In this article, we will continue our analysis of the small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery (MZA) of the Sevastopol battleships.
As mentioned earlier, the "October Revolution" became the first ship of this class in the Soviet fleet, which in 1934 received an MZA in the form of four 45-mm 21-K cannons and the same number of quadruple installations "Maxim". The most cursory review of the capabilities of these artillery systems shows their complete inadequacy: they could not effectively protect the ship either in 1934, or, even more so, during the Second World War. Apparently that is why they were not installed on the Marat at all. As for the Paris Commune, during its modernization, which ended in 1937, three 45-mm 21-K towers were installed on the 1st and 4th turrets of the main caliber.
A certain piquancy of this situation is given by the fact that in the same year these artillery systems were removed from the "October Revolution" for their complete incompetence. However, the 21-K did not stay at the Paris Commune either, and soon gave way to more advanced artillery systems. By the beginning of World War II, air defense in the near sectors was based on two main systems: a 37-mm 70-K anti-aircraft machine gun and a 12, 7-mm DShK machine gun.
I must say that in modern historical literature and various publications, the attitude towards these artillery systems is very ambiguous. But first things first.
A bit of history
The history of the creation of such an installation goes back to the 19th century, when the famous American inventor H. S. Maxim offered the Russian Naval Department an automatic 37-mm cannon. Of course, in those years there was no talk of any air defense, it was assumed that the task of this artillery system would be to fight the enemy's fast "minionosks". The gun was repeatedly tested and returned to the inventor for revision, but in the end, several of these artillery systems were nevertheless purchased and installed on some ships of the Russian Imperial Navy. Nevertheless, they did not receive wide distribution, for the reasons that they were expensive, complicated, not very reliable (including the use of cloth belts, but not only), and, in general, did not have a big advantage over much cheaper ones. revolving or single-barreled Hotchkiss guns of the same caliber. Ultimately, the Obukhov plant received everything it needed to produce 37-mm automatic cannons, but, due to the lack of demand from the military, it did not start mass production.
They realized that Lender's 76, 2-mm cannons were not very good in "close combat" against enemy aircraft, while rifle-caliber machine guns were also not effective enough against them. The first lacked reaction time (manual tube installation, insufficient vertical and horizontal guidance), the second - effective firing range. In general, the troops needed an automatic cannon with a caliber of 37-40 mm and a seemingly forgotten Kh. S. artillery system. Maxima was quite suitable for this role.
So, there was an order for the autocannons, but it didn't work out. The fact is that the Obukhov plant, in essence, had blueprints and equipment, but it did not produce such artillery systems, did not fine-tune the weapon, eradicate inevitable childhood diseases, etc. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the autocannons were required so urgently that they gave up on military acceptance, and all this led to the expected results: firstly, the 37-mm Maxim automatic cannon began to arrive at the troops with a delay, and secondly - raw, especially since the Obukhov plant was already overwhelmed with orders, and it seems that he simply did not have enough strength to fine-tune the autocannon.
In addition, the Russian Empire acquired in England 40-mm Vickers assault rifles ("pom-poms"), both in finished form and with the possibility of production in Russia: for example, the same Obukhov plant received an order and made the swinging part of the machine Vickers. In addition, during the First World War, the Empire acquired 37-mm McLean assault rifles, however, as far as the author knows, without attempting to produce them in Russia.
Thus, after the revolution, the Land of the Soviets had some groundwork for the production of automatic guns of 37-40 mm caliber, and during the Civil War even conducted a small-scale production of such artillery systems (10-30 automatic machines a year), although there is a reasonable opinion that it was only about finishing work from parts and spare parts created earlier. It is also not surprising that the first work on the creation of our own automatic anti-aircraft gun was carried out precisely on the basis of the Vickers 40-mm anti-aircraft gun. In 1926, the design bureau of the Bolshevik plant was engaged in this.
The directions of modernization were easy to guess, because the "pom-pom" had a number of obvious shortcomings. Firstly, the low power - the 40-mm projectile was given a speed of only 601 m / s. In England itself, it was even lower, 585 m / s, and only in Italian installations it was slightly higher - 610 m / s. Secondly, the low rate of fire. Although according to the passport "Vickers" and could maintain a rate of fire of up to 200 rds / min. in fact, this figure did not exceed 50-75 rpm. And thirdly, of course, there was still the question of reliability, which product of the British gunsmiths, alas, did not differ.
