From previous articles, we saw that the experience of V. K. Vitgefta as a naval commander is completely lost against the background of his enemy Heihachiro Togo, and the squadron over which the Russian Rear Admiral took command was significantly inferior to the Japanese fleet in quantitative, qualitative and crew training. It seemed that things had deteriorated completely, but this was still not the case, because with the departure of the governor, the paradigm "Take care, and do not risk!", Which hitherto fettered the fleet, suddenly unclenched its claws.
And this happened, surprisingly, thanks to the governor Alekseev. And it turned out this way: the admiral himself was the commander-in-chief at the theater, and therefore the direct leadership of the squadron did not threaten him - it seemed as if not by rank. Therefore, the governor could calmly wait until the deceased S. O. Makarov will not receive a new commander of the fleet, appointing someone else as temporary acting, for example, the same V. K. Vitgeft. Instead, Alekseev acts very politically: shortly after the death of Stepan Osipovich (he was replaced for several days by the prince and the junior flagship Ukhtomsky), he arrives in Arthur and quite heroically takes command. This, of course, looks spectacular and … does not require absolutely any initiative from the governor: since the squadron suffered heavy losses, there is no talk of a confrontation with the Japanese fleet yet. So, you can, without fear, raise your flagship banner over the battleship "Sevastopol" and … do nothing while waiting for the new commander.
After all, what happened under S. O. Makarov? The fleet, although it was much weaker than the Japanese, still tried to conduct constant and systematic combat work, and this (despite the losses) gave our sailors invaluable experience and fettered the actions of the Japanese, and there was nothing to say about raising the morale of the Arthur squadron. Nothing prevented the continuation of these practices after the death of "Petropavlovsk" - except for the fear of losses, of course. In war, it is impossible without losses, and Stepan Osipovich understood this perfectly, risking himself and demanding the same from his subordinates: as mentioned earlier, the question of whether S. O. Makarov is a great admiral or not, remains controversial, but there can be no two opinions about the fact that nature has awarded him with a certain entrepreneurial spirit, personal courage and leadership qualities. S. O. Makarov was not afraid of losses, but the governor Alekseev was a completely different matter. The latter, of course, sought to command the fleet in wartime, but all his actions suggest that, being ready to try on the laurels of a combat admiral, the governor Alekseev did not want and was not ready to take on the responsibility of the fleet commander.
The fact is that no matter how weakened the Arthur squadron, as soon as it became clear that the Japanese were preparing to land only sixty miles from Port Arthur, the fleet simply had to intervene. It was not at all necessary to try to attack the Japanese with the last three remaining battleships (of which, moreover, Sevastopol could not develop more than 10 knots until May 15, when it was repaired). But there were high-speed cruisers and destroyers, there was the possibility of night attacks - the only problem was that such actions would be associated with great risk.
And this put Admiral Alekseev in front of an extremely unpleasant dilemma: at his own peril and risk, organize a countermeasure to the Japanese landing, fraught with losses, or go down in history as a squadron commander, under whose very nose the Japanese carried out a major landing operation, and he did not even hit a finger, to stop them. None of the options promised a political profit, and therefore the governor Alekseev … hastily departs from Port Arthur. Of course, not just like that - having previously given a telegram addressed to the Sovereign Emperor with a justification why Alekseev, well, it is insanely urgent to be in Mukden and having received the appropriate order from the Sovereign. So, the urgent departure of Alekseev is ironically motivated - since the Emperor himself deigned to order …
And right there, even before the governor's train arrived at its destination, Admiral Alekseev suddenly becomes a champion of active operations at sea: he instructs the one who was left to command the squadron V. K. Witgeft to attack the landing site with 10-12 destroyers under the cover of cruisers and the battleship "Peresvet"!
