada project and the ever-memorable Polyment-Redut. The slogan "Abroad will help us" turned out to be completely wrong: the French simply did not want to give up the Mistrals they had ordered, and the stake on Ukrainian and German engines almost became fatal for the fleet. Domestic shipbuilders were constantly pushing the deadlines for the delivery of ships "to the right", and in the budget itself, alas, there was no funds for the implementation of such a large-scale program.
And that's when it became clear that the planned GPV 2011-2020. a mighty stream of more than a hundred ships of the main classes "dries up" almost fivefold and that the repair programs of the combat units available in the Russian Navy are disrupted almost in the same proportion, a reasonable question arose: what should the fleet do? The fact that the sailors desperately needed at least some ships was quite obvious, while our industry could still master the "mosquito" fleet. Accordingly, the shipbuilding programs were adjusted towards the Karakurt and patrol ships of Project 22160. But it should be understood that this was a forced decision, dictated not by tactical considerations, but by the need to replenish the fleet with at least something. Of course, the decision to go "into the mosquitoes" was the right one, since the corvettes and frigates went wrong. But even here, according to the author, the accents on the classes of ships were placed incorrectly, and there are a lot of questions about the performance characteristics of projects 22800 and 22160, which the author will raise later. The same material is devoted to the current construction of SSBNs.
Leader of the shipbuilding program
Indeed, if we consider the implementation of our ambitious shipbuilding plans for 2011-2020, it will become clear: the lag in SSBNs is, one might say, minimal. Of the 10 ships of this class planned for delivery to the fleet, three Project 955 SSBNs (Yuri Dolgoruky, Alexander Nevsky and Vladimir Monomakh), as well as the lead ship of the improved Borei-A project, Prince Vladimir.
But the next "Prince Oleg", most likely, by the end of 2020, will not have time to get up in line. In total, 4 ships out of 10 planned are obtained, that is, the fulfillment of the plan is as much as 40%. And the phrase "as much as whole" here, alas, is quite appropriate without any irony. The same MAPLs "Yasen" and "Yasen-M" were at first going to build 10, then - 8, then - 7, but in reality there is only one "Severodvinsk" in the fleet today, and God forbid that by the end of 2020 the sailors will be given also "Kazan". Less than 30%. For frigates - out of 6 project 11356 "admiral" series for the Black Sea and 8 project 22350 for other fleets in the ranks we have three "admirals", the lead "Gorshkov" and there is still hope for the "Admiral of the Fleet Kasatonov". Total - about 36%. Corvettes? Of the 35 planned for construction, 5 were put into operation, and. Perhaps, by the end of 2020, they will finish “Zealous” with “Thundering” - a total of 7 or 20%. It should be noted that today we have not 5 corvettes of project 20380 in service, but 6, but the head "Guarding" was delivered to the fleet in 2008 and, naturally, was not included in the GPV 2011-2020.
Landing ships? Well, four French musketeers - the UDC of the Mistral project - never made it to the Russian Navy (though the author is not sure what is worth upset about this). Of the 6 "Ivanov Grenov" planned to be handed over to the fleet, only 2 will enter service, provided that "Petr Morgunov" is still in time in 2020.
In fact, the pace of construction of SSBNs (as a percentage of the original plan) is overtaken only by "mosquitoes" and diesel-electric submarines. But to rejoice at the success of the "mosquito" fleet, for the reasons stated above, is to pass off the need for virtue, and with diesel-electric submarines …
With diesel-electric submarines, the situation is frankly difficult. In total, it was planned to build 20 such ships, of which 6 for the Black Sea, according to project 636.3, that is, the improved "Varshavyanka", and the remaining 14 - the newest 677 "Lada". Maybe even with VNEU if it works out.
Did not work out. Neither VNEU nor Lada, at least within the framework of the GPV 2011-2020. As a result, it was decided to increase the series of "Varshavyanka" 636.3 from 6 to 12 units, sending six of these ships to the Pacific Fleet. And here - yes, there are successes. To date, all 6 diesel-electric submarines planned for the Black Sea, and another seventh for the Pacific Ocean, have been commissioned. The eighth "Varshavyanka" is undergoing mooring tests and with the highest degree of probability will replenish the Pacific Fleet in 2020. As for the "Lad", in addition to the lead "St. Petersburg", with its many years of trial operation, the fleet may receive the "Kronstadt" ". Total - 9 or 10 ships out of 20, that is, 45-50% of the state program. But comparing these figures with the Borei is hardly correct, since the percentage of completion is "stretched", even with modernized ships of the previous generation.
