M. V. Lomonosov
Today it is obvious that the Arctic will play an increasing role for the economy and military security of Russia every year. And in this regard, great efforts and investments in the development of the capabilities of the state, the armed forces, and the solution of the tasks we face in Artik are understandable.
Challenges in the Arctic
At the Army-2018 forum, at a conference held by the Military Academy of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, the report of the Navy “The main threats to the military security of the Russian Federation in the Arctic region” showed an assessment of the main threats to the military security of the Russian Federation in the Arctic and outlined the main activities carried out by the Russian Navy. with this in mind.
In principle, everything is correct. The only question is the lack of priorities (the main thing is the secondary one).
The efforts of the state and the Ministry of Defense in the Arctic are great and, of course, expedient. But the question arises: how effective are they and where are they directed? And in the end, what are the performers doing and how objective are their reports? Especially taking into account external threats and aggravation of the military-political situation.
RIA News :
The commander of the Russian Northern Fleet, Admiral Nikolai Evmenov, said that the risk of conflicts in the Arctic region is increasing.
Our objectives in the Arctic are objectively:
• control of the general situation, the zone of the Arctic possessions of Russia, the route of the Northern Sea Route and their support (navigation, rescue, repair, supply, ice escort, etc.);
• participation in strategic deterrence through the use of NSNF, long-range aviation and naval forces (including non-nuclear forces) and their support (including in terms of destroying submarine-hunters and enemy missile defense carrier ships);
• provision of cargo transportation (including “duplication” of Transib for special cargo);
• defense of the territory of the Russian Federation from sea areas.
A grouping of the Northern Fleet was deployed in Artik, on the basis of which the joint strategic command of the USC Sever was created in 2014 (in fact, in terms of its status, it is a district).
The extensive construction of Arctic bases and the restoration of the airfield network have been launched. The mistake in our military withdrawal from the Arctic of the previous years began to be corrected.
Long-term plans provide for the deployment of an air defense group:
Six "nodes of ground air defense": S-400 and "Pantsir" C1 - Severomorsk, Novaya Zemlya, about. Average, oh. Boiler house, M. Schmidt, Tiksi village.
Arctic airfields (construction and reconstruction): Novaya Zemlya, about. Alexandra Land (Franz Josef Archipelago), about. Boiler room (with provision of reception, including long-range aircraft), Tiksi settlement, Naryan-Mar, Norilsk (the last two are dual-use).
To control the route of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) on the island. Boiler room, M. Schmidt, about. Wrangel, the deployment of the Sunflower radar station is envisaged (the detection zone of surface targets for each is 400-450 km).
Everything is fine? How to say…
The first question arises about the real threats in Artik and what the Northern Fleet is preparing for.
It is clear that (so far) the only adversaries in the Arctic are the United States and NATO. At the same time, there can be no question of carrying out by them, even in the medium term, "amphibious operations" and "breakthroughs of ships" along the NSR route, etc."Virtual threats", to "repelling" which our Northern Fleet has been so stubbornly preparing in recent years: "search for enemy submarines in the Norwegian Sea by cruisers of the Northern Fleet" (who will give them in the war?), "Amphibious assault on the islands" deployment of SCRC "Bastion" on the island. Boiler room. The latter is generally beyond common sense and understanding - with whom was Bastion going to "fight" there? With "groups of Canadian polar bears - violators of the state border of the Russian Federation"?
… the forces of the Northern Fleet, located in the area of the Novosibirsk Islands archipelago, conducted an exercise to protect the Arctic island zone and the sea coast of the Russian Federation with missile firing … the Bastion coastal missile system was used, which is on alert on Kotelny Island (the Novosibirsk Islands archipelago).
As the commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Nikolay Evmenov, summing up the preliminary results of the exercise, “the calculation of the Bastion coastal missile system successfully fired at a naval target position located at a distance of more than 60 kilometers, thereby confirming its readiness to effectively carry out combat duty in the Arctic and carry out tasks for the protection of the island zone and the sea coast of Russia”.
