A week ago, I was here in passing noticed that the thesis about the alleged inability of pre-communist Russia to the rapid and successful development of the defense industry and about the absence in Russia until 1917 of large investment funds allocated for defense, is refuted as the successful implementation in Russia of programs for the development of military shipbuilding industries in 1910-1917, and the rapid growth of the defense industry in Russia during the First World War (WWI), when Russia was able to achieve phenomenal growth in military production, and this was ensured, among other things, due to a sharp expansion of production capacities and the rapid construction of new enterprises.
These remarks of mine provoked here numerous angry cries and type of objection. Alas, the level of most of the objections testifies to the extreme ignorance of the public in this matter and to the incredible littering of heads with all kinds of prejudices and completely mossy ideas borrowed from accusatory journalism and propaganda.
In principle, this should not be surprising. The denunciation of the alleged inability of the vile Ancien Régime to cope with the needs of war production was promoted by the liberal and socialist opposition even before February 1917, and was unanimously supported by generals who tried (finding themselves on both the red and white sides) to dissociate themselves from the "old regime", and then it became a commonplace of communist propaganda for obvious reasons. As a result, in Russian historiography this has become a common historical cliché, practically unanswered and indiscriminate. It would seem that almost 100 years have passed, and one could hope for a more objective coverage of this issue now. Alas, the study of the history of WWI (and the domestic military-industrial complex) in Russia is still at an extremely low level, no one is engaged in studying the development of the country's military-industrial complex during WWI, and if this topic is touched upon in publications, it all comes down to the thoughtless repetition of memorized cliches … Perhaps, only the authors-compilers of the recently published collection "Military Industry of Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century" (1st volume of the work "History of the creation and development of the defense industry of Russia and the USSR. 1903-1963") questioned and criticized this mythology.
It can be said without exaggeration that the development of the Russian military industry in WWI remains a large-scale blank spot in Russian history.
I have been very interested in this topic lately, and I am even thinking about the possibility of starting to study it more seriously. Nevertheless, even a small acquaintance with the materials is enough to assert, and repeat it here again: during the First World War, a huge leap in military production was made in Russia, and the pace of industrial development was so high that it did not repeat itself after that in Russian history., and were not repeated in any of the segments of the Soviet period of history, including the Second World War. The basis of this leap was the rapid expansion of military production capacity in 1914-1917. due to four factors:
1) Expansion of the capacity of existing state-owned military enterprises
2) Massive involvement of private industry in military production
3) Large-scale program of emergency construction of new state-owned factories
4) Extensive construction of new private military factories, secured by government orders.
Thus, in all cases, this growth was ensured by large investments (both public and private), which makes speculations about the alleged inability of Russia to carry out large-scale investments in the defense industry before 1917 completely ridiculous. Actually, this thesis, as noted, is clearly refuted by the rapid creation and modernization of shipbuilding facilities for large shipbuilding programs before WWI. But in matters of shipbuilding and the fleet, the criticizing public is at a very profane level, therefore, not being able to object, quickly switches to shells, etc.
The main thesis was that few shells were made in Russia. At the same time, the figures of the total release of shells in Western countries for the entire period of WWI, including both 1917 and 1918, are cited as a favorite argument. military production in 1915-1916 (because in 1917 Russian industry went downhill) - and on this basis they are trying to draw some conclusions. Interestingly, what such "argumentators" are counting on to prove. However, as we will see below, even in 1917 the situation with the production and availability of the same artillery shells in Russia was not so bad.
It should be noted here that one of the reasons for the distorted ideas about the work of Russian industry in WWI are the works of Barsukov and Manikovsky (that is, partly, again, Barsukov) - in fact, partly because nothing new has appeared on this topic since then. Their works were written in the early 1920s, kept in the spirit of those years, and in matters related to the defense industry, they concentrated to a large extent on the shortages of military supplies for the period 1914-1915. Actually, the very issues of deploying the production of weapons and supplies are reflected in these works insufficiently and contradictory (which is understandable from the terms of writing). Therefore, the "suffering-accusatory" bias taken in these works has been uncritically reproduced for decades. Moreover, both Barsukov and Manikovsky have a lot of unreliable information (for example, about the state of affairs with the construction of new enterprises) and dubious statements (a typical example is howls directed against private industry).
For a better understanding of the development of Russian industry in WWI, in addition to the aforementioned collection of articles "Russian military industry at the beginning of the twentieth century," I would recommend the recently published "Essays on the history of the military industry" by gene. V. S. Mikhailova (in 1916-1917 he was the head of the military-chemical department of the GAU, in 1918 the head of the GAU)
This commentary is written as a kind of educational program to educate the general public about the mobilization and expansion of the Russian defense industry during WWI and is intended to demonstrate the scale of this expansion. In this commentary, I do not touch upon the issues of the aircraft and aircraft engine industry, as well as the automotive industry, because this is a separate complex topic. The same applies to the fleet and shipbuilding (also a separate topic). Let's just look at the army.
Rifles. In 1914, there were three state-owned arms factories in Russia - Tula, Izhevsk (in fact, a complex with a steel plant) and Sestroretsk. The military capacity of all three factories for the summer of 1914 was estimated in terms of equipment at a total of 525 thous.rifles per year (44 thousand per month) with 2-2, 5 shift work (Tula - 250 thousand, Izhevsk - 200 thousand, Sestroretsky 75 thousand). In reality, from August to December 1914, all three factories produced only 134 thousand rifles.
Since 1915, forced work was undertaken to expand all three factories, as a result of which the monthly production of rifles at them from December 1914 to December 1916 was increased fourfold - from 33.3 thousand to 127.2 thousand. … In 1916 alone, the productivity of each of the three factories was doubled, and the actual delivery was: Tula plant 648, 8 thousand rifles, Izhevsk - 504, 9 thousand and Sestroretsk - 147, 8 thousand, total 1301, 4 thousand rifles. rifles in 1916 (figures excluding repaired).
The increase in capacity was achieved by expanding the machine tool and power plant of each of the plants. The largest-scale work was carried out at the Izhevsk plant, where the machine park was almost doubled, and a new power plant was built. In 1916, an order was issued for the second stage of the reconstruction of the Izhevsk plant worth 11 million rubles. with the aim of bringing its release in 1917 to 800 thousand rifles.