Another matter is SSBN. Three Project 955 ships are already in service, and although these SSBNs are, in fact, an intermediate link between the ships of the 3rd and 4th generations, they are much more advanced than the previous types of ships of this class. Five improved "Boreev A", which are today in different stages of construction and completion (and "Prince Vladimir" - and delivery to the fleet) will most likely become the most invisible nuclear submarines in the history of the USSR / RF, although whether they will correspond to the American MPS - large question. And a contract has been signed for two more Borea-A, now preparatory measures are underway for their laying, which is to take place in September 2020. And, judging by the construction time, the likelihood that all 10 SSBNs of project 955 and 955A will be operational before the end of 2027 is very large. That's just … the author is worried about one question.
Is it good?
The service life of a modern nuclear submarine tends to be 40 years, provided that the ship receives all the necessary types of repairs on time. But 40 years is a whole era for modern scientific and technological progress in the military field, and by the time it ends its service, the nuclear submarine will be completely outdated. At the same time, it is obvious that the enemy will use the most modern multipurpose nuclear submarines to track our SSBNs, if only simply because this class of US and NATO ships, perhaps, does not have a more important strategic task. And it is quite obvious that the recently commissioned SSBN of the latest project will be much easier to evade unnecessary and annoying attention than a 30-35-year-old ship.
What to do? The “ideal” solution is to build 12 SSBNs, say, every 10 years and remove the old ones from the fleet as the next series is built. Then we will always have a super-new fleet of 12 strategic missile submarines. But, of course, no budget can withstand such costs.
According to the author, an extended construction program is suitable for SSBNs. Suppose that it is necessary and sufficient for us to have 12 ships of this class in the fleet (the figure is conditional), while the connection of such ships consists of 3 units. Then it would be optimal to put into operation a connection of 3 SSBNs every 10 years. That is, for example, 3 SSBNs entered service in 2020, then the next three should be transferred to the fleet in 2030, another three - in 2040, then in 2050, and the three, built in 2060 as will replace the first three SSBNs introduced in 2020. The next three, handed over to sailors in 2070, will replace the ships of 2030 b. - and so on until peace occurs on the entire planet (wars will finally move into outer space) and SSBNs will no longer be necessary.
Adhering to this logic, at each moment of time we will have 12 SSBNs in the Russian Navy, of which 3 will be the newest, 3 - quite modern, three obsolete, and three more - preparing for decommissioning. What are we doing?
We are building 10 Boreyevs and Boreyevs-A at a shock pace for our country, which should be commissioned in 15 years, from 2013 to 2027 inclusive. Thus, we get 10 modern warships in a relatively short time, but then what? A quarter of a century later, all of them will be considered obsolete and we will have to either put up with this, or withdraw part of the Boreyevs from the Russian Navy, replacing them with SSBNs of the latest construction. That is, we either agree that the backbone of the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces will consist of obviously outdated ships, or we lose money by withdrawing from the fleet ships that have not yet served their due date.
There is, of course, an important objection here. The proposed system will not work if there is a failure at the start. As part of the Russian Navy by the beginning of the GPV 2011-2020. there were only "oldies" of project 667BDRM, born 1984-1990. and even earlier "Squids". And all of them, in an amicable way, will have to be scrapped in 2030 or a little later. Thus, starting the construction of SSBNs on the principle of "three ships every 10 years" within the framework of the GPV 2011-2020. we would have received a significant reduction in the number of submarine strategic forces - from about 12 (in 2010, maybe more) in total to 6 SSBNs.
It seems to be horror-horror-horror, but if you think about it …
Is it really that bad?
As has been repeatedly mentioned in previous articles of the cycle, naval strategic nuclear forces need to ensure the secrecy of their combat services. But it is impossible to ensure this very secrecy by the tactical and technical characteristics of SSBNs alone: here the general-purpose forces of the fleet must be involved, including, of course, naval aviation.