Absolutely antique and virtually incapacitated mine countermeasures forces of the Northern Fleet imitate "combat training" for a long time outdated "walking on mines with trawls."
The minesweepers of the Northern Fleet are practicing the search and destruction of mines in the Barents Sea, as part of three naval trawling groups, the crews of five minesweepers are operating.
Severomorian sailors practiced escorting the ship search and strike group as part of the small anti-submarine ships Yunga and Snezhnogorsk behind the trawls, using the entire complex of anti-mine weapons - hydroacoustic stations for searching for anchor and bottom mines and various types of trawls …
Basic minesweepers "Kotelnich", "Kolomna" and "Yadrin" as part of the mine-sweeping group worked out maneuvering, setting trawls, searching for sea mines and trawling a certain section of the sea area.
Trawls … trawls … trawls. There is not a single modern anti-mine ship (PMK) in the Northern Fleet, the existing minesweepers do not have a single underwater vehicle (the only "Ketmen" at the MTSH "Humanenko" is highly likely not in service, and it does not make sense, because. because it will be blown up by the very first "smart" mine).
Undoubtedly, a positive moment is the creation of the Arctic 80th separate motorized rifle brigade with the task of controlling the territories from Murmansk to the Novosibirsk Islands in operational cooperation with units of the Airborne Forces and marines of the Northern Fleet. The main thing is that not only a force appeared that was ready to act in difficult physical and geographical conditions, but also had the appropriate equipment that had undergone regular checks in these conditions.
However, there are serious problems that significantly complicate the use of the Arctic brigade in real conditions.
These are, first of all, the means of landing (what the Northern Fleet demonstrated in the exercises is just an example of how to do it in a real war), and the limited design capacity of the new Arctic military camps.
Part of the problem of transport can be solved by helicopters, especially the Arctic Mi-8AMTSh-VA, which received the most positive reviews among the troops. However, after disembarking from it, the personnel are left only with what they can carry on their own two feet. Place snowmobiles and ATVs in the cockpit? Then we "throw out" people (and the number of helicopters is limited). The solution could be the possibility of placing cargo and small-sized troop transport on the helicopter pylons, but this simple question, which has been "hanging in the air" for a long time, has not yet received a "technical answer".
Here the question arises: why "helicopters for the landing"? With "bears to fight"?
And then, that the real situation and the balance of power in the Arctic is far from good for us.
Enemy
The actual threats in the Arctic are real and they come from the air and from under the water (ice).
From the air, these are strategic bombers (more than 120 units) and cruise missiles, tactical and carrier-based aircraft, (strike) long-range UAVs of the United States and NATO in providing a powerful group of fighters and AWACS.
On April 12, 2019, the US Department of Defense issued a contract to Boeing Corporation worth $ 14.3143 billion to modernize the weapons systems of the B-1B and B-52H strategic bombers. The contract is for ten years - until April 11, 2029.
And this is a "direct and obvious threat" for us, and first of all in the Arctic.
From under the water (ice) is:
• actions of US and British submarines against the Northern Fleet and especially NSNF;
• minefields (aviation, submarines and submarines, in the near future - underwater robotic systems (RTK)).
In addition, one should not forget about the "traditional American occupation in the war" - the seizure of foreign airfields to ensure the most effective use of their aircraft against the enemy from them.
Loss of the airfield on the island. The boiler room (the plans for which provide for the possibility of using long-range aircraft, among other things) will have extremely serious strategic consequences. This is not only the loss of the NSR for us, it is obvious (from the previous experience of the US wars) that in a few days at the airfield hundreds of flights of military transport aircraft will create not only a powerful air base of the US Air Force, but also an air hub will appear in a short time to ensure the delivery of strikes in depth the territory of the Russian Federation and "entry into Siberia".
Let's consider the situation in more detail.