It’s so interesting: it means “to take care and not to risk” and suddenly - a sudden passion for risky and even adventurous operations in the best traditions of Admiral Ushakov … TO. Witgeft on departure:
"1) in view of a significant weakening of forces, do not take active actions, limiting ourselves only to the production of reconnaissance by cruisers and destroyer detachments to attack enemy ships. cruisers can be produced … without the apparent danger of being cut off …"
Experienced in intrigues, Alekseev perfectly arranged the matter: if the Acting Chief of the squadron does not attack the Japanese, well, he, the governor, has nothing to do with it, since he gave a direct order to attack, and the rear admiral did not follow the order. If V. K. Vitgeft will risk attacking the Japanese and will suffer defeat with sensitive losses, which means that he violated the governor's orders unnecessarily not to risk given to them upon departure. And in the extremely unlikely event that the Rear Admiral left on the squadron still succeeds - well, that's great, most of the laurel wreath in this case will go to Alekseev: it happened "according to his instructions" and V. K. Vitgeft is just the chief of staff for the governor …
In essence, V. K. Vitgeft fell into a trap. Whatever he did (except, of course, the heroic Victoria over the Japanese fleet) - the fault would lie solely with him. But on the other hand, he was no longer dominated by a direct order to protect the forces entrusted to him: Admiral Alekseev could not give V. K. Witgefta was directly instructed to "sit and not stick out", because in this case the viceroy himself would be accused of the inaction of the fleet. Thus, V. K. Vitgeft was able to carry out military operations according to his own understanding without much violation of the instructions given to him - and this was the only (but extremely important) plus in his unenviable position.
But why, in fact, unenviable? After all, the position of S. O. Makarov was no better: he led the squadron at his own peril and risk, but after all, he would have to answer, if anything happened. But only Stepan Osipovich was not afraid of responsibility, but Wilhelm Karlovich Vitgeft …
It is not so difficult to assess the actions of the rear admiral during the three months of commanding the squadron, which also became the last months of his life. Of course, temporarily I. D. The squadron commander, Rear Admiral Vitgeft, did not become a worthy successor to the Makarov traditions. He did not organize the correct training of the crews - of course, the training program was and was carried out, but how much can you learn while at anchor? And at sea for the entire period of his command V. K. Vitgeft took out the squadron only twice. The first time was on June 10, as if to break through to Vladivostok, but retreated, seeing the Japanese fleet. The Rear Admiral came out again on July 28, when, fulfilling the will of the Sovereign Emperor, he nevertheless led the squadron entrusted to him to a breakthrough and died in battle, trying to carry out the order given to him to the last.
Regular fighting? By no means, the officers of the 1st had to forget about the dashing destroyer night raids in search of the enemy. From time to time the ships of the Arthurian squadron came out to support their own troops with artillery fire, but that was all. Another credit to V. K. Witgeft is usually charged with his efforts to clear the free passage at sea from mines, and this was indeed a worthy undertaking by an experienced admiral in mines. The only problem was that V. K. Vitgeft fought with the effect (mines), not the cause (the ships that put them). Let us recall, for example, “The opinions expressed at the meeting of Mr. Flagships, land generals and commanders of ships of the 1st rank. June 14, 1904 :
“The chief of the fortress artillery, Major General Bely, expressed the following: that to protect the raid from mining by the enemy and for the free exit of the fleet to the sea, as well as passages along the coast to support the flanks of the fortress, one should not spare shells and keep enemy ships away from 40-50 cables … to the fortress, what is currently forbidden to him.»
But coastal artillery, in any case, was not a panacea for enemy mines. Word of Vl. Semenov, at that time - the senior officer of the cruiser "Diana":
“So, on the night of May 7, three small steamers came and went about their business. The serf searchlights illuminated them; batteries and boats standing in the aisle fired at them for about half an hour; boasted that one had exploded, and as a result - in the morning the boats that went out for trawling picked up about 40 wooden racks floating on the surface. Obviously, by the number of mines dropped. But only five of these were caught. Disappointing!.."
What is it? Some steamers, in view of the squadron … and no one could do anything? And all because even such Makarov's "trifle" as the cruiser duty on the outer roadstead, the governor canceled, because "no matter what happened," and V. K. Vitgeft, although, in the end, and decided to restore the watch, but not immediately. There was no question of keeping several destroyers ready for a night attack and destroying the impudent Japanese with another attempt at mining.