So, the Russian Navy today does not have the forces that would allow us to carry out an effective deployment of SSBNs. Literally everything is missing - minesweepers, multipurpose nuclear submarines and diesel-electric submarines, surface "submarine hunters", effective anti-submarine aircraft, modern analogues of the American SOSUS, etc. etc. And it is not clear why we need to increase the number of SSBNs if we are not yet able to ensure their use? Well, we are transferring the Borei to the Pacific Fleet, but does it make a lot of sense if the fleet is unable to detect the Japanese submarine patrolling the entrance to Avacha Bay?
Of course, in no case should one completely abandon strategic missile carriers. SSBNs are much more complex than a spacecraft, and its operation is a real art that is easy to lose, but extremely difficult to restore. In addition, the presence of SSBNs is a strong deterrent against the "lightning strike" strategy designed to neutralize the nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation. Even in the Pacific Ocean, even in very difficult conditions (insufficient PLO forces, outdated types of SSBNs), there was still no one hundred percent control over our ships. Yes, there are reasonable estimates that on the Tikhiy in eight cases out of ten SSBNs were found and accompanied by US nuclear submarines in combat services, but even the remaining two cases still created a factor of uncertainty. And in the north it was even more difficult to keep track of our "strategists", there, most likely, the percentage of SSBN detection was lower. Finally, as mentioned earlier, there is the White Sea, where tracking SSBNs is almost impossible.
And so, according to the author of this article, the Russian Federation really should have gone to a temporary reduction of SSBNs in the fleet to 6-7 units, while continuing to work on the development of new types of ships of this class. Among other things, this would free up quite significant funds to channel them …
Where to?
First of all, to strengthen the most stable component of the domestic strategic nuclear forces, that is, the strategic missile forces. "Bulava", apparently, is more expensive than "Yars", because it is clearly more difficult to start from under water than from a ground launcher. And 16 mobile autonomous launchers (or 16 mines) will obviously cost and much cheaper project 955A SSBNs. Thus, the shortage of SSBNs in the fleet could well be "compensated" by the deployment of additional ground installations - and at the same time remain in the financial plus. In any case, the reduction in the total number of intercontinental ballistic missiles due to the reduction of SSBNs is unacceptable. So the strengthening of the Strategic Missile Forces in this case will have the highest priority.
The next thing that comes to mind is investing the savings in a general fleet force. However, according to the author, there are much more interesting problems.
About sea horse
The second is measures aimed at increasing the coefficient of operational stress, or KOH. What it is? If an SSBN of a certain country spends six months a year in combat service, its KOH is 0.5 ensuring the constant watch of two SSBNs at sea, it is necessary to have 4 SSBNs in the fleet. With KOH = 0.25, the number of SSBNs required to solve the same problem increases to 8.
So, the KOH of the domestic submarine forces was usually lower than that of the Americans. And it would be quite good to analyze the reasons for this lag and take measures to reduce it. Thus, to a certain extent, we would compensate for the decrease in SSBNs in the fleet by more frequent visits to combat services. What is important is that when a submarine has a high KOH, it will hardly be able to manage with one crew. Thus, by increasing the SSBNs, we ensure the training of a larger number of sailors, which will be in great demand in the future, when the number of SSBNs can again be increased.
And again about low noise
It should be expected that, in spite of a number of simplifications regarding the initial project, SSBNs of Project 955 Borey are still less noticeable than the domestic strategic nuclear submarines of previous projects. And we can safely assume that "Borei A", thanks to its improved design, will be even quieter.
But the problem is that design perfection is not everything. The most important role is played by resource mechanisms. To put it simply, after the submarine is handed over to the fleet, the submarine can be uniquely secretive, but now one military service has passed, the second … ocean. The problem is quite solvable - fix the bearing, fix the shock absorber, replace the pump, and the SSBN will again turn into a "black hole", but all this must be done in a timely manner. Alas, repairs are the eternal Achilles' heel of the Russian Navy. And foreign sailors have repeatedly written that Soviet submarines, after several years of operation, become much more noisy, and therefore noticeable.