NSNF
A photo that caused a scandal a few years ago:
The pictures were taken in early August 2015. As it is easy to see in the pictures, at the Gadzhievo base there are simultaneously five SSBNs - four 667BDRM projects (K-51 Verkhoturye, K-84 Yekaterinburg, K-18 Karelia and K-407 Novomoskovsk) and a new K- 535 "Yuri Dolgoruky" project 955 (until now has not started combat duty). Taking into account that the Project 667BDRM SSBN K-114 Tula is under mid-term repair at the headquarters of the Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center JSC in Severodvinsk, it can be concluded that only one boat was in combat service at the time of this photo session. this division - K-117 "Bryansk" project 667BDRM.
Thus, it can be seen that 80 deployed strategic carriers (ballistic missiles) and 352 deployed nuclear warheads (in other words, 15.5% of the total number of carriers and 22.25% of the number of deployed nuclear warheads of all strategic nuclear forces of Russia) were in a state of motionless accumulation, in a practically unprotected form, in one place and can be guaranteed to be destroyed by one enemy nuclear warhead. This is a clear example of the level of real combat readiness and combat value in general of Russia's naval strategic nuclear forces (NSNF), on which astronomical funds are spent. It is quite obvious that guaranteed destruction by one enemy nuclear warhead of 352 nuclear warheads of ground-based ballistic missiles of the Strategic Missile Forces is impossible in principle.
(bmpd.)
The question about this picture is not about the boats in the base (although such an accumulation of them is undoubtedly an abnormal phenomenon), but about the "absent" "Bryansk". For if during this period of time it is not tracked (moreover, it is not guaranteed to be tracked) by the enemy, then the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces has already completed its task.
The key factor that makes it necessary to place strategic assets on sea carriers (in difficult physical and geographical conditions of their use and significant superiority of the enemy's anti-submarine forces), - this is the vulnerability of the ground component of the NSNF to a sudden nuclear (!) "Disarming" blow. And this is not a "virtual" threat, but a very real one, and is being practiced by the enemy.
Those. even one, but guaranteed not to be tracked by an RPLSN with SLBMs, which excludes the possibility of such a strike, is an extremely important strategic and political factor. And the main thing here is not the "number of warheads" of the NSNF, but its combat stability. That is, figuratively speaking, for the NSNF as the Bulava system it is secondary to the issues of stealth, hydroacoustics, naval underwater weapons, etc. In our country, it has been turned upside down - according to Bulava, there are “dances with a tambourine”, tough decisions, but because of what gives in general “the right to go to sea” and “carry strategic missiles at sea,” the blockage is complete.
I repeat: if the NSNF system does not have combat stability at the level of "at least one guaranteed untraceable RPLSN capable of producing a retaliatory nuclear strike against the enemy's territory in the most unfavorable conditions of the situation", it not only does not make sense, but is a weight on the neck of the state and its armed forces, diverting huge resources.
Let me remind you that the Borey-Bulava program turned out to be our most expensive military program, moreover, from the “difficult” years, when funds for its implementation were diverted from wherever possible (and even from where it is impossible).
At the same time, an extremely "sore point" is the possibility of using "Boreyev" in the Arctic. RPLSN project 667BDRM, which had a developed "hump" for missile silos, due to the surfacing and breaking of ice with a trim, they provided the discharge of more of the ice from the mine covers, and, accordingly, the use of SLBMs
"Boreas" have practically no hump, and, accordingly, the problem of removing a huge amount and extremely heavy ice simply negates the possibility of firing SLBMs in such conditions. You can shoot only after surfacing in a large and clean hole (which you still need to find!)
This problem has technical solutions (without details), but at the moment the situation is such that the latest RPLSN have great restrictions on the used (main weapon) in the Arctic (their problems in the Pacific Fleet are a subject for a separate conversation).
It is pertinent to recall that one of the requirements for the closed complex with the Bark SLBM (instead of which the unreasonable choice was made in favor of the Bulava) was to ensure firing “through the ice”, ie. "Streamlined" RPLSN project 955 was originally conceived with the possibility of firing SLBMs without surfacing, "through the ice", and this capability was "buried" by the Bulava.