As a result, a vicious circle arose - V. K. Vitgeft had every reason to fear Japanese mines, and it was only because of this that he could not strive to withdraw his ships to the outer roadstead. Despite all his efforts to organize trawling (and in this matter, the rear admiral's disposition should in no case be underestimated), the waters in front of Port Arthur turned into a real minefield, which is why during the "sortie" of the Port Arthur squadron at sea, 10 June, the battleship Sevastopol was blown up. V. K. Vitgeft, at the same meeting of the Flagships on June 14, noted:
“… Despite daily trawling for too long a month, on the day of their exit, all the ships were in obvious danger from newly placed mines, from the setting of which there was no physical possibility to protect themselves, and if only one Sevastopol, and did not explode upon leaving and anchor "Tsarevich", "Peresvet", "Askold" and other ships, it is only the grace of God."
It is known that on June 10, during the departure of the Arthurian squadron, its ships anchored in the outer roadstead, and at least 10 Japanese mines were caught between the ships, so the rear admiral was largely right. But it should be understood that such a density of mine laying was possible only due to the fact that Japanese light ships felt at home around Port Arthur - and who allowed them to? Who actually locked up the light forces of the squadron and cruiser in the inner harbor of Port Arthur? First - the governor, and then - Rear Admiral V. K. Vitgeft. And this despite the fact that a detachment from "Bayan", "Askold" and "Novik" with torpedo boats could do the Japanese a lot of dirty tricks with short raids even during the period of maximum weakness of the squadron. The Japanese regularly patrolled near Port Arthur with their armored cruisers, but all these "Matsushima", "Sumy" and other "Akitsushima" could neither leave nor fight with the Russian detachment, and the "dogs" would not be very happy if they dared they are to fight. Of course, the Japanese could try to cut off the Russian cruisers from Arthur, but in this case, during the operation, no one bothered to bring a couple of battleships to the outer raid. In one way or another, it was possible to provide cover for the light forces, there would be a desire: but this is what Rear Admiral V. K. There was no Vitgeft.
It can be assumed that V. K. Vitgeft felt like a temporary worker. We know for sure that he did not consider himself capable of leading the forces entrusted to him to victory. It is likely that he saw his main task only in preserving the naval staff and people by the time the real squadron commander arrived, and in the governor, who soon after his departure began to "encourage" the rear admiral to take active actions, he saw an obstacle to the implementation of that that he considered it his duty. Judging by the documents at the disposal of the author of this article, the governor's expectations looked like this: active actions by cruisers and destroyers (but without unnecessary risk!), The earliest possible repair of damaged battleships, and while they are being repaired, the rest cannot be used anyway - remove the guns from them in favor of the land fortress. Well, there, you see, the new commander will arrive in time. If not, wait until all the battleships are ready, return the guns to them, and then act according to the situation.
VC. Vitgeft was with all his heart for disarming the fleet, he not only battleships, but also the cruisers was ready to disarm (here the governor had to restrain the impulses of his chief of staff) - just not to lead the ships into battle. It is hardly possible to speak of cowardice - apparently, Wilhelm Karlovich was sincerely convinced that he would not be able to achieve anything with active actions and would only fail the whole thing. Therefore, V. K. Vitgeft quite sincerely urged the flagships to accept the famous Magna Carta of the abdication of the fleet, as it was later called in Port Arthur, according to which the artillery of the battleships should be brought ashore to strengthen the defense of the fortress, and the destroyers should henceforth be protected as the apple of their eye for future operations. Perhaps V. K. Witgeft was truly convinced that he was acting for good. But if so, then we can only state: Wilhelm Karlovich did not understand people at all, did not know how and did not know how to lead them and, alas, did not understand at all what his duty to the Fatherland was.