The Sestroretsk plant underwent a large-scale expansion, where by January 1917 the output of 500 rifles per day was achieved, and from June 1, 1917 the output of 800 rifles per day was planned. However, in October 1916, it was decided to limit the production of rifles with a capacity of 200 thousand pieces per year, and the increased capacity of the plant to focus on the production of Fedorov assault rifles at a rate of 50 pieces per day from the summer of 1917.
We add that the Izhevsk Steel Plant was a supplier of weapons and special steel, as well as rifle barrels. In 1916, the production of steel in relation to 1914 was increased from 290 to 500 thousand poods, rifle barrels - six times (up to 1.458 million units), machine-gun barrels - 19 times (up to 66, 4 thousand), and further growth was expected.
It should be noted that a considerable part of machine tools for weapons production in Russia were produced by the machine tool production of the Tula Arms Plant. In 1916, the production of machine tools on it was brought to 600 units. per year, and in 1917 it was planned to transform this machine-building department into a separate large Tula state machine-building plant with an expansion of capacity to 2,400 machine tools per year. 32 million rubles were allocated for the creation of the plant. According to Mikhailov, of the 320% increase in rifle production from 1914 to 1916, only 30% of the increase was achieved by "forcing work", and the remaining 290% was the effect of equipment expansion.
However, the main emphasis in expanding rifle production was placed on the construction of new weapons factories in Russia. Already in 1915, appropriations were authorized for the construction of a second arms factory in Tula with an annual capacity of 500 thousand rifles per year, and in the future it was supposed to merge with the Tula arms factory with a total total capacity of 3,500 rifles per day. The estimated cost of the plant (3,700 units of machine tool equipment) amounted to 31.2 million rubles, by October 1916, the allocations increased to 49.7 million rubles, and an additional 6.9 million rubles were allocated for the purchase of equipment from Remington (1691 machine) for the manufacture of another 2 thousand rifles per day (!). In total, the entire Tula arms complex was supposed to produce 2 million rifles per year. The construction of the second plant was started in the summer of 1916 and should be completed by the beginning of 1918. In reality, because of the revolution, the plant was already completed under the Soviets.
In 1916, construction began on a new state-owned Yekaterinoslav arms factory near Samara with a capacity of 800 thousand rifles per year. At the same time, it was planned to transfer the capacities of the Sestroretsk Arms Plant to this site, which was then abandoned. The estimated cost was determined at 34.5 million rubles. Construction was intensively carried out in 1916, by 1917 the main shops were erected, then collapse began. The Soviet government tried to complete the construction of the plant in the 20s, but did not master it.
Thus, in 1918, the annual production capacity of the Russian industry for the production of rifles (without machine guns) should have amounted to 3.8 million pieces, which meant an increase of 7.5 times in relation to the mobilization capacity of 1914.and a tripling in relation to the release of 1916. This exceeded the orders of the Headquarters (2.5 million rifles per year) by one and a half times.
Machine guns. Machine gun production remained a bottleneck in Russian industry throughout WWI. In fact, right up to the revolution itself, the production of heavy machine guns was carried out only by the Tula Arms Plant, which increased the production of these to 1200 units per month by January 1917. Thus, in relation to December 1915, the increase was 2.4 times, and in relation to December 1914 year - seven times. In 1916, the production of machine guns almost tripled (from 4251 to 11072 pieces), and in 1917 the Tula plant was expected to supply 15 thousand machine guns. Together with large import orders (in 1917, the delivery of up to 25 thousand imported heavy machine guns and up to 20 thousand light machine guns was expected), this should have satisfied the requests of the Headquarters. In exaggerated hopes for imports, proposals from the private industry for the production of heavy machine guns were rejected by the GAU.
The production of Madsen light machine guns was organized at the Kovrov machine-gun factory, which is being built under an agreement with Madsen. An agreement on this with the issuance of an order to a syndicate of 15 thousand hand rulers for 26 million rubles was concluded in April 1916, the contract was signed in September, and the construction of the plant began in August 1916 and proceeded at a very fast pace. The assembly of the first batch of machine guns was carried out in August 1917. By the beginning of 1918, despite the revolutionary mess, the plant was almost ready - according to the act of inspection of the plant from August 1919 (and nothing changed there in a year and a half), the readiness of the workshops accounted for 95%, power plants and communications - 100%, equipment was delivered 100%, installed 75%. The production of machine guns was planned to be 4000 units in the first half of the year of work, followed by an output of 1000 units per month and with bringing up to 2,5-3 thousand light machine guns a month when working in one shift.
Cartridges. In 1914, three state-owned cartridge factories were engaged in the production of rifle cartridges in Russia - Petrogradsky, Tula and Lugansky. The maximum capacity of each of these factories was 150 million cartridges per year in one-shift operation (totaling 450 million). In fact, all three factories already in peaceful 1914 were supposed to produce a total of one third more - the state defense order amounted to 600 million cartridges.
The release of cartridges was largely limited by the amount of gunpowder (more on that below). From the beginning of 1915, enormous efforts were made to expand the capacities of all three factories, as a result of which the production of Russian 3-liner cartridges was increased from December 1914 to November 1916 threefold - from 53.8 million to 150 million pieces (in this number does not include the release of Japanese cartridges in Petrograd). In 1916 alone, the total output of Russian cartridges was increased by one and a half times (up to 1.482 billion pieces). In 1917, while maintaining productivity, it was expected to give 1.8 billion cartridges, plus the arrival of approximately the same number of Russian cartridges for import. In 1915-1917. the number of pieces of equipment in all three cartridge factories has doubled.
The rate in 1916 was clearly overstated requirements for cartridges - for example, at the inter-union conference in January 1917, the need was calculated at 500 million cartridges per month (including 325 million Russians), which gave an expense of 6 billion. per year, or twice the consumption of 1916, and this is with sufficient ammunition supply of parts by the beginning of 1917.