Well, and the final touch - despite the long-term development, the Bulava SLBM has not yet been adopted for service …
That is, despite the colossal costs of the Borey-Bulava system, the backbone of our NSNF is (and will remain for a long time) Project 667BDRM RPLSN. And here again it is worth remembering the collision of the K-407 and the US Navy submarine "Grayling". The newest (at that time) SSBN of the Navy with an intelligent commander and a well-trained crew was tracked for a long time by a US Navy submarine built in 1967!
At the same time, the "PLO line" of the US High Speed Forces has been located not in the area of Iceland (or Bear Island) for many decades, but actually starts from our bases.
Flagship miner of the 4th squadron of PLPL SF E. K. Penzin:
Fleet Commander Admiral of the Fleet G. M. Egorov threw an introductory message to our squadron - to find patrol areas for Norwegian submarines. Virtually none of our nuclear submarines could enter or leave the main base unnoticed by them. We knew about their presence nearby, but we needed to find a way to get around their positions. We were asked to search for areas where batteries are charging and, holding onto the boat, follow it until we come to the patrol area. The squadron allocated two pairs of submarines, which operated as part of tactical groups. To no avail.
Further (if our RPLSN nevertheless successfully left the base, without being blown up by a mine, and without being torpedoed by the Norwegian "Uloy"), the main problem of the Northern Fleet arises - a narrow deployment front. Obviously, no one will send RPLSN "to the west" - into the zone of overwhelming domination of the enemy's anti-submarine forces. Remains - "under the ice", and there are only two, and relatively narrow "roads" - "eastern" (through the Karskiye Vorota) and "northern").
Taking into account the relatively shallow depths and new means of search, our submarines find themselves on the "northern road" due to the massive use of low-frequency active "illumination" by the enemy, in fact, in the form of a fly on glass.
In the West, already in the 1980s, the transition to joint complex processing of signals from the RGAB field began as from a single antenna, that is, RGAB became a "sensor". This technical solution has dramatically increased the search performance of anti-submarine aircraft. With the advent of low-frequency RGAB-emitters (LFA) in the early 1990s, detection of the lowest-noise submarines was ensured.
Now the "look" of the low-frequency "illumination" has changed significantly, the power has significantly decreased, processing has become more complicated (up to the appearance of covert (for target detection) modes of operation of multi-position sonars).
All this is still a "revelation" both for our Navy and for the developers of our search and targeting systems for anti-submarine aviation ("stopped" in the distant 70s), despite the fact that for the enemy a long time ago the "routine" of combat preparation.
The shallow depths of the Barents Sea sharply raise the question of the enemy's use of "unconventional" means of search (and ensuring the concealment of our submarines in these conditions). The author cites, in one of his articles, a quotation from Lieutenant-General V. N. (which, alas, underwent a serious and distorted editorial revision) on the Orion overflight and the discovery by it in a short time of ten submarines of the Northern Fleet, caused a great resonance and discussion.
Now it is possible to clarify the timing of this case: around 1996. However, such search methods were not an "American invention", but … ours (!).
Another example: in the magazine "Gangut" in the article by A. M. Vasiliev, the deputy commander-in-chief of the Navy for shipbuilding and armament, Admiral Novoselov, gave an assessment of this issue:
… at the meeting he did not give the floor to the head of the institute, who was eager to tell about experiments to detect the surfaced trace of a submarine using a radar. … Much later, at the end of 1989, I asked him why he dismissed this question. To this Fyodor Ivanovich replied: "I know about this effect, it is impossible to protect oneself from such detection, so why upset our submariners"?
The question arises: does the principle “no need to upset” also apply to the military-political leadership of the country? Incl. and problems with the secrecy of NSNF?
In fact, on the "northern route", our submarines in a real war will simply be massacred.