So, in order to eradicate the first drawback of the Bolshevik Design Bureau, it acted ingeniously and simply. Instead of puzzling over how to strengthen the design of the Vickers automatic cannon to provide an increased muzzle velocity, the designers reduced the caliber to 37 mm, which made it possible to give the projectiles a speed of up to 670 m / s. The rate of fire was also supposed to grow to 240 rds / min, while the practical rate of fire was expected to be 100 rds / min. The result of the design bureau's work was named “37-mm automatic anti-aircraft gun mod. 1928 ", and went on trials in the same 1928, but alas, it turned out to be very unreliable. And in any case, it should be understood that even for the late 1920s its design (and the "pom-pom" was essentially an enlarged Maxim machine gun) was already quite archaic and did not have much room for improvement. Still, if the 37-mm cannon arr. 1928 would still have been brought to mind, but it was quite realistic, since many of its shortcomings were associated not so much with the artillery system itself, but with the ammunition for it, then the fleet could receive … Well, let's say, not a modern anti-aircraft machine gun, of course, but still a much more effective anti-aircraft artillery system in comparison with the 21-K.
"Guests" from Germany
However, at the end of the 1920s, another decision was made - to concentrate the production of all anti-aircraft guns at plant No. 8 in Podlipki near Moscow, and take German 20-mm and 37-mm automatic cannons as the basis for their work. Drawings and copies of the latter could be purchased from German firms, which, generally speaking, were prohibited from engaging in such "creativity" under the terms of the peace treaties of the First World War. As for the 37-mm automatic anti-aircraft gun mod. 1928 ", then it was also planned to transfer it to plant No. 8 for fine-tuning, which was supposed to organize its small-scale production.
On the one hand, there were some reasons for all this - the German gunsmiths were famous for their quality, and one could expect that their autocannons would provide the Red Army and the Navy with a much more modern MZA than if the USSR had limited itself to work on the 37-mm gun mod. 1928 But that's why the finishing of the German samples was not transferred to the same design bureau "Bolshevik" - it is already more difficult to understand. Of course, the designers of this design bureau could hardly be called great specialists in the field of automatic cannons at that time, but, of course, while working on improving the "pom-pom", they gained some experience. However, in fairness, we note that the engineers from Podlipki were not very far from anti-aircraft artillery - 76, 2-mm anti-aircraft guns were produced by their plant.
But then it turned out quite interesting. Most modern publications describe the subsequent epic as follows: Plant No. 8 received blueprints and samples of first-class artillery systems at its disposal, which were later adopted by the Wehrmacht into service and proved to be good in battles in Spain.
But the "scoundrels from the Moscow region" could not dispose of the treasure they received, and failed the serial production of both 20-mm and 37-mm machine guns, as a result of which work on German artillery systems had to be stopped, and in the future to look for other options for creating small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery.
However, there are some nuances here. And the first of them is that the German documentation and samples were transferred to the representatives of the USSR in 1930, while the 20-mm and 37-mm automatic guns entered service with the Wehrmacht only in 1934. In other words, the Germans had another 4 years to improve the design of the 1930 model. At the same time, the author of this article did not find any data that the 20-mm and 37-mm artillery systems transferred to the USSR and adopted by the Wehrmacht 20-mm FlaK 30 and 37- mm FlaK 18 had an identical design, but a number of publications give a completely opposite point of view. So, A. Shirokorad, although he criticized the activities of plant No. 8, nevertheless pointed out: “So, on the basis of a 2-cm cannon, 2-cm Flak 30 installations were created, and on the basis of a 3, 7-cm cannon - 3, 7- see Flak 18.
On the base. It turns out that the artillery systems that entered the German armed forces were not copies of what they sold in the USSR, but were created on the basis of the latter, and who knows how far the Germans have gone from this basis? Strange as it may sound to someone, but we generally have no reason to believe that the implements sold to us were working copies.