After all, what was happening in the squadron? S. O. Makarov died, which caused general despondency, and the etching of the "Makarov" spirit and any initiative during the period of the governor's command only worsened the situation. But on April 22, the governor left Arthur, and everyone seemed to even breathe a sigh of relief, realizing that with the governor, nothing would happen, but with the new commander … who knows?
VC. Witgeft should not have been overly concerned about the preservation of the ships. Well, let's say he would have handed over technically sound battleships to the newly appointed squadron chief - then what? What's the use of serviceable battleships if their teams since November last year have had less than 40 days of practice during the period of S. O. Makarov? How to defeat a skillful, experienced, numerically and qualitatively superior enemy with such crews? These are the questions that Wilhelm Karlovich had to attend to, and the answers to them consisted in the need to continue what Stepan Osipovich Makarov had begun. The only sensible act in place of the new commander would be the resumption of systematic hostilities and the most intensive training of the squadron battleships that remained on the move. Moreover, the formal permission for active actions of V. K. Vitgeft received.
Instead, just three days after taking office, the rear admiral convinces the flagships to sign the Magna Carta of the abdication of the fleet. As Vladimir Semyonov wrote ("Reckoning"):
“The protocol began with a statement that in the current situation the squadron is not able to have any success in active operations, and therefore, until better times, all its funds should be allocated to strengthen the defense of the fortress … The mood on the ships was the most depressed, not much better than on the day of Makarov's death … The last hopes were crumbling …"
On April 26, the text of the Magna Carta became known to the squadron, which dealt a severe blow to its morale, and less than a week later, on May 2, V. K. Vitgeft finished it off completely. It's amazing how the new commander managed to turn the only indisputable victory of Russian weapons into a moral defeat, but he succeeded.
Now there are different views on the role of V. K. Vitgefta in blowing up the Japanese battleships Yashima and Hatsuse. For a long time, the prevailing opinion was that this success was not due to, but in spite of the actions of the Rear Admiral, and it was done solely thanks to the valor of the commander of the Amur mine layer, Captain 2nd Rank F. N. Ivanova. But then it was suggested that the role of V. K. Vitgefta is much more significant than it was commonly believed. Let's try to figure out what happened.
So, some 4 hours after the departure of the governor on April 22, V. K. Vitgeft gathered flagships and captains of the 1st and 2nd rank for a meeting. Apparently, he offered them mining approaches to the internal raid in order not to miss the Japanese fire-ships, but this proposal was rejected. But the second paragraph of the minutes of the meeting read:
At the first opportunity, place a minefield from the Amur transport
However, neither the place nor the time of the mine laying was specified. For some time everything was quiet, but then the rear admiral was disturbed by the commander of the "Cupid" Captain 2nd Rank F. N. Ivanov. The fact is that the officers noticed: the Japanese, carrying out the close blockade of Port Arthur, over and over again followed the same route. It was necessary to clarify its coordinates in order not to be mistaken when setting up a mine bank. For this, the cavtorang asked V. K. Vitgeft about a special order for observation posts. VC. Vitgeft gave such an order:
“The Amur transport will have to go out to sea as soon as possible and at a distance of 10 miles from the entrance lighthouse along the alignment of the entrance lights on S to put 50 min information from the surrounding posts, and when the officer on duty, in accordance with the location of the enemy and his movement, finds that the Amur transport can carry out the aforementioned order, report to the Brave boat for a report to Admiral Loshchinsky and Amur transport."
Several observation posts located in various places took the bearings of the Japanese detachment during the next passage of the latter, and this made it possible to quite accurately determine its route. Now it was necessary to lay mines, and this was a rather difficult task. During the day, there were Japanese ships near Port Arthur that could sink the Amur or simply notice the laying of mines, which immediately doomed the operation to failure. At night there was a great risk of colliding with Japanese destroyers, and in addition, it would be difficult to determine the exact location of the minelayer, which is why there was a great risk of placing mines in the wrong place. The task looked difficult, and V. K. Vitgeft … withdrew from her decision. The right to determine the time of the exit of the minesag was delegated to the head of the mobile and mine defense, Rear Admiral Loshchinsky.
