Our media spoke so synchronously about the fact that Saudi Arabia was unable to protect its oil refineries and wells from semi-literate militants that one should inevitably think about it.
And not only on the topic of what the Saudis tried to defend themselves with, but also on the topic of protection against these self-made UAVs and the same "cruise" missiles in general.
The main motive - the repetition of Putin's words, they say, would not be in service with the American "Patriots", and the Russian S-400, you would be happy.
Would it be?
We decided to consider this issue with the involvement of a specialist. Our specialist is a former employee of one of the military research institutes. That is, a person who worked precisely in the direction of condemning the enemy's drone as efficiently as possible.
And to begin with, we will try to answer the question whether it is so important what air defense systems the Saudis tried to protect themselves with. And how really important is the replacement of "Patriot" with "Triumph".
Not important at all.
No, buying the S-400 instead of the Patriot is useful. Especially for the Russian budget, so in this regard, we are only welcome. But essentially …
Both the American complex and the Russian one, in our case, will have one problem: they will work equally poorly on small-sized low-flying targets. That the S-300 (and the S-400 is still a modification of the S-300PM3), that the MIM-104 "Patriot" were not developed for such purposes. In the 70s of the last century, drones, if there were, then pilots in size, if inferior, then a little.
Of course, there are modifications, and today we have to chase the day, however, in our opinion, air defense is still losing out to UAVs. Those are becoming faster, less noticeable, and it becomes more and more difficult to nail them.
The best example of this is plastic airplanes that terrorists use to fire at everyone they can reach, including ours in Syria.
A wing span of 4 meters, a petrol motor from a trimmer of 4-5 horsepower, for example, XAircraft or poverty-stricken KapteinKuk as a base for flight control and Arduinka as a processor for everything else.
In general, the cost of $ 200 at the exit (with "Captain"). And this structure may well carry up to 10 kg of payload. We recount in C-4 or something from this opera, and we get a very wide range of possibilities in terms of causing damage. Moreover, the "Arduin" is quite capable of activating the detonator.
And the most unpleasant thing is that this structure is almost invisible to radars. And if it flies at an altitude of 50-100 meters, and with a bend around the landscape, everything is generally sad for air defense.
The Saudis had the Patriots and the very old Hawk complexes. Compared to the Syrians, these are the S-300 and S-125. That is, it can be launched, the only question is efficiency. It will be approximately the same, that is, below average. Something will fly through that protection.
Meanwhile, photographs of the damage to the complexes showed that the job had been done perfectly well. The oil tanks on Abkaik, and the huge tanks, are difficult to miss, but in each of the eight victims there were even holes from the warheads of cruise missiles or drones that fell into them.
We can say that the Saudis are faced with a problem, but in fact, this problem is faced with the oil tanks of Saudi Arabia.
And you can criticize the Patriots as much as you like and praise the S-400, we are sure that if our air defense systems were in place, the result might have been less sad, but the overall success is more than doubtful.
By the way, this is not the first time the world has encountered such flying products. And the tail stretches from the last century, because in the first campaign in the Gulf, the Iraqis used something that did not quite fit into the canons. And already in the second campaign, they began to use everything that could be tucked under the arm. That is, it could fly and explode.
This is probably why, immediately after the victorious end of the Gulf War, the United States began to seriously prepare for the fact that all "undeveloped countries" would begin to try to produce inexpensive, but simple and affordable ersatz missiles. Winged, of course.
It was believed by someone that in order for such a rocket to take off, follow the route in accordance with the terrain based on GPS data and simply dive at the target, the power of a 486 processor, 16 MB of RAM and 1 GB of hard disk memory is needed. Well, the simplest GPS receiver.
Today, all this can be arranged with the help of a Rapsberry Pi or Arduino controller, which, for some 35 dollars, "Aliexpress" is glad to offer to everyone.
There - they want.
But let's leave Saudi Arabia's air defense system for a while and ask ourselves the answer to another question: how to shoot down IT, which flies at a speed of 100 km / h at an altitude of less than 100 meters and drags explosives to our oil tanks?
It is necessary to shoot down …
Now on everyone's minds and on the lips of electronic warfare. Almighty and omnipotent. Let us please, yes, we will have more successes in this direction than others will.
"The snare". It is the anti-drone complex. "Silok" is powered from a regular outlet, maybe from 127V. But in fact it is a close-range weapon. Effective ranges, depending on the signal transmission, are not more than 5 km, at an altitude of more than 200 m and not more than 1 km at a UAV height of less than 100 m.
The numbers are clear. If the UAV sneaks at an altitude of less than 100 meters, then even the latest "Silok" will be able to detect it at a distance of less than a kilometer.
The Seal is able to intercept control if the drone is manually controlled from the ground, or to create interference in the entire radio frequency range. In the latter case, the UAV simply loses control and crashes. In the first case, it is necessary for the drone to work in answering machine mode, i.e. gave not only video information to the operator, but also reported his coordinates.
If the UAV does not meet these criteria, that is, it follows the program …
We have “Rosehip-AERO”. The station is still under construction, but the project looks promising.
The station can put noise interference both within the range and narrowly targeted. After jamming the control signal in drones, a program is usually triggered to return the vehicle to the launch point. To prevent this, "Rosehip-AERO" creates a false navigation field (time to create - a few minutes), changing dynamic coordinates, as a result of which the UAV is diverted to the side and ultimately can land where we need, and not the enemy.