Actually, the former commander-in-chief of the Navy Vysotsky said briefly and exhaustively about the situation:
If we do not have an aircraft carrier in the North, then the combat stability of the RPLSN will be reduced to zero already on the second day, because the main enemy of boats is aviation
Eastern Route? Yes, it remains … only a squadron will be enough for the enemy - two bombers with mines to completely "cork" it.
The absolutely cave-like, prehistoric level of the Northern Fleet's anti-mine forces was mentioned above.
However, in the "victorious reports" of our admirals "everything is fine":
The crew of the base minesweeper "Yelnya" carried out sweeping a minefield to escort a conventional detachment of ships and vessels. The sailors used non-contact deep trawls. All training mines were successfully defused.
And what about the RPLSN combat service, already deployed "under the ice"?
Due to the narrow front of deployment and preemption in the detection of submarines of the US and British navies, it does not cause any particular problems, having discovered our RPLSN on the deployment route, then covertly and for a long time monitor it in readiness for destruction on order.
Taking into account that Russia has powerful strategic nuclear forces, there are two options for the emergence and escalation of a large-scale conflict with the United States: "slow escalation", with the wide involvement of "third countries" and limitation of the forms of hostilities (with the gradual involvement of the United States and further escalation of the conflict, but below the level of "nuclear threshold "), or" quick disarming strike "with massive nuclear destruction of our entire SNF grouping. At the same time, before delivering such a strike, the enemy must be sure that the threat from our NSNF has been eliminated. Those. RPLSN combat service awaits "covert shooting", and even before the formal start of hostilities.
And the US Navy is not only practicing such actions, there are a number of cases of deliberate firing at our boats "something very similar to a torpedo" (the last case, known to the author, was on the 16th submarine squadron in the mid-2000s).
Now let's look at the situation on board our RPLSN. Thirty … day of military service, everything is calm, familiar …
Speaker acoustics: "Torpedo on bearing !!!"
I will keep silent about the "first reaction", noting only that at such moments they do not think about the TRPL ("Tactical leadership … of submarines") (especially since the provisions on anti-torpedo protection in it, to put it mildly, are inadequate and absolutely divorced from reality) …
The main question is whether it is a real torpedo (i.e. a war) or is it another American provocation (with a simulator with torpedo noises or just a practical (non-combat) torpedo). Moreover, "you can't report to the shore" …
What to do? Shoot back?
First, with almost a single probability, there is no enemy submarine behind the detected torpedo.
Secondly, our torpedoes, to put it mildly, are very much inferior to the enemy's torpedoes.
Thirdly, in order to shoot quickly, you need to have a torpedo system in the appropriate readiness. During the Cold War, this was practiced, but in the 90s. almost forgotten about it. In the 2000s. again (after "some events") they remembered, but at the level of a specific commander. For the general trend is “if nothing happened”.
Fourthly, the enemy who organized the provocation can turn things around (by falsifying documents and registration data) our counterattack as the first attack, already allegedly about our RPLSN.
The use of hydroacoustic countermeasures (SGPD)? They are all ineffective against modern torpedoes.
Rear Admiral Lutsky ("Marine collection" No. 7 for 2010):
… it is proposed to equip the Yasen and Borey submarines under construction with PTZ systems, the technical specifications for the development of which were drawn up back in the 80s of the last century, the results of studies of the effectiveness of these means against modern torpedoes indicate an extremely low probability of non-defeat of the evading submarine
How it all happened in reality (when they were shooting at our submarines), we can say in one short phrase: not at the TRPL. Yes, there were no real (combat) enemy torpedoes. Or were they all the same?
Bottom line: our RPLSN combat service, with what we have for today, will be shot. And the enemy prepares for this toughly and purposefully (including at the ICEX exercises).
Why admirals Korolev and Evmenov are not preparing for this, I would very much like to hear from them. True, I doubt that they will have something worthy and real to say to the facts given. And here it is already appropriate to recall Confucius:
To send people untrained to war is to betray them.