In July 1916, construction began on the Simbirsk Cartridge Plant (capacity 840 million cartridges per year, estimated cost 40.9 million rubles), planned to be commissioned in 1917, but due to the collapse, it was put into operation only under the Soviets. in October 1918. In general, the total estimated capacity of the Russian cartridge industry for 1918 can be estimated at up to 3 billion cartridges per year (taking into account the production of foreign cartridges).
Light weapons. The production of light and mountain 3-inch artillery was carried out at the Petrograd state and Perm gun factories. In 1915 the private Putilovsky plant (eventually nationalized at the end of 1916), as well as the private "Tsaritsyn group of plants" (Sormovsky plant, Lessner plant, Petrogradsky metal plant and Kolomensky plant) were connected to production. Monthly release of guns mod. 1902 g.as a result, it grew in 22 months (from January 1915 to October 1916) more than 13 times (!!) - from 35 to 472 systems. At the same time, for example, the Perm plant increased the production of 3-inch field guns in 1916 by 10 times compared with 1914 (by the end of 1916, up to 100 guns per month), and carriages for them - 16 times …
The release of 3-inch mountain and short guns at Russian factories in 22 months (from January 1915 to October 1916) was tripled (from 17 to about 50 months), and plus, from the fall of 1916, the production of 3-inch anti-aircraft guns. In 1916, the annual total production of 3-inch guns of all types was three times higher than that of 1915.
The Tsaritsyn group, having started production from scratch and handed over the first six 3-inch guns in April 1916, six months later (in October) gave 180 guns a month, and in February 1917, 200 guns were manufactured, and there were reserves for further increasing production. The Putilov factory, having resumed production of a 3-inch gun only in the second half of 1915, came out by the end of 1916 at a capacity of 200 guns per month, and in mid-1917 it was expected to reach 250-300 guns per month. In fact, due to the sufficiency of the release of 3-inch guns to the Putilov plant, the program for 1917 was given only 1214 guns mod. 1902, and the rest of the power was reoriented to the production of heavy artillery.
For the further expansion of artillery production at the end of 1916, the construction of a powerful Saratov state-owned gun factory was begun with a productivity per year: 3-inch field guns - 1450, 3-inch mountain guns - 480, 42-line guns - 300, 48-line howitzers - 300, 6-inch howitzers - 300, 6-inch fortress guns - 190, 8-inch howitzers - 48. The cost of the enterprise was determined at 37.5 million rubles. Due to the revolution of February 1917, the construction was stopped at the initial stage.
Thus, with the monthly demand for 1917, declared by the Headquarters in January 1917, in 490 field and 70 mountain 3-inch guns, Russian industry had actually already reached its supply by that time, and in 1917-1918, most likely would greatly exceed this need. With the commissioning of the Saratov plant, one could expect a total output of at least about 700 field guns and 100 mountain guns per month (when assessing the disposal of 300 guns per month by shooting, excluding combat losses)..
It should be added that in 1916, the Obukhov plant began the development of Rosenberg's 37-mm trench cannon. Of the first order of 400 new systems from March 1916, 170 guns were delivered already in 1916, the delivery of the rest was scheduled for 1917. There is no doubt that new mass orders for these guns would follow.
Heavy weapons. As we all know, the production of heavy artillery in Russia in WWI is a favorite topic of all denunciators of the “old regime”. At the same time, it is hinted that the vile tsarism could not organize anything here.
By the beginning of the war, the production of 48-line howitzers arr. 1909 and 1910 was conducted at the Putilovsky plant, the Obukhovsky plant and the Petrograd gun plant, and 6-inch howitzers mod. 1909 and 1910 - at the Putilov and Perm plants. After the start of the war, special attention was also paid to the production of 42-liner guns mod. 1909, under which the Obukhov and Petrograd factories were expanded, and also began their mass production at the Putilov factory. In 1916, the Obukhovsky plant launched the production of a 6-inch Schneider cannon and a 12-inch howitzer. Throughout the war, the Putilov Plant was the leading manufacturer of 48-liner howitzers, having reached the production of up to 36 of these guns per month by the fall of 1916, and was supposed to increase their production in 1917.
The release of heavy artillery grew very quickly. In the first half of 1915, only 128 pieces of heavy artillery were manufactured (and all - all 48-liner howitzers), and in the second half of 1916 - already 566 heavy guns (including 21 12-inch howitzers), in other words, in the calculated coefficients Manikovsky, the issue has grown 7 times (!) Over a year and a half. At the same time, this number, apparently, does not include the supply of ground guns (including 24 6-inch howitzers) for the Naval Department (mainly the IPV Fortress). In 1917, a further increase in production was to continue. First of all, 42-line guns, the output of which at all three manufacturing plants in 1917.was supposed to be an estimated 402 units (against 89 in 1916). In total, in 1917, if there was no revolution, the GAU (without Morved) was estimated to have been supplied by the industry with up to 2,000 heavy Russian-made guns (against 900 in 1916).
Only one Putilovsky plant in mastering the main production under the 1917 program was supposed to provide 432 48-lin howitzers, 216 42-liners and 165 6-inch howitzers for the army, plus 94 6-inch howitzers for Morved.
In addition to the nationalization of the Putilov plant, it was decided to create a special heavy artillery plant for the production of 6-inch and 8-inch howitzers with a production volume of up to 500 howitzers per year. The construction of the plant was carried out at an accelerated pace in 1917, despite the revolutionary chaos. By the end of 1917, the plant was almost ready. But then the evacuation of Petrograd began, and by the decision of the GAU of December 14, the new plant was subject to a priority evacuation to Perm. Most of the equipment of the enterprise was eventually delivered to the Perm plant, where it formed the basis of Motovilikha's capacities for the production of heavy weapons for the next decades. However, a large part was scattered throughout the country during the civil war of 1918 and was lost.
The second new center for the production of heavy artillery was to be the aforementioned Saratov state gun factory with an annual program for heavy guns: 42-line guns - 300, 48-line howitzers - 300, 6-inch howitzers - 300, 6-inch fortress guns - 190, 8-inch howitzers - 48. Due to the February 1917 revolution, the construction was stopped at the initial stage.
