Ships of projects 26 and 26 bis. The first cruisers of the Soviet fleet laid down in the USSR. Graceful beauties, in whose silhouettes the swift outlines of the Italian school are easily guessed … It seemed that we should know almost everything about these ships: they were built in our country, all archival documents should be at hand. Nevertheless, among all the cruisers of the Russian imperial and Soviet navy, there are probably no ships that have received such contradictory assessments as the cruisers of the Kirov and Maxim Gorky type. Only Soviet nuclear-powered cruisers, which, by a strange coincidence, are also Kirov-class cruisers, can compete with them in this matter. Surprisingly, but true: even the classification of ships of the project 26 and 26-bis is still a subject of discussion.
In the USSR Navy, these cruisers were considered light, and Soviet historiography, like most of modern publications, also classifies these ships as a subclass of light cruisers. Indeed, “if something swims like a duck, quacks like a duck and looks like a duck, then this is a duck”: projects 26 and 26-bis were not only called light cruisers, they were created on the basis of a light Italian cruiser project, and the dimensions and other main characteristics, with the exception of the main caliber, were quite consistent with this class of ships. There were more light cruisers in world practice, there were better protected or faster ones, but there were many that were inferior in these characteristics to Soviet cruisers. The only difference between "Kirov" and "Maxim Gorky" from foreign ships of this class is that the caliber of their guns is one inch larger than it was customary.
It is this difference that proponents of a different point of view point to: despite all of the above, the firstborn of Soviet shipbuilding should be considered not light, but heavy cruisers, since according to the international classification, any cruisers with guns over 155 mm are considered heavy. And this is one of the reasons for the polar assessments of our ships. Indeed, if we compare Maxim Gorky with Fiji, Montecuccoli or Leipzig, our cruiser (at least on paper) is very good, but, of course, against the background of Hipper, Zara or Takao type 26-bis looks pale.
In this series of articles, the author will try to understand the history of the creation of the cruisers of the project 26 and 26-bis. To understand for what tasks they were designed and how their tactical and technical characteristics were determined, whether these ships were clones of Italian cruisers or should they be considered the brainchild of Soviet shipbuilders, what was the quality of their construction, what became their strengths and what were their weaknesses. And, of course, compare the Soviet cruisers with their foreign counterparts.
The history of the cruisers of the project 26 and 26 bis began on April 15, 1932, when the head of the Naval Forces of the Red Army V. M. Orlov approved the signature signed by the head of the USU (training and combat management, in fact - the headquarters of the fleet) E. S. Panzerzhansky operational-tactical assignment for the development of a light cruiser. According to the document, the cruiser was charged with:
1. Support for submarine combat operations at their bases and at sea.
2. Reconnaissance, support for reconnaissance and attacks of destroyers.
3. Reflecting enemy landings and providing their own tactical landings.
4. Participation in a combined strike by the forces of the fleet against the enemy at sea and in position.
5. Fight with enemy cruisers.
We should dwell on these tasks in more detail. Where, for example, did the task of supporting submarine combat operations, never and nowhere set for a light cruiser, come from? The cruisers were supposed to withdraw the submarines from the base, act together with them, direct them to the enemy, and exercise control … But these are ships of completely different qualities and purposes! How did the Soviet military men manage to tie into one harness "a horse and a quivering doe"?
Let's try to figure out how this happened. To do this, remember that less than two years before the events described, in 1930, engineer A. N. Asafov proposed the idea of a squadron submarine. In his opinion, it was possible to build a submarine with a surface speed of up to 23-24 knots, capable of supporting its surface squadron, attacking enemy warships. At a time when the leadership of the naval forces of the USSR was fond of the development of the "mosquito fleet", such ideas were simply doomed to the understanding and support of the "fathers-commanders". This is how the history of the Pravda-class submarines began; the first three (and last) ships of this series were laid down in May-December 1931.
By the way, an expensive experiment to create a squadron boat ended in a deafening failure, since attempts to combine the deliberately incongruous elements of a high-speed ship and a submarine could not be successful in any way. The lines of the destroyer, required to achieve high speed, are completely unsuitable for scuba diving, and the need to ensure good seaworthiness required a large buoyancy reserve, which made the submarine extremely difficult to submerge.