And more about ICEX. The fact that underwater vehicles (UUVs) have long been used in ICEX exercises has been known for a long time. But the scale and depth of this work during the last exercises (ICEX-2018) is just a "knockout" to all our "naval commanders" and the heads of the corresponding work in the defense industry complex.
ICEX 2018 deployed 30 Atom large-size UVs, 18 of which were equipped with the Advanced Sea Warfare (ADSEWA) module, which houses a suite of advanced submarine communications and VFD technologies, as well as various sensors for submarine detection, including a static antenna array system on the sea. bottom (in the future - its use as a small GPBA).
And what do we have in the "air"?
Is the "Arctic air defense shield" as strong as it is reported in the media?
Let's start with an extensive quote, which, nevertheless, is worthy of being quoted in full (including so that its electronic source is not deleted due to the obvious scandalousness of the issues raised).
The problems of the Russian air defense are surrounded by silence. A. Khramchikhin.
The fact that one missile defense system can shoot down no more than one target, apparently, does not need to be explained to anyone at all, this is arithmetic at the level of the first class. The combat algorithms of the S-300P and S-400 imply the use of two missiles at one target during automatic combat work; you can switch to the "one missile - one target" option only manually. That is, if a regiment has 64 ready-to-launch missiles, then it can shoot down a maximum of 64 targets, in reality - 32. After that the regiment is "reset". The standard for reloading one launcher (PU) for "excellent" is 53 minutes. That is, it will take at least an hour to restore the regiment's combat readiness, which is too much in the conditions of a modern war.
However, in reality, the regiment will not recover in any hour, and in two, too. Simply because the air defense missile system does not include charging vehicles, there is not at least one spare ammunition in the divisions. All this must be brought from the missile storage and preparation bases.
Maneuvering forces in relation to the S-300P / 400 air defense system is theoretically possible, but practically unrealizable, given the cumbersomeness of these systems and our huge distances. All this did not really matter when the "300th" regiments were part of the powerful echeloned air defense system of the USSR, but it is very important now.
… The United States has a very real opportunity to "load" Russian air defense systems with a huge number of BGM-109 Tomahawk, AGM-86, AGM-158 JASSM-LR missiles, "and so on and so forth."
… This problem is becoming more and more serious, which we already observe on a small scale in Syria. But here it has been turned into a “figure of silence”.
All this does not mean that the S-400 is "bad", it is about the fact that only a system with various elements can be stable, which compensates for the shortcomings of some means with the merits of others.
It is obvious that aviation is an element of the qualitative and quantitative enhancement of the ground component of air defense.
Regardless of the effectiveness of new ground-based air defense systems, an air defense system built only on their basis is flawed already due to geographic factors (the curvature of the Earth and the presence of a radio horizon). We need fighters, we need long-range radar detection and control aircraft (AWACS).
But with this in the USC "North" and in the Northern Fleet, everything is very bad.
The large-scale maneuvers involved 36 warships, submarines and support vessels, about 20 aircraft, more than 150 weapons, military and special equipment of coastal missile and artillery and ground forces, marines and air defense forces.
These figures are a recognition of the fact that the fleet has defeated its own naval aviation.
For reference: the ratio of "ships and aircraft" at the time when the Northern Fleet was really the "MOST" fleet: in 1982 it had 395 warships and boats, 290 auxiliary ships and … 380 aircraft, and in the exercises "Ocean 83" involved 53 ships, 27 submarines, 18 auxiliary vessels, as well as 14 naval aviation regiments and 3 regiments of air defense fighters, that is, more than 400 aircraft.