In other words, it is not enough to create a low-noise SSBN. It is also necessary to make sure that the ship does not lose this quality throughout its service. And, of course, all of the above also applies to other physical fields - after all, the secrecy of an underwater ship depends not only on its noise.
What will all this give?
Suppose, at some time, we limited the number of SSBNs in the fleet to 7 units, transferring them to the Northern Fleet. But at the same time, they brought their KOH to 0, 3, and the number of escorts in military services was reduced to 50% due to basing in the north, high performance characteristics, timely repairs of all types, a certain number of military services in the White Sea, etc. What does this mean?
Only that we will have 2 SSBNs in combat service, and on average the enemy will accompany only one of them. The second missile cruiser will be that latent threat that guarantees retaliation to anyone who dares to launch a surprise nuclear missile attack on the Russian Federation. What else do we need?
Here, of course, the reader may have the following question: if such indicators can be achieved, then why bother, then, sometime in the future, to increase the number of SSBNs? We will manage with 6-7 ships of this class! According to the author, we should still have a larger number of such ships, and that's why. We should not limit ourselves to basing SSBNs only in the north; we also need a connection for the Pacific Ocean.
The very fact of the presence of SSBNs in the Far East will force our "sworn friends" to make significant efforts to find and escort them. The Americans will need to constantly monitor our bases as they do today. In general, by deploying our "strategists" to the Far East, we are forcing the Americans to spend significantly more resources on countering this potential threat to them.
But in our reality
Unfortunately, we did not take advantage of the advantages that could be derived from the time-consuming and relatively small-scale construction of SSBNs. This in itself is not very good, but the leadership of the Navy also managed to worsen the situation by adopting a new type of strategic nuclear weapons. We are talking, of course, about "Status-6", or, as it is usually called now, about "Poseidon".
The author of this article is deeply convinced that Poseidon is a completely unnecessary weapons system for the Russian Federation, which did not add anything to our nuclear deterrent capabilities, but diverted significant resources to its creation. In addition, the deployment of Poseidon now appears to be using the worst practices of the USSR in the field of naval weapons. Where the Americans get by with one type of SSBN ("Ohio", which is being replaced by a new project of ships of this class) and the same type of ballistic missiles ("Trident"), the Russian Federation uses as many as 3 types of submarines (SSBN project 667BDRM "Dolphin", project 955 and 955A "Borey", as well as carriers of "Poseidon" project 09851) with three fundamentally different weapons systems: liquid ICBM "Leiner", solid-fuel ICBM "Bulava" and nuclear torpedoes.
In the part of "Dolphins", of course, there is nothing to criticize: these SSBNs, who honestly guarded the borders of the Fatherland since the 90s of the last century, are serving their time, they will soon retire. Actually, to replace them, "Borei" are being built. Let us also assume that the author is completely mistaken about the Poseidons and in fact they are exactly what the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation need. But why was it necessary to simultaneously deploy both the Boreas with missiles and the carriers of the Poseidons? Even if we assume that Poseidon is archival and essential for us (and this is far from the case), then what prevented us from waiting for a while and deploying it on the technologies that are planned to be used in the creation of nuclear-powered ships of the Husky type? Indeed, with the commissioning of three Project 955 ships and seven 955A ships, we get a quite acceptable quantitatively and qualitatively naval component of the Russian strategic nuclear forces. And instead of thinking about how to ensure its deployment and combat use, we are spending money on "Belgorod", which is a remake of the outdated project 949A, and quite modern "Khabarovsk". Thus, even after the Project 667BDRM Dolphins left the Russian Navy, we will be left with three types of strategic nuclear submarines built almost simultaneously, and if we also remember that the Husky was also planned in the SSBN version, then there will be four of them … What for?
conclusions
According to the author of this article, the massive and almost simultaneous construction of various types of nuclear submarines, carriers of strategic weapons, is one of the biggest mistakes in the development of the Russian Navy. The creation of three Project 955 SSBNs and three or four more according to the improved Project 955A would look much more optimal, with a complete rejection of Poseidon and its carriers. The saved funds could be distributed in favor of the multipurpose forces of the fleet (yes, the same "Ash") or on measures that increase the KO of the newest SSBNs. And it was worth resuming the construction of new submarines of this class as soon as the Husky project was ready.