Among other measures considered by 1917 to strengthen the release of heavy artillery, were the issuance of an order for 48-liner howitzers to the private "Tsaritsyn group of factories", as well as the development in 1917 of the production of 12-inch howitzers and new "light" 16-inch howitzers at the Tsaritsyn plant for the production of naval heavy artillery (RAOAZ), which was built since 1913 with the participation of Vickers, whose construction was carried out sluggishly during WWI, but the first stage of which was expected in July 1916 by the spring of 1917. A production project was also put forward there since 1918, 42-line guns and 6-inch howitzers (note that the production of 42-line guns and 6-inch howitzers was eventually mastered at the Barricades by the Soviets in 1930-1932).
With the commissioning of the howitzer plant at the Putilov plant and the first stage of the Tsaritsyn plant, the Russian industry would have reached an annual production of at least 2,600 heavy artillery systems in 1918, and more likely more, given that, apparently, in 1917-1918. serious efforts would be made to expand the production of 48-lin howitzers. And this is without taking into account the Saratov plant, the possibility of commissioning which before 1919 seems to me doubtful.
In fact, this meant that the applications of the 1916 Headquarters for heavy artillery could be covered by the Russian industry by the end of 1917, and the massive release of 1918 could be turned, along with covering losses, to a sharp (in fact, multiple for many artillery systems) increase states of Taon. We add to this that in 1917 and early 1918. about 1000 more heavy artillery systems were to be received by import (and this is without taking into account possible new orders abroad). In total, the total Russian heavy artillery, even after deducting losses, could reach the number of 5000 guns by the end of 1918, i.e. be comparable in number to the French.
Note that at the same time in Russia (mainly at the Obukhov plant, as well as at the Perm plant), a very large-scale production of powerful large-caliber naval artillery (from 4 to 12 dm) continued, the production of 14-dm naval guns was mastered, and despite the WWII, reconstruction continued at full speed. Perm plant for organizing the production of 24 ship guns of calibers 14-16 dm.
And, by the way, a little touch for those who like to speculate that the fleet before WWI was eating the army, and the unfortunate army was suffering from a shortage of guns. According to the "Subsequent report on the War Ministry for 1914", as of January 1, 1915, the land fortress artillery consisted of 7,634 guns and 323 semi-submerged mortars (425 new guns were supplied to the land fortresses in 1914), and the fortress ammunition stock was 2 million piecesThe artillery of the coastal fortresses consisted of 4162 more guns, and the stock of shells was 1 million pieces. No comments, as they say, but it looks like the story of the real greatest Russian drank before WWI is still waiting for its researcher.
Artillery shells of caliber 3 dm. Reasoning about shells is a favorite topic of critics of the Russian military-industrial complex in WWI, while, as a rule, information about the shell famine of 1914-1915. completely inappropriately transferred to a later period. Even less awareness is manifested in the issue of the production of heavy artillery shells.
The production of 3-inch shells before WWI was carried out in Russia at five state-owned (Izhevsk Steel, as well as Perm, Zlatoust, Olonets and Verkhneturinsk mining departments) and 10 private factories (Metallichesky, Putilovsky, Nikolaevsky, Lessner, Bryansk, Petrograd Mechanical, Russian Society, Rudzsky, Lilpop, Sormovsky), and until 1910 - and two Finnish factories. With the outbreak of the war, shell production underwent a rapid expansion, both by increasing production at the aforementioned factories, and by connecting new private enterprises. In total, by January 1, 1915, orders for 3-inch shells were issued to 19 private enterprises, and by January 1, 1916 - already 25 (and this is without taking into account Vankov's organization)
The main role in the production of shells through the GAU was played by the Perm plant, as well as the Putilov plant, which eventually united around itself a number of other private enterprises (the Russian society, the Russian-Baltic and Kolomensky). So, the Perm plant, with an annual design power of 3-inch shells of 500 thousand units, already in 1915 gave 1.5 million shells, and in 1916 - 2.31 million shells. In 1914, the Putilov Plant with its cooperation produced only 75 thousand 3-inch shells, and in 1916 - 5.1 million shells.
If in 1914 the entire Russian industry produced 516 thousand 3-inch shells, then in 1915 - already 8, 825 million according to Barsukov, and 10 million according to Manikovsky, and in 1916 - already 26, 9 million shots according to Barsukov. "The most submissive reports on the War Ministry" give even more significant figures for the supply of 3-inch Russian-made shells to the army - in 1915 12, 3 million shells, and in 1916 - 29, 4 million rounds. Thus, the annual production of 3-inch shells in 1916 almost tripled, and the monthly production of 3-inch shells from January 1915 to December 1916 increased 12 times!
Of particular note is the well-known organization of the authorized GAU Vankov, which organized a large number of private enterprises for the production of shells and played an outstanding role in the mobilization of industry and the promotion of shell production. In total, 442 private factories (!) Were involved in production and cooperation by the Vankovs. Since April 1915, Vankov's organization received orders for 13.04 million French-style 3-inch grenades and 1 million chemical projectiles, as well as 17.09 million ignition nozzles and 17.54 million detonators. The issuance of shells began already in September 1915, by the end of the year it had manufactured 600 thousand shells, and in 1916 Vankov's organization produced about 7 million shells, bringing the release to 783 thousand in December 1916. By the end of 1917 it was it manufactured 13.6 million 3-inch shells of all types.
In view of the success of the work of the Vankov organization, in 1916 it was given orders for an additional release of 1, 41 million heavy shells with a caliber from 48 lin to 12 dm, as well as 1 million shells (57, 75 and 105 mm) for Romania. Vankov's organization in the shortest possible time delivered a new production for Russia of heavy shells from steel cast iron. As you know, it was the mass production of steel cast iron shells that largely contributed to the resolution of the shell crisis in France. Having started the production of such shells in Russia at the end of 1916, Vankov's organization almost completely fulfilled the orders for casting all ordered heavy shells by the end of 1917 (although due to the collapse, only about 600 thousand of them were processed).
Along with this, efforts continued to expand the production of 3-inch shells at state-owned enterprises. In 1917, it was planned to increase the production of 3-inch shells at the Izhevsk plant to 1 million per year, in addition, 1 million.3-inch shells per year were planned for release at the new large Kamensk state-owned steel plant under construction (about it below).