However, our sailors should not be blamed for excessive adventurism: the idea looked extremely attractive, and it was probably worth a try, especially since similar attempts were made by other maritime powers, including such as England and France. Although, of course, at that time in no country in the world attempts to create a squadron submarine were not crowned with success (something like this was only approached with the advent of nuclear power plants, and even then with certain reservations). But as long as the creation of an effective squadron submarine seemed possible, the task of interacting with them for a light cruiser looked quite rational.
Participation in a combo strike. Everything is quite simple here: at the beginning of the 30s, the theory of "small naval war" still retained its positions. The main assumption of this theory was that in coastal areas such types of weapons as aircraft, submarines, torpedo boats, coupled with modern land artillery and mines, are capable of crushing the obviously superior naval forces of the enemy.
Without going into the details of the discussions of the supporters of the "small war" and the traditional fleet, I will note that in those specific economic conditions in which the USSR was at the turn of the 30s, one could only dream of a mighty ocean-going fleet. At the same time, the task of defending its own coast was very acute, so reliance on the "mosquito fleet" as a temporary measure was justified to a certain extent. And if the supporters of the "small naval war" were engaged in the thoughtful development of naval aviation, submarines, communications, paying special attention to the development of effective tactics for their use and the practice of crews (not in numbers, but in skill!), Then the benefits of all this would not be easy undoubted, but colossal. Unfortunately, the development of domestic light forces took a completely different path, the consideration of which will take us too far from the topic of the article.
The combined strike was, in fact, the highest form of combat in the theory of "small war". Its meaning was to quickly and imperceptibly for the enemy concentrate maximum forces in one place and deliver an unexpected and strong blow by diverse forces - aviation, destroyers, torpedo boats, submarines, if possible - coastal artillery, etc. A small nuance: sometimes the combined blow is called concentrated, which is not entirely true. The difference between them lies in the fact that a combined strike assumed a simultaneous attack with all forces, while a concentrated strike is carried out by sequentially entering into battle units of different types. In any case, the greatest chances of success were achieved in the coastal areas, since it was there that it was possible to concentrate the maximum of light forces and provide the best conditions for attacks by coastal aviation. One of the main options for combat operations was a battle in a mine position, when the enemy, while advancing towards it, was weakened by the actions of submarines, and a combined blow was delivered during attempts to force it.
At that stage of its development, the Soviet fleet was not going to go to the world ocean or even to remote sea areas - it simply had nothing to do with it. The main task of the Red Army Navy in the Baltic was to cover Leningrad from the sea, in the Black Sea - to defend Sevastopol and to defend Crimea and Odessa from the sea, but in the Far East, due to the almost complete absence of naval forces, they were not given any tasks at all.
Under these conditions, the clause on the participation of Soviet light cruisers in the combined strike became uncontested. Of course, the Soviet admirals wished in every possible way to strengthen the light forces, which were to carry out the main task of the fleet, but even if this were not so, no one would have understood the leadership of the MS of the Red Army, had it wished to assign other tasks for the cruisers. To create the most modern light cruisers without the ability to use them for the most important mission of the fleet? “This is worse than a crime. This is mistake.
True, here the question may arise: how exactly should light cruisers be used in a combined strike? After all, it is obvious that any attempt to send them into an artillery battle against battleships, battle cruisers or even heavy cruisers is deliberately doomed to failure. The author could not find a direct answer to this question, but, most likely, it is contained in the second paragraph of the OTZ: "Reconnaissance, maintenance of reconnaissance and attacks of destroyers".
In those years, reconnaissance functions in squadrons of surface ships were universally assigned to light cruisers. Aviation provided only preliminary data, but when the distance between the fleets preparing for confrontation was reduced to several tens of miles, it was the patrols of light cruisers that were put forward to detect the approaching enemy, maintain visual contact with him and notify the commander of the formation, course, speed of the main enemy forces … Therefore, light cruisers were very fast in order to prevent heavy enemy ships from getting close to dangerous distances, strong enough to fight on an equal footing with ships of their class, and the presence of numerous medium-caliber artillery (130-155 mm) allowed them to effectively fight enemy destroyers … It was to be expected that the enemy light cruisers would be the first to spot and try to intercept the Soviet destroyers in order to prevent them from reaching the main forces. Accordingly, the task of domestic cruisers was to crush or drive away the light forces of the enemy and bring the leading destroyers to the line of attack of heavy ships. Hence, in fact, the paragraph OTZ "Fight with enemy cruisers".