But also not without nuances, for accurate work it is necessary to know the parameters of the UAV, that is, to collect information in advance. There is not always time for this, and UAVs assembled in shed conditions can be strikingly different from ordinary ones.
And here we have an idea that many will not like.
A UAV that follows a route using an inertial reporting system. Let's say, collected on elementary offal from China. And what, a compass - no problem. Gyro-compass? Yes, a gyro stabilizer from a video camera will solve the issue just as well. Speed sensors and other things are taken from any children's copter. And a system is being assembled on the knee, according to which the device, conventionally not using satellite navigation, will be able to fly from point A to point B. From memory.
At point B, serious business begins. The navigation system turns on, the device makes precise guidance, after which it attacks the target. How long does it take? A little. But until this moment, the UAV can be tried to suppress as much as necessary. But it is impossible to give a drone to the brain or take control if it simply does not exist.
Now smart people will say: who will write the program for these mumblers? Our answer will be this: since the gentlemen do not need money from either terrorist organizations or from the countries of the Middle East, to put it mildly, there will be someone to write a program to. For a suitcase of "green" - there is.
Having twisted the idea from different angles, we recognized it as unpleasant, but it had the right to life. It's good that while the world's nuclear weapons are under lock and key. It seems to be.
And what if we have such a point C? And something will fly there?
The question, as they say, is of course an interesting one. And we will go and answer from top to bottom.
Yes, we have the S-400. Quite a good complex, so to speak, with a fair amount of confidence. But how advisable is it against a 50kg drone?
The smallest missile for the S-400, namely the 9M96E2, has a length of almost 6 meters and a mass of 240 kg. Yes, active radar homing is present. This is all good, but how much can the rocket maneuver if something happens? And how easy will it be for her to aim at a target in which the metal is slightly more than 10% of the total mass?
It will be unrealistic. In both cases. But there is also a third nuance.
Not so long ago, talking about night fighters, I wrote how the Germans, driven to hysterics by the lawlessness that the Po-2 crews were doing at night, specially to fight this plane shot down a special night fighter from the Focke-Wulf-189, then there is from the "frame". Why?
Yes, because he was not fast and could take a locator first, and then, when the Germans realized that Po-2 does not "shine", they installed the ancestor of today's thermal imagers.
The S-400 missile is intended for an aircraft that is a contrasting target. It is made of metal, there is a lot of metal, you can see it. He, the plane, is fast.
And the drone? Where is 90-100 km / h? And how about a minimum of metal?
And then, there is no data on the cost of one missile, but we think that it will be more expensive than the "Pantsir" will have. But there is data on missiles for "Pantsir-1C". About 10 million for one 57E6E.
Yes, there is "Pantsir-1C". With guns and missiles.
Alas, the cannons are almost useless here. We have observed more than once what it looks like. Too big a projectile for such a purpose, too few of them.
The 57E6E missiles are good. They take any flying target, and take it confidently if they take the radar. But again, we compare the price / quality parameter and understand that by firing bomb-carrier drones with such missiles, you can bankrupt any country, perhaps, except for the United States and Saudi Arabia.
And again: the radius of work is very small.
If we were assigned to protect tanks with oil from drones, then we see this option: first, solve the detection problem. Visual - at 100-150 meters in height, nothing is visible and almost inaudible, but with the radar it is still sadder. So the principle of the good old VNOS posts may well work.
A radar capable of detecting small-sized and low-speed targets at a distance of more than a kilometer, unfortunately, exists so far only in words or on paper. Even with Pantsir-1C it is done optically and visually. Physics and extremely low RCS will not be canceled by anyone, but all assurances that our systems “take” confidently targets with RCS of 0, 1-0, 3 sq. m - this is, you know … a 30 x 30 cm square of metal from a distance of a kilometer …
By the way, very often from such a distance such an EPR is possessed by … geese! And what, the electrolyte in their circulatory system and water in the body sometimes give such pictures …
So, the posts of visual observation. At such a distance that you can effectively warn of the attack and give the opportunity to prepare for a reflection.
What to beat?
Opinions were divided. Initially, it seemed, the "Shell" seemed quite to itself, but then we remembered the torment of the calculations in Alabino, when they tried to shoot down the target drone from the cannons …
Yes, a 30-mm projectile is completely unsuitable here. Too big. The ammunition load is too small. A projectile too strong, because it was designed either for a serious missile or for a helicopter. But not on a plastic creation with a motor from a petrol cutter.
And the Shilka, although it has more barrels and a smaller caliber, looks better, but not perfect. For the same reasons.
If we were deciding what to blame, then - don't laugh - ShKAS! Well, or something like that. Spark MG-34 or MG-42, but better ShKAS.
Ideal anti-drone agent: a rifle-caliber aircraft machine gun.
The rate of fire is quite. The number of cartridges is the same. The cartridge is fast but weak. Yes, the wing will pierce and not notice, but how many are there? ShKAS gives out such a cloud, there at least heels, but it will get into the engine. Or into the gas tank. Or in the blades.
In general, with the theory of probability and ShKAS it is quite possible.
Someone might say that this is not serious. Well, speak. Actually. What we see in Saudi Arabia is serious. The serious thing is that today nothing can yet be opposed to a small apparatus, which is poorly detected by modern means of observation, and therefore it is difficult to destroy it.
One can only make a preliminary conclusion that a very serious adversary for air defense has appeared on the scene - a small-sized kamikaze drone. Poorly detectable and difficult to destroy.
Well, the conclusion is this: we are waiting for a new round of air defense development all over the world. The antidrone direction is already lagging behind in its development today.