We add that 56 million rounds were ordered abroad for Russian 3-inch guns, of which 12, 6 million, according to the "All-Subject Report", were received in 1916. (draws attention to the fact that Barsukov generally gives lower figures for many items than "Reports"). In 1917, it was expected that 10 million shells of the "Morgan" order from the United States and up to 9 million of the Canadian order would arrive.
It was estimated that in 1917 it was expected to receive up to 36 million 3-inch rounds from Russian industry (taking into account Vankov's organization) and up to 20 million for imports. This number exceeded even the maximum possible wishes of the army. It should be noted here that due to the shell crisis of the beginning of the war, the Russian command in 1916 was seized by something like a psychopathy in terms of storing shells. For the whole of 1916, the Russian army, according to various estimates, used up 16.8 million shells of 3 dm caliber, of which 11 million - in the five summer months of the most intense battles, and without experiencing any particular problems with ammunition. Let us recall that at such a cost, in 1916, up to 42 million shells were actually delivered to the Military Department. In the summer of 1916, General. Alekseev in a note demanded for the future the supply of 4.5 million shells per month. In December 1916, the Headquarters formulated the need for 3-inch shells in 1917 by an openly overstated figure of 42 million. Upart in January 1917 took a more reasonable position, formulating the requirements for the supply for this year of 2.2 million shells per month (or 26.6 million in total). Manikovsky, however, considered this too high. In January 1917, Upart declared that the annual need for 3-inch rounds was "satisfied in excess" and that by January 1, 1917, the army had a stock of 3-inch rounds of 16, 298 million pieces - in other words, the actual annual consumption of 1916 During the first two months of 1917, approximately 2, 75 million 3-inch rounds were fed to the front. As we can see, almost all of these calculations would be more than covered in 1917 only by Russian production, and most likely by 1918 Russian light artillery would have approached with an open overstocking of ammunition, and with the preservation and at least a limited increase in production and supply rates, By the end of 1918, the warehouses would have been bursting with huge stocks of 3-inch shells.
Heavy artillery shells. The main manufacturer of heavy land artillery shells (more than 100 mm in caliber) before WWII were the Obukhov plant, the Perm plant, as well as the three other plants of the mining department mentioned above. At the beginning of the war, four mining factories (including the Perm one) already had 1, 134 million (!) Rounds of 42 and 48 lin and 6 dm (excluding heavier ones) in operation, another 23, 5 thousand shells were ordered by the Russian society. With the outbreak of the war, emergency orders were made for another 630,000 rounds of heavy artillery. Thus, statements about the allegedly small number of heavy shells being released before the war and at the beginning of the war are in themselves an absurd myth. During the war, the release of heavy shells grew like an avalanche.
With the beginning of the war, the expansion of the production of heavy shells at the Perm plant began. Already in 1914 the plant produced 161 thousand heavy shells of all types (up to 14 dm), in 1915 - 185 thousand, in 1916 - 427 thousand, including the release of 48-liner shells since 1914 city quadrupled (up to 290 thousand). Already in 1915, the production of heavy shells was carried out at 10 state and private factories with a constant expansion of production.
In addition, since 1915, the mass production of heavy shells (up to 12 dm) was started at the Putilov group of factories - in 1915 140 thousand shells were delivered, and in 1916 - already about 1 million. In 1917, despite the collapse that began, the group produced 1.31 million heavy shells.
Finally, Vankov's organization produced more than 600 thousand ready-made heavy shells in a year from the end of 1916 to the end of 1917, having mastered a new production of shells from steel cast iron for Russia.
Summing up the results of the production of heavy shells in Russia before the revolution, it should be noted that Barsukov, whom they like to refer to, cites obviously incorrect data on the production of heavy shells in 1914 - allegedly only 24 thousand.48-inch shells and 2,100 11-inch grenades, which contradicts all known data and his own information about the release of shells at individual factories (he has the same incorrect data for 3-inch shells). The tables given in Manikovsky's edition are even more stupid. According to the "All-Subject Report on the War Ministry for 1914", from August 1, 1914 to January 1, 1915, only 446 thousand shots were actually sent to the army in the field for 48 howitzers, 203, 5 thousand shots for 6- dm howitzers, 104, 2 thousand rounds for 42-lin guns, and this is not counting other types of shells. Thus, it is estimated that only in the last five months of 1914 at least 800 thousand heavy shells were fired (which coincides with the data on the reserve at the beginning of the war). The 1915 document "The Code of Information on the Supply of Artillery Shells to the Army" in the "Russian Military Industry" gives the release of about 160 thousand heavy ground shells in the last 4 months of 1914, although it is not clear from the text how complete these data are.
There are suspicions that Barsukov also underestimated the production of heavy artillery shells in 1915-1916. So, according to Barsukov, in 1915 in Russia 9.568 million shells of all types (including 3 dm) were manufactured and another 1.23 million shells were received from abroad, and in 1916 - 30.975 million shells of all types and about 14 million more received from abroad. According to the "All-Subject Reports on the War Ministry", in 1915 more than 12.5 million shells of all types were supplied to the active army, and in 1916 - 48 million shells (including 42 million 3-dm). Manikovsky's figures for the supply of shells to the army in 1915 coincide with the "Report", but the figure for 1916 is less than one and a half times - it gives only 32 million shells, including 5.55 million heavy. Finally, according to another table of Manikovsky, in 1916, 6, 2 million heavy shells and plus 520 thousand rounds for French 90-mm guns were supplied to the troops.
While Barsukov's figures for 3-inch shells more or less "beat", then for shells of larger calibers, when Barsukov's numbers are taken on faith, obvious incongruities are formed. The figure cited by him for the release of 740 thousand heavy shells in 1915 with the release of at least 800 thousand in five months of 1914 is completely inconsistent and contradicts all known data and obvious trends - and the data of the same Manikovsky about the supply of 1.312 million heavy shells in 1915 In my opinion, the release of heavy shells in 1915-1916. at Barsukov it is underestimated by about 1 million shots (apparently due to the failure to take into account the production of some factories). There are also doubts about Barsukov's statistics for 1917.