Unfortunately, the leaders of the naval forces of the Red Army did not strive for pharmaceutical accuracy in the wording, because otherwise this paragraph would probably sound like "Fight with enemy light cruisers."Such a battle could take place in two situations: during a combined strike on heavy ships, as described above, or during an attack by enemy transport or landing convoys. Soviet naval thought assumed that such convoys would have "two-tier" protection - destroyers and (at most) light cruisers in direct escort of transports and larger ships such as heavy ones, or even battle cruisers as long-range cover. In this case, it was assumed that the Soviet cruiser should quickly approach the convoy, destroying its immediate guard with artillery, attack transports with torpedoes and quickly retreat so as not to come under fire from heavy ships.
Paragraph: "Reflecting enemy landings and providing their own tactical landings" does not add anything new to the above functionality of Soviet cruisers. It is obvious that the enemy's heavy ships will go into Soviet coastal waters only to carry out some important and large operations, most likely amphibious operations, as was the case in the ever-memorable Albion operation. Then the task of the Soviet naval forces in general, and cruisers in particular, will be to counteract such landings, by delivering a combined strike against the main enemy forces or against a convoy of landing transports.
What qualities should a Soviet cruiser have to meet the requirements of an operational-tactical assignment?
First, the ship had to have a high speed comparable to the speed of destroyers. Only in this way the cruiser could, without breaking away from the destroyers, move into the area of the "combined strike" and only in this way could she lead the torpedo flotillas in battle. At the same time, the Soviet cruisers had to operate in conditions of the overwhelming superiority of the enemy's naval forces, and only speed gave chances of survival both in battles off their own coast and in raids on enemy communications.
Secondly, a long cruising range was not required for Soviet light cruisers, and could be sacrificed to other characteristics. All tasks of this class of ships, in relation to the Soviet fleet, were solved in coastal areas, or during short raider "sorties" in the Black and Baltic Seas.
Thirdly, the main battery artillery must be more powerful than that of ships of this class and powerful enough to quickly disable enemy light cruisers.
Fourthly, the booking must be sufficiently developed (extended along the waterline). The need for the maximum area of armor was explained by the requirement to maintain high speed, even undergoing intense shelling from enemy light cruisers and destroyers, because the shells of the latter already reached a caliber of 120-130 mm and, if they hit the waterline area, could do a lot. On the other hand, it didn't make much sense to increase the thickness of the vertical armor to withstand more powerful than 152-mm shells. Of course, there is no superfluous protection, but the cruiser was not intended for combat with heavy enemy ships, and the increase in vertical armor increased the displacement, required a more powerful power plant to provide the necessary speed and led to an increase in the cost of the ship. But the horizontal booking should be made as powerful as possible, which can be placed on the cruiser, without prejudice to its speed and power of artillery, because acting in coastal areas, and even on the flanks of the belligerent armies, the danger of enemy air raids could not be ignored.
Fifth, all of the above was required to fit into the minimum displacement and cost. We must not forget that in the early to mid-thirties the possibilities of the military budget and industry of the USSR were still frankly small.
It was assumed that in order to comply with all of the above tasks, the cruiser should have armament 4 * 180-mm (in two towers) 4 * 100-mm, 4 * 45-mm, 4 * 12, 7-mm machine guns and two three-tube torpedo tubes, also a ship should have been able to take up to 100 minutes in overload. Aircraft armament was supposed to consist of four "torpedo bombers" of a hitherto unknown design. The side armor was supposed to protect against a 152-mm high-explosive projectile at a distance of 85-90 kbt, decks - from 115 kbt and closer. The speed was supposed to be 37-38 knots, while the cruising range was set very insignificant - only 600 miles at full speed, which corresponded to 3,000 - 3,600 miles of economic speed. It was assumed that such performance characteristics can be obtained with a cruiser displacement of 6,000 tons.