On the morning of May 1, Lieutenant Gadd, who was on duty at the Golden Mountain signal station, discovered Rear Admiral Dev's blocking unit. Gadd interviewed other posts and came to the conclusion that the laying of mines is possible, which he reported to the mine defense headquarters and on the Amur. However, the exit of the minelay remained rather risky, which is why Rear Admiral Loshchinsky did not want to take responsibility for himself - instead of sending the Amur to plant mines, he requested instructions from the squadron headquarters. However, V. K. Vitgeft, apparently, also did not thirst for this responsibility, since he ordered to inform Loshchinsky by phone:
"The head of the squadron ordered that regarding the expulsion of" Amur "be guided by the location of the enemy ships"
But even now Loshchinsky did not want to send Amur on a combat mission of his own free will. Instead, he, taking with him the commander of the minelayer, went to the meeting - to report to V. K. Vitgeft and ask his permission. But V. K. Instead of direct instructions, Vitgeft responds to Loshchinsky:
"Mine defense is your business, and if you find it useful and convenient, then send"
In the end V. K. Witgeft nevertheless gave a direct order by raising the signal on the Sevastopol:
"Cupid" go to destination. Go carefully"
These altercations took almost an hour, which, however, played into the hands of the mine setting - the Japanese ships were moving away from the place of setting. The matter was risky - the Amur was separated from the Japanese by a very small distance and a strip of fog: it could have been noticed, in which case the minelayer would have been doomed.
But if V. K. Vitgeft did not strive to determine the time for setting mines, then he determined the place of setting exactly - 8-9 miles and it is completely incomprehensible what he was guided by. The Japanese could not damage this barrier, they went more seaward. The admiral did not want to set up a fence outside the territorial waters? But in those years, the zone of territorial waters was considered three miles from the coast. In general, the decision is completely inexplicable, but the Amur commander received just such an order and violated it, setting up a minefield at a distance of 10, 5-11 miles.
The fact of violation of the order was reflected in the report of F. N. Ivanova V. K. Vitgeft, and in the report of V. K. Vitgefta - to the governor, and therefore can not cause doubts. Accordingly, it can be argued that the official point of view on this issue is correct, and the role of V. K. Vitgefta is small in this operation. Of course, he supported (and maybe even put forward) the idea of an active mine setting, and helped F. N. Ivanov (at his request) to determine the route of passage of the Japanese troops, but this is all that can be recorded in the asset of the rear admiral.
It is very sad that, having begun at least some active actions, V. K. Vitgeft could not use them to raise the morale of the squadron. Having placed mines, he simply had to admit that on these mines someone would be blown up and there would be a need to finish off the enemy's detachment. Moreover, even if no one had been blown up, but the ships were "ready for the march and battle" (the battleships could be taken to the outer raid), all the same, such a readiness to attack the enemy aroused great enthusiasm in the squadron. Instead, as Vl. Semenov:
“- To the raid! To the raid! Roll out the rest! - shouted and raged around …
As I believed then, so I believe now: they would have been “rolled out”!.. But how was it to go to the raid without vapor?.. Brilliant, the only one for the whole campaign, the moment was lost …
… This blunder affected the squadron worst of all losses.
We will never be able to do anything! Where to us! - hot heads repeated acrimoniously … Not destiny! - said the more balanced … And somehow everyone immediately decided that there was nothing more to wait, that all that was left was to recognize the justice of the renunciation written in the Magna Carta … I have never seen such a decline in spirit. True, then the mood got stronger again, but this was already based on the determination to fight in any case and in any situation, as it was necessary, as if “to spite” someone …"
Even when the success of the mine laying became obvious, V. K. Vitgeft was still hesitant - the cruisers had not received an order to breed pairs at all, and the destroyers - only with a great delay. The first explosion under the stern of the "Hatsuse" sounded at 09.55, the Russian destroyers were able to reach the outer roadstead only after 13.00. The result was not slow to affect: the Japanese took the damaged Yashima in tow and left, driving off the destroyers with cruiser fire. If temporarily I. D. Squadron commander Rear-Admiral Vitgeft had destroyers and cruisers under steam at the time of the detonation, then their joint attack could well end not only Yasima, but, possibly, Sikishima, because at the first moment after the detonation the Japanese panicked, opening fire by water (assuming that they were attacked by submarines). And the later actions of the Japanese sailors betray their strongest psychological shock. "Hatsuse" died in view of Port Arthur, "Yashima" was taken to Encounter Rock Island, but, according to the official Japanese history of the war at sea, it soon became clear that the possibilities of fighting for the survivability of the battleship had been exhausted. The ship was anchored in a solemn atmosphere, accompanied by shouts of "Banzai!"