But that is not all. The fact is that many consider the German 2-cm Flak 30 and 3, 7-cm Flak 18 excellent anti-aircraft guns, reliable and unpretentious. But according to some other sources, they were not at all like that. So, in Spain, the 20-mm Flak 30 turned out to be sensitive to changes in the elevation angle: at small angles, there were many delays due to the incomplete retreat of the machine parts to the rear position. In addition, the gun was found to be overly sensitive to dust, dirt and grease thickening. The technical rate of fire of the Flak 30 was very low, amounting to only 245 rds / min, which, by the standards of the Second World War, was categorically insufficient for an artillery system of this caliber. The Germans managed to bring it to reasonable values of 420-480 rds / min only in the Flak 38 modification, the deliveries of which to the troops began only in the second half of 1940.
As for the 37-mm Flak 18, it can be assumed that in it the Germans were generally unable to achieve reliable operation of the automation, built on the principle of using recoil energy with a short barrel stroke. One thing is for certain - the automation of the next 37-mm anti-aircraft gun, which entered service with the Wehrmacht, worked according to a different scheme.
But, perhaps, all this is incorrect and in fact, the "gloomy Aryan genius" with Flak 18 succeeded? Then the question arises - how, having a magnificent 37-mm cannon with perfectly working automatic equipment, the German fleet managed to adopt the 3.7 cm / 83 SK C / 30, which … was not automatic at all? Yes, you heard right - the standard 37-mm artillery system of the German fleet was charged in almost the same way as the Soviet 21-K - one round manually, and had a rate of fire quite similar to the 21-K within 30 rds / min.
The only difference was that the German 37-mm anti-aircraft gun had 2 barrels, was stabilized, and reported a very high muzzle velocity to its projectile - 1,000 m / s. But, according to some reports, the stabilization did not work very well, and in practice the MZA Kriegsmarine did not achieve much success even when their ships were opposed by such ancient, in general, opponents as the British torpedo bombers Suordfish.
The author in no way tries to portray the designers from Podlipki as geniuses of automatic artillery. But, it is quite possible that the failure of the serial production of the 20-mm and 37-mm artillery systems, which we have received the names 2-K and 4-K, respectively, was associated not so much with the qualifications of Soviet specialists as with the general dampness and lack of knowledge of the German samples.
So what's next?
Alas, the following years can be safely called a "period of timelessness" for the domestic MZA. And not to say that nothing was done - on the contrary, the leadership of the Red Army had an understanding of the need for rapid-fire small-caliber artillery, so the designers created a number of rather interesting samples, such as the 37-mm AKT-37, ASKON-37, 100-K assault rifles., "Autocannon" Shpitalny of the same caliber, as well as larger-caliber 45-mm and even 76-mm artillery systems. There were also attempts to adapt 20-mm and 23-mm rapid-fire aircraft guns for the needs of air defense. But all these systems, for one reason or another (mainly technical) reasons, never made it to service or mass production. The situation began to improve only after the USSR acquired the later famous 40-mm automatic cannon of the Swedish company "Bofors" - in fact, this was the beginning of the history of the 70-K.
37-mm assault rifle 70-K
This was the case - at the end of 1937, plant No. 8 manufactured a prototype of a 45-mm automatic cannon, which at that time was called ZIK-45, and later - 49-K. It was created on the basis of the purchased 40-mm Bofors installation. Soviet designers did not pretend to be exclusive - in the documents of 1938, the gun was referred to as a "Bofors-type cannon of factory # 8".
The artillery system turned out to be promising, but incomplete - the tests demonstrated the need for further improvement of the design, which was done in the period 1938-39. The results were not slow to affect - if on tests in 1938 the gun fired 2,101 shots and had 55 delays, then in 1939 - 2,135 shots and only 14 delays. As a result, the artillery system was adopted in 1939, and even issued an order for 190 guns for 1940, but in the second half of 190, all work on this artillery system was curtailed.
The fact is that, despite the fact that the leadership of the Red Army liked the 49-K very much, the 45-mm caliber was considered excessive for the automatic cannon of the ground forces. The military wanted a 37-mm artillery system, and the designers of factory # 8, of course, had to roll up their sleeves. However, the new artillery system did not require much effort - in fact, the 37-mm 61-K anti-aircraft machine gun was almost a complete copy of the 49-K, adjusted for a smaller caliber.