Noteworthy is the rather strange requirements for the protection of the cruiser - if the armored deck was supposed to provide almost absolute protection against 6-inch artillery, then the board should only protect from a high-explosive 152-mm projectile and then, practically at the maximum distance for such weapons 85-90 kbt. It is difficult to understand what this is connected with: after all, the leading of the destroyers for a concentrated strike, and the attack of enemy transport convoys were a kind of oncoming and fleeting sea battle, and, therefore, it was necessary to expect rapprochement with enemy light cruisers at much closer distances than 8- 9 miles. It is possible that the sailors were impressed by the high performance of the 180-mm gun and hoped to quickly crush the enemy at a great distance. But most likely, the answer should be sought precisely in the oncoming nature of the battles: if the ship goes to the enemy, then the heading angle to it is relatively small and enemy shells will hit the side at a very large angle, at which even an armor-piercing 152-mm cannot do anything even relatively thin armor.
Thus, having studied the OTZ and the alleged performance characteristics of the Soviet cruiser, we can draw a completely unambiguous conclusion: no one set our ship the task of achieving success in an artillery battle with heavy enemy cruisers. Of course, a 6,000-ton cruiser with 4 * 180-mm guns could not in any way withstand the modern at that time "Washington" heavy cruiser with its eight 203-mm cannons and a displacement of 10,000 tons, and it would be at least strange to assume that our sailors did not understand this. In addition, we see that for the armor protection of the Soviet cruiser, the tasks of confronting 203-mm shells at any distances (at least ultra-long-range ones) were not set. Heavy cruisers could become an object of attack for a "combined strike" of the Red Army naval forces, but in this case, the task of the Soviet cruisers was to pave the way for their destroyers and torpedo boats, which were to deliver the fatal blow.
In other words, in the light of the views of the time, the fleet needed an ordinary light cruiser, with one exception: the requirements for the main caliber of our ships exceeded the standard tasks for light cruisers. While it was enough for a classic light cruiser not to be inferior in artillery to ships of the same class of other countries, our ships needed a lot of firepower, sufficient to quickly disable or even destroy light cruisers. This is understandable: it was required to break through the barriers of the enemy light forces quickly, there could be no time for any lengthy fire duels.
The rest of the requirements: high speed with moderate displacement, armor and cruising range, largely coincided with the Italian concept of ships of this class. Small, very fast, decently armed, although not too well-armored, the Mare Nostrum was more suited to the tasks of the Red Army's naval forces than the light cruisers of other powers.
England, France, Germany - all of them for the most part built weakly protected ships almost equally armed (8-9 six-inch guns) and had a very moderate speed (32-33 knots). Moreover, the fastest of them (French "Duguet Truin", 33 knots) did not have deck and side armor at all: only towers, cellars and wheelhouse were protected by 25-30 mm armor plates. The situation was even worse with the Emile Bertin laid down in 1931 - although this ship received as much as a 20-mm armored deck, but its artillery was not protected at all - neither the towers, nor the barbets. The British "Leaders" had good vertical protection of the citadel, consisting of 76 mm armor plates, supported by 25, 4 mm medium carbon steel lining. But this armor belt covered only the boiler rooms and engine rooms, and the armored deck, barbets and towers had only an inch (25, 4 mm) armor protection, which, of course, was completely insufficient. Although it is fair to mention the rather strong "box" protection of the artillery cellars, but on the whole, the "Linder" looked clearly under-armored. The German "Cologne" had a longer citadel than their British counterparts, the thickness of the armor belt was 50 mm (and 10-mm bevel behind it), but otherwise only 20 mm of the armored deck and 20-30 mm of turret armor. At the same time, the standard displacement of these ships was 6700-7300 tons.
Only the French cruisers of the La Galissonniere class stand apart.
With the standard armament of the light cruiser (9 * 152-mm guns in three turrets), the ships had extremely powerful booking: the armor belt covering the vehicles and ammunition storage was 105 mm thick (it thinned to the lower edge up to 60 mm). Behind the armor belt there was also a 20-mm bulkhead to the very bottom of the ship, which played the role of not only anti-fragmentation, but also anti-torpedo protection. The thickness of the deck armor was 38 mm, the forehead of the towers was 100 mm, and the barbets were 70-95 mm.
At the time of the bookmark, La Galissoniere was the most protected light cruiser, but what is there - many heavy cruisers could envy its armor! However, the price of such a powerful protection turned out to be considerable - the French cruiser had a standard displacement of 7,600 tons, and its maximum speed should have been only 31 knots, which is why ships of this type did not at all fit into the concept of the Red Army Naval Forces.