But this is according to the official history, but the report of the British observer, naval attaché, captain W. Packinham contains a "slightly" different vision of those events. According to S. A. Balakin in "Mikasa" and others … Japanese battleships 1897-1905 ":
“According to some reports, Yasima remained afloat until the next morning, and several ships were sent to rescue the abandoned battleship on May 3 … In general, in Pekinham's presentation, the story with Yasima is very reminiscent of the circumstances of the death of the Boyarin cruiser for three months earlier.
With just one well-timed attack, the Russians had a good chance of increasing the number of Japanese battleships killed from two to three. But even if this did not happen, there is no doubt that on May 3, the 1st Pacific Squadron could, if not crush Japanese domination at sea, then significantly shake it and deliver a powerful blow that seriously confused all Japanese maps. If on that day the Russian fleet was led by a decisive admiral capable of taking risks, then …
Let us imagine for a second that on the eve of May 2 in K. V. Witgeft would have possessed the spirit of Admiral F. F. Ushakov - what could have happened in this case? At dawn, all the Russian ships went to the outer roadstead - would they have managed to get close to the Japanese squadron after their battleships were blown up or not, a fortune-telling question, and let's say that it was not possible, and the Sikishima with the cruisers left. But it is obvious that after such a "embarrassment" the Japanese will be confused and hesitant, since the commander of the United Fleet simply will not be ready for the death of his two battleships without the slightest damage to the Russian fleet - which means it's time to strike at the Japanese landing site in Biziwo!
Surprisingly, this move had excellent chances of success. Indeed, literally a few hours before the explosion on the Russian mines of the Yashima and Hatsuse, the armored cruiser Kasuga rammed the armored deck Iosino. The latter immediately went to the bottom, but Kasuga got it - the ship was badly damaged, and another armored cruiser, Yakumo, was forced to drag the Kasuga to Sasebo for repairs. And Kamimura with his armored cruisers at that time was looking for the Vladivostok detachment, since Heihachiro Togo quite reasonably believed that his 6 squadron battleships and three armored cruisers would be more than enough to block the weakened Arthurian squadron. Indeed, on May 2 V. K. Vitgeft could lead into battle only three battleships, an armored one and four armored cruisers, and 16 destroyers, and with such forces, of course, there was nothing to dream of crushing the backbone of the United Fleet.