The resulting machine gun was not devoid of a number of disadvantages. For such, for example, was considered a large loss of time in the cycle of the automation (roll of the barrel - sending the cartridge - closing the shutter), and the relatively free movement of the cartridge in the receiver could lead to distortions in the store and delays in firing. But in general, 61-K was produced in a large series, and in operation it distinguished itself by the reliable operation of mechanisms and ease of maintenance. This 37-mm machine gun, of course, was not perfect, but it was still a good example of a small-caliber automatic anti-aircraft gun and fully met its purpose. Therefore, it is not at all surprising that the navy preferred to receive the "chilled" version of the 61-K. Fortunately, this time there were no interruptions, and in 1940 the serial production of the 37-mm 70-K assault rifle began.
Why are both Soviet 37-mm assault rifles, 61-K and 70-K, criticized in many publications? There are several reasons for this.
Criticism 61-K
Firstly, the "reputation" of 61-K turned out to be somewhat spoiled by the complexity of mastering the machine in the series: alas, but the production culture was at first insufficient, which entailed a high percentage of defects and certain problems in combat units. But this was an inevitable stage in the development of new technology in our conditions: let us remember that the T-34 had various "childhood diseases" for a long time, but this did not prevent it from becoming a very reliable tank over time. Roughly the same thing happened with the 61-K: after the elimination of production problems, the machine proved to be excellent, and it was destined for a very long and rich combat life. The 61-K antiaircraft guns were exported by the USSR to dozens of countries, and, in addition, were produced in Poland and China. They fought not only in the Great Patriotic War, but also in the Korean and Vietnam wars, as well as in numerous Arab-Israeli conflicts. In some countries, 61-K remains in service today.
Secondly, the most famous summary of the Soviet commission regarding comparative tests of 61-K with 40-mm Bofors “hurts the eye” for many:
The 40-mm Bofors cannon does not have any advantages over the 61-K in terms of the main TTD and performance characteristics. In order to improve the design of the 61-K cannon, it is necessary to completely borrow from Bofors the coupling device, the brake system, the location of the brake boot and the barrel mount. The "Bofors" sight is inferior to the sight of the 61-K cannon ".
The fact is that usually in such cases, a lover of military history and technology, comparing the capabilities of 61-K and "Bofors" without much difficulty convinces himself of the advantage of the latter. Accordingly, there is a feeling of bias on the part of the domestic commission, and a general distrust of Soviet sources, who speak very well about 61-K. But here it is necessary to take into account one important nuance.
The fact is that the 40-mm Swedish "Bofors" was an ingenious artillery system … which, nevertheless, was not slightly modified with a file. Countries that set up production of Bofors, as a rule, made certain changes in the design, sometimes quite significant, so that, for example, spare parts and parts for 40-mm Bofors from different countries often turned out to be not even interchangeable. Naturally, the degree of refinement of "Bofors" in each specific country depended on the level of design thought and technological capabilities of the industry. And therefore, for example, it is not surprising that the best Bofors, perhaps, turned out in the USA: it is the American Bofors that has every right to claim the best small-caliber automatic artillery system of the Second World War.
But the fact is that the commission in the USSR compared 61-K not with the American Bofors, which, in fact, she had absolutely nowhere to take - it was either about the "purebred" Swedish Bofors, on the basis of which, in fact, the USSR and led the development of 61-K, or about a certain trophy, which, more than likely, was inferior to the American and English versions of this artillery system. And the "basic" "Bofors", quite likely, really did not have any significant superiority over the 37-mm 61-K assault rifle.
Criticism 70-K
Here, perhaps, the tone was set by the well-known author of many works devoted to artillery, A. Shirokorad. So, his first claim is that the Soviet Union unified army and naval rapid-fire artillery calibers. The logic here is as follows: firstly, the larger the caliber, the greater the combat capabilities of the anti-aircraft machine gun, but at least in terms of range and reach. But in the production of MZA for the army, one has to reckon with the need to save money: after all, we are talking about many thousands, and in case of war - about tens of thousands of barrels. At the same time, the demands of the fleet are much more modest, and the objects of protection - warships - are very expensive, and it was absolutely not worth saving on the MZA caliber for them.