The existing group of fighters of the USC "Sever" is deliberately unable to solve the tasks facing them. This is compounded by the problem with new aircraft weapons that have just entered the troops. However, for a very strange reason, despite the mass of official photos of the exercises, there are practically no photos of aircraft with new air-to-air missiles. Are they saving the resource of new missiles? So you need to master them first! So, start to carry and use en masse (as it was in the days of the USSR and is happening today in all developed countries)
At the same time, the most pressing issue is the R-37M long-range air-to-air missile system, firstly, in view of the unique and highly demanded performance characteristics, and secondly, because without this missile system, even the upgraded MiG-31BSM have limited combat value. … Taking into account the capabilities of modern electronic warfare systems, the effectiveness of the standard MiG-31B - R-33 missile is extremely low. In fact, this missile today can be effectively used only against low-maneuverable cruise missiles that do not use electronic warfare means.
The only time when the R-37M "lit up" in the combat unit was the 80th anniversary of the Kansk air regiment last year.
However, the possibility that the latest combat missiles were on display to the public raises serious doubts, and with a high probability, the MiG-31BSM hangers had weight and size models.
The scanty number of modernized AWACS A-50U aircraft does not allow creating a continuous radar field and ensuring constant patrolling in the theater of operations.
Sad outcome
What's the bottom line? As a result, we get a clear and understandable already today complete defeat of the Northern Fleet of OSK Sever in the event of real hostilities, and with minimal damage to the enemy.
1. RPLSN combat service are destroyed before the start of hostilities.
2. RPLSN in bases - by strikes on bases, on mines, US and NATO submarines, submarines and UAVs on the "northern" deployment route ("eastern" - covered with mines)
3. The decision to use SLBMs from the Barents Sea in the near future can be countered by the deployment of missile defense carrier ships in it in zones inaccessible for destruction by the coastal SCRC "Bastion").
4. All bases of the Northern Fleet, located in the immediate vicinity of the border, are destroyed (together with repair funds and accumulated ammunition and supplies of material and technical support).
5. The remnants of the Northern Fleet retreat to the southeastern part of the Barents Sea, where they are destroyed.
6. The air defense grouping on the Arctic islands is quantitatively suppressed, destroyed, the most valuable bases are captured by helicopter assault forces, to ensure the subsequent delivery of strikes and an offensive deep into Siberia.
With what we have today (and is being implemented in the form of "long-term plans") - this is the real picture.
But according to the reports of admirals Evmenov and Korolev, the Northern Fleet is "full of hockey" (which can be easily seen by going to the OSK Sever page on the website of the Ministry of Defense, and there are more than a lot of "victorious reports" and hockey).
Are they aware of the real situation? Of course, yes.
And a very good question here: what do admirals Evmenov and Korolyov report to the Supreme Commander on the real combat capability of the Northern Fleet and the situation with the combat stability of the NSNF?
Is it possible otherwise?
Yes! If you do not hide from problems and do not pretend that "they do not exist", but solve them.
Let's go in order.
1. NSNF.
The installation of an active anti-torpedo defense system sharply increases the combat stability of the RPLSN and, most importantly, provides an effective tool for responding to a sudden torpedo attack (or its imitation). Those. the question “what to do” is no longer worth it - to destroy the torpedo (or the simulator with the torpedo noise) with your anitorpedo.
According to the mind and conscience, it was the RPLSN of the 667BDRM project that should have (and for a long time) received the first AT "Lasta" in the ammunition load.
Effective modernization of the Physicist torpedo, taking into account the most significant proposals of specialists, will allow even Ryazan to win a duel with Virginia. I repeat: this is not "fantasy" or "theory", but quite specific test results obtained for real PL targets.
Installation of special automatic long-distance communication buoys (with the possibility of transmission from under the ice), which are automatically fired upon the death of our submarine (with registration and transmission to the shore of registration data and the last significant information).
Of course, on this issue, much more can and should be clarified, but the open nature of the article excludes "excessive detail."
However, these three main points: anti-torpedoes, a well-modernized "Physicist" and a long-range emergency communication buoy - this is something that is not easy and possible, but needs to be tough and straightforward! And moreover, to confront the United States with the implementation of this, because this will be the strongest deterrent for them.