But on May 2, everything changed, and the absence of Kamimura with his 2nd detachment could play a bad joke on Togo: on that day, the forces of the United Fleet were scattered, and he could immediately throw into battle only 3 battleships, 1-2 armored cruisers (moreover, rather, still one), several armored, and 20 pieces of destroyers - i.e. roughly equivalent to the Russian forces. Yes, of course, "Mikasa", "Asahi" and "Fuji" were stronger than "Peresvet", "Poltava" and "Sevastopol", but the battle on July 28, 1904 testified with all irrefutability - at that time Russian battleships were able to withstand many hours of battle with the Japanese, without losing their combat effectiveness. Moreover, according to Vl. Semyonov's attack on Bitszyvo with the ships remaining in the ranks of the Russians was animatedly discussed by the officers of the squadron:
“Such a plan was hotly discussed in the saloons. Taking advantage of the spring weather (light fogs often came), get out of Arthur as unnoticed as possible, destroy the transport fleet and return, of course, with a fight, since the Japanese will undoubtedly try not to let us back. It would not even be a battle, but a breakthrough into its own, albeit blocked port. Of course, we would have suffered a lot, but damage in an artillery battle is always easier than mine holes: when repairing them, you can usually do without a dock and without a caisson, which means - by the time the "Tsesarevich", "Retvizan" and " Victory "- we will again be in full force. Finally, even if the battle had come out decisive and unhappy for us, if our main forces were almost destroyed, the Japanese would have got it too! They would have to leave for a long time and thoroughly repair, and then in what position would the landed army find itself, which we (by the number of transports) determined at about 30 thousand?.. Without supplies, without a convoy, it would have to retreat to Yalu to join the active there by troops …"
And if such actions were discussed when Togo had six battleships, then now, when he had only three directly at his disposal … and even four, if the Sikishima managed to join the main forces before the Russian ships approached Biziwo? In any case, while the main forces of both squadrons would have tied each other in battle, the armored "Bayan" with the support of armored "six-thousanders" could well break through and attack the landing site. It is extremely doubtful that her direct cover, the old men "Matsushima" and "Chin-Yen" under the command of Vice Admiral S. Kataoka, would be able to stop them.
Perhaps such an attack would not have been successful, but it would have had the most significant impact on the Japanese command. What can I say - only one timid exit of the Russian squadron on June 10, when V. K. Vitgeft did not dare to fight the Japanese and retreated in view of the enemy to an external raid under the cover of coastal artillery caused a certain change in the plans of the Japanese command - the very next day after the squadron went to sea, the army commanders were notified:
“The fact that the Russian fleet can leave Port Arthur has come true: the sea transportation of foodstuffs required for the formations of the Manchurian armies is endangered, and it would be imprudent for the 2nd Army to advance north of Gaizhou at the present time. The Liaoyang battle, which was supposed to take place before the onset of the rains, was postponed for a period of time after their end."
And what effect could then have been produced by a decisive battle of the main forces, perhaps in view of the place of landing?
However, all these are just unrealized possibilities and we cannot know what they could lead to: all of the above is nothing more than a genre of alternative history despised by many. Nevertheless, the author of this article considers it appropriate to show how wide the choice of solutions really was for V. K. Vitgeft and how modestly he took advantage of the opportunities presented to him.
Returning to real history, it should be noted that during the command of V. K. Vitgeft, the port economy and the repairmen worked well enough: work on the damaged battleships was carried out very quickly and efficiently. But can this be credited to the Rear Admiral? The fact is that on March 28, 1904, a certain naval officer, who had previously commanded the battleship Tsesarevich, was promoted to rear admiral and was appointed commander of the port of Port Arthur. This officer distinguished himself by his extraordinary management, reorganized the work of the port facilities, which is why the fleet did not know any problems with coal, materials, or repair work. His name was Ivan Konstantinovich Grigorovich, as you know, he later became a naval minister: and I must say that if he was not the best, then he was certainly one of the best ministers in the entire history of the Russian State. Also, in no case should you forget that S. O. Makarov brought along with him one of the best Russian ship engineers - N. N. Kuteinikov, who immediately took an active part in the repairs of damaged ships. Such subordinates should not be ordered what to do - it was enough not to interfere with them so that the job was done in the best possible way.
Thus, we can state with the usual sadness that V. K. Vitgeft did not cope with the duties of the squadron commander - he did not want and could not organize either training of crews, or systematic hostilities, and in no way prevented the landing of the Japanese army, which threatened the base of the Russian fleet - Port Arthur. In addition, he did not at all show himself as a leader, and his actions to disarm the fleet in favor of the fortress and the inability to use the gift of Fate (which this time acted in the person of the commander of the Amur minelayer FN Ivanov) had an extremely negative effect on combat the spirit of the squadron.
But by the beginning of June, the damaged battleships returned to service - now the Russians had 6 squadron battleships against four Japanese ones, and it was time to do something …