All this is absolutely sound reasoning, but let's approach the issue from the other side. After all, work on 49-K continued until 1940, the gun was put into service and ready to be transferred to mass production. But if we take a closer look at its performance characteristics, then, oddly enough, we will see that this 45-mm artillery system had no particular advantage over the 37-mm 61-K. That is, of course, 49-K was much more powerful, sending a projectile weighing 1.463 kg with an initial speed of 928 m / s, while 61-K was only 0.732-0.758 with an initial speed of up to 880 m / s. sec. But you need to understand that the fragmentation effect of both projectiles was negligible, and they could disable the enemy aircraft only with a direct hit, and the 37-mm projectile coped with this not much worse than the 45-mm. And this direct hit could be ensured primarily due to the density of the "swarm" of shells, that is, due to the rate of fire. So, if we take the rate of fire of the 37-mm 61-K and 45-mm 49-K, then they seem to be not very different, amounting to 160-170 rds / min for the first artillery system, and 120-140 rds / min for the second. However, the same A. Shirokorad gives interesting data on the operating rate of fire: 120 rds / min for 61-K and only 70 for 49-K. That is, in practice, 61-K turned out to be almost twice as fast, and this parameter, for obvious reasons, is extremely important.
And again, it is possible that a much higher rate of fire could subsequently be obtained from 49-K, which, in fact, was demonstrated by the "Bofors" of England and the United States. But the question was that the Soviet fleet had a complete failure in terms of equipping MZA, anti-aircraft guns were needed not even "yesterday", but "many years ago", and wait for the designers to finalize something (and finalize whether, given the number of anti-aircraft guns that did not go into series in the 30s?) would be a real crime. Again, it was not necessary to be Nostradamus to foresee the difficulties with the parallel production of assault rifles of two different calibers, especially taking into account the fact that thousands of orders of the Red Army from factory # 8 will be in clear priority over much more modest naval ones …
Thus, we can state that, although theoretically, of course, it would be correct for the fleet to use 45-mm anti-aircraft guns, but in real conditions of 1939-40. This theory could not be confirmed by practice and the adoption of the 37-mm artillery system was completely justified.
Another claim of A. Shirokorad is much more substantiated. The fact is that the 70-K, which was air-cooled by analogy with the 61-K, experienced overheating of the barrel after about 100 shots fired continuously. As a result, according to A. Shirokorad, it turned out that an effective battle of 70-K could be fought for a minute or two, and then it was necessary either to change the barrel, which required at least a quarter of an hour, or to declare an hour and a half smoke break until the barrel cooled down.
It seems that the numbers are terrible, but the point is that, speaking of 100 shots, we mean a continuous burst, and thus no one shoots from an automatic weapon. The Kalashnikov assault rifle is universally considered a recognized standard for the reliability of automatic weapons, but by firing from it continuously for a minute or a half in a row, we will still spoil it. They shoot from automatic weapons in short bursts, and in this mode the 70-K could work much longer than "less than a minute" announced by A. Shirokorad.
Nevertheless, A. Shirokorad is absolutely right that water cooling is required for the naval anti-aircraft gun. Why wasn't it made for 70-K? The answer is obvious - the reason was that all conceivable terms of supplying the MZA fleet came years ago. In fact, at the end of the 30s of the last century, the RKKF was defenseless against the modern aircraft of our potential adversaries. Admirals simply did not have the right to delay the delivery of MZA to the fleet in anticipation of more advanced artillery systems - and one should not think that the lack of water cooling is a consequence of bungling or incompetence. In the end, the technical design of the B-11, which is a "70-K of a healthy person", that is, a double-barreled 37-mm installation with water cooling, was created in 1940.
But during the war years there was no time for specialized naval equipment, so the B-11 was put into service only in 1946. But the 70-K during the war years, our fleet received 1,671 installations, and it was they who, in fact, “pulled on yourself air defense of ships at sea.