However, even if we take Barsukov's numbers on faith, then in 1916 Russia produced 4 million heavy shells, and in the crisis year 1917, despite everything, already 6, 7 million. At the same time, according to Barsukov, it turns out that that the release of 6-inch howitzer shells in 1917 increased in relation to 1915 20 times (!) - up to 2.676 million, and 48-liner howitzer shells - 10 times (up to 3.328 million). The actual increase was somewhat smaller in my opinion, but the numbers are impressive nonetheless. Thus, Russia only from 1914 to 1917 manufactured from 11.5 million (Barsukov's estimate) to at least 13 million (my estimate) heavy shells, and up to 3 million heavy shells were imported (from 90 -mm). In real terms, all this meant that the Russian heavy artillery quickly overcame the "shell hunger", and in 1917 a situation of an overabundance of heavy artillery ammunition began to take shape - for example, 42 guns in the active army had 4260 rounds each in January 1917 on the barrel, 48-lin and 6-inch howitzers by September 1917 - up to 2,700 rounds per barrel (despite the fact that a considerable part - more than half - of the huge release of these types of shells in 1917 never hit the troops). Even the massive deployment of the release of heavy artillery in 1917-1918. would hardly change this situation. It is most significant that even the extremely inflated and unjustified demands of the Headquarters from December 1916 to 1917 - 6.6 million 48-liner shells and 2.26 million 6-inch shells - were covered by 6-inch by the actual release of this disastrous 1917 G.
However, as noted, in fact, production was only getting hotter, the results of which were manifested precisely in 1917. Most likely, without a revolution, one could expect up to 10 million heavy shells to be delivered in 1917. There was an expansion of the production of heavy shells at the Putilov group, and the possibility of loading Vankov's organization with mass production of 48-lin and 6-inch howitzer shells after completing an order for 3-inch grenades was considered. Judging by the rate of release of these heavy shells by the Vankov organization in 1917, the successes here could also be very significant.
Finally, for the mass production of heavy shells, the largest of the projects of the Russian defense industry being implemented in PMA was calculated - a large steel-sludge state-owned plant in st. Kamenskaya Oblast Don Cossacks. Initially, the plant was designed and sanctioned for construction in August 1915 as a steel foundry for the production of weapons steel and gun barrels with a design capacity of 1 million rifle barrels per year, 1 million 3-dm shells, and more than 1 million poods of "special steels". The estimated cost of such production was 49 million rubles. In 1916, the project of the plant was supplemented by the creation of the most powerful state-owned shell production in Russia with a planned output of 3.6 million 6-inch shells, 360 thousand 8-inch shells and 72 thousand 11-inch and 12-inch shells per year. The total cost of the complex reached 187 million rubles, the equipment was ordered from the USA and Great Britain. Construction began in April 1916, by October 1917, the main workshops were under construction, but due to the collapse, only a small part of the equipment was delivered. At the beginning of 1918, the construction was finally stopped. Once in the epicenter of the Civil War, the unfinished plant was plundered and virtually liquidated.
Another steel-making state-owned plant was built since 1915 in Lugansk with a design capacity of 4, 1 million poods of weapons-grade steel per year.
Mortars and bombs. The production of mortar and bombardment weapons was absent in Russia before the start of WWI and developed on a wide front starting in 1915, mainly due to the division of private enterprises through the Central Military District. If in 1915 1,548 bombers and 1,438 mortars were delivered (excluding improvised and outdated systems), then in 1916 - already 10,850 bombers, 1,912 mortars and 60 Erhardt trench mortars (155 mm), and the release of ammunition for mortars and bombers increased from 400 thousand to 7.554 million shots, that is, almost 19 times. By October 1916, the needs of the troops for bombers were covered by 100%, and in mortars - by 50%, and full coverage was expected by July 1, 1917. As a result, by the end of 1917 the army had twice the number of bombers against the state (14 thousand with a staff of 7 thousand), small-caliber mortars - 90% of the staff (4500 with a staff of 5 thousand), large-caliber mortars for TAON - 11% (267 units) of the projected huge need for 2400 systems. In ammunition for bombers, an obvious surplus was achieved, and therefore their release in 1917 was curtailed with a reorientation to the production of mines for mortars, in which there was a shortage. In 1917, the production of 3 million mines was expected.
In 1917, it was envisaged to reorient production from bombers to mortars (in 1917, 1024 mortars were produced according to Barsukov, but there are suspicions that his data for 1917 are clearly incomplete, which is confirmed by his own data on the presence of systems in the troops), as well as increasing the production of large-caliber systems (for example, at the Metal Plant, the production of 155-mm trench mortars of its own production began - 100 units were delivered in a year, the production of 240-mm mortars was also mastered). Another 928 bombers, 185 mortars and 1.29 million units of ammunition for them were received by the end of 1917 by import (the data may also be incomplete).
Hand grenades. Before WWII, hand grenades were produced in small quantities for fortresses. The production of pomegranates in Russia was mainly by the small private industry in 1915-1916. grew in colossal quantities, and grew from January 1915 to September 1916 23 times - from 55 thousand to 1.282 million pieces. If in 1915 2, 132 million grenades were manufactured, then in 1916- already 10 million. Another 19 million garnets were in 1915-1916. received by import. In January 1917, the need for the supply of the army per month was declared 1, 21 million hand grenades (or 14, 5 million per year), which was fully covered by the achieved level of Russian production.
Rifle grenades were manufactured in 1916, 317 thousand and delivery in 1917 was expected up to 600 thousand. In January 1917, 40 thousand of Dyakonov's mortars and 6, 125 million shots to them were also ordered, but due to the beginning of the collapse, mass production was never established.
Powder. By the beginning of WWII, gunpowder for the military department was being produced at three state-owned gunpowder factories - Okhtensky, Kazan and Shostken (Chernigov province), the maximum productivity of each of which was estimated at 100 thousand poods of gunpowder per year, and for the naval department - also at the Shlisselburg private a plant with a capacity of up to 200 thousand poods. In factories and warehouses, stocks of gunpowder amounted to 439 thousand poods.