It is impossible to ignore the question of the optimal strength of the NSNF. Taking into account the significant superiority of the enemy's anti-submarine forces, the difficult physical and geographical conditions and the limited "capacity" of the theater of operations, where we can ensure the combat stability of the NSNF, their excessive number is inappropriate.
Of course, during the ice period, one RPLSN should be in combat service in the protected area of the White Sea. It should be understood that, due to the shallow depths, it will most likely be impossible to ensure its secrecy during the clear ice period (i.e., at this time, there should be other patrolling areas, for example, in the Kara Sea).
2. Creation of a "protected area" Karskiye Vorota ", excluding the possibility of" clogging "it with mines, and the provision of all types of defense (including new ones, for example, against underwater vehicles). The most expedient way to do this is to recreate the abandoned Yokangsky naval base (Ostrovnoy settlement).
Its significant distance from the border (in contrast to all other naval bases) raises the question of moving there part of the fleet's stocks and ammunition.
3. Coastal SCRCs, as those possessing the highest combat resistance, should have priority in rearmament on the "Zircon" anti-ship missiles. It is necessary to deploy SCRC on Novaya Zemlya (for example, by redeploying Bastion from Kotelny Island) to completely close the entire Barents Sea by the affected zones (excluding the use of missile defense ships in it) and create a constant threat to the enemy from two directions.
4. Creation of a high-speed transport and landing group within the Northern Fleet, which ensures the rapid transfer of troops and cargo (including ammunition for air defense missiles), incl. in ice conditions, on the basis of the modernized design of the landing ship on the air shelf "Zubr".
5. Priority development of the aviation group
The solution of tasks in the North is impossible without a sharp increase in the capabilities of our aviation group.
The main thing: AWACS, new air-to-air missiles (especially long-range missiles), electronic warfare systems and modern fighter airborne radars.
Taking into account the limited rates of delivery of A-50U and A-100 AWACS aircraft, a light tactical AWACS aircraft is definitely needed (and a patrol aircraft at its base). Taking into account the tight deadlines, the solution may be to create in a short time a radar similar to the SAAB Argus aircraft based on the Irbis serial fighter radar (with a significant increase in its aperture)
Taking into account the fact that deliveries of medium-range 170-1 missiles were made to the Aerospace Forces several years ago, the situation with respect to the R-37M (its apparent absence in combat units in significant quantities) raises deep concern. It is very likely that the price of the missile turned out to be quite expensive, but it is critically important for us (first of all, to "knock out" the enemy AWACS and UAV aircraft). Its deliveries to the Air Force of the fleets should be considered a priority (including for the actual shooting).
A powerful and combat-ready aviation grouping makes it possible not only to qualitatively strengthen the country's air defense from the north, but also, relying on the "unsinkable aircraft carriers" Severomorsk and "Rogachevo" (Novaya Zemlya), to give combat stability to the forces of the Northern Fleet and ensure the deployment of NSNF under ice.
6. The capacity of the Arctic military bases should provide for the deployment of significantly increased groups of servicemen with equipment to ensure the deployment of security units during the threatened period, in terms of the number, level of combat training and equipment that exclude the seizure of military facilities of the Russian Federation (primarily airfields) by enemy airborne assault forces.
7. For operations in the Arctic, the most appropriate type of multipurpose submarine is the version of the new project 677, but equipped with a nuclear main power plant. Project 885 is too expensive and large in size (which greatly complicates its application at shallow depths). The presence of a large ammunition load of missiles in the UVP under the ice has no advantages.
At the same time, the construction of diesel-electric submarines for ocean theaters (Northern and Pacific fleets) is impractical, and the best anaerobic installation for them is a small-sized nuclear reactor.
If problems are solved and not hidden
Of course, the complete list of necessary measures is much larger than the one given and is a closed document. However, even the implementation of this short list provides a qualitative change in the balance of forces in the Arctic, and ensuring the solution of the tasks of our armed forces there.
However, all this is possible only if the problems are really solved, and not hidden, which, alas, is being done now.