Italians are a different matter. In 1931, the Duce's fleet was replenished with four "A" series Condottieri: light cruisers "Alberico da Barbiano". Ships of this type were designed as Italy's ultimate response to the extremely powerful (perhaps the most powerful in the world) leaders of destroyers built in France. Interestingly, initially, these brainchildren of Italian shipyards were not even considered cruisers. According to the design assignment, these ships were called "37-node scouts", a little later they were referred to as "esploratori", ie scouts - a class peculiar only to Italians, in which there were also large destroyers. It was only later that the Condottieri were reclassified as light cruisers.
Their defense was extremely weak, designed to counter the French high-explosive 138-mm shells. The main belt, 24 mm thick, thinned to the extremities up to 20 mm (in some sources - 18 mm). It should be noted that the Italians used an innovative spaced vertical armor system for a light cruiser, since there was a 20 mm armor bulkhead behind the main armor belt, which gave the cruiser 38-44 mm of total vertical armor thickness. But in the battle with the cruiser, there was no sense from this, because with such "thicknesses" both "armored belts" penetrated 152-mm shells at any reasonable distance of the battle. The armored deck and traverse also had 20 mm, while the towers were defended with either 22 mm or 23 mm armor plates. In general, the views of those Italian historians who consider ships of the "Alberico da Barbiano" type to be armored cruisers are not far from the truth.
However, surprisingly enough, from the standpoint of protection among their foreign peers, Italian cruisers do not at all look like "black sheep" - simply because these peers were armored very badly (not counting the "La Galissoniers", which were only laid down then, when the first "Condottieri" were already part of the Italian fleet). For the rest (it would seem!) "Condottieri" series "A" consisted of nothing but merits. Not inferior in armament (8-152-mm guns), they were almost one and a half thousand tons lighter than the smallest foreign cruisers - the German "Cologne" (5280 tons against 6650-6730 tons) and at the same time almost 10 knots faster. The founder of the series, "Alberico da Barbiano", was able to develop enchanting 42, 05 knots on tests!
Is it any wonder that in 1932 V. M. Orlov wrote to Voroshilov: "The Condottieri-class cruisers should be considered a very suitable type of light cruisers for the USSR Naval Forces," in the future to build similar ships at their shipyards? True, Soviet experts noted the weakness of the booking of Italian cruisers, which is why the Condottieri did not fully meet the expectations of the leadership of the Red Army MS, but, apparently, the desire to get the latest cruiser in the shortest possible time outweighed other considerations, and for serial construction the project can be would have to be finalized … Fortunately for the Soviet fleet, the deal did not take place - the Italians refused to sell one of their newest ships that had just entered service.
The "Italian miracle" did not happen: it is impossible at an equal level of technology to build ships that are equally powerful and protected, but much lighter and faster than those of competitors. Moreover, the technological base of Italy can hardly be considered equal to the French or British. The Italians' attempt to get ahead led to a natural ending: the cruisers of the Alberico da Barbiano type turned out to be extremely unsuccessful ships, over-lightened and poorly navigable, while in everyday operation they could not develop more than 30-31 knots. Many of their shortcomings were obvious to the designers even before they were put into operation, so the next series of "Condottieri", cruisers of the "Luigi Cadorna" type, laid down in 1930, became "correcting mistakes" - an attempt to correct the most glaring shortcomings without a global redesign of the project.
However, here, too, the result was very far from what was expected, which again became clear even at the design stage - therefore, just a year later, work on two light cruisers of a completely new type began to boil on the Italian stocks.
This time, the Italian fleet approached the matter extremely sensibly: setting high, but not excessive requirements for the speed of new light cruisers (37 knots) and leaving the main caliber unchanged (four two-gun 152-mm turrets), the sailors demanded protection from 152-mm shells. agreeing to the associated increase in displacement. This is how the cruisers Raimondo Montecuccoli and Muzio Attendolo were designed, in which speed, artillery power and defense were combined very harmoniously.