With the beginning of the war, work began on the expansion of all four factories - for example, the capacity and number of employees at the Okhtensky plant were tripled. By 1917, the capacity of the Okhtensky plant was increased to 300 thousand poods, Kazan - up to 360 thousand poods, Shostken - up to 445 thousand poods, Shlisselburg - up to 350 thousand poods. At the same time, starting in 1915, next to the old Kazan plant, a new Kazan gunpowder plant with a capacity of another 300 thousand poods was built, which began work in 1917.
In 1914, even before the war, the Military Department began the construction of a powerful Tambov state-owned gunpowder factory with a capacity of up to 600 thousand poods per year. The plant cost 30, 1 million rubles and began work in October 1916, however, due to the collapse of 1917, it just started functioning. At the same time, in order to fulfill the orders of the Maritime Department, at the beginning of 1914, the construction of a private plant Baranovsky (Vladimirsky) with a design capacity of 240 thousand poods was started. in year. After the outbreak of the war, the equipment ordered in Germany had to be reordered in the USA and Great Britain. The Baranovsky plant was put into operation in August 1916, although it continued to be equipped, and by the end of 1917 produced 104 thousand poods of gunpowder. At the end of 1916, the plant was nationalized.
The production of smokeless gunpowder (taking into account the Shlisselburg plant) in 1914 amounted to 437, 6 thousand poods, in 1915 - 773, 7 thousand, in 1916 - 986 thousand poods. Thanks to the reconstruction, by 1917, the capacity was brought to 2 million poods, however, due to the revolution, they did not have time to get a return on this. Prior to that, the basic needs had to be covered by imports, which amounted to 2 million poods of smokeless powder in 1915-1916 (200 thousand in 1915 and 1.8 million in 1916).
In the summer of 1916, the construction of the Samara state-owned gunpowder plant with a capacity of 600 thousand poods with an estimated cost of 30 million rubles began, using American equipment, and among other things, the entire pyroxylin plant of the American company Nonabo was purchased. Almost all the equipment arrived in Russia, but in 1917 the construction slowed down sharply and in 1918 came to naught, and as a result, already under the Soviets, the equipment was distributed among the “old” gunpowder factories. Thus, in 1918, the total capacity of gunpowder production in Russia could reach 3.2 million poods per year, having become more common in comparison with 1914, which made it possible to actually get rid of imports. This amount of gunpowder was enough to produce 70 million charges for 3-inch shells and 6 billion cartridges. It should also be added that the possibility of issuing orders for the development of the production of gunpowder to private chemical plants was considered. I will note that at the beginning of 1917 the total demand for the next year and a half of the war (until July 1, 1918) was determined at 6,049 million poods of smokeless powder and 1.241 million poods of black powder.
In addition, in 1916-1917. the construction of the Tashkent state cotton ginning plant was carried out at a cost of 4 million rubles with an initial capacity of 200 thousand poods of refined material per year with the prospects for a subsequent sharp expansion.
Explosives. The release of TNT and ammunition equipment of the Military Department before WWII was carried out by the Okhtensky and Samara factories of explosives. With the beginning of the war, the capacities of both factories were expanded many times. The Okhtensky plant produced 13, 95 thousand poods of TNT in 1914, but its TNT production was severely damaged by an explosion in April 1915. The Samara plant increased the output of TNT from 1914 to 1916. four times - from 51, 32 thousand poods to 211 thousand poods, and tetril 11 times - from 447 to 5187 poods. The equipment of shells at both factories increased during this period by 15-20 times - for example, 3-inch shells on each from 80 thousand to more than 1.1 million units. The Samara plant in 1916 equipped heavy shells with 1.32 million, plus 2.5 million hand grenades.
By 1916, the Shlisselburg plant of the Maritime Department produced up to 400 thousand poods of TNT, the Grozny plant of the Maritime Department - 120 thousand poods, in addition, 8 private factories were connected to the production of TNT. Before PMV, picric acid was produced at two private factories, and already in 1915 - at seven, and in Russia a synthetic method for obtaining picric acid from benzene was developed, mastered by two factories. Two factories mastered the production of trinitroxyol and two - dinitronaphthalene.
The total number of enterprises producing explosives for GAU increased from four by the beginning of WWII to 28 in January 1917. Their total capacity in January 1917 was 218 thousand poods per month, incl. 52 thousand poods of TNT, 50 thousand poods of picric acid, 60 thousand poods of ammonium nitrate, 9 thousand poods of xylene, 12 thousand poods of dinitronaphthalene. This meant a tripling in comparison with December 1915. In fact, in a number of cases, the capacities were even excessive. In 1916, Russia produced only 1.4 million poods of explosives, and imported 2.089 million poods of explosives (including 618.5 thousand poods of TNT) and 1, 124 thousand poods of ammonium nitrate. In 1917, a turning point was expected in favor of its own production, and in 1918 it was estimated that the volume of Russian explosives production should have been at least 4 million poods, excluding ammonium nitrate.
Even before the WWI, GAU had planned the construction of the Nizhny Novgorod explosives plant. Construction began at the beginning of 1916 at an estimated cost of 17.4 million rubles and a planned output per year of 630 thousand poods of TNT and 13.7 thousand poods of tetril. By the beginning of 1917, the main structures were erected and the delivery of equipment began. Due to the collapse, everything stopped, but later, under the Soviets, the plant was already put into operation.
In the fall of 1916, the construction of the Ufa plant of explosives was also authorized, worth 20.6 million rubles and with a capacity of 510 thousand poods of TNT and 7 thousand poods of tetrile per year and an equipment capacity of 6 million 3-dm 3 per year. and 1.8 million heavy shells, as well as 3.6 million hand grenades. Because of the revolution, the matter did not go beyond the choice of the site.
In 1915-1916. a special Troitsky (Sergievsky) equipment plant was built near Sergiev Posad. The cost is 3.5 million rubles, the capacity is 1.25 million hand grenades per year, as well as the production of capsules and fuses. Six equipment workshops were also built for the equipment of hand grenades and mines for mortars and bombs.