With a standard displacement of 7,431 tons (in some sources - 7,540 tons), the armor thickness of the side of the new Italian cruisers was 60 mm (and another 25 - 30 mm longitudinal bulkhead behind the main armor belt), towers - 70 mm, turret barbets - 50 mm … Only the traverse (20-40 mm) and the deck (20-30 mm) looked unimportant, but in general, this reservation was a huge step forward compared to the previous Condottieri. The next pair ordered for construction (Duca d'Aosta and Eugenio di Savoia) was distinguished by further improvement of protection, for which they had to pay with an increase in displacement by almost a thousand tons and a drop in speed by half a knot. All four ships of the indicated subtypes were laid down in 1931-1933. and became part of the Italian fleet in 1935-1936.and it was these ships that were destined to become the "Italian roots" of the Soviet cruiser of Project 26.
However, it is worth noting that the development of Italian cruisers (in iron) and the Soviet ship (still only on paper) in the period 1932-33. went completely different ways. While the Italians, satisfied with the firepower provided by 8 * 152-mm guns, concentrated on improving protection, doing this to the detriment of such a parameter traditionally important for their school of shipbuilding as speed, the Soviet ship, having received a certain level of reservation, further evolved into side of strengthening weapons.
Planning to use an Italian power plant, on March 19, 1933, Namorsi Orlov approves "A tactical task for a light cruiser with mechanisms (turbines) of the Italian cruiser Montecuccoli." Reservation of the side and deck was supposed to be 50 mm, traverses and barbets of main caliber guns - 35-50 mm, turrets - 100-50 mm, speed - 37 knots, economic range - 3500 miles. All these data are within the original OTZ dated April 15, 1932, except that the thickness of the armor is specified, designed to provide the level of protection specified in the OTZ. But the composition of the armament began to increase significantly. So, it was decided to add a third two-gun 180-mm turret, bringing the number of main-caliber barrels to six, and even this did not seem enough: having approved the new TK for a three-turret cruiser with six main-caliber guns, Orlov immediately ordered to calculate the possibility of installing a fourth on it. such a tower. Anti-aircraft artillery was also strengthening: the number of 45-mm anti-aircraft guns and 100-mm guns increased from four to six, but the latter (if it was impossible to keep within the given displacement) was allowed to leave four. The four obscure "torpedo bombers" disappeared from the project, only two KOR-2 reconnaissance aircraft with one catapult remained, and after all these innovations, the standard displacement should have increased to 6,500 tons.
The conservatism shown in determining the speed of the future cruiser is interesting. As already mentioned, the Soviet ship was to receive turbines and boilers "Raimondo Montecuccoli", which, having 7,431 tons of standard displacement, in normal cargo had to develop 37 knots. Accordingly, from the Soviet cruiser, whose displacement at that time was estimated at almost a thousand tons less and with the same machine power, a higher speed should be expected, but it was set at the level of its Italian "relative" - all the same 37 knots. What this is connected with is unclear, but we note that Soviet designers in this case did not at all strive to achieve any record performance.
Interestingly, this "modesty" was practiced in the future. Namorsi Orlov approved the draft design of the cruiser with a displacement of 6,500 tons on April 20, 1933, and it is quite obvious that the turbines and the theoretical drawing of "Raimondo Montecuccoli" would be quite suitable for such a ship. Nevertheless, the USSR acquires turbines in Italy and a theoretical drawing of the much larger "Eugenio di Savoia", whose standard displacement reached 8,750 tons.
Perhaps the sailors were afraid that the displacement of the Soviet cruiser, as the project improved, would climb further up? This would be quite reasonable: firstly, the ship was still "breathing" in the sketches and there were no guarantees that its performance characteristics were close to final - there could have been quite serious changes in the composition of weapons, etc. And secondly, one of the problems in determining the displacement of the ship was that for it there were not yet many mechanisms that still had to be developed, so there was simply no exact information about their mass and they could turn out to be much heavier than it was now supposed.
Thus, it can be stated that the Soviet cruiser was designed for the specific tasks of the naval forces of the Red Army, by no means copying the views of the Italian fleet. Nevertheless, in terms of their tactical and technical characteristics, it was the Italian cruisers of the Raimondo Montecuccoli and Eugenio di Savoia types that turned out to be the best prototype for the cruiser of Project 26. How much did the Kirov-class cruisers copy their Italian prototype?