To obtain benzene (for the production of toluene and picric acid) in 1915 in the Donbass, the Makeevsky and Kadievsky state-owned plants were built in a short time, and a program for the construction of 26 private benzene plants was adopted, of which 15 were introduced by the beginning of 1917. three of these plants also produced toluene.
In Grozny and Yekaterinodar, by the end of 1916, under a contract with GAU, private enterprises were organized to extract mononitrotoluene from gasoline with a capacity of 100 and 50 thousand poods per year, respectively. At the beginning of 1916, the Baku and Kazan plants for the production of toluene from oil were also launched, with a capacity of 24 thousand respectively (in 1917 it was planned to increase to 48 thousand) and 12 thousand poods of toluene. As a result, the production of toluene in Russia increased from zero to 28 thousand poods per month by May 1917. Then, the construction of three private factories for this purpose (including Nobel), which were put into operation in 1917, began in Baku.
For the production of synthetic phenol (for the production of picric acid), they were in 1915-1916. four factories were built, producing 124, 9 thousand poods in 1916.
Before PMV, sulfuric acid was produced in Russia in the amount of 1.25 million poods per month (of which 0.5 million poods in Poland), while ¾ of the raw material was imported. During the year from December 1915, 28 new private plants for the production of sulfuric acid were put into operation with an increase in monthly production in Russia from 0.8 million to 1.865 million poods. The production of pyrite in the Urals was tripled in a year and a half from August 1915.
Nitric acid was produced in Russia from Chilean saltite, the annual import of which was 6 million poods. For the production of nitric acid from Russian materials (ammonia), a whole program was deployed and in 1916 an experimental state-owned plant was built in Yuzovka with a capacity of 600 thousand poods of ammonium nitrate per year, according to the model of which a network of factories was planned for construction, of which two were built. in Donbass. In the fall of 1916, the construction of a large calcium cyanamide plant in Grozny was also authorized to produce bound nitrogen.
In 1916, the construction of a large Nizhny Novgorod plant of nitric and sulfuric acids was started with an output of 200 thousand poods of nitric acid per year. On the river Suna in the Olonets province, the construction of the Onega plant was begun in 1915 to produce nitric acid by the arc method from the air. The cost of this enterprise was not sickly amount 26, 1 million rubles. By 1917, only part of the work had been completed, and because of the collapse, everything was stopped.
Interestingly, the main motive for accelerating work on the construction and modernization of gunpowder and explosives production since 1916 was a frank desire to get rid of imports of gunpowder and explosives (as well as materials for their production) "for the new Berlin Congress" in the face of possible confrontation with the former allies. This especially concerns the establishment of production of nitric acid, which was directly linked by the leadership of the GAU with the possibility of a British naval blockade in the event of a confrontation in a future peace settlement.
Poisonous substances. The development of the production of OM in Russia by a forced route began in the summer of 1915. The first step was to start the production of chlorine at two plants in the Donbass by September, and its production by the fall of 1916 was 600 poods per day, which covered the demands of the front. At the same time in Finland, construction of state-owned chlorine plants in Vargauz and Kayan was carried out at a cost of 3.2 million rubles. the total capacity is also 600 poods per day. Due to the actual sabotage of construction by the Finnish Senate, the factories were not completed until the end of 1917.
In 1915, in a short time in the Donbass, the Globinsky military-chemical state-owned plant was built, at first producing chlorine, but in 1916-1917. reoriented to the production of 20 thousand pounds of phosgene and 7 thousand pounds of chloropicrin per year. In 1916, the Kazan state military-chemical plant was built and at the beginning of 1917 commissioned at a cost of 400 thousand rubles and with an annual output of 50 thousand poods of phosgene and 100 thousand poods of chlorine. Four more private factories were focused on the production of phosgene, two of which began to produce products in 1916. Chloropicrin was produced at 6 private factories, chloride sulfurin and chloride anhydride - at one plant, chlorine tin - at one, potassium cyanide - at one, chloroform - on one, arsenic chloride - on one. In total, 30 factories were already engaged in the production of toxic substances in 1916, and in 1917 another 11 were expected to be connected, including both Finnish chlorine ones. In 1916, 1, 42 million chemical 3-dm shells were equipped.
You can also write separately about the production of tubes and fuses, optics, supplies, etc., but in general there we see the same trend everywhere - the absolutely enchanting scale of the expansion of military production in Russia in 1915-1916, the massive involvement of the private sector, construction of new large modern state-owned enterprises, which would make it possible for an even more grandiose expansion of output in 1917-1919.with real prospects of complete disposal of imports. Mikhailov determined the estimated cost of the Big Program for the construction of military plants at 655.2 million rubles, in fact, taking into account a number of other enterprises, it was at least 800 million rubles. At the same time, there were no problems with the allocation of these funds, and the construction of large military enterprises was carried out in many cases at an accelerated pace.
Brief conclusions:
1) Russia achieved a colossal and still underestimated leap in military production in 1914-1917. The growth of military production and the development of the defense industry in 1914-1917. were probably the most ambitious in Russian history, surpassing in relative numbers any leaps in military production during the Soviet period (including the Second World War).
2) Many bottlenecks in supply and military production were successfully overcome by 1917, let alone 1918, Russian industry was ready to supply the Russian army in abundance with almost everything it needed.
3) The dispersed volumes of military production and the real prospects for its further increase made it possible in 1918 for the Russian army to reach the parameters of support for the main types of ground weapons (primarily artillery), comparable to the armies of the Western Allies (France).
4) The growth of military production in Russia in 1914-1917. was provided by a huge mobilization of private and state-owned industry, as well as an increase in production capacity and the construction of new enterprises, with a colossal amount of state investment in military production. Many of the military enterprises built or launched during this period formed the basis of the domestic defense industry in their specializations for the interwar period and even beyond. The Russian Empire has demonstrated a high ability to invest in the military industry and the real possibilities of a gigantic increase in the capacity and capabilities of the PKK in the shortest possible time. Thus, there are no grounds other than religious to ascribe such possibilities only to Soviet power. The Soviet government rather continued the traditions of organizing and developing the Russian military industry of the late imperial period, rather than fundamentally surpassing them.
